

Playing the 'Green Card' - Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 1

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In the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance operations are described. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, extortion and drug trading, although very specific, serve to illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising activities, the general issues that surround them, as well as specific internal organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and members of their organization operate. How the PIRAs involvement in certain kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only their operational development and successes but also the development and sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, is discussed. It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn Fein's political successes. In the second article, which describes how and why PIRA financing operations have evolved into a much more sophisticated and technical set of activities (including money laundering), what emerges is a picture of the PIRA and Sinn Fein which serves to portray one of the most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a large, sophisticated terrorist group (and its political wing) as finance, and not solely the personal or ideological commitment of its active members. Both of these articles will illustrate the PIRA leadership's many internal organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the links between the PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein - and between PIRA and Sinn Fein fundraising - and the relative sophistication of the Republican movement as a whole. Aiding these illustrations will be case study material, interview data and both public and privately-held documentation. The descriptive data, surrounding issues and its implications presented here, along with case-study material, discussions and interpretations presented in a second article serve to illustrate the many more general and conceptual issues emerging from terrorist financing.

Over ten years ago, the Sunday Times correspondent James Adams correctly identified a fundamental weakness in our perception of terrorism by observing:

Terrorism is generally perceived as being the pursuit of political ends through violent means and certainly, in the popular perception, involves such things as bank robberies and the kidnapping or killing of innocent civilians. In part, this remains true, but a high degree of sophistication has been added to this so that the terrorist is now more likely to conform to the image of a middle-ranking clerk than to a gun-toting hoodlum.1

All too often, we are beguiled by the rhetoric of political violence into focusing on the political agenda of terrorism, but in doing so we frequently fail to appreciate the sometimes substantial organizational and financial context to terrorism and terrorist campaigns.2 Moreover, this has especially been the case in Ireland, where images often substitute for reality at all levels of the political process. Terrorist groups from both Nationalist and Loyalist sides of the Northern Irish community may well have their roots in ideological and historical processes, but they exist very much in the here and now, and have required considerable financial resources to sustain their existence.3 Stating that terrorist groups need financial support to maintain their existence is fraught with difficulty, and always runs the risk of misperceiving the nature of the terrorist threat. Terrorism is clearly not just a cost-effective means of political representation at a broad level, but terrorist tactics can be inexpensively implemented in terms of finance. Amid the current plethora of discussions on nuclear terrorists and their apocalyptic array of high-tech weaponry, terrorist tactics utilize cheap tools in practice. Fertilizers and other commercially available chemical compounds found in household products will for a long time remain part and parcel of the basic devices of even the most powerful terrorist groups. While finance does not strictly curb the ability of an organization, such as the PIRA, to conduct a terrorist campaign per se (as indeed many terrorist groups, notably EOKA in Cyprus have sustained their campaigns on shoestring budgets), rather the extent and sophistication of a terrorist organization's activities, and, furthermore, the activities of its political wing are clearly restricted by financial resources. Another example, which predates the IRAs current campaign, relates to the older original Irish Republican Army. During the 1950s, when the IRA's 'border campaign' was in full flight, even IRA members themselves recognized that their campaign would not amount to the kinds of changes for which the present day IRA appears to have been a catalyst. The movement was poorly organized, had problems with resources (arms, money, and other supplies), had problems even in the identification of opportunities, and the organization clearly did not make enough of an impact to gather popular support. Not all of this can be explained through simple finance, but it remained a significant factor.

In this, the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance operations are discussed. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed

robbery, extortion and drug trading, although very specific, will serve to illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising activities, the general issues that surround them, as well as specific internal organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and members of their organization operate. How the PIRA's involvement in certain kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only their operational development and successes, and the development and sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, also emerges. It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn Fein's political successes. Much descriptive material is furnished in the present piece because the richness and depth of activity is so often glossed over and referred to in very general terms throughout discussions of PIRA fundraising in attempts to support some wider political viewpoint. This happens invariably in the context of black propaganda aimed at terrorists. In the second article, we describe how and why PIRA financing operations have evolved into a much more sophisticated and technical set of activities, including money laundering. What will emerge is a picture of the PIRA and Sinn Fein which supports the notion that finance is one of the most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development of a large, sophisticated terrorist group and its political wing. Very often, it is easy to see why finance for a terrorist group is necessary, but difficult to establish with any degree of certainty why or how it is a sufficient limiting factor for the development of a terrorist group. Part 2 of this article supports this view with evidence of its relevance to the development of both PIRA and Sinn Fein from the early 1980s. Both of these articles will illustrate the PIRA leadership's many internal organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the links between the PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein - and between PIRA and Sinn Fein fundraising, and the relative sophistication of the Republican movement as a whole. Aiding these illustrations will be case study material, interviews and both public and privately-held documentation.

The 'Needs'

Weapons and Munitions

Conducting a terrorist campaign requires human resources (in terms of individuals prepared to take the risk of planting a bomb or aiming and firing a weapon) but it also requires material resources: bombs, rifles or other forms of weaponry. Meeting this fundamental requirement for munitions has always been one of the major priorities of the Provisional IRA, to the resources of a campaign of violence and maintain the motivation of its volunteers.⁴ From the earliest days of the present IRA campaign, security forces in Northern Ireland, the Republic and

across the world have recognized the significance of monitoring, controlling and eliminating the supplies of weapons.5

Police on both sides of the Irish border have often stated that the PIRA has sometimes employed substantial weaponry throughout the organization's struggle for an end to the British presence in Northern Ireland. Such munitions are often difficult to obtain and expensive if bought on the open market through arms traders. Throughout the PIRAs operational areas, be they inside or outside of Ireland, the organization has employed the use of surface-to-air missiles ('SAM') and their launchers, Russian-made rocket-propelled grenade ('RPG') launchers, assault rifles and machine-guns from the USA, Libya and Russia, and many smaller arms including shotguns and pistols. The PIRA is said to have procured many heavy machine-guns (a number of which are believed to have been supplied by Libyan support), and its arsenal of heavy weaponry further (and more notoriously) includes at least one Barrett Light-50 heavy machine-gun. Security sources 6 believe a single PIRA sniper has used such a weapon since the early 1990s to kill ten British soldiers, including Lance Corporal Stephen Restorick, the last soldier to be killed by the PIRA before its 1997 cease-fire.

Often equally as effective, but certainly far cheaper, are the home-made munitions which the PIRA has increasingly manufactured throughout its campaign.7 PIRA 'engineers' have demonstrated the ability to make home made mortar bombing equipment and home-made bombs. PIRA bombs have been made from commercial and home-made explosives, employing their own radio-controlled detonation devices, or 'sleeper' devices, enabling bomb detonation after a long period. The PIRA has also used different 'vehicle' bombs with cars, trucks, buses, or vans. These are either 'attached' in order to kill the occupant (such as the type used by the PIRA to kill Ulster Defence Association (UDA) chief John McMichael in December 1987), or are 'loaded' on to a vehicle for delivery to a target,8 as demonstrated when the PIRA bombed the centre of Manchester in June 1996, using a bomb stored in a van, with commercially available fertilizer as the home-made device's main component.9

Of course the attack and its aftermath are usually the only aspects of terrorist operations which we see, through the media or unfortunate firsthand experiences, and on which we subsequently concentrate. What we do not have access to is a view of the sometimes considerable, and almost always costly, planning and preparation which goes into paramilitary operations. For the Provisional IRA, the structure and kinds of demands on the organization, whether they be training, procuring and buying weapons or transport and equipment storage, results in the PIRA running up huge costs. There are numerous and some quite obvious indicators of this. The evident operational successes of the PIRA has often involved sophisticated equipment such as rocket launchers or heavy machine-guns. Whether

explosives or other armaments are manufactured and purchased through international arms dealers, or made 'at home', the logistical costs involved can be quite substantial, even when home-made equipment consists of raw materials (when not stolen) purchased through legitimate builders' suppliers.¹⁰

During the PIRA campaign leading up to the recent cease-fires, homemade equipment appeared to have become increasingly important for the organization. ¹¹ This is not surprising given both the cost of munitions and the security risks involved in obtaining munitions from third parties (as illustrated by the trawler interceptions) which inevitably arise. Moreover, since home-made weaponry is usually made up of components that can be obtained quite legitimately, security may not be compromised in the purchase of such parts. In fact, security sources in the Republic of Ireland believe that between 1996 and late 1997, the PIRA did not see a need to spend as much money on explosives, machine-guns and rifles. Of course, we need to consider the prevailing political climate for Sinn Fein at this time also, but presumably the PIRA followed this concern because the organization at least appeared to be well-stocked.

As far as explosives are concerned, sources note that these were almost exclusively being made by the PIRA themselves in recent times. Garda ¹² operations, such as 'Operation Silo' in 1992, had seemingly stunted the PIRA's arsenal of weapons - it was estimated that following this operation in the Republic, aimed at finding the imported armaments, the Gardai had actually recovered 45-60 per cent of the weapons acquired from Middle Eastern countries such as Libya throughout the 1980s.¹³ It is still believed, however, that the PIRA retains about 100 tonnes of weapons and explosives, and in any event, the frequency and ferocity of PIRA operations since 1992 up to and during the recent cease-fires, suggest that past arms 'recovery' operations were effectively useless in limiting the operational potential of the PIRA. ¹⁴ This often cited '100 tonnes' retained by the PIRA is said to include at least 500 rifles, 450 handguns and over 2,500kg of Semtex. Security forces in the Republic believe that the PIRA has at least five bomb-making factories, which can be operating at any one time ¹⁵ spread throughout all 32 counties of Ireland. Of course, the PIRA has to keep these facilities safe, secret and very secure. Considerable effort has gone into this and the extent and nature of these efforts was seen through uncovered arms dumps which a building contractor is believed to have constructed some years ago.¹⁶ That these are indeed well-hidden, fortified bunkers became evident more recently again following the discovery of a PIRA bomb-making factory near Clonaslee, Co. Laois (again in the Republic) in 1996.¹⁷

However, although PIRA weaponry has certainly undergone substantial development and evolution, both in its type and usage, the importance of strong financial support for a large, hierarchically-organized and sophisticated terrorist organization, such as the

Provisional IRA, extends far beyond the purchase of a gun and bullets which culminate in an attack. Transport costs for example are incurred in many ways: this includes everything from petrol for the car used in a robbery or for transportation of weapons to an operational area - to some of the more sophisticated operations which include the incursion of PIRA terrorists into another country. Transport costs may well involve the purchase of a train, bus, or even airplane ticket, food and accommodation for living in the operational area for perhaps up to a week or sometimes longer, but often without the support of the traditional 'safehouse'. Further to this, the PIRA is believed to run six to eight 'permanent' cars of their own in the Republic 18 whose purpose is believed to be solely that of arms transportatio 19 from the south to the border areas if and when necessary. These cars do not include stolen vehicles sometimes kept on farms for use in robberies. Radio equipment is another commodity of vital importance in allowing the PIRA to monitor security force movements, and has evolved considerably for the PIRA since the early 1970s, but it is also often very expensive, and in the main has to be purchased.

