Intelligence

Guardian | Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace

 

Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Michael Howard and John Hooper Saturday April 7, 2007 Guardian The US offered to take military action on behalf of the 15 British sailors and marines held by Iran, including buzzing Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions with warplanes, the Guardian has learned.

Source: Guardian | Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace

In the first few days after the captives were seized and British diplomats were getting no news from Tehran on their whereabouts, Pentagon officials asked their British counterparts: what do you want us to do? They offered a series of military options, a list which remains top secret given the mounting risk of war between the US and Iran. But one of the options was for US combat aircraft to mount aggressive patrols over Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases in Iran, to underline the seriousness of the situation.

The British declined the offer and said the US could calm the situation by staying out of it. London also asked the US to tone down military exercises that were already under way in the Gulf. Three days before the capture of the 15 Britons , a second carrier group arrived having been ordered there by president George Bush in January. The aim was to add to pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme and alleged operations inside Iraq against coalition forces.

At the request of the British, the two US carrier groups, totalling 40 ships plus aircraft, modified their exercises to make them less confrontational.

The British government also asked the US administration from Mr Bush down to be cautious in its use of rhetoric, which was relatively restrained throughout.

The incident was a reminder of how inflammatory the situation in the Gulf is. According to some US and British officers, there is already a proxy war under way between their forces and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Meanwhile, the Iranians are convinced that separatist guerrilla attacks in Khuzestan and Baluchistan provinces are the work of British and US intelligence respectively. Earlier this week, ABC television news reported that a Baluchi group, Jundullah, based in Pakistan and carrying out raids inside Iran, had been receiving advice and encouragement from American officials since 2005.

A senior Iranian source with close ties to the Revolutionary Guard, told the Guardian: "If this had been between Iranian and American soldiers it could have been the beginning of an accidental war."

With the crisis now over, a remarkable degree of consensus is emerging among British, Iranian and Iraqi officials about what happened over 13 nervous days - namely that the decision to seize the Britons was taken locally, and was not part of a grander scheme cooked up in Tehran.

"My best guess is that this was a local incident which became an international incident," said one British source closely involved in the crisis.

Both sides had been watching each other closely for years across the disputed line separating the Iranian and Iraqi sides of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the northern Gulf beyond and British officials say that Iranian boats regularly infringe on foreign waters.

The senior Iranian source meanwhile, claimed there had been three British incursions into Iranian waters in the three months leading up to the capture and that the decision to detain the British naval crew on March 23 was taken by a regional Revolutionary Guard commander, responsible for the waterway.

Once the 15 captives were brought back to Iran, their stay was guaranteed to be unpleasant. The Pasdaran (as the Revolutionary Guards are universally known in Farsi) are a law unto themselves, feared within Iran for their thuggish methods.

There is also general agreement in London and Tehran that once the crisis had been triggered it took nearly two weeks to untangle, because their release had to be agreed by all the key players in the perpetual poker game that passes for government in Tehran. But those players could not be reached because they were scattered around the country for the No Rouz (new year) holiday.

"Nobody who counted was answering the phone," said one senior British official. "By the time the Iranian leaders got back from the holiday [on Tuesday] the phone was ringing off the hook, including from people they didn't expect, calling on them to release the captives quickly."

Among those unexpected callers were their closest allies, the Syrians, as well as leaders from far-flung states with no direct stake in the Gulf. Even the Colombian government issued a protest.

Another surprise intervention came from the Vatican. Hours before Wednesday's release, a letter from Pope Benedict was handed to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It said the Pope was confident that men of goodwill could find a solution. He asked the supreme leader to do what he could to ensure that the British sailors and marines were reunited with their families in time for Easter. It would, he said, be a significant religious gesture of goodwill from the Iranian people.

What impact the Pope's message had is impossible to assess. But some of its language was reflected at the press conference at which the release of the 15 Britons was announced. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the decision to "forgive" the sailors and marines had been taken "on the occasion of the birthday of the great prophet [Muhammad] ... and for the occasion of the passing of Christ".

The Iraqi government also played a critical role, pushing for consular access to five Iranians who had been arrested by US forces in Irbil and had been in custody since January, and helping organise the mysterious release of an Iranian diplomat who had been in captivity since February.

In the first days of the crisis, Iraqi officials also helped the British to identify the exact boundaries of Iraqi waters, the Guardian has learned, suggesting the British were not as certain of their case as they had publicly claimed.

But it was the unexpected release of Jalal Sharifa, the second secretary at the Iranian embassy, that raised most eyebrows, fuelling speculation that some kind of bargaining was going on. The diplomat had been missing since he was plucked from the streets of Baghdad on February 4. Iran blamed US forces in Iraq for ordering the diplomat's abduction, but US military officials denied the claims. Baghdad's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, however, has insisted that negotiations over Mr Sharafi had been under way long before March 23.

Some credit for the abrupt release of the British naval crew has also been given to Tony Blair's top foreign policy adviser, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who got through to his Iranian counterpart, Ari Larijani for the first time the night before Mr Ahmadinejad made his surprise announcement. The opening of a Sheinwald-Larijani channel of communication is being hailed as one of the few pluses to emerge from the affair.

The crucial decision for release was taken on Tuesday by the supreme national security council. It includes representatives of the presidency, the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard, and Tuesday was the first day they could all be brought together following the No Rouz holiday.

"I think they realised pretty quickly the game was not worth the candle," a senior British government source said.

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2007

April 8, 2007 at 07:20 PM in Middle East, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

In quotes: Kendall Myers on US-UK relations

Telegraph | News | In quotes: Kendall Myers on US-UK relations

By Toby Harnden
Last Updated: 7:29am GMT 30/11/2006

Comments by Kendall Myers, US State Department official, at the SAIS lecture in Washington DC on 28th November 2006
# Britain's special relationship 'just a myth'
# Toby Harnden's blog: An American View of Tony Blair

On 'the myth of the special relationship':

"There never really has been a special relationship or at least not one we've noticed."

"As a State Department employee, now I will say something even worse: it has been from the very beginning very one-sided."

"The State Department and the American Embassy in London, by God they'll be pushing the special relationship till the end of time."

"The last prime minister to resist American pressure was Neville Chamberlain who was a much more brilliant figure in British diplomacy [than Winston Churchill]."

"We typically ignore them and take no notice. We say, ‘There are the Brits coming to tell us how to run our empire. Let's park them'. It is a sad business and I don't think it does them justice."

On what happens next:

"It's hard for me to believe that any British leader who follows Tony Blair will maintain the kind of relationship he has. There'll be much more of a distant relationship and certainly no more wars of choice in the future."

On Vietnam:

"Harold Wilson was a great deal more clever in my opinion than Tony Blair. He managed to fool us all on Vietnam."