Human Resources

Terrorist campaigns are not run on weaponry alone. Personnel are required to use the weaponry, and they alone can generate enormous financial costs for the PIRA. Men known to the security forces need support to exist within clandestine lives, and a permanent cadre of volunteers (albeit small in number relative to the overall level of Republican supporters in their continuum of 'activity') needs to be maintained for operational needs. Various types of safe houses have to be maintained, 20 both to secure men on the run, but also to offer active terrorists opportunities to relax and unwind away from the threat of the security services. Cost in this respect can involve payment of money to some safehouse owners who provide meals or lodgings to PIRA members, or who provide a temporary resting place for periods ranging literally from minutes to weeks.21 It also translates into the purchase of alcohol and other gifts for the house-owners at Christmas as tokens of appreciation for their 'goodwill' 22 Other safehouse owners who perhaps stored weaponry, or parts of weaponry for the PIRA would be paid 'not to ensure that they kept their mouths shut, but also because of the considerable risks they faced ... consequently, many of those who agreed to hide weapons were widows or young, unmarried mothers who desperately needed the money' . 23 A further major concern for the PIRA leadership is the welfare of prisoners' relatives, the support of men 'on the run' and their families, as well as 'recently released IRA men who had served long prison sentences and had little or no chance of securing a proper job'.24

An issue of some debate is the extent to which PIRA Volunteers are 'salaried'. Up until the 1994 cease-fire, many Active Service Unit (ASU)

members were estimated by some sources 25 to be receiving £30-£40 per week, but others describe different amounts, sometimes higher, sometimes lower.26 The amounts involved are difficult to establish with any certainty, and presumably differ from 'role' to 'role' depending on the extent and nature of individuals: activities (McGartland 27- describing the need to pay for 'full-time IRA staff who were too busy to hold down regular jobs') and in some cases, geographical location. With informed estimates of 400-500 PIRA members, weekly payouts could at the very least, amount to anywhere from £12,000 upwards 28 Of course, this excludes the 'support' which volunteers receive for their families at Christmas, and indeed the support which prisoners' families receive on a weekly or monthly basis, which is very difficult to estimate. One senior figure within the PIRA's southern command based in Dublin was said to receive a figure close to £6,000 at one Christmas during the 1994-96 cease-fire 'to keep him happy', i.e. it was seen as a form of control and effectively safeguarding against dissent against the continued cease-fire. 29

We should note too that the costs incurred by the PIRA's legitimate political wing, Sinn Fein, are equally extensive. For the PIRA, legitimate political representation by Sinn Fein has become an increasingly important aspect of the overall Republican movement in recent years. At the level focused on for the present article 30 however, financial sustenance is needed for everything from the maintenance of premises (from the Sinn Fein Headquarters in 44. Parnell Square, Dublin, and in Belfast, to the Regional offices around the 32 counties, to public meetings in hotels or pubs even in rural areas) and costs incurred during elections (for posters, advertising, etc., travelling expenses, promotion and' highlighting of the anti-drugs campaign in the South 31). The links between the PIRA and Sinn Fein in the context of funding are illustrated and discussed in Part 2, two detailed case studies of recent PIRA fundraising operations in the Republic of Ireland.

How is PIRA Income Generated - and How Much ?

The income generating activities of the PIRA remain to this day no different from other terrorist organizations except in scale, although the PIRA probably shows more sophistication and specialization than most. Security sources in Northern Ireland and in the Republic gather equally as much intelligence on the Provisional IRA's 'incidental' activities - the purpose of which is to raise funds for the organization. Sources descriptions vary, from at least one clear example of 'riding shotgun' (providing an armed escort for payment) on an international drugs shipment, to money- laundering schemes in the US, Northern Ireland, and the Republic. The latter involves the purchase of legitimate businesses with illegally obtained funds. Such businesses may then be run as commercial concerns, yielding 'legitimate' profit which finds its way back to the terrorist organization, or the businesses may be exploited using fraudulent or other means to

maximize returns and avoid tax, the business then having been 'run into the ground', abandoned and/or sold on. An examination of one such business located in the Republic of Ireland is the focus of one of our case studies.

Legitimately-owned businesses have included private security firms, the 'black' taxi cabs in Belfast (one co-operative of over 300 taxis located on the Falls Road is estimated to have had an annual income of about US\$1m 32 - income which is legally reported to the British taxation authorities). They also include at least two known hackney cab services in Dublin, construction firms, shops, restaurants, courier services, guest houses, cars and machinery, pubs which at one time or another have included at least one in Boston in the United States, two small pubs in Finglas, Co. Dublin, two in Coolock, also in Dublin with several more in the city centre, three in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, three in Cork (including one Cork hotel), and more small pubs 'scattered about' the country. The 'mini empire' also includes social clubs (with some illegally installed slot machines to augment income from the legal ones 33), illegal drinking clubs or 'shebeens', and antiques (sometimes having been stolen in the Irish Republic and resold at various markets in Britain 34). Social welfare fraud is reported as particularly common, and protection rackets and extortion (from pubs and clubs, shops, business people), as described in detail by James Adams,35 are nothing less than a fact of many people's lives in certain areas. Support groups, such as NORaid (the Northern Aid Committee) and FOSF (Friends of Sinn Fein), the Irish-American fundraising bodies, and others, local collections in pubs and clubs in Ireland and voluntary private donations (including cheques of £100-£150 having been frequently given by businessmen across the 32 counties) are further sources of funds - this last source is one not to be underestimated amid hurried and almost automatic suspicions of more sophisticated forms of raising money including money-laundering.36

Other activities include income tax frauds involving the use of false tax exemption certificates (on Northern Ireland building sites),37 the smuggling of livestock grain, cattle and pigs (even the smuggling of bovine antibiotics 38), the pirating of video and audio tapes (including in isolated cases pornographic materials, although security forces in Dublin believe the official IRA (OIRA) to be more closely involved in these activities), pirating of computer games, trading in livestock growth promoters and the theft of cars (including about whatever else is needed at one time or another, for operational duties). Fundraising has included the sale of contraband cigarette lighters in Belfast, and in the past, major areas of concern have involved kidnapping for ransom. One of the best known and certainly widely-reported sources of funds have come from armed robbery. Such activity in Northern Ireland, the Republic and England has long played a major role in obtaining hard cash for the PIRA.

This wide array of activities leads to some specialization of function within the organization, mirroring a broader theme in PIRA terrorism, which was also illustrated in an earlier description of the PIRA command and functional structure. ³⁹ As we shall see in Part 2, the PIRA's Finance Department, with its Director and support staff, presently draws on the experiences and consultancy of experienced bank managers and at least two accountants (one practising perfectly legitimately in the Dublin area). Specialization leads to highly effective and well co-ordinated efforts and results not from any particular pressures related to terrorism as such, but more from factors related to organizational change and development. For example, we know that some ASUs are task- specialized. This is especially the case for some PIRA members based in the Republic, such as in Munster, where an ASU is said to have 'handed up £60,000' to senior figures in Dublin at the beginning of the 1994-96 cease-fire. ⁴⁰ Furthermore, the extent to which the PIRA has become involved in some of the above activities for a relatively short period of time illustrates an opportunistic, almost entrepreneurial quality to this aspect of the organization. Identifying areas of opportunity within the market available has added to its 'source pool', which (with the emergence of newer avenues) is an indicator of the exceptional adaptability to which the organization's financing co-ordinators appeared to have achieved. This particular quality of PIRA behaviour is one deserving far more attention.

The Balance Sheet: How Much Does the PIRA Earn?

Although this cannot be an exhaustive list, some estimates (by source) of the PIRA's annual income are listed in Table 1.

Without a doubt, these figures are necessarily tentative, and are largely based on informed guesses, including those stated by the security forces. On the other hand, they do show a certain uniformity and illustrate the enormous financial commitments involved in sustaining the PIRA

TABLE 1	ANNUAL PIRA INCOME ESTIMATES BY SOURCE (1978-98)	
Year of estimate	Amount (millions)	Source
1978	£STGO.95	The Glover Report ⁴¹
1988	IR£7	An Garda Siochanna ⁴²
1990	£STG5.3	The Independent and Northern Ireland Office ⁴³
1994	£STG7	Irish Independent ⁴⁴
1994	US\$10	Anderson ⁴⁵
1994	£STG10.75	The Sun ⁴⁶

1995	US\$6	Associated Press <u>47</u>
1995	US\$15	Sunday Times <u>48</u>
1996	IR£6-8	An Garda Siochana <u>49</u>
1996	£STG10	Royal Ulster Constabulary(RUC) <u>50</u> (see endnote)
1997	IE£10	Sunday Times <u>51</u>
1996-98	IR£5-6	Interviews conducted by authors <u>52</u>

campaign. One inevitable issue which arises however, and which appears to have been overlooked by many of these same sources, is there have been no attempts made to check as to whether the amounts raised equal the estimated size of the PIRA's budget. 53 On the basis of the above, it seems that they do not. Security forces often cite that the PIRA needs about IR£5m per year to keep the organization running effectively. 54 Therefore if income exceeds expenditure, questions naturally arise as to what happens to their surplus.

While global figures are of value in general terms, the sophistication of the organization is better illustrated by examining particular illegal activities in which the PIRA has developed competence. We do not attempt to present an authoritative overview of PIRA fundraising, as attempting to do so would be over-ambitious and probably foolhardy even in the present political climate. Instead we focus on examples, and although they are very specific, these will illustrate the nature and complexity of fundraising activities and some of the issues surrounding them in general. The specific areas chosen are kidnapping for ransom, robbery, extortion, drugs and money laundering.

Kidnapping for Ransom

As with robbery, kidnapping for ransom is a traditional method of raising funds for many terrorist organisations around the world. Some groups are more successful than others; the Basque Separatist group ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna - Basque Homeland and Freedom) has relied considerably on this practice to raise funds, and some groups engage in this tactic more than others do for varying reasons. A popular avenue has been the kidnapping of wealthy businessmen, or of executives of large companies. 55

However, unlike the PIRA's successes through other fundraising avenues, the organization's experiences at kidnapping for ransom did not have such a thoroughly auspicious life-cycle. In October 1979, the

PIRA kidnapped Ben Dunne from his home in Dublin. A member of the Dunne family, owners of an extensive chain of retail stores in Ireland, he was released five days later in south Armagh, amid 'considerable controversy' 56 as to whether or not a ransom was actually paid by the Dunnes to the PIRA. Coogan 57 who provides an overview of PIRA kidnappings, describes having heard 'the sum of £750,000 being discussed in Republican circles'. The Dunne kidnapping was the first of several such operations undertaken by the PIRA. Two months later saw the kidnapping of Margaret Fennelley, the wife of a Cork bank manager, in December 1979. Then, in a series of raids in Dublin and Wicklow directed at the families of bank managers, ransom payments were delivered to the PIRA before the Gardai could become involved. Coogan describes such activity as being considered 'common' in Northern Ireland for a long time, 'though ... officially denied by the banks'..58 In the case of Margaret Fennelley and her £60,000 ransom, however, the Gardai actually succeeded in rescuing the woman before the payment could be made. This was not the case for all kidnappings however as demonstrated when the daughters of two bank managers, were abducted, from Dundalk and Ardee, in Co. Louth. just across the border from Co. Armagh in the north, when two ransoms of £50,000 each were delivered before the police could act.59

What Coogan describes as 'one of the most celebrated kidnappings to occur' took place on 8 February 1981. when Shergar, the thoroughbred horse and Derby Winner, was taken from the Balylemoney Stud at the Curragh (near the Irish Army headquarters). Although 'the Shergar affair' (or perhaps more accurately, mystery') has never fully been resolved. Coogan notes that the horse was 'apparently Put down by his kidnappers when the syndicate which owned the horse led by the Aga Khan, failed to pay the ransom'. There was also some speculation that Shergar's kidnappers could not handle the animal and consequently killed him. Shergar's body has not been found, but Interest in the case continues. In April 1996, it was announced that the investigation was to reopen with an examination of forensic evidence to establish a DNA link between an alleged carcass of Shergar and hair samples from the horse. 60 Thus far, this seems inconclusive.

If animals proved troublesome to handle, it was time to go back to what terrorists kidnap best, people with a lot of money. In 1983, five PIRA members were charged and convicted of the attempted kidnapping of Galen Weston, a multi -millionaire from Canada. Gardai, acting on information supplied to them, simply laid in wait until the PIRA gang arrived at Weston's house in Co. Wicklow. Also, in October 1983, Alma Manima was kidnapped from Greystones, Co. Wicklow. Although Manima was released and a number of local PIRA members were arrested, Coogan noted 'it is not clear what happened to the £60,000 ransom'.61 Furthermore in 1983, a tragic event was to contribute to the eventual long-term decline of kidnapping for ransom

by PIRA active service units. Following the kidnapping of Associated British Foods executive Don Tidey, an Irish soldier and a Garda were both killed as police and army personnel surrounded the PIRA unit and their hostage in Ballinamore, Co. Leitrim, engaging in a fierce shootout. 62

Coogan subsequently describes the PIRA as having gone 'cold' on kidnapping after the Don Tidey abduction, 63 noting a cessation of kidnapping for ransom until a criminal gang kidnapped Jennifer Guinness, the daughter of a Dublin merchant banker, from Dublin in April 1986.64 However, it is obvious that 'non-ransom' kidnappings are not infrequent for the PIRA, many resulting from internal security concerns. This mainly relates to suspected informers, be they PIRA members or members of nationalist communities, when individuals are kidnapped, tortured, and sometimes killed. In July 1994, before the PIRA's 17-month cease-fire was to begin, an ASU kidnapped Caroline Moorland, a 34-year old mother of two, reinforcing the view that the PIRA has never felt it necessary to excuse its often brutal interrogations and subsequent executions' of infiltrators other than through a statement of allegations. In this case, Moorland was suspected of working as a low-level informer for the British security forces. The PIRA later claimed that under interrogation (and as Cusack 65 pointed out, 'probably accompanied by torture'), Moorland admitted to receiving a weekly wage for being an informant. After being held for two weeks, she was shot in the head and her body was dumped on a side-street.66

Non-ransom related incidents aside, however, it has not been uncommon for many terrorist groups, and the PIRA in particular, to extort money under the continuing threat of kidnap, long before the security forces have any knowledge of the event. Although we can point to examples (as will follow), the true nature and extent of this will probably unfortunately remain unknown.

However, if kidnapping was to decrease, the PIRA's involvement in robbery certainly would not.

Robbery

The PIRA, or indeed most terrorist groups operating from Northern Ireland, are not alone in their fundraising exploits with respect to robbery. Taylor 67 draws on examples from Northern Spain, where ETA is known to have committed a number of successful robberies to raise funds for its operations. He cites Clark, 68 a long-time commentator on ETA affairs, noting that during 1967-77, ETA raised the Spanish equivalent of over \$1 m from bank robberies alone. In a more dramatic illustration, ETA is believed to have committed over 50 robberies in 1978, netting the terrorists the equivalent of over \$4m in a single year.69

Although it is difficult to quantify the number of PIRA-related robberies in Northern Ireland and the Republic, robbery certainly appears to be one of the PIRA's main 'outwardly' sources of funding, if not the single main source.⁷⁰ Such incidents illustrate part of a consistent series of well executed robberies, but it is probably impossible to gauge the numbers of robberies for which the PIRA have been responsible over the years, both North and South. We usually only hear more of foiled robberies than of the successful operations. Presumably success for the PIRA in these cases implies there has been no detection by the security forces. The number of robberies in Ireland in which the PIRA have been suspected, but for which no-one has ever been charged, is immense. Of all the reported armed robberies which have taken place since the early 1970s, it is reasonable to assert that PIRA-related robberies represent some of the most valuable and well organized of these.

Fundraising Implications: A Closer Look at Kidnapping and Robbery

An authoritative account of terrorist-related robberies is lacking, but it is clear that much greater analysis of particular situations is necessary to fully understand some of the broader issues and implications involved. Events surrounding the highly-publicized attack in Adare, Co. Limerick in June 1996 for example, in which an ASU shot and killed a Garda during a robbery attempt, raise a number of questions relating to the efficacy of the command and functional structure of the PIRA, and terrorist fundraising at a broader level. Had this robbery been successful, and had it not been for the presence of the Gardai and the shooting attack which ensued, then the Adare incident may have been seen as just another criminal robbery. Certainly, the PIRA members in Adare did not foresee such a risk in what they had intended to be just another robbery, an activity in which this ASU specialized. The ASU presumably did not purposely intend to bring pressures on the Republican movement to prompt increased security in the Republic and politically on Sinn Fein to condemn the attack and reassure its Political counterparts in Northern Ireland of the Republican party's commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process. A discussion of events surrounding the Adare incident illustrates the potential complexity of analysis involved for this particular terrorist group.

The Murder of Garda Jerry McCabe

At 6.50am, on Friday 7 June 1996, Detective Garda Jerry McCabe, and Detective Garda Ben O'Sullivan, both Special Branch officers of An Garda Síochána were sitting in their unmarked police car, in plainclothes, as the post office van which they were escorting stopped outside the post office in Adare village in Co. Limerick. The van driver, William Jackson, was in the process of taking the post, which

included pension and unemployment benefits, from the van into the post office, when he heard the sound of another vehicle crashing into the detectives' car. Three men wearing balaclavas and army-fatigues jumped out of a Mitsubishi 'Pajero' jeep and stood at either side of the police car. The detectives were still in a sitting position inside the car when the masked men opened fire, using Russian AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles. As gunfire raked the detectives' car, McCabe was shot eight times with rounds from the Kalashnikovs and died in his seat. The raiders immediately fled in the 'Pajero' and ignored a £ 100,000 cash haul in the post office van. 71

While O'Sullivan underwent emergency surgery at Limerick Regional Hospital, Garda road-blocks were set up throughout Limerick County with Air Corps helicopters joining in the search for McCabe's killers. By that afternoon, the Gardai had discovered incendiary devices in two vehicles which pointed to Provisional IRA involvement. A Mitsubishi 'Lancer' was found in an isolated lane beside a derelict cottage, about one mile from Granagh village, near Adare. It appears that the 'Lancer' was driven up this lane, out of sight, and abandoned immediately. On the 6 o'clock news on Irish television that same evening, Gardai reported the discovery of the incendiary devices in two vehicles used by the four-man gang, the jeep vehicle (Pajero) used to ram the car, and an abandoned suspected getaway car (the Lancer). These developments, in conjunction with the use by the gunmen of 'the favoured tool of the [P]IRA over 25 years of fighting' - the Kalashnikov automatic rifle weapon - and the paramilitary nature of the attack was seen as pointing to only one possibility, that of PIRA involvement. 72

The PIRA soon acted swiftly to distance themselves from the shooting when the Gardai said they strongly suspected PIRA involvement. A statement was telephoned to the RTE 73 offices with the caller using a recognized PIRA codeword, saying 'None of our volunteers or units were in any way involved in this morning's incident at Adare ... there was absolutely no IRA involvement'. 74 A written statement issued to RTE was signed 'P. O'Neill. Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin'. Reporters described the speedy response of the PIRA as a 'damage-limitation exercise' in view of the possible impact of the killing on the fragile Northern Ireland peace process'. Initially, it was believed the killing was the result of a raid that went badly wrong. But later, when it was found that the big cash haul was ignored, Gardai began to speculate that the gang could have been on a 'more sinister straightforward murder mission' targeted at the two detectives. It emerged that both were friends of former Irish Minister for Justice and local politician Des O'Malley. O'Malley said, 'This was a calculated attempt to kill the men. Because the money was not taken it makes me wonder whether the primary intention was a desire to murder the police'.

On Monday 10 June, Irish Times journalists Jim Cusack and Suzanne Bree 75 reported Republican sources in Belfast confirming that the 'Munster unit led by senior IRA figures was behind the killing'. They said that the men were members of an officially approved PIRA unit and did not belong to a breakaway faction. According to one of the journalists' sources, 'these are seasoned IRA activists who are respected in the Republican movement. The source said that their 'evident access to IRA arms' showed they were not rebels outside the movement. He added that they seemed to have been indifferent to the effects the incident would have on the peace process: 'I don't think that Gerry Adams' difficulties are first and foremost in their minds ... they would be out to do what they had to do'. This same source also pointed to the PIRNs 'Green Book' '76 forbidding members from opening fire on Gardai. Cusack and Breen cited several Republican sources as saying 'harsh disciplinary action against the leaders of the unit was unlikely. The IRA members involved were of too high a standing for that. There was no question of the Army Council ordering [the] execution [of the PIRA members]. The journalists proceeded to quote a Sinn Fein source as saying even if the IRA expressed regret and said it was an operation which went wrong, there would be complete political upheaval ... our relationship with Dublin [the Irish Government] would be placed under severe strain'.

By Sunday 23 June, Gardai had finally established that the 'bungled robbery' was sanctioned by the then Operations Commander of the PIRAs Southern Command in Dublin. That same day, the Sunday Independent journalist Veronica Guerin 77 reaffirmed the thought that much-needed support for Sinn Fein and the PIRA had indeed gathered momentum during their recent 17 month cease-fire, but she cited her own Garda sources noting that 'a lot of ground was lost when they murdered Jerry McCabe and it will be hard for them to get it back'. This was effectively illustrated with an anonymous call from a member of the public to the Gardai, disclosing the secret site of a huge bomb-making factory in Co. Laois in the Republic, a severe blow to the PIRA's arms stocks. Guerin reported a police source as noting: 'We keep saying that it is neighbours and friends who are protecting the Provos. People have to realize they are murdering innocent civilians and Gardai. 78 With the Gardai closing down their bomb-making factory, the PIRA leadership would soon realize the effects that this single shooting would have on what relatively little active support the organization had in the Republic.

McCabe was a native of Ballylongford, Co. Kerry, and was married with five children. McCabe's son is also a Garda, stationed in Co. Monaghan. O'Sullivan is a native of Mallow, Co. Cork and is married with two children. McCabe and O'Sullivan were long-time partners, well known in the Limerick area. They both had been in the Garda Siochana for more than 30 years, and O'Sullivan was awarded the Scott Medal for bravery in 1994 for disarming a man with a gun in Co. Limerick. The attack on the two detectives was the first time a Garda

on duty had been shot in the Republic for more than a decade,⁷⁹ but marked the thirteenth Irish police fatality since the start of the Northern Ireland-linked troubles.

If we begin without assumption and ask why exactly terrorist robberies are committed, we must bear in mind that generally speaking, individuals do not join political terrorist organizations for money. In the case of the PIRA, we know that individual ASU members do not live lavish lifestyles, the kind sometimes observed in other, even some local, terrorist groups at one time or another.⁸⁰ Certainly, from the perspectives of researchers with first-hand experience of PIRA lifestyles and interviews with leadership figures, 'certainly these very often cramped "kitchen houses" of back street Belfast [where interviews were conducted] showed no sign of affluence, nor did the lifestyle of their occupants'.⁸¹ After a robbery has been committed, the haul can be collected by a person (not necessarily a member of the ASU who committed the robbery) and is sometimes stored locally, for use against local costs. The loot is often passed along a chain to designated individuals, for storage sometimes in office safes for similar uses (or to finance bigger operations), or the money is stored so it can be submerged through moneylaundering at a present or later date.