"The deal was not one cent, not one Bobby, not one Johnny, nobody, not one participant in the Vietnam war. Wilson succeeded by sounding good but doing nothing… Blair got it the other way round and in the end joined in this Iraq adventure."

On Tony Blair's legacy:

"I would have to say that one of the most brilliant prime ministerships of modern times was brought a cropper by the Iraq war. He'll never recover in my opinion. It's been ruined for all time. That is tragic."

Why did Blair go into Iraq?

"You would have to say that the key fact was the British perception of the special relationship that when the Americans decide a major issue of national importance the British will not oppose. The way that Iraq developed it would have been extremely difficult for Tony Blair to have done a Harold Wilson."

"Tony Blair's a modern Gladstone. He really believes it. He may not have believed WMD – I don't know anybody knew that – he essentially believed this was in the West's interest to remove this evil dictator."

"Unfortunately, Tony Blair's background was as an actor and not an historian. If only he'd read a book on the 1920s he might have hesitated."

"I think it was probably a done deal from the beginning. It was a one-sided relationship and that one-sided relationship was entered into I think with open eyes. Tony Blair perhaps hoped that he could bring George Bush along, that he could convince him but of course George Bush has many other dimensions politically and intellectually."

What did Blair get from the Iraq war?

"I can't think of anything he got on the asset side of the ledger."

On Blair's verbal skills versus those of Bush:

"I suppose he [Blair] explained the war better than us. Whenever the two…would appear together it was always Tony Blair who sort of made sense. When Tony said it, at least the words were strung along eloquently."

On David Cameron

"He's taken some distance from the US and politically it's a shrewd, astute move."

"This one sounds right and looks good and even sounds a bit like Tony Blair, shockingly."

On Rumsfeld's March 2003 comments that British military help was not essential:

"That was sort of the giveaway. I felt a little ashamed and a certain sadness that we had treated him like that. And yet here it was – there was nothing, no payback, no sense of a reciprocity of the relationship."

On Britain's 'fundamental ambivalence' towards Europe:

"The more serious issue that confronts Britain is not the strength of the special relationship but the strength of ties to Europe."

"In a certain sense I hope they break it with us because rather personally I want to see the British more closely attached to Europe."

"Tony Blair could sound European on a good day, could occasionally pronounce French well and he wears blue jeans with the best Americans. I just think the role of Britain as a bridge between Europe and the United States is vanishing before our eyes."

"What I fear is, and what I think is, that the British will draw back from the US without moving closer to Europe. In that sense, London's bridge is falling down."

On Blair and the Labour Party:

"The Conservative party has a long and distinguished tradition of knifing its leaders in the back the moment a leader looks like a liability. Otherwise they remain absolutely loyal. While the Labour party belittles, attacks its leaders in and out of power from day one to the end as it turns out they'll never remove a leader."

"I would say that Tony Blair will become the Ramsay McDonald of the Labour party and the legacy will go on for a long time. But the difference is that the Labour party lacks the sense of the jugular. They will not remove him."

"He stood up to the Labour party and they haven't had the courage or audacity to remove him, to do what the Conservative party did when Margaret Thatcher became a liability. She had to be removed and they did it."

On the ascendancy of Scots in British politics:

"It's like Sicily taking over Italy."

When accused by an audience member of sounding negative:

"We're talking about post-Iraq and it's very difficult if one is being realistic not to sound pessimistic. This is a bad moment, let's face it. To be realistic we have not only failed to do what we wanted to do in Iraq but we have greatly strained our relationships with others."

"If you're looking at this from the moon it's Iraq, Iraq, Iraq and it does not look too pretty."

The silver lining:

"There is one quite brilliant achievement. It's Northern Ireland."

"Clinton delivered on it with Sinn Fein and I think in a way Bush is helping to deliver the Protestants."

"Northern Ireland is a success story of Britain and Anglo-American policy."

November 30, 2006 at 08:01 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Lop-sided alliance has lasted 60 years

Telegraph | News | Lop-sided alliance has lasted 60 years

ast Updated: 1:59am GMT 30/11/2006

Speaking in the American heartland of Missouri after the Second World War, Winston Churchill coined the phrase "special relationship" that has both blessed and dogged affairs between Britain and the United States ever since.

There was, he said, a "fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples", a "growing friendship and mutual understanding" between the two countries. "This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States."

Churchill's experience had been forged with President Franklin Roosevelt through the war.

By the time he reached Fulton, Missouri in March 1946 to deliver his famous speech about the emergence of an "Iron Curtain" across Europe, Churchill had been rejected by the British electorate and Roosevelt had succumbed to a brain haemorrhage.

Churchill's point was that the "special relationship" went beyond any friendship between two leaders. But there has always been dispute about exactly how much Britain has gained from the relationship.

In Russia in July, an unguarded conversation near an open microphone between Tony Blair and President George W Bush cemented the popular view of the Prime Minister as a poodle.

"Yo Blair!" greeted Mr Bush. "How are you doing?" When Mr Blair indicated he was leaving, Mr Bush responded: "No, no, no not yet." He asked if he was going to make a statement and Mr Blair said: "If you want me to."

The extraordinarily frank comments by Kendall Myers, who works for Condoleeza Rice in the State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence, will confirm accusations by Mr Blair's critics that he has sacrificed Britain's independence for nothing in return.

His broad thesis is supported by a significant strain of American diplomats who see the "special relationship" as an outdated concept useful chiefly because it helps guarantee that the White House can count on unswerving loyalty from Downing Street.

Mr Myers argued that the "special relationship" had been an illusion from the beginning. Even Churchill and Roosevelt had "constantly been at odds".

President Dwight Eisenhower had stood in the way of Britain over the 1956 Suez crisis, Mr Myers said, and there was still "strong resentment" among British elites because of this. Harold Wilson, he commented, had returned the favour by "sounding good but doing nothing" over Vietnam.

Despite the close affinity between Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan, America did not offer overt support for the Falklands war in 1982. The following year, the US invaded Grenada, a Commonwealth country, without informing Britain.

By the time of President Bill Clinton there was a certain disdain for Britain.

There was a furious transatlantic row over Mr Clinton's decision to grant Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader, a visa. Afterwards, John Major refused to take the president's telephone call.

Yet the continuing emotional ties between Britain and America were epitomised when the Coldstream Guards played the "Star Spangled Banner" outside Buckingham Palace after the September 11th atrocities.

And even today a British accent in the Mid-West often prompts a heartfelt expression of gratitude for the sacrifices of UK troops and Mr Blair's unstinting support over Iraq.