The weekly income for an ASU member, from his superior(s) is low, and although reported to vary from member to member in different areas, it is certainly not enough to sustain family living. Weekly PIRA wages only supplement social welfare payments, or income from part-time or full-time employment, varying from member to member, as operational roles are likewise varied. ⁸² The prospect for 'earning' more money is obviously therefore quite tempting. It appears that this particular ASU, as was illustrated in previous commentary, did not indeed seem 'too concerned' about the implications which this kind of activity had on anyone, be it on the organization which these individual members claimed to represent or on members of the terrorist audience in general (the disillusionment of one of whom led to their telephone call to the Gardai about the Laois site). A perennial problem for security forces in speaking of PIRA robberies is the difficulty in assessing whether any robbery involves units indulging in local fundraising (either to sustain local activities or to supplement their own pockets or to submit money to their finance department) or if the robbery is an example of a breakaway act of unsanctioned Republican activity, even while having the purpose of raising funds 'for the good of the Movement'. Indeed, some PIRA OC's ⁸³ have spoken of their volunteers' tendency in 'going for it' (i.e. robbing without permission from higher source). However, as British intelligence agent and PIRA informer Martin McGartland ⁸⁴ describes: 'most of the IRA men who handled income from whatever source seemed to be meticulous in their accounting. There were also examples of punishment beatings handed to those few who misused IRA funds for their own ends. Those men would not only be beaten

but would also earn the scorn and contempt of their IRA mates, friends and often their families.' This is just one illustration of the close relationship between the 'controllers and the controlled' in the context of Irish terrorism and emerges because the PIRA leadership has certainly learned the advantages of controlling its members. And as we shall see later, this is a point of strong consideration for both PIRA and Sinn Fein figures. Another former PIRA member, Eamon Collins (murdered in January 1999), spoke of the breakdown of his 'romantic image' of the Republican campaign when, during a bombing operation in Warrenpoint, Co. Down, his colleague 'robbed the tills ... took the shine off the operations and made the IRA look like common criminals'. ⁸⁵ Control is an extremely pervasive element of Republican terrorism. During the period before the elections to the Irish Dail and to Westminster, the PIRA leadership called on its members to cease all activities. Three days later, however, following the election to the Dail of Caoimhghin O'Caolain, operations resumed, and the PIRA shot dead two RUC constables shortly afterwards.⁸⁶

Coogan ⁸⁷ reports one senior PIRA figure as noting 'if some "loosehorse" IRA men did decide to go in for bank robberies, with their training they'd be inclined to go for a million' rather than much smaller amounts. Why incur the planning, intelligence-gathering, operational preparation and Post-operational procedures, but above all, the risk involved to rob an amount such as £10,000, and then to have to share it between maybe six or seven people? This logic in this is indeed arguable to a degree. Yet, in general, the bigger the operation, the greater intelligence, preparation and planning is required, which perhaps contradicts the 'going it alone' aspect of what Coogan's source describes, since it would be much more difficult for leadership or authority figures not to know about such a planned operation. Paradoxically then, it probably pays 'loose-horse IRA men' to go for the smaller, or 'in-between' targets (such as rural post offices, perhaps, as it was in the case discussed here).

How leadership can view maverick acts of robbery was illustrated during the PIRA 'damage-limitation' exercises after the Adare attack. It is easy in retrospect for leadership figures to describe their own ASUs behaviour as 'unsanctioned' or 'breakaway' (even when such behaviour is actually sanctioned or not). This has particular usage during sensitive times, as was demonstrated on more than one occasion during the 1994-96 ceasefire, an example of which became apparent when the PIRA denied it had authorized a robbery in Newry, Co. Down. when an ASU killed an elderly postal worker. The revolutionary theorist Regis Debray ⁸⁸ noted that whenever terrorist organizations cease to have clearly defined political objectives, the movement may indeed continue to exist, but its activities tend to drift in focus towards other things they do well. For terrorist organizations such as the PIRA, these tend to be robberies, increases in the level of punishment attacks as a form of 're-directed violence' and other criminal acts. For the PIRA organization as a whole, it only emerged a

week after the Adare shooting that the Southern Command OC, operating from his Dublin base, had indeed endorsed the operation. Even if the leadership had known about the OC's approval earlier there still would have been denials of PIRA involvement through its Publicity Bureau. The PIRA leadership had to deny knowledge of PIRA involvement in the Adare shooting until the Gardai uncovered the relevant forensic and other evidence.

The Adare robbery serves also as an example in which organizational communication appears to have broken down and was proven to be highly embarrassing for the PIRA leadership priding itself on control and discipline. The Southern Command OC apparently permitted the robbery without the expressed consent of either peers or the superiors who expressed anger at his decision. For all intents and purposes then, the Adare attack is still seen as an unsanctioned, breakaway act, but committed by seasoned PIRA activists and it is important to note not a Republican breakaway group. The Southern Command OC in question apparently remained 'Officer Commanding Southern Command' up until September 1996, and frequently attended anti-drugs meetings held and organized by inner-city community movements in Dublin. On one such meeting, which took place in early October 1996, accompanying him were what was described as three 'hitmen' from Northern Ireland (they were in effect, all three men carrying Walther PPK pistols. However, to replace the existing Southern Command OC, the Northern Command and Army Council bodies elected another man as the new Southern Command OC, and who now also operates from PIRA GHQ (General Headquarters) in Dublin. This man, originally from Belfast retains very close connections with senior PIRA and Sinn Fein figures. Republican sources describe him as having very strong connections with the Sinn Fein leadership. Of course communication breakdown is commonly found in clandestine organizations, but the significance of this particular breakdown in communication is that it is one of the few clear examples which not only led to an internal organizational re-shuffle of members, but equally significantly to other changes. In the months following the Adare shooting, the PIRA leadership took the unprecedented step of changing the command and functional structures of the organization. The details remain unclear, but it led to the establishment of more regional command areas under the tight control of trusted brigadiers, with long experience in the PIRA. This move was to ensure that an Adare could not be sanctioned again. Thus control over particular groups of ASUs has been tightened, and members have been more accountable to regional commanders apparently much more so than previously.

At another level, we must refer to the PIRA's Green Book. The section entitled 'General Order No. 8' disallows military operations to be conducted against the 'Free State', i.e. the Irish Republic, stating:

Volunteers are strictly forbidden to take any military action against 26 County forces under any circumstances whatsoever. The importance of this order in present circumstances especially in the border areas cannot be over-emphasised At all times, Volunteers must make it clear that the policy of the Army [PIRA] is to drive the British forces of occupation out of Ireland.

In effect, General Order No. 8 appears to be a reminder to PIRA members either based in the Republic or who travel to the Republic for operations, to keep a low profile. Of the 26 counties in the Republic of Ireland, 21 fall into the PIRAs 'Southern Command' area. As described elsewhere, ⁸⁹ Southern Command, like Northern Command, refers to a distinct operational area and command structure. Excluding the five border counties, Southern Command areas consist of the remaining 21 counties in the Republic of Ireland. Its command structure consists of 'Brigadiers', OCs, and ASUs. Security forces in the Republic describe the Southern Command as functioning as the 'logistic support' for Northern Command, acting mainly in what is referred to as a 'Quartermaster' role. Its principal activities include volunteer training, funding, and the storage and movement of armaments.⁹⁰ The relevance of Southern Command areas to Northern Command's operational successes largely translates into offering logistical support in the form of safehouses and arms storage to Southern and Northern ASUs.⁹¹ Without the traditional stringent pressures in the form of intense security hampering activities in Northern Command areas, police sources describe Southern Command leadership as 'less cohesive' and it is seen to play a 'much lesser role in major decisions' than both Northern Command, or General Headquarters (GHQ), even though GHQ has often been based in Dublin.

From the perspective of the PIRA leadership, the Southern Command area encompasses a population whose general passivity to the PIRA is to be manipulated. For the PIRA, the repercussions of killing a member of the Gardai are tremendous, and have wide-ranging implications, not just in terms of how the localized passive support for the PIRA (frequently found in areas all over the Republic) could turn against them, but in terms of how the PIRAs more active support would suffer also. This 'active' support covers everything from a more general kind of sympathizer who could be persuaded to allow the PIRA to keep a stolen car on his farm, to those whose Republican sympathies play a role in the potential development of their own future terrorist behaviour with the appropriate organization. For those opposed to the killing of Gardai, the PIRA's practical assistance would suffer in the wake of the shooting - again as demonstrated by the anonymous disclosure of the Clonaslee bomb-making factory in Co. Laois.

Such 'support' factors have almost certainly played a part in the decline of kidnapping. As kidnapping for ransom by the PIRA has now

effectively disappeared in the 1990s, its decline is equally indicative of a number of issues emergent within the PIRA command structure relating to logistic and 'support' factors. The outrage expressed by the general public in the Republic of Ireland during and after the Don Tidey kidnapping was considerable, and indeed some would say considerable enough to force PIRA leaders into rethinking about the utility of this tactic. Would the potential for short-term financial gain outweigh the potential for possibly longer-term security and practical political support? Surely not. If it did, it would in turn have further implications for the PIRA's use of Southern Command areas for logistic utility (which could translate into the compromising of security in training and safe-house resources, arms dumps and so on, which, as we know, frequently relies on the passivity and implicit support of local communities). Similarly, with the killings of Gardai such as Francis Hand and Jerry McCabe, surely the PIRA would be met with increasingly heavy pressure from the security services in the Republic. In any event, overt kidnapping operations appear to have ceased outright and General Order No. 8 appears to have been stressed increasingly by PIRA leaders from the mid-1980s onwards. Again, this illustrates how the PIRA is not simply an organization which raises and spends a lot of money, but is very much in touch with the here and now, and susceptible to the influence of external factors related to 'support' at many levels. There have been many discussions about what is perceived to be an 'acceptable' level of paramilitary violence (regardless of whether or not cease-fires officially exist) and clearly, killing Gardai does not qualify.

Extortion

Some of the earliest examples of extortion date back to the PIRA's first attempts at fundraising. The PIRA began in the early 1970s to demand 'protection' money from publicans, local businessmen, shopkeepers and so on in Northern Ireland, through intimidation and in some cases, quite overt threats. As Adams 92 described in 1987:

Ten years ago protection would be demanded in a quite straightforward manner. The gang, typically three or four strong, would march into the premises, brandish a weapon and demand money; if the owner did not pay up they might break a few windows or beat him up.

This rather heavy-handed practice appears to have subsided somewhat. The 'greening' of the PIRA with the birth of more covert fundraising activities, including money laundering (as we shall see in Part 2), appear to have overshadowed overt extortion. In the North, the establishment of PIRA-controlled security companies has emphasized that to survive any local 'security threats', hiring the right company to control security could be a wise choice:

Today, the whole operation has become more sophisticated and gentlemanly. Any contractor or business new to an area controlled by one of the paramilitary organizations is approached by representatives of the group concerned, but now the approach is generally made by an apparently legitimate security company that has been established by a terrorist group to provide a legitimate veneer for what remains a simple racket. These new and apparently legitimate sources of funds have been increasingly popular among the terrorists. The Belfast Yellow Pages in 1970 listed only seven security firms for the city but today there are more than sixty. Of course, the legitimate security firms have had extraordinary difficulties competing with terroristsupported ones. Although they may be able to match the price, they do not benefit from the concealed threat of a beating or shooting to back up a profit bid.93

In the Republic, the link between the kidnapped Don Tidey, his employers Associated British Foods, and the PIRA did not end with the killings in Ballinamore, but extended to what proved to be an extremely successful attempted extortion directed against Tidey's employers. The PIRA initially demanded a £5m ransom from Tidey's company for his return, but this was later reduced to £2m. At the time of the kidnapping and subsequent rescue of Tidey, Associated British Foods denied that it had paid a ransom to the PIRA.94 It later emerged however that in 1984 (the kidnapping occurred in November 1983) the company had actually paid the £2m ransom into a numbered account at the Swiss Bank Corporation in Zurich.95 The PIRA had threatened to conduct more attacks and kidnappings against senior officials of Associated British Foods unless their demands were met. The money was subsequently transferred to Ireland through the Bank of Ireland's New York Branch. In November 1985, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, following requests for information from New Scotland Yard police officials in London, ordered the Zurich authorities to disclose details of the transactions involving the extortion. Following a brief appeal from the Swiss Bank Corporation on the grounds that releasing such information could endanger the lives of the extortion victims, the Federal Court decided the release of the details overshadowed such concerns, but that the obvious security precautions would be adopted.

In that same year, 1985, the Irish government took drastic action and passed emergency legislation 96 enabling the government to seize IR£1,750,816.27 from an account in the Navan, Co. Meath, branch of the Bank of Ireland. Initially neither the Government nor the bank disclosed the name(s) of the account holders or the actual branch name, government officials believing that the owners of this money was the PIRA.97 At the time, the chairman of Associated British Foods publicly denied that this money was part of the ransom paid by the company to the PIRA for the release of Tidey,98 although highly-placed security forces to this day continue to pronounce otherwise.99 Then in 1988, two men claimed ownership of the money, and

proceeded to challenge the constitutionality of the Irish Government's actions in seizing it. 100 Alan Clancy, an Irishman, and David McCartney, a Scottish man living in New York, claimed that it was their money which was in the bank for use in establishing a pig exporting business. Clancy had approached the Industrial Development Authority in Ireland about such a business. Clancy is reported to have had 'a reputation for doing business deals with large sums of cash'.101 He had in his possession twelve pubs in New York, and it is said in Republican circles that some of these were actually paid for in cash. He is described as having been a 'staunch Republican', well known in NORAID circles, and his New York pubs have been used on more than one occasion for Republican fundraising collections. Joseph Doherty, the PIRA member who was wanted on charges in the UK for shooting a British Army captain, was arrested in one of Clancy's pubs in 1983. Doherty, who was arrested by the FBI, had been working in Clancy's bar under an assumed name.

Unfortunately for Clancy and McCartney, their bid to retrieve their money failed in the High Court in Dublin. Neither the Irish Government nor Clancy have ever clarified the 'exact origin of the sum',102 Clancy apparently not being able to convince the court of the legality of his holding of the money. Evidence surfaced in 1987, however, to suggest that the money was to be used for the PIRA and Sinn Fein in the council elections campaigns of 1985. This would be one of the first clear examples of PIRA money used by Sinn Fein, and also one of the first examples from which we have evidence as to how the financing of a terrorist organization actually limits the potential success of its political wing. This we will elaborate on in Part 2 in much more detail. Adams, Morgan and Bambridge write:

The Dublin Government believed the [Bank of Ireland] money had been earmarked to finance Sinn Fein's council election campaign in May that year [1985]. Its loss led to a bitter struggle within the IRA that almost saw [Gerry] Adams' demise. Four hardline members of the IRA's ruling elite opposed Adams' ballot box strategy, arguing that it was contributing little to the removal of British rule in Ulster. Only a special army convention called by Adams and his supporters staved off defeat; and then only after he had prepared the ground by expelling four hardliners, including his one-time friend and fellow Belfast brigade commander Ivor Bell. The victory was a resounding endorsement of Adams' long-term strategy and increased his grip on the Republican movement to the extent that the 1988 revenue of £7 million 103 would be split 80%-20% in favour of political activity.104

The important theme of a Sinn Fein-PIRA linkage across financial dimensions is one much deserving of attention and we will return to it. Another clear example of attempted extortion became evident in 1988, when the Bank of Ireland in the Republic issued the following statement to all of its branches:105

SECURITY ALERT - STAFF BRIEF

The Bank has received a demand for £2 million from a paramilitary group which has identified itself as the Provisional IRA. The demand was accompanied by an unspecified threat against the Bank. We are satisfied that this threat should be taken seriously. The Bank's priority in the face of any threat is the safety of our staff and the public. This priority can only be effectively served by not acceding to demands of this nature. We believe that if we ever acceded to such a demand, we would be placing our staff at greater ultimate risk. The best advice available to us strongly supports this policy. While it is not easy to gauge precisely the substance of any threat received, it would be prudent for all of us to exercise extra vigilance in the weeks ahead and to adhere fully to security procedures in the interests of both staff and public.

Extortion is not solely a practice that holds dangers for those on the receiving end of threats, but also can have wide-ranging implications for the terrorist group itself. As we have seen, the public image of paramilitaries in the eyes of the terrorist audience often changes and widely differs from group to group, and while within a specific group can change from time to time as was often the case with some of the Loyalist terrorist groups.¹⁰⁶ Internal dissent regarding tactics is not alien to many terrorist groups -even dissent within the Republican movement became clear in the wake of the first Enniskillen bombing in November 1987, when Gerry Adams announced at the party's Ard Fheis ¹⁰⁷ later that such activities (referring to the bombing) would 'have to stop'. Sinn Fein President Adams foresaw the risk of the Republican movement being portrayed in the same light, or rather lack of it, as their Loyalist counterparts. This is probably why overt extortion threats in conjunction with what James Adams described as 'thuggery' in the name of the PIRA appear to have decreased considerably. This contrasts considerably with the popular image of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) which has been seen as a group of gangsters or 'hoods', with the caricatured image of sun-tanned, jewellery-wearing 'players', hellbent on gaining easy extortion money to fund their campaign and holidays in Florida.

James Adams' comment is useful when discussing the metamorphosis of terrorist movements, particularly the PIRA. The PIRA fundraiser has become typified as somewhat of a 'bank-clerk' rather than a 'masked thug'.

To survive, terrorist groups need to cross an economic divide that separates those who live a hand-to-mouth existence from those who can actually plan ahead. All those groups who have come and gone ... have failed to cross that divide. ¹⁰⁸

And as we know, with the help of the Cook Report in 1987, the UDA's involvement in organized criminal acts almost lead to their downfall'

109 - the movement being so fragmented and in such complete disarray, from which, one could argue, it has never completely recovered.

Of course, explicit extortion threats still do exist, and it is firmly believed by security forces on both sides of the border that the PIRA's alleged involvement in the drug trade relates not to drug dealing, but directly to extortion of local drug dealers. At another level, the RUC reported in 1995 that despite the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires, extortion of money from building contractors and businesspeople showed a slight increase,110 as did the abuse of tax exemption procedures and counterfeiting of brand name items. This, also according to the same report, has been supplemented with a 50 per cent increase in the number of voluntary disclosures to the police by representatives of financial institutions regarding what is deemed to be 'unusually large' financial transactions, or bank accounts denoting financial transactions which appear inconsistent with personal income.

To conclude our rudimentary analysis of some initially explored fundraising areas, it is certain that kidnapping for ransom served as a lucrative source of PIRA funds until the practice began to cease following the Tidey incident. Extortion, as with robbery, is yet another example of a fundraising activity, the true extent of which we may never know. Kidnapping for ransom is an example of fundraising which has been specifically chosen by us, not because it is an activity traditionally associated with terrorist fundraising in Ireland, but because it is an example of an activity that the PIRA has stopped for specific reasons. These reasons are indicative of the PIRA's ability to organizationally and tactically adapt (even in the face of continued needs (i.e. money) demonstrating an acute awareness of the possible implications of external influences on the support and security (and ultimately, survival of) the organization. This is an aspect of PIRA terrorism more generally illustrated in the development of the PIRNs command and functional structure, and is part and parcel of PIRA thinking that will become more evident as we proceed through our description of its fundraising operations. It seems likely that in the event of continuing PIRA activity, the organization will continue to use robberies as a means of gaining funds, but lessons have been learned from Adare.

Does the PIRA Profit from Drug Dealing?

The three examples discussed above, of all the fundraising avenues explored by the PIRA, do not match allegations of drug dealing in terms of the controversy and propaganda frequently associated with terrorist fundraising. Any discussion of profiting from drugs within the context of the activities of the PIRA raises controversial issues, as do any allegations of PIRA influence on the behaviour of anti-drugs community movements in the south of Ireland in recent times. One

major form of PIRA community activity has been its involvement in anti-drug activities in inner city Communities, and there is no doubt that Sinn Fein has gained political benefit from such involvement in areas including Dublin. ¹¹¹ On the other hand, there are enormous financial profits to be made from the drug trade, and any involvement in the control and distribution of illegal drugs would clearly net the PIRA much financial gain. This, when taken with other more traditional terrorist fundraising activities such as robbery, can only contribute towards the movement's financial survival. However, there remains considerable evidence to suggest that it is unlikely the PIRA is involved in direct drug trading. An analysis of internal and external mitigating factors helps to understand this, primarily related to the increasing policy since the early 1980s of Sinn Fein to extend its political base in Ireland through community involvement. The drugs 'issue' has served as a highly effective political rallying point.

Political support for Sinn Fein has grown with its increasingly consistent stand against drugs in the Republic of Ireland. Martin Ferris, the senior Sinn Fein member and alleged PIRA strategist, received over 5,800 first preference votes in his North Kerry constituency during the 1997 local elections - an unexpectedly high level of support for this small region. Ferris is known locally for his fervent anti-drugs campaigning. It seems likely, at least for the foreseeable future, that the PIRA and Sinn Fein will continue to use this anti-drug stand as a means of gaining political support in the Republic. In the long term this greatly offsets any potential loss of income not being involved in the drugs trade might produce. It is also important to see, and a worrying potential development, that visible high profile activity against drug dealing also serves to introduce and entrench an urban role for PIRA and its associates outside of the traditional terrorist context, giving it a populist base from which to develop its activities in the Republic of Ireland. Long term strategic planning to develop this base is entirely consistent with Sinn Fein's objectives.¹¹² This is an issue which we expect to receive more attention amid the formation of the Northern Ireland Assembly following the Referendum results on the Good Friday Agreement.

Is PIRA Involved in the Drug Trade?: A Further Analysis of Internal and External Factors

The issue of the PIRA's alleged involvement in the drug trade is, and probably will remain, a hazy one. However, we can identify both internal and external factors that will help understand the nature of involvement (or lack thereof) in narcotics dealing for a paramilitary organization such as the PIRA.