November 30, 2006 at 07:56 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

'London's bridge is falling down'

'London's bridge is falling down' - Britain - Times Online

Tom Baldwin in Washington and Philip Webster, Political Editor
# Damning verdict on one-sided US-UK relations after Iraq
# State Department official says Blair is ignored by Bush

See pictures of the Bush/Blair "special relationship" from first meeting to "Yo, Blair"

Timeline

In a devastating verdict on Tony Blair’s decision to back war in Iraq and his “totally one-sided” relationship with President Bush, a US State Department official has said that Britain’s role as a bridge between America and Europe is now “disappearing before our eyes”.

Kendall Myers, a senior State Department analyst, disclosed that for all Britain’s attempts to influence US policy in recent years, “we typically ignore them and take no notice — it’s a sad business”.

He added that he felt “a little ashamed” at Mr Bush’s treatment of the Prime Minister, who had invested so much of his political capital in standing shoulder to shoulder with America after 9/11.

Speaking at an academic forum in Washington on Tuesday night, he answered a question from The Times, saying: “It was a done deal from the beginning, it was a onesided relationship that was entered into with open eyes . . . there was nothing. There was no payback, no sense of reciprocity.”

His remarks brought calls from British politicians last night for the special relationship to be rethought, but also attracted scathing criticism from one close supporter of the Prime Minister.

Dr Myers had hard words for his own Administration’s record in the Iraq war: “It’s a bad time, let’s face it. We have not only failed to do what we wanted to do in Iraq but we have greatly strained our relationship with [Britain].”

Dr Myers, a specialist in British politics, predicted that the tight bond between Mr Bush and Mr Blair would not be replicated in the future. “What I think and fear is that Britain will draw back from the US without moving closer to Europe. In that sense London’s bridge is falling down.”

The extraordinarily frank remarks will be seen as further evidence of the long-standing unease felt within some parts of the State Department over the direction of White House policy. They may also be an indication of the weakness of President Bush as he struggles to stop Iraq sliding into civil war and faces a Democrat-dominated Congress elected this month.

Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat leader, said: “These remarks reflect a real sense of distaste among thinking Americans for Mr Blair’s apparent slavish support for President Bush . . . The special relationship needs to be rebalanced, rethought and renewed.”

But Denis MacShane, Labour MP for Rotherham and a former Foreign Office minister, who supported the Iraq war, said: “After the Republican defeat in the midterm election, every little rat who feasted during the Bush years is now leaving the ship. I would respect this gentleman, who I have never heard of, if he had had the guts to make any of these points two or five years ago.”

Last night Dr Myers, who is thought to have attended the discussions over the infamous Downing Street memo in 2002 before the Iraq war, was disowned by the State Department. Terry Davidson, a spokesman, said: “The US-UK relationship is indeed a special one. The US and the UK work together, along with our allies in Europe and across the world, on every issue imaginable. The views expressed by Mr Myers do not represent the views of the US Government. He was speaking as an academic, not as a representative of the State Department.”

Privately, US officials are furious about the comments made by a man not even involved in the policymaking process, which can only rock relations at a time of high-wire tension in international diplomacy. Dr Myers himself was said to be considering early retirement.

He said on Tuesday that Mr Blair had been left “ruined for all time” by the Iraq war and that if he had “only read a book” on the last British invasion of Iraq in the 1920s, “he might have hesitated”.

November 30, 2006 at 07:50 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

US pushed MI5 into airport terror swoop

The Observer | World | US pushed MI5 into airport terror swoop

Fight over suspect in Pakistan revealed as Musharraf quashes terror claims

Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
Sunday October 1, 2006
The Observer

The US warned Britain that it was prepared to seize the key suspect in the UK's biggest ever anti-terrorism operation and fly him to a secret detention centre for interrogation by American agents, even if this meant riding roughshod over its closest ally, The Observer can reveal.

American intelligence agents told their British counterparts they were ready to 'render' Rashid Rauf, a British citizen allegedly linked to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and who was under surveillance in Pakistan, unless he was picked up immediately. Rauf is the key suspect in the alleged plot to detonate explosives on up to 10 transatlantic planes that was exposed in August and, according to the police, would have brought 'mass murder on an unimaginable scale'.

The Americans' demand for Rauf's quick arrest dismayed the British intelligence services, which were worried that it could prompt terrorist cells in the UK working on separate plots to bring forward their plans or go underground. In the weeks preceding his arrest it is understood that MI5 and MI6 discussed with their US counterparts the best way to dismantle the alleged plot. Britain wanted more time to monitor Rauf, but the US was adamant that Rauf should be arrested immediately.

The revelation casts new light on the nature of America's relationship with Britain in the war on terrorism and provides further evidence of its suspicions that Pakistan was not fully committed in the war against al-Qaeda.

It comes as Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, today launches a fierce defence of claims that his country has fuelled Islamic terrorism and attacks Britain for failing to integrate Muslims into its society.

US intelligence has harboured fears for many years that Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, has not done enough to combat al-Qaeda and as a result was worried it would allow Rauf to flee. But the British intelligence agencies were concerned that seizing Rauf too soon would compromise further investigations. Although there were allegedly significant amounts of wire-tap evidence, this could not be made use of in a British court, so a decision was taken to continue with Rauf's surveillance.

However, a senior intelligence source has told The Observer that US agents had agreed on a plan to seize Rauf and fly him to an interrogation centre at a secret location if he remained at large.

Immediately following the US's veiled ultimatum that MI6 should 'lift' Rauf, which was communicated to ISI, he was arrested by Pakistani intelligence officials, a move that forced the British police to carry out a series of arrests as they looked to pick up those allegedly linked to him. Rauf's father, Abdel, was arrested in Pakistan. Rauf's brother, Tayib, from Birmingham, was arrested and later released without charge.

The intelligence source said the alleged plot had not been at the advanced planning stage.

Rauf remains in custody in Pakistan. Britain is now looking to extradite him in connection with the murder of his uncle in Birmingham in 2002.

Tellingly, although Britain's Home Secretary, John Reid, was full of praise for the part played by Pakistan in uncovering the alleged plot, the US did not pay tribute to the country's role.

American concerns about Pakistan's role in the war on terror were echoed last week. A leaked document from a Ministry of Defence think-tank, the Defence Academy, suggested that Pakistan was sabotaging British efforts in Afghanistan. The report blamed the ISI for 'indirectly supporting terrorism and extremism, whether in London on 7/7 or in Afghanistan or Iraq'.

Today, Musharraf uses an interview on ITV's Sunday Edition to fiercely reject claims the 7/7 bombers were indoctrinated in his country. 'The main problem is here in your society, which is allowing these youngsters to be indoctrinated and then attack you through suicide bombs,' Musharraf tells the programme.

Musharraf also says he believes Osama bin Laden could be hiding in Pakistan but rules out US forces being allowed to enter the country to hunt for him. 'We are in the hunt for Osama together,' Musharraf says. 'When we locate him, we'll hunt him down.'