One set of factors has more to do with what it is generally believed the PIRA is involved in. In a sense this is the 'outsider's' view of the PIRA's involvement in drugs, and it is one that is often used as an issue for propaganda purposes. After all, who is going to believe terrorist

denials of responsibility for drug dealing, when they are so evidently involved in many other illegal and abhorrent activities? Reasons suggesting PIRA involvement in drug trading are numerous: Robinson, 113 an expert commentator on financial crimes, has argued that terrorist groups such as the PIRA demonstrate their ability to be just as skilled at involvement in money-laundering and organized crime as do the more traditional 'criminal' gangs such as the oriental Triad and Yakuza gangs. According to Robinson, the Metropolitan Police in Britain think that the PIRA does not deal in drugs. He says that although the Garda Siochana in the Republic has 'openly contradicted' the London police, referring to instances of marijuana trafficking in which the PIRA have been involved, 114 there's probably every reason to believe that the IRA deal in whatever they need in order to finance their struggle ... and drug dealing is now a conventional means of turning dirty money into guns'. Robinson does not clarify PIRA involvement for us, but argues that 'the betting line must be on the Irish police'.115

However, contrary to Robinson's argument, reasons for the Provisional IRA not to be involved in drugs are equally numerous, and relate to the PIRA's strong political and community dimension and their internal organizational concerns. We have evidence of this internal view from PIRA intelligence documents obtained by the authors, including A Reporter's Guide to Ireland (an extremely detailed intelligence and training manual written and developed by the Official IRA in the mid-1970s (which later became the basis for the PIRA's Green Book), but adapted and is still used by the PIRA), which refer to drugs not in relation to what we might expect to be ideological issues, but in relation to the organization's internal security and the leadership's necessary concerns about infiltration and intelligence procedures:

Drug taking is a hazard, not alone from a health viewpoint, but also from because of the danger to security and because of the possibility of infiltration by police agents in the guise of pushers, a technique frequently employed in other countries and coming into practice here. If any member is suspected of taking or pushing drugs, careful inquiries should be made and the matter reported fully as soon as possible, to the section, unit and command I.O.'s [Intelligence Officers]. Anyone in any doubt should immediately consult his I.O.

The manual states that in both cases of drugs and infiltration:

The greatest care and tact must be applied to investigation and no action must be taken without consultation with the D.O.I. [Director of Intelligence]. This is essential to security and discipline and must not be disregarded in any way.

In a similar vein, the dangers of alcohol are emphasized:

Volunteers who drink should be warned of the serious dangers of loud talk in pubs and the likelihood of being indiscreet while drunk. Very often men under considerable stress drink and relieve their tension by talking of the problems they are facing. Under no circumstances must the actions, policies or attitudes of the Movement be discussed in this fashion. It is dangerous for the man involved and could be disastrous for his comrades and the actions on which they are engaged.

The Gardai have continuously stated their belief, both publicly and privately, that one of the two main aims of the PIRA in the Republic of Ireland is to expand and build on a potential political base, by being publicly observed and, through Sinn Fein, to be involved in important and contentious social issues. Such social issues incorporate, as we have noted, anti-drugs campaigns, housing matters, unemployment issues, etc., thereby apparently '[enhancing] the organization's chances of political advancement by winning seats at local council and parliamentary level.¹¹⁶ By their own reckoning, Sinn Fein councillors are said to have one of the most, if not the most, committed records for a political movement in tackling drugs issues:

If we've succeeded in anything like, we've succeeded in focusing attention on the drug problem, know what I mean? ... and you can't do much more than that ... because ... our priority is the national struggle, and we can't allow ourselves be side-tracked then down to be the police people of the state ... but we have no involvement in drugs.'
117

This man proceeded to illustrate his argument with an example:

A Sinn Fein councillor [was] caught ... Hugh Brady in Derry ... was caught ... couple of joints in his pocket for smoking - he was expelled from the movement. The movement doesn't tolerate it.

The movement certainly does not tolerate it. On his release from RUC custody, Brady received a savage beating at the hands of his PIRA colleagues. In a case similar to this, but on a much larger and more significant scale, in October 1992 the PIRA took action against the drugs problem' when a senior member of the Irish People's Liberation Organisation (IPLO), a Republican splinter group, was killed and eight others were wounded following PIRA claims that the IPLO was heavily involved in drug trading. The IPLO has since been disbanded.

Another related example is worthy of note. What Coogan describes as a 'highly embarrassing' moment for the PIRA leadership occurred in August 1979, when the Gardai seized about £1 m worth of cannabis near Naas in Co. Kildare. ¹¹⁸ One of the men arrested was James 'The Fox' McCann, known as the 'Green Pimpernel' in Republican circles because of his escape from the Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast. After arrest, and McCann's transportation to Portlaoise prison in Co. Laois, the Green Pimpernel was 'badly kicked and beaten by Provisional prisoners.'¹¹⁹ The PIRA leadership subsequently issued a

statement denying involvement with McCann or with the incident in Kildare.

However, while the PIRA may not be directly involved in drug dealing, many allegations of involvement in drug trading certainly do arise from the involvement of some former paramilitary figures who become attracted to more overtly criminal acts:

I know people that were Republicans that are ... there running drugs ... they haven't been members of the Republican movement nearly for ten years ... right ... there's two or three from Cork ... ex ... ex-IRA a couple of years120

The following statement is from a senior Sinn Fein member,121 and according to the Irish police, a 1997 Army Council delegate:

Regarding drugs ... if I thought for one minute that the Republicans were involved with drugs ... or anything to do with drugs ... I would be straight out of it ... and I have been involved in it 26 years like ... I can honestly say ... and I have my hand on my heart here, and my heart to God ... that I have never ever ... I never knew of any Republican, as a Republican, being involved in any of that kind of stuff ... I know people who were Republicans ... they left the Republican movement, and they became involved in drugs.

Coogan 122 recommends that:

The constant black propaganda about drug-trafficking may be discounted ... the fact of being implicated through the capture of a man once prominently associated with the IRA in gun-running was both infuriating, and particularly where their conservative supporters both in Ireland and America were concerned, was potentially highly damaging to the Provisionals.123

The man in question was Joseph Paul Murray who pleaded guilty with two others in a Boston court to charges of smuggling arms to the PIRA on board the Marita Ann and its supply ship Valhalla, along with the trafficking of marijuana into the United States (the 'riding shotgun' on a drug shipment referred to earlier by Robinson). Murray, a well-known Boston crime figure, and his colleagues pleaded guilty to 'lesser charges' while impending charges of racketeering were dropped along with promises to lower the recommended sentences.

The image of the PIRA as popular protectors from the drugs epidemic in urban areas can be seen through some of their operations. On 31 March 1996, the PIRA intercepted a drug cache destined for south Co. Down, and alerted the RUC to the whereabouts of the hijacked shipment that contained an estimated £20,000 worth of cannabis. The RUC was quoted as being 'very pleased' at this recovery, and it is believed this was not an isolated incident. However, some recent events indicate a somewhat more accurate witness to the complex

nature of the strong opposition of the PIRA to the drugs scourge, and relate to the group 'Direct Action Against Drugs' or DAAD. A string of brutal deaths indicated that a systematic effort was made during 1995-96, and again in February 1998 to target known, or presumed, drug dealers. This seems to have been a reflection of a change of policy by the PIRA leadership in Northern Ireland, taking a clearer and more energetic stand against drug activity, and using a front name of Direct Action Against Drugs to claim responsibility. In February 1998, the DAAD killed drug dealer Brendan 'Bap' Campbell, whose murder formed half of the case (the killing of UDA member Robert Dougan was the second half) for Sinn Fein's expulsion from the multi-party political talks later that month.124

It is clear therefore that the PIRA does have a strong relationship with the drug trade per se. It remains unclear, however, not only concerning the PIRA's murder of Northern Ireland drug dealers, but regarding incidents which have involved the PIRA with criminals in the Republic, as to the principal reason why these drug dealers are either threatened or killed. Is it primarily related to extortion or attempted extortion (which would almost effortlessly gain much reward for the PIRA), or does this primarily happen so that the PIRA can raise support at a 'ground level' among the communities from which come PIRA members, both Northern and Southern? Or perhaps it has the dual purpose of both outcomes? Certainly, extortion from drug dealers as part of fundraising modus operandi has received much media attention. Tommy 'The Boxer' Mullen, a notorious Dublin drug dealer, fled to England in 1996 while claiming that he was on the run from the PIRA.125

According to the Royal Ulster Constabulary 126 (RUC), the PIRA involvement in the drug trade relates to a far more 'detached' practice than some of their Loyalist counterparts demonstrate:

They [the PIRA] attempt to adopt a public stance that they abhor the use of drugs ... that belies the fact that they have in the past, and certainly do at present, derive funding from the drugs trade ... the Loyalist paramilitary organizations are much more directly involved in the straightforward drugs dealing. The IRA tend to be two or three steps removed.

This 'removed state' is deemed by the RUC to be 'licensing' some of the Northern Ireland drug gangs to deal in drugs, while the PIRA subsequently profits from extortion. Vincent Kearney elaborates on what he terms the 'hidden agenda to IRA hits on drug dealers': 127

There is evidence that DAAD is being used not to eliminate the sale of drugs, but to enable the IRA to control the lucrative trade. Police and dealers say the IRA controls the distribution of drugs to criminals on both sides of the border. Narcotics are smuggled into Ireland through Dublin and Cork and distributed after prices and quantities are

agreed at meetings in hotels in Dundalk and Drogheda. The IRA does not handle the drugs, but oversees the operation and takes a percentage from each deal. In return, it sanctions the dealers' activities and moves against their opponents.

An associate of Brendan Campbell, the drug dealer killed by DAAD, points to a police seizure of ecstasy tablets with a street value of over £67,000 found in a PIRA stronghold area of west Belfast, Ballymurphy, once the home of Gerry Adams. Kearney quotes sources as saying:

He [Campbell] was not killed because the IRA is opposed to drugs but because he wouldn't play the game by their rules ... the IRA is up to its neck in drugs. Nobody would even think of selling drugs in west Belfast unless it [the PIRA] gave the ok. The IRA could wipe out the drugs scene in nationalist areas in a very short time, but it doesn't want to. It only wants to wipe out the opposition.

For the moment, we can conclude, as a Research Institute for the Study and Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT) report has done in 1991 [128](#) that regarding alleged PIRA involvement in drugs, 'until there is clear cut evidence to back up these allegations it would be wise to suspend judgement'.

Conclusions

One aspect of writing about terrorism, and perhaps especially on terrorist organizations, is that we have a tendency sometimes to overestimate the threat posed. We, having a background in academic psychology, do not share the opinion that we can overestimate the abilities of the Provisional IRA as an effective terrorist organization. This, to some, may seem superfluous to mention, but it does merit careful consideration. Certainly, the PIRA is an organization in constant flux, and researchers and PIRA/terrorism commentators as much as law enforcement officials should be equally as open to acceptance of the implications.

Here in Part 1 of this article, we have begun to describe a set of activities that have, to say the least, traditionally not received very much attention in the terrorism literature, except by way of anecdotal evidence or black propaganda. Admittedly, very little is actually known by way of empirical research about terrorist fundraising as a whole, let alone those 'local' operations in Ireland which the Provisional IRA has organized, or gained from, and the kind with which this article concerns itself. We already know that a complex administration and support network is necessary for any of the 'bigger' terrorist organizations such as the PIRA and ETA to live, survive and evolve. As we will see, the funding of terrorist acts ranges from the much simpler, straightforward and 'public' act of robbery or extortion described here, to the more secretive and certainly much more

sophisticated, yet still surprisingly straightforward, money- laundering operations, details of which we will describe in Part 2.

From discussion of some of the PIRA's fundraising operations and using specific examples, the relative complexity of the issues surrounding involvement in certain forms of fundraising (e.g. armed robbery) to the exclusion of others (e.g. drug trading) has hopefully been illustrated. Some of the specific internal organizational issues (e.g. following the Adare shooting) and factors surrounding involvement in such activity are indicative of an acute awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and their members operate. It is clear also that the PIRAs involvement in drug trading may not only affect the PIRA's operational development and successes in terms of potential 'active' support in the South, but also in the development and sustenance of public popular support for Sinn Fein. Part 2 of this article builds on the descriptive material presented here, with an explanation of how and why the PIRA's leaders have decided to create money-laundering schemes to sustain the organization's finances. Money laundering illustrates how the PIRA have evolved into a sophisticated money-making organization, and how that organization understands the implications of tactical and strategic planning and adaptation in the face of continuous internal and external pressures.

Whatever the case, it is clear, however, that we have very often been guilty of misperceiving the terrorist threat. Perhaps this may be changing. As the RUC Chief Constable's Report of 1994 states, 'further progress was made in 1994 in stemming the flow of funds and in securing convictions. Extensive investigations into this multi-million pound area of criminality are continuing and further prosecutions are anticipated. It is an understandable worry that one legacy of terrorism will be the entrenchment of organized crime in Northern Ireland and the RUC is fully alive to this public concern. It is our intention that the sophisticated resources brought to bear on terrorists' financial crime will be applied to preventing the continuation and development of racketeering in peace-time.' Hopefully, this kind of recognition that terrorists no longer simply shoot and bomb, will effectively grow. Their activities can be, and are, much broader in their scope and nature.

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NOTES

1. J. Adams. 'The Financing of Terror'. in P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), *Contemporary Research of Terrorism* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP 1987) p.401. Although over 10 years old. Wilkinson and

Stewart's collection of contributions remains a cornerstone of academic and policy-oriented research. Within this volume is presented James Adams' research on terrorist fundraising - probably the most detailed descriptions and analyses of this topic, including the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA. Adams' account remains unrivalled.

2. A preliminary attempt to address the organizational context to Provisional IRA terrorism was described in J. Horgan and M. Taylor. 'The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure.' *Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV)* 9/3 (Autumn 1997) pp. 1-32. For a similar look at Loyalist terrorism, see J. Cusack and M. Taylor. 'Resurgence of a Terrorist Organization Part 1: The UDA, a Case Study', *TPV* 513 (Autumn 1993) pp. 1-27.

3. This has been the case even for the older, original IRA and their sporadic 'Border campaign' of the 1950s. Although several reasons contributed to the nature and extent of this short period of guerrilla activity for the IRA, the question of resources was always a very practical concern to the organization at this time. For a worthy discussion of Loyalist fundraising efforts, refer to Steve Bruce. *The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland* (Oxford: OUP 1992) and for an insightful account of fundraising issues and developments within the Ulster Defence Association up to 1993, see J. Cusack and M. Taylor (note 2). Also for a detailed look at specific examples, see A. Silke, 'In Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Part One: Extortion and Blackmail', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 2 1/4 (1998). pp.331-61.

4. The PIRA itself owes its origins to a split in which the future PIRA divided from the older, original IRA in a dispute largely centred around the then IRA leadership's invocation of an increased socialist political struggle throughout Ireland.

5. For example, in 1971, the Dutch police foiled an attempted shipment of 166 crates of arms to the PIRA from Schipol airport near Amsterdam (T. P. Coogan, *The IRA* (London: HarperCollins 1995) p.433). Two years later, in March 1973, the fishing trawler *Chiltdia* was apprehended in Irish territorial waters following a concerted multi-agency intelligence effort. On board the trawler was not only, the then PIRA chief Joe Cahill, but over five tonnes of arms and ammunition given to the PIRA by Libyan sympathisers (J. BoxkyerBell, *The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979* (Dublin: Poolbell Press Ltd 1989) p.398). The shipment contained over 450 rifles and small arms, explosives and anti-tank mines. More arms shipments were intercepted by police in Canada in 1975 (Coogan, p.433) and Dublin in 1977 (*ibid.*) and in Sept. 1984. another huge seizure saw the Irish Naval Service intercept the trawler *Marita Ann*. off the south west coast of Ireland near Co. Kerry. The boat contained 7 tonnes of arms, including over 160 pistols, machine guns and rifles, 11 bullet-

proof vests, over 70,000 rounds of ammunition, rockets, weapons Manuals and grenades, de-bugging equipment and voice distortion equipment ('Three jailed for smuggling arms to IRA', Irish Times (Dublin), 1 July 1984). One of these men, Martin Ferris, from Ardfert in Co. Kerry, later became (and remains to this day) a senior Sinn Fein member). At least two, but perhaps up to four arms shipments from Middle Eastern sympathisers, primarily Colonel Ghadafi (encouraging the PIRA's campaign against Britain following the American bombing of Libya in 1986, using British-launched jets) preceded the capture of yet another vessel: On 1 Nov. 1987, French customs officials seized the Eksund off the coast of Brittany, north-west France. Over 150 tonnes of arms were aboard the trawler, Composing of twenty SAM-7s [surface-to-air missiles], 1,000 AK-47s, 600 grenades, ten heavy duty machine-guns, anti-tank guns, Beretta machine-guns, 50 tons of ammunition and two tons of the powerful plastic explosive, Semtex H' (J. Adarns, R. Morgan, and A. Bambridge. *Ambush: The Secret War between the SAS and the IRA* (London: Pan Books 1988) P. 185). To date, this has been the largest ever shipment of PIRA arms ever seized.

6. Interview with the first author. Unless otherwise indicated, references to security forces denote that material is sourced from direct interviews conducted by one or both of the authors.

7. For good examples, see M. Carolan, 'Huge explosive haul dwarfs seizures unearthed in Ireland', Irish News, 24 Sept. 1996; E. Keogh, 'Explosives found as Garda search extended in Louth', Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Nov. 1996; and L. Clarke, 'Farmland conceals huge IRA arsenal', Sunday Times (London and Dublin), 2 Jan. 1994.

8. See CM. Drake. 'The Provisional IRA: A Case Study' TPV 3/2 (Summer 1991) pp.43-60.

9. For an excellent general overview of the activities of the PIRA, see Drake (note 8).

10. See L. Allen. 'IRA units are still 'alive and kicking''. The Sunday Tribune (Dublin), 23 June 1996, p. 12. Allen cites Gardai as noting 'They are now going to legitimate engineering works and placing orders as if in the building business'.

11. See, e.g., D. Ljunggren. 'London security measures stepped up after blast'. Reuters, 10 Feb. 1996, and J. Cusack, 'Surveillance pays off with Garda bomb find'. Irish Times (Dublin), 19 Feb. 1997.

12. A 'Garda' or 'Garda Síochána' is an Irish police officer. 'An Garda Síochána, is the Irish police force.

13. M. Crenshaw. 'Decisions to Abandon Terrorism: A Preliminary Case Study of the IRA' (paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting

of the American Political Science Association. Chicago Hifton. 31 Aug-3 Sept. 1995) p.5.

14. See M. Taylor and J. Horgan. 'The 1994-96 Provisional IRA Cease-fire in Northern Ireland', TPV. forthcoming.

15. A similar figure was reported by Allen (note 10). Liz Allen, a respected crime journalist in Ireland, draws on material from what she describes as 'well placed, senior intelligence sources in the Republic'.

16. Interview with security forces in the Republic.

17. See V. Guerin, 'IRA used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign', Sunday Independent (Dublin), 23 June 1996, p.7. This is one of the few reliable media articles to describe PIRA fundraising activities.

18. A similar figure again was reported by Allen (note 10).

19. See note 2.

20. J. Horgan, J. Cusack and M. Taylor. 'The 'Kevin Brady Manual: An Example of Terrorist Training Material' (Department of Applied Psychology. University College Cork). Copies available on request from the first author.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. M. McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking (London: Blake Publishing Lid 1997) pp. 182-3.

24. Ibid., p. 182.

25. Interviews conducted by first author with security forces.

26. For a different set of estimates, see McGartland (note 23) p. 182, noting that 'all IRA cell members received £10 per week and the cell commanders received between £30-£50 per week'.

27. Ibid., p. 182.

28. At least 400 members receiving at least £30 amounts to £ 12.000.

29. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14). The cost of this man's views becoming known to other 'doubters' of the peace process could have been phenomenal, as happened with the PIRA's Quartermaster General who, with a small cadre of dissenters, left the PIRA to form the 'Real IRA', responsible for the Omagh bombing in 1998.

30. Part 2 of this article discusses in greater detail the association between what has been virtually sectioned as 'Sinn Fein-IRA' and the mutual membership by individual, in both organizations'. In some

cases, this is seen to be especially true with respect to Republican fundraising.

31. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14).

32. S. Anderson, 'Making a Killing', Harpers Magaine 288. 1 Feb. 1994.

33 See Adams (note 1) p.397.

34. See McGartland (note 23).

35. See note 1.

36. The first author attended many Republican fundraiser 'functions' in pubs in Cork to observe the different amounts of cash being gained from very legitimate activities (perhaps in 3-4 hours, the Sinn Fein purse would easily net £1,200).

37. For a very detailed account of these procedures refer to Adams (note 1)

38. The Garda Siochina has often referred to examples of this.

39. See note 2.

40. Interviews conducted by first author with security forces and members of the PIRA in the Republic. Also see notes 2 and 14.

41. Cited in S. Cronin, Irish Nationalism: Its Roots and Ideology (Dublin: Academy Press 1980).

42. interview conducted by first author with security forces. This was all official estimate for 1988 made by, An Garda Siochana in 1990.

43. See 'MP calls for tough laws against IRA racketeering', The Independent (London), 6 Nov.1990. This estimate is from the Northern Ireland Office, as described in 'Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence - A Special Report'. Conflict Studies 246, Nov-Dec. 199 1. pp. 1-29.

44. T. Brady, 'Era of the Renegade IRA', Irish Independent (Dublin). 23 Dec. 1994.

45. Anderson. 'Making a Killing' (note 32),

46. 'IRA rackets busted'. The Sun (London). 20 April 1994.