Separately, it has emerged that a senior government official has joined a growing list of experts to warn the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exacerbated the threat from Islamic terrorism.

David Richmond, the director general of Defence and Intelligence at the Foreign Office, states in a paper for the Royal United Services Institute that concerns over foreign policy are used by al-Qaeda to justify attacks and have helped terrorist cells to recruit. According to Richmond, misgivings over foreign policy among elements of the Muslim community are 'exploited by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to justify terrorism and ... propagate their message and seek new recruits'.

October 1, 2006 at 10:31 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

US kept spying data from Blair

US kept spying data from Blair - Sunday Times - Times Online

SARAH BAXTER, WASHINGTON
White House plot to get rid of Rumsfeld claimed
TONY BLAIR was angered by America’s refusal to share intelligence on Iraq with Britain, according to a revealing new book by Bob Woodward, the veteran journalist who exposed the Watergate scandal.

The prime minister protested to President George W Bush about the way intelligence was routinely marked NOFORN (no foreigners), denying access to the US’s closest ally.

In State of Denial, published tomorrow, Woodward reveals that raw intelligence gathered by British operatives in Iraq and fused with the Americans’ own data was stored on the classified Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

“The British couldn’t see it, let alone get a copy, because it was marked NOFORN,” Woodward writes.

British pilots flying American warplanes such as F-117 Nighthawks and F015E Strike Eagles were even denied access to classified pilot manuals for the same reason.

“At times it went beyond absurd,” Woodward notes.

After complaints from Blair, Bush promised to lift the NOFORN restrictions, but the Pentagon simply began creating a new, separate SIPRNET to cut out the British, Woodward claims.

Bush confided in Blair about his frustration with the course of the Iraq war, telling him that the Americans were doing “such a lousy job of communications” that he was tempted to just “give this thing to the UK”.

During the first Iraqi elections in January 2005, Blair stepped in to help the country’s then leader, Iyad Allawi, when Bush refused to allow the US embassy or the CIA to “pick winners”.

Blair told Bush that the British would take care of matters and sent two operatives to help Allawi’s election campaign, though to little effect. Woodward also recounts how Bush was so intent on reviewing intelligence data that he met a junior Saudi Arabian diplomat to discuss a highly questionable report suggesting that the Saudis had been tipped off in advance about the July 7 London suicide bombings.

The memos said a captured terrorist suspect had told the Saudis six months before the attacks that four terrorists would mount an operation in London that would include the area around “Edgewood Road”, an apparent reference to the Edgware Road Underground station where one of the bombs exploded.

The suspect claimed the operation would involve four bombers coming from different countries, using explosives from Bosnia and requiring a money transfer of $500,000 (£270,000) to complete the operation.
Woodward said the memo was checked by the CIA and British intelligence. “It soon looked like another fabricator, and clearly should have been handled at a lower level,” he concludes in the book.

This weekend the White House was trying to limit the fall-out in Washington from Woodward’s disclosures. One of his most explosive allegations is that presidential aides twice tried to have Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, fired — once with the support of the first lady, Laura Bush.
Woodward portrays the White House as a “royal court” riven by feuds, where bearers of bad news from Iraq are swatted aside. Rumsfeld emerges as the chief villain.

According to Woodward’s account, he has been at odds with both Laura Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state. The first lady is said to have told Andrew Card, Bush’s former chief of staff, that Rumsfeld was hurting her husband’s reputation. “I don’t know why he’s not upset with this,” she reportedly said.

Card is believed to be bitter he was forced out of the White House last spring when “the man most responsible for the post-war trouble, the one who should have gone, was staying”. He admitted this weekend that he had discussed Rumsfeld’s possible removal with the president, but denied leading a sacking “campaign” or talking about it with Laura Bush.

Rumsfeld is described feuding with Rice when she was national security adviser. He would refuse to return her calls on the grounds that she was not in the chain of command. Rice complained to Bush, who advised her to charm the defence secretary by being “playful”.

Bush’s resistance to changing course in Iraq is said to have been stiffened by talks with Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s secretary of state.

The situation in Iraq is likely to worsen in 2007, according to the leaked report. But if Woodward is to be believed, no amount of criticism or bad news will persuade the president to switch tactics.

“I will not withdraw even if Laura and [his pet dog] Barney are the only ones supporting me,” Bush reportedly said.

Additional reporting: David Leppard

September 30, 2006 at 10:13 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

“The Fog of War”: An Examination of the United Kingdom’s and the United States’ “Special Relationship”, 1990 – 2003, with reference to “Friendly Fire” Incidents

“The Fog of War”: An Examination of the United Kingdom’s and the United States’ “Special Relationship”, 1990 – 2003, with refe

British foreign policy in the post-Cold war period accords neatly with an expanded, pluralistic agenda as British leaders have pursued “subjective preferences” formed “periodically both in response to the domestic political process itself and in response to shifts in the international environment”21. As McNair surmises, “[i]n one key sense, of course, international relations are a domestic matter, since a government’s conduct in this area can sharply affect its popularity with the voters... In the pursuit of a state’s international relations, a government has the opportunity to perform on the world stage, before a global audience of billions”22. Consequently, the frontiers between international and domestic affairs have become indistinguishable, but the misnomer ‘national interest’ persists as a hyperbolic tool intended to imbue prime ministerial goals with loftier values.

July 23, 2006 at 12:17 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

THE END OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?

The Secret Realignment of UK Defence Policy with the EU - Military Photos

How the secret realignment of UK defence procurement will mean that the UK will no longer be able to co-operate militarily with the US……at a cost to the UK of £14 billion. One of the most significant – yet largely unreported – political developments of recent years is the move being made by the UK to integrate its armed forces with those of the EU.

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In turn, it will be increasingly hard for the UK either to fight independently or to co-operate militarily with the US. The special relationship will be at an end. That is the conclusion of Richard North in The Wrong Side of the Hill: the secret realignment of UK defence policy with the EU, published on Thursday, 13 October 2005 by the Centre for Policy Studies. As Major-General Julian Thompson writes in the Foreword to the pamphlet, “the British public should be shocked by what is revealed”. What is even more alarming is the extent to which the British Government has been at pains to conceal and even to deny its true military and political agenda. The pattern of the procurement policy now being followed by the MoD means that the capabilities of the armed forces of the UK and the US are rapidly moving apart. This policy is traced back to the St Malo agreement in 1998 which in turn led to the EU’s decision to establish a multi-national ‘European Rapid Reaction Force’ (ERRF) as the centrepiece of its new military ambitions.

The repercussions of this decision are made infinitely greater by the fact that both the US and the EU stand today on the edge of a technical revolution in warfare, centred on satellites, electronics and a new generation of vehicles, unmanned aircraft and weapons systems (“net-centric warfare”). So closely co-ordinated will the forces of the future need to be through their technology that it will be virtually impossible for forces working under different systems to work alongside one another. Until recently the UK and the US were still working in close partnership in developing the technology required to achieve this revolution in the nature of warfare. But in the past year or two, the MoD’s procurement policy has shifted away from co-operation with the US towards closer dependence on Britain’s EU partners. Almost across the board, the MoD is now turning its back on joint defence projects with the US, even where these involve British firms. As a result, the MoD is buying inferior or more costly equipment than that which Anglo-US contractors could supply. The potential cost is estimated at £14 billion (see pp 48-49).The nature of the equipment now being bought for the UK’s armed forces implies not just a growing technical divergence between the ERRF and Nato but also a doctrinal conflict with established US and Nato practice.

It will be increasingly difficult for forces on each side of this divide to work together, or even to share the same battlezones. The situation is compounded by the EU’s formal co-operation with China, a strategic rival of the US. This includes the Galileo satellite global positioning system, in which the UK is an equal partner. Because of potential technology leakage from the EU to China, the US is increasingly reluctant to share its technology with Britain. The problems of UK-US co-operation are therefore being exacerbated further. It will soon be too late to reverse this trend. The Commission is now also proposing to control intra-EU movements of military products, thereby making the actions of the British Army dependent on her EU partners’ consent. The UK would be irreversibly committed to operating within a framework defined by European Union interests. The special relationship would be over.

October 13, 2005 at 10:45 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

NYPD clarifies bomb disclosures

BBC NEWS | UK | NYPD clarifies bomb disclosures

New York police insist they were right to release details of the bombs that killed 56 people in London, even though they had not been vetted by UK police.

Deputy NYPD commissioner Paul Browne said commissioner Raymond Kelly was right to include details of the devices in a briefing for security experts.

These included saying the 7 July bombs had been detonated by mobile phones.

But Mr Browne said he regretted making an erroneous statement saying the details had been cleared by the Met.

'Routine'

He said he had made the statement believing it to be true but it had turned out to be wrong.

However, he maintained all the information released by the NYPD was unclassified and open source material.

He added that it was normal for New York police to release such information, saying: "We do this routinely with information we have about the elements used in terrorist attacks around the world.

"We've been doing it for three-and-a-half years - long before the incidents in London - and it's helped us educate the public."

Mr Kelly gave details of the bombs during a briefing for New York security industry bosses on information given to NYPD officers monitoring the investigation in London.

He said: "Initially it was thought that perhaps the materials were high-end military explosives that were smuggled - but it turns out not to be the case.

"It is more like these terrorists went to a hardware store or some beauty supply store."

"Flophouse"

The NYPD said investigators believed the bombs were made using a peroxide-based explosive that can be made from hair bleach and other ingredients.

Officials said the bombs had probably been made in Leeds and had been stored in a powerful refrigerator.

The substances used in the failed 21 July bomb attacks were "similar but not necessarily the same", a spokesman said.

The bombs were transported to the outskirts of London in drink coolers stashed in the boot of two cars and detonated by mobile phones that had alarms set to 0850 BST, the officials added.

Deputy commissioner of counter-terrorism Michael Sheehan said: "In the flophouse where this was built in Leeds, they had commercial grade refrigerators to keep the materials cool."

The NYPD was troubled by information it had received about the bombers' links to "organisations" he added.

"We know those same types of organisations that they are affiliated with are very much present in New York City.

"That is something we are studying very, very carefully.

"This could happen here."

Scotland Yard has refused to comment on the NYPD claims.

August 5, 2005 at 12:06 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Hints of ‘another Madrid’

Newsday.com: Hints of ‘another Madrid’

BY KNUT ROYCE
SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

July 8, 2005

WASHINGTON -- U.S. intelligence had picked up warnings recently that the al-Qaida terror network or its followers were seeking to duplicate the dramatic 3/11 Madrid train bombings in another European city, two knowledgeable sources said Thursday.

The information lacked details on what city might be the target or when the attacks might occur, but it appeared to foreshadow Thursday's London mass-transit bombing, which was similar to the 2004 Madrid attacks that also targeted commuter trains at rush-hour.

Some of that information had been culled from a notebook belonging to Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the No.3 official in al-Qaida and the group's operations chief, who was arrested in Pakistan in May, one intelligence source said.

"There was some intelligence that they wanted to do another Madrid in Europe," said the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "This came from al-Libbi's secret notebooks."

An administration official familiar with current counterterrorism intelligence confirmed the United States had picked up the unspecified warning of Madrid-style train attacks in Europe, but the source provided no further details.

Both British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and U.S Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said there had been no warning of an imminent attack in London.

In London, bombs on three commuter trains were detonated by timers, not cell phones, as were used in Madrid, one U.S official said. A fourth blast on a double-decker bus appears to have been the work of a suicide bomber, according to the preliminary investigation, the sources said.

In addition, two unexploded bombs were recovered from trains, one source said.

A previously unknown group calling itself The Secret Organization of al-Qaida in Europe posted a claim of responsibility for the London attacks on a Web site popular with Islamic militants, but it couldn't be verified last night.

In Madrid, terrorists planted 10 bombs on four commuter trains on March 11, 2004 -- or 3/11, as it came to be known -- killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,400. Investigators later found three unexploded bombs and determined that they were rigged with cell phones as detonators.

The heads of the CIA and FBI have said the Madrid train bombings were carried out by local Muslim terrorists who might have been inspired by al-Qaida but not necessarily directed by them, in an effort to force Spain to remove troops from Iraq.

Despite the al-Libbi notes, counterterrorism experts said the London bombing could also highlight a new and troubling phase of the anti-terror fight. That would mean the enemy isn't merely al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden and his direct operatives but an unknown number of loosely affiliated Islamic extremists.

"Our enemy now is so unknown to us ... that we have no sense of what al-Qaida is anymore," said Juliette Kayyem, a leading terrorism expert at Harvard University. "This will make our job so much more difficult."

The London attack "suggests that the terrorist threat is strong enough, organized enough and able to bypass numerous intelligence agencies ... the enemy is in better shape than we believed," she said.

The attacks come after the arrest of al-Libbi, and other events have caused some outside the United States to say al-Qaida was on the ropes and even U.S. officials to claim success against the terror group.

"It should be a wake-up call," said Fred Burton, a former State Department counterterrorism official now with Stratfor, a private intelligence group. "If you look at al-Qaida of the future, this is the type of al-Qaida operation we're going to be faced with: soft targets, high casualty count and an extreme amount of shock and awe. It has woken up the world that al-Qaida is still a very dangerous organization."

Craig Gordon and Tom Brune of Newsday's Washington Bureau contributed to this story.

July 9, 2005 at 05:47 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Blair planned Iraq war from start

Blair planned Iraq war from start - Sunday Times - Times Online

Michael Smith
INSIDE Downing Street Tony Blair had gathered some of his senior ministers and advisers for a pivotal meeting in the build-up to the Iraq war. It was 9am on July 23, 2002, eight months before the invasion began and long before the public was told war was inevitable.

The discussion that morning was highly confidential. As minutes of the proceedings, headed �Secret and strictly personal � UK eyes only�, state: �This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.�

In the room were the prime minister, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, and military and intelligence chiefs. Also listed on the minutes are Alastair Campbell, then Blair�s director of strategy, Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Sally Morgan, director of government relations.

What they were about to discuss would dominate the political agenda for years to come and indelibly stain Blair�s reputation; and last week the issue exploded again on the political scene as Blair campaigned in the hope of winning a third term as prime minister.

For the secret documents � seen by The Sunday Times � reveal that on that Tuesday in 2002:

# Blair was right from the outset committed to supporting US plans for �regime change� in Iraq.

# War was already �seen as inevitable�.

# The attorney-general was already warning of grave doubts about its legality.

Straw even said the case for war was �thin�. So Blair and his inner circle set about devising a plan to justify invasion.

�If the political context were right,� said Blair, �people would support regime change.� Straightforward regime change, though, was illegal. They needed another reason.

By the end of the meeting, a possible path to invasion was agreed and it was noted that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the defence staff, �would send the prime minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week�.

Outside Downing Street, the rest of Britain, including most cabinet ministers, knew nothing of this. True, tensions were running high, and fears of terrorism were widespread. But Blair�s constant refrain was that �no decisions� had been taken about what to do with Iraq.

The following day in the House of Commons, Blair told MPs: �We have not got to the stage of military action . . . we have not yet reached the point of decision.�

It was typical lawyer�s cleverness, if not dissembling: while no actual order had been given to invade, Blair already knew Saddam Hussein was going to be removed, sooner or later. Plans were in motion. The justification would come later.

AS a civil service briefing paper specifically prepared for the July meeting reveals, Blair had made his fundamental decision on Saddam when he met President George W Bush in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002.

�When the prime minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April,� states the paper, �he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change.�

Blair set certain conditions: that efforts were first made to try to eliminate Iraq�s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through weapons inspectors and to form a coalition and �shape� public opinion. But the bottom line was that he was signed up to ousting Saddam by force if other methods failed. The Americans just wanted to get rid of the brutal dictator, whether or not he posed an immediate threat.

This presented a problem because, as the secret briefing paper made clear, there were no clear legal grounds for war.

�US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community,� says the briefing paper. �Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law.�

To compound matters, the US was not a party to the International Criminal Court, while Britain was. The ICC, which came into force on 1 July, 2002, was set up to try international offences such as war crimes.

Military plans were forging ahead in America but the British, despite Blair�s commitment, played down talk of war.

In April, Straw told MPs that no decisions about military action �are likely to be made for some time�.

That month Blair said in the Commons: �We will ensure the house is properly consulted.� On July 17 he told MPs: �As I say constantly, no decisions have yet been taken.�

Six days later in Downing Street the man who opened the secret discussion of Blair�s war meeting was John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. A former MI6 officer, Scarlett had become a key member of Blair�s �sofa cabinet�. He came straight to the point � �Saddam�s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action�.

Saddam was expecting an attack, said Scarlett, but was not convinced it would be �immediate or overwhelming�.

His assessment reveals that the primary impetus to action over Iraq was not the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction � as Blair later told the country � but the desire to overthrow Saddam. There was little talk of WMD at all.

The next contributor to the meeting, according to the minutes, was �C�, as the chief of MI6 is traditionally known.

Sir Richard Dearlove added nothing to what Scarlett had said about Iraq: his intelligence concerned his recent visit to Washington where he had held talks with George Tenet, director of the CIA.

�Military action was now seen as inevitable,� said Dearlove. �Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.�

The Americans had been trying to link Saddam to the 9/11 attacks; but the British knew the evidence was flimsy or non-existent. Dearlove warned the meeting that �the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy�.

It was clear from Dearlove�s brief visit that the US administration�s attitude would compound the legal difficulties for Britain. The US had no patience with the United Nations and little inclination to ensure an invasion was backed by the security council, he said.

Nor did the Americans seem very interested in what might happen in the aftermath of military action. Yet, as Boyce then reported, events were already moving swiftly.

�CDS (chief of the defence staff) said that military planners would brief (Donald) Rumsfeld (US defence secretary) on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.�

The US invasion plans centred around two options. One was a full-blown reprise of the 1991 Gulf war, a steady and obvious build-up of troops over several months, followed by a large-scale invasion.

The other was a �running start�. Seizing on an Iraqi casus belli, US and RAF patrols over the southern no-fly zone would knock out the Iraqi air defences. Allied special forces would then carry out a series of small-scale operations in tandem with the Iraqi opposition, with more forces joining the battle as they arrived, eventually toppling Saddam�s regime.

The �running start� was, said Boyce, �a hazardous option�.

In either case the US saw three options for British involvement. The first allowed the use of the bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus and three squadrons of special forces; the second added RAF aircraft and Royal Navy ships; the third threw in 40,000 ground troops �perhaps with a discrete role in northern Iraq entering from Turkey�.

At the least the US saw the use of British bases as �critical�, which posed immediate legal problems. And Hoon said the US had already begun �spikes of activity� to put pressure on the regime.

AMID all this talk of military might and invasion plans, one awkward voice spoke up. Straw warned that, though Bush had made up his mind on military action, the case for it was �thin�. He was not thinking in purely legal terms.

A few weeks later the government would paint Saddam as an imminent threat to the Middle East and the world. But that morning in private Straw said: �Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.�

It was a key point. If Saddam was not an immediate threat, could war be justified legally? The attorney-general made his position clear, telling the meeting that �the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action�.

Right from the outset, the minutes reveal, the government�s legal adviser had grave doubts about Blair�s plans; he would only finally conclude unequivocally that war was legal three days before the invasion, by which time tens of thousands of troops were already on the borders of Iraq.

There were three possible legal bases for military action, said Goldsmith. Self-defence, intervention to end an humanitarian crisis and a resolution from the UN Security Council.

Neither of the first two options was a possibility with Iraq; it had to be a UN resolution. But relying, as some hoped they could, on an existing UN resolution, would be �difficult�.

Despite voicing concerns, Straw was not standing in the way of war. It was he who suggested a solution: they should force Saddam into a corner where he would give them a clear reason for war.

�We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,� he said.

If he refused, or the weapons inspectors found WMD, there would be good cause for war. �This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force,� said Straw.

From the minutes, it seems as if Blair seized on the idea as a way of reconciling the US drive towards invasion and Britain�s need for a legal excuse.

�The prime minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors,� record the minutes. �Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD . . . If the political context were right, people would support regime change.�

Blair would subsequently portray the key issue to parliament and the people as the threat of WMD; and weeks later he would produce the now notorious �sexed up� dossier detailing Iraq�s suspected nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes.

But in the meeting Blair said: �The two key issues are whether the military plan works and whether we have the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.�

Hoon said that if the prime minister wanted to send in the troops, he would have to decide early. The defence chiefs were pressing to be allowed to buy large amounts of equipment as �urgent operational requirements�. They had been prevented from preparing for war, partly by Blair�s insistence that there could be no publicly visible preparations that might inflame splits in his party, partly by the fact there was no authorisation to spend any money.

The meeting concluded that they should plan for the UK taking part in any military action. Boyce would send Blair full details; Blair would come back with a decision about money; and Straw would send Blair the background on the UN inspectors and �discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam�.

The final note of the minutes, says: �We must not ignore the legal issues: the attorney-general would consider legal advice with (Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence) legal advisers.�

It was a prophetic warning.

Also seen by The Sunday Times is the Foreign Office opinion on the possible legal bases for war. Marked �Confidential�, it runs to eight pages and casts doubt on the possibility of reviving the authority to use force from earlier UN resolutions. �Reliance on it now would be unlikely to receive any support,� it says.

Foreign Office lawyers were consistently doubtful of the legality of war and one deputy legal director, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ultimately resigned because she believed the conflict was a �crime of aggression�.

The Foreign Office briefing on the legal aspects was made available for the Downing Street meeting on July 23. Ten days ago, when Blair was interviewed by the BBC�s Jeremy Paxman, the prime minister was asked repeatedly whether he had seen that advice.

�No,� said Blair. �I had the attorney-general�s advice to guide me.�

But as the July 23 documents show, the attorney-general�s view was, until the last minute, also riven with doubts.

Three years on, it and the questionable legality of the war are still hanging round Blair�s neck like an albatross.

May 1, 2005 at 09:34 AM in Iraq, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

The secret Downing Street memo

The secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times - Times Online

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

May 1, 2005 at 09:30 AM in Iraq, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Bush, not Blair, is the key

Telegraph | Opinion | Bush, not Blair, is the key

(Filed: 23/05/2004)

On the BBC's The Week in Westminster yesterday, Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British Ambassador to Washington, made a thought-provoking observation about the relationship between Tony Blair and George W Bush over Iraq. "We've [given] near-as-damn-it total support in public," he said. "I don't think we've always had enough candour in private."

Last week, Michael Howard called for Mr Blair to make public at least some of his arguments with the President. The Tory leader took issue with "the view that any advice [Mr Blair] offers on US policy must be made in private and any disagreement kept secret".

Sir Christopher, who organised Mr Blair's first contact with Mr Bush before he was President, has provided a different perspective: namely, that it is the private negotiations themselves which are the problem. Britain had conspicuously failed, he said, "to get our views into the [US] administration and adopted, on how you handled Iraq after Saddam Hussein".

This failure is, in part, a reflection both of Mr Blair's strong conviction and of his emollient character. Precisely because he believed that Britain had a moral obligation to join the war in Iraq, he has sometimes been more reluctant than he should have been to exploit his position.

At the same time, his perception that Mr Bush values loyalty above all else and the Prime Minister's compulsive desire to please has made him more concerned with preserving good relations than with aggressive diplomacy. It is reported in the current Spectator that Mr Blair was provided with a "wish-list" of British demands before a pre-war meeting with the President and failed to raise a single one of them with Mr Bush. When officials expressed their exasperation to Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary reportedly shrugged and said: "That's the nature of the beast."

The Prime Minister, it is true, played a significant role in persuading Mr Bush to seek UN authorisation for the liberation of Iraq and in the launch of the Middle East "road map" on the eve of the war. The trouble for Mr Blair is that both undertakings went disastrously wrong, and convinced many of the President's less friendly colleagues that the Prime Minister was becoming a liability, delaying US policy with his woolly preoccupations.

Mr Bush, it is quite clear, still regards the Prime Minister as a great asset to his cause. But the President is undoubtedly more receptive than he was to Mr Blair's critics in Washington. When the Prime Minister raised concerns about Ariel Sharon's plan for the West Bank and Gaza, Mr Bush appeared to listen sympathetically but then - to the consternation of Mr Blair's advisers - backed the plan anyway.

Even so, the President must be wishing - or at least should be - that he had heeded the warnings of the British Government about Ahmed Chalabi, the discredited pretender to the leadership of Iraq and creature of the Pentagon, which uncritically swallowed his bogus intelligence about Saddam Hussein's WMD. British ministers and officials also constantly warned their American counterparts about the likely perils of reconstruction in Iraq, emphasising that security must precede democracy.

The debate last week focused on the extent to which Mr Blair should make public his disagreements with the President. On the BBC's Newsnight, Peter Mandelson said that for the Prime Minister to do so would "demoralise British troops".

On the contrary: British servicemen, appalled by the images from Abu Ghraib, which they regard as only the most grotesque example of the hamfistedness of US troops, would probably be heartened if Mr Blair expressed a measure of irritation with the US armed forces. But the President himself has a part to play in this too, and - at a time when our two nations are spliced together in coalition - it is not inappropriate to remind him of this.

To a greater extent than is often appreciated, this President has always understood the need for America to pursue the war on terror as part of an international alliance. It is important that he and his administration realise, therefore, that this coalition is in a dire condition. Spain has already peeled off, and now the pressures upon Mr Blair are more intense than ever.

The Prime Minister has made it clear that he will not withdraw from Iraq for short-term political gain: but it is not hard to envisage a Labour Government led by someone else taking a very different view. The White House understands the need to support Mr Blair but does not, it would seem, grasp how precarious is his position: in practice, the collapse of the entire coalition is only a few well-organised Labour mutinies and a poll slump away.

It is for the President to decide how much this matters to him. But if he wishes this particular alliance to survive, and with it the campaign that will define his presidency's place in history, he must acknowledge unambiguously that he is listening to his closest ally, and that he has learned. At this dangerous moment, it is what Mr Bush - rather than Mr Blair - says that truly matters.

May 23, 2004 at 10:48 AM in Special Relationship | Permalink | TrackBack (465) | Top of page | Blog Home

Times - Europe or America: it's time for Britain to choose

Times Online - Comment

William Rees-Mogg

At the cost of consuming fish, chips and mushy peas in a Durham pub, President Bush has returned to the United States with a diplomatic success and, inevitably, a better understanding of the balance of British opinion. The President demonstrated that he was a serious and thoughtful man, and not the Texan cowboy of tabloid cartoons.

The President and the Prime Minister showed that theirs is a genuine partnership, with real elements of friendship and trust on both sides. Yet the unforeseen circumstance had the greatest effect. That was the bombing by al-Qaeda of British targets in Turkey. At the start of the President’s visit there were many people who had forgotten the underlying cause of the new Anglo-American alliance — not the alliance that dates back 62 years to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, but the one that dates back two years from the bombing of the World Trade Centre.

In London, the weekend before the visit had been one of grumblings about the inconvenience, about the traffic, about the heavy security. The suicide bombs in Turkey, killing British people as well as Turkish, made their point. After the United States, Britain is regarded by al-Qaeda terrorists as their chief enemy. Britain is in this alliance with America and our political leaders work in partnership, because both our countries are under attack. The President’s state visit gave a physical expression to a joint determination to fight terrorism.

Of course, some people have argued that, if Britain had done nothing to provoke al-Qaeda, it might have been spared. I am old enough to remember the same arguments being used by the advocates of appeasement in the late 1930s. If Britain lets Hitler seize Czechoslovakia, they said, he will be satisfied with that. He will not turn on us: Hitler is a German patriot with limited aims.

We now hear the argument that it is the allied invasion of Iraq that has led to the bombs in Turkey and caused these tragic deaths. Yet Turkey is conspicuous as the country which changed its mind about supporting the American action. That did not save Turkey, and it certainly would not have saved us.

It was an additional credit to Mr Bush, which may have contributed to his rising support in British opinion, that it took courage for him to come here. There are at least 100 people in London who sympathise with al-Qaeda and would have been more than willing to murder the President if they had seen an opportunity. It took courage to stay in Buckingham Palace, a rambling old house with Victorian standards of security, as the Daily Mirror proved. It even took courage to go to a pub in Co Durham that had been named in all the newspapers the day before. The President’s secret servicemen must have had an anxious week.

This constant threat is a price that has to be paid by modern political leaders. Tony Blair faces the same danger. No one can have shaken hands with the President without for a second half-wondering whether that might not be the moment a terrorist bomb would explode.

There were, of course, protests, but they came to less than had been expected. The protests were concerned with Middle East policy, primarily with the campaign in Iraq and secondly with US support for Israel. Interestingly, there was little protest from the advocates of European integration, although the balance between Britain’s relationship with the United States and that with “old Europe” is becoming a central question for our foreign policy.

The Americans, as Irwin Steltzer was explaining here last week, are becoming increasingly worried at the risk of losing Britain to Europe which, under Franco-German leadership, they see as increasingly hostile to the United States.

They are concerned about the new European constitution. British politicians are divided. Some are Europhiles who want Britain to make a clear and total commitment to the European Union and its new draft constitution, even at the expense of integration into a European federation. They would accept a common European defence force at the expense of Nato, and a common European foreign policy potentially antagonistic to the United States.

Some hope for a friendly, free trade relationship with Europe, but reject the new constitution and oppose integration into a single European state. If forced into a choice between Europe and the United States, they would probably choose the United States. Others want to leave the European Union and resume full British independence.

At present the Government belongs to none of these groups, but hopes it will be possible to continue to ride both horses, and simultaneously be Europeanist and Atlanticist. Perhaps Mr Blair shares the philosophy of Harold Wilson: “If you cannot ride three horses at once, you should not be in the bloody circus.”

In each of the major parties at Westminster one can find some Members of Parliament who support each of these views. Each party is divided, although the Liberal Democrats are predominantly Europhile, the Conservatives predominantly Eurosceptic, and most Labour members believe, as the Tories used to, in a judicious straddle. It is a very governmental posture.

While the President and the Prime Minister were discussing the Anglo-American alliance in London, President Chirac of France and Gerhard Schröder, the German Chancellor, were discussing the Franco-German alliance. One cannot consider these two relationships separately. As a senior French official put it last week, “the British must choose. Either they are with us, united in Europe, where they should be, or they are destined to become united with America, something like an American state.”

This is an exaggeration. I know many Americans who value Britain’s close alliance with the United States highly but hardly any who believe that a federal merger of British and American sovereignty is either desirable or practical. If our objection to the European constitution is that we do not want to be submerged in a federal structure, we are unlikely to seek a federal marriage with the United States. After all, Canada has never felt it necessary to seek admission to the Union. Nevertheless, there probably will be a choice to be made.

The development of the European constitution, and the ever-closer links of the Franco-German alliance, could present us with the choice British statesmen have been trying to avoid since 1945: Europe or America? Are we a Continental or an Atlantic nation? The combination of the centralisation of the new constitution with the close Franco-German alliance creates the difficulty.

If France and Germany act together, as a federation inside a federation, they can dominate Europe under the new constitution. Even in qualified majority voting terms, they will effectively have the power to block any European laws they do not like. We shall lose our veto, but France and Germany will, in practice, keep theirs. Britain might conceivably be persuaded to join a democratic European federation of the 25. Britain is likely to recoil from a bureaucratic European superstate dominated by France and Germany.

So will other European powers. When I was last in Denmark I was astonished by the depth of Danish fears of Franco-German dominance; they are particularly suspicious of the French. Similar fears are felt in Poland, Italy and Spain. These fears of a Europe which would really become a Franco-German empire, as Germany became the Prussian Empire after 1871, could lead to the rejection of the draft constitution, itself a French document.

Last week’s visit by President Bush confirmed the importance of the Anglo-American alliance to Britain and to the United States. In today’s talks, President Chirac will be discussing the European constitution with Mr Blair. The Prime Minister believes in the American alliance; he also believes in Britain’s European future. The draft constitution would make it impossible for him to remain loyal to both alliances.

If he agrees to President Chirac’s proposal that the constitution should go through almost unchanged at next month’s Brussels summit, the Prime Minister will be opting for integration in a Franco-German Europe, as against alliance with the United States. If that is what he prefers, he must at least be open about it. Such an historic decision is not for him alone: it must have the full, informed consent of the British people, which can be expressed only in a referendum.

Join the Debate on this article at comment@thetimes.co.uk

November 23, 2003 at 08:09 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London

Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace
Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace
London, England

1:24 P.M. (Local)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Secretary Straw and Secretary Hoon; Admiral Cobbald and Dr. Chipman; distinguished guests: I want to thank you for your very kind welcome that you've given to me and to Laura. I also thank the groups hosting this event -- The Royal United Services Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. We're honored to be in the United Kingdom, and we bring the good wishes of the American people.

It was pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit London stayed in a glass box dangling over the Thames. (Laughter.) A few might have been happy to provide similar arrangements for me. (Laughter.) I thank Her Majesty the Queen for interceding. (Laughter.) We're honored to be staying at her house.

Americans traveling to England always observe more similarities to our country than differences. I've been here only a short time, but I've noticed that the tradition of free speech -- exercised with enthusiasm -- (laughter) -- is alive and well here in London. We have that at home, too