47. S. Pogatchnik. 'N. Ireland - Law Vs. Order'. Associated Press. 21 Dec. 1995.

48. See Sunday Times (London and Dublin). 12 March 1995. in Crenshaw (note 13).

49. Series of interviews conducted by the first author.

50. D. Henderson. 'Cash-hit Loyalists behind security raid', Press Association News. 14 April 1996. This estimate of £10m covers the PIRA and the then principal Loyalist terrorist groups, the UDA/UFF and the UVF
51. M. Shechan. 'Police move to seize IRA businesses'. Sunday Times (London and Dublin).30 April 1996.
52. These specific interviews were with security forces based in the Republic of Ireland.
53. See B. Cordes. B. M. Jenkins and K. Kellen, 'A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Terrorist Groups'. RAND Corporation (Jun. 1985) esp. p.106.
54. This figure has been repeated throughout the course of interviews conducted by the authors with different members of the security forces North and South.
55. M. Taylor. The Terrorist (Brassey's: London 1988) p.52.
56. See Coogan (note 5) p.522.
57. Ibid., p.522.
58. Ibid., p.522.
59. Ibid., p.523.
60. See C. Parkin, 'New hope of solving Shergar mystery'. Press Association News, 4 April 1996.
61. See Coogan (note 5) p.523.
62. Ibid., p.523.
63. Ibid., p.524.
64. Guinness was released without injuries and without a ransom having been paid. Coogan (note 5. p.524) concludes, 'the only good thing to be said about kidnappings in the period is that the Gardai showed a consistent and successful record against them. Throughout the 1980s, INLA Units. as well as some particular criminal gangs were seen to mirror Provo kidnappings (as demonstrated through the Guinness kidnapping). not only through actual kidnapping itself but also through the frequent issue of kidnap threats, (ibid.. pp.52 1-4). The Loyalists were not unaware of the effectiveness and potential profit of such exploits. Soon after the Don Tidey incident, Loyalist paramilitaries 'promptly counterattacked by, demanding a like amount of money from stores owned by Associated British Foods in Ireland. There were some reports of vegetables being poisoned, causing the Quinnsworth chain to install videos carrying warnings to shoppers and requests to report anything suspicious. This episode

petered out without it being ascertained whether or not the Loyalists had received any money' (ibid.. p.524).

65. J. Cusack. 'Co-ordinated British effort to combat IRA is paying off'. Irish Times (Dublin), 28 Sept. 1996.

66. Her case is not isolated. In 1996. PIRA member and Brixton Prison escapee, Nessian Quinlivan was charged in Dublin with falsely imprisoning a man in Limerick. and in Nov. 1995, a five-man PIRA ASU. armed with hammers and pistols, kidnapped a 19 year-old man from Strabane. in Co. Tyrone. tying him up and forcing him into a car which was later found burned out in the countryside near the border. This type of behaviour is commonly seen among Ireland's paramilitary groups, and often in the context of internal security matters.

67. See Taylor (note 55) p.52.

68. Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents. ETA: 1952-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1984).

69. See Taylor (note 55) p.52.

70. In 1974. PIRA active service unit hijacked a priceless art collection owned by Lady Clementine Beit, the widow of former Tory MP Sir Alfred Beit. The gang broke into their home, the Russborough mansion in Blessington, Co Wicklow, bound and gagged the couple and stole 19 paintings worth over £8m (Coogan (note 5) p.406). On 31 March 1976, a PIRA unit robbed the Cork-Dublin train at Co. Kildare of over £220,000 in an operation planned by, the PIRA long in advance of the actual robbery, a raid that was even considered by the INLA because of the nature of the potential reward. In 1979. Patrick Aaron 'Arnie' O'Connell from Cork was charged with the murder of Eamonn Ryan, shot dead in a robbery in the Bank of Ireland. in Strand Street. Tramore. Co. Waterford on 7 Aug. 1979. O'Connell was also charged with the armed robbery, of £5,400 from the bank and membership of the PIRA (also charged with the robbery, from the bank was, William Hayes from Waterford. Hayes was also charged of being a member of PIRA). In Aug. 1984. an ASU robbed a cash delivery van in Drumcree. Co. Meath. and in doing so, shot dead Garda Francis Hand (See 'A dozen other Gardai killed in last 26 years'. Irish Times (Dublin). 8 June 1996). In May 1990. a 6-member ASU attempted to rob a bank in Enniscorthy, Co. Wexford. The ASU was led by one of the relatively few female Irish terrorists. and opened fire on Garda' during the raid (J. Cusack. 'IRA unit caused Gardai increasing worry', Irish Times (Dublin). 8 June 1996). In June 1994. the head of the PIRA in Minister was believed to have been responsible for the robbery of £95,000 in Co. Limerick. He was also believed responsible for a double bank raid in neighbouring Co. Cork in Jan. 1994 (see Allen. note 10). In Nov. 1994. three months inside the PIRA cease-fire, an ASU shot and killed postal worker Frank Kerr. in Newry. Co. Down during a post office raid (J. Cusack. 'Armed robberies persisted during

cease-fire'. Irish Times (Dublin). 10 June 1996). Within two months. PIRA members in Co. Monaghan conducted all armed robbery, of a local Cash and Carry, outlet (ibid.). In June 1996 in Adare, Co. Limerick in the Republic of Ireland, a small ASU of the Munster Brigade shot two Garda detectives, killing one of them (Detective Garda Jerry McCabe) in a botched raid. The gang had intended to rob the post office delivery van of its contents. Pearse McCauley. the Brixton Prison escapee was charged in Dublin on 4 Dec. 1997 with the murder of McCabe. and of conspiring with Michael O'Neill. Jeremiah Sheehy, Pat Walsh and others to commit the robbery (see 'MCCAuley charged with murder of Garda McCabe'. Irish Times (Dublin). 5 Dec. 1997). The Munster Brigade of the PIRA's Southern Command, including the ASU that killed McCabe, is one of the main units in the country responsible for robberies. a unit believed to be generally quite proficient at this.

71. Compiled front: J. Cusack and M. M. Tynan. 'Government accepts IRA killed Garda in Adare'. Irish Times (Dublin). 14 June 1996: C. Parkin. 'Police shooting: second man in court'. Press Association New's. 12 June 1996: other Irish Times excerpts front 8, 10. 11 June 1996.

72. See C. Parkin. 'IRA denies killing Irish policeman'. Press Association News. 7 June 1996.

73. Radio Telefis Eireann. the Irish state broadcasting agency.

74. See Parkin (note 72). and 'IRA denies involvement in Limerick shooting.'. An Phoblacht/Republican (Dublin and Belfast). 13 June 1996.

75. J. Cusack and S. Breen. 'Reputed head of Minister IRA arrested over killing'. Irish Times (Dublin). 10 June 1996.

76. The Green Book is the PIRA's training manual, issued to each new recruit and the material front which is used as a basis for lectures in training.

77. V. Guerin . IRA used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign'. Sunday Independent (Dublin), 23 June 1996.

78. Ibid.

79. The mandatory sentence for murdering a Garda is 40 years imprisonment without remission.

80. See Silke (note 3) and Cusack and Taylor (note 2).

81. Coogan (note -5) p.581.

82. Our use of apparent generalities. e.g.. when we mention the variety, of distribution (of financial income for each 'PIRA member') should riot be seen as a form of safeguarding against incorrectness -

rather it should be seen as a real and practical aspect of life, for any Republican, be he/she an active member of the PIRA or not. This 'heterogeneity mirrored when we discuss the psychology of the terrorist and examine the false assumption of the existence of so-called terrorist 'profiles'.

83. Officer Commanding or Officer Commandeering.

84. See McGartland (-note 23) p. 183.

85. E. Collins and M. McGovern. *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books 1997) p.103. Collins was found dead with multiple stab wounds on Wednesday, 27 Jan. At the time of writing, responsibility for the murder has not been attributed.

86. J. Cusack, 'IRA killed more during cease-fire than since ending'. *Irish Times* (Dublin), 19 July 1997.

87. Coogan (note 6) p.480.

88. R. Debray. *Revolution in the Revolution* (New York: MR Press 1967).

89. See note 2.

90. See, e.g., E. Keogh. 'Explosives found as Garda search extended in Louth', *Irish Times* (Dublin), 28 Nov. 1996.

91. One security force member in the Republic described areas, of Co. Limerick as 'worse than Crossmaglen' (interview conducted by the first author). Also see M. Taylor and J. Horgan 'The 1994-96 Provisional IRA Cease-fire in Northern Ireland' (note 14).

92. Adams (note 1) p.394,

93. *Ibid.*

94. See 'Swiss bank ordered to disclose IRA fund details', *Irish Times* (Dublin), 21 Nov. 1985.

95. *Ibid.*

96. *Offences Against the State Act (Amendment) 1985.*

97. E. Shanahan, 'Bank transfers £1.7m IRA funds to court'. *Irish Times* (Dublin). 21 Feb. 1985.

98. *Ibid.*

99. Interviews with the first author.

100. See 'Court to decide oil £ 1.75m'. *Irish Times* (Dublin). 27 April 1988.

101. J. Cusack. Money lot pig exporting or funds to help the IRA?. Irish Times (Dublin), 5 May 1988.
102. Ibid.
103. This source's estimate is not included in Table 1.
104. J. Adams. R. Morgan and A. Barnbridge, Ambush: The War between the SAS and the IRA (London: Pan Books 1988). pp.38-9.
105. Document shown to the authors.
106. See Bruce (note 3) and Cusack and Taylor (note 2).
107. Annual Party Conference.
108. Adams (note 1) p.401,
109. See Cusack and Taylor (note 2).
110. Royal Ulster Constabulary Chief Constable's Report 1995. Published by the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
111. See Taylor and Horgan (note 14).
112. Throughout discussions such as this, many commentators argue that Sinn Fein politicians become involved in anti-drugs activities because of 'caring for their communities'. While the issue of motivation as it might relate to fundraising will be addressed in Part 2 of this article, there is a considerable body of evidence (apart from the nature and extent of paramilitary punishment attacks and killings of suspected drug dealers) to Support an altogether more practical and realistic view.
113. J. Robinson, The Laundrymen (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd 1995).
114. Ibid., p. 213.
115. Ibid.
116. Interview conducted by first author.
117. Interview with Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle member.
118. Coogan (note 5) p.430.
119. Ibid. [Back](#)
120. Interview with senior PIRA member.
121. Interviewed by the first author in 1997.
122. T.P. Cougar. The Troubles.. Ireland's Ordeal 1960-1995 and The Search for Peace (London: Hutchinson 1995) p.213.

123. Coogan (note 5) p.430.

124. The RUC said in 1996 that it "was in no doubt that the DAAD killings were sanctioned by the PIRA leadership. One officer said that the PIRA increased its attacks on alleged drugs dealers because they feared they were losing their grip on nationalist areas in the light of the 1994-96 cease-fire. Other observers in Belfast believe that the 1994-96 shootings were a way of 'letting off steam' among PIRA activists, deemed to be frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. The much forwarded suggestion however, that Loyalist paramilitaries would have wasted little time in retaliating if this were so has some credibility. Security sources in the Republic have commented on the concern which the PIRA Southern Command have had about 'unleashing' their activists in the south. Information from the families of the DAAD victims helps in understanding the development of DAAD. Some family members of victims denied outright their loved ones' involvement in the drug trade, but others more interestingly point to 'personality clashes' with some PIRA figures in positions of authority. Veronica Guerin has argued that PIRA supporters are apparently exploiting Dublin city's drug epidemic through exercising their 'Republican muscle' in order to drive drug dealers out of communities. Guerin believes that these supporters are playing to a plan devised by PIRA strategists. She cites Gardai as saying that even these vigilantes are 'made to feel important': The idea is they will encourage support for Sinn Fein at the next election because they will have driven the pushers out' (see V. Guerin. 'IRA used cease-fire to plan bomb campaign', Sunday Independent (Dublin). 23 June 1996). Subsequent electoral results seem to have upheld this assertion.

125. R. Balls, 'No hero in communities which he exploited', Irish Times (Dublin) 16 Jan. 1998.

126. H. MacDonell, 'MPs told of paramilitary ecstasy rake-off-. Press Association News, 1 May 1996.

127. V. Kearney, 'Hidden Agenda to IRA hits on drug dealers", Sunday Times (London and Dublin), 15 Feb. 1998.

128. 'Northern Ireland: Reappraising Republican Violence - A Special Report'. Conflict Studies (note 43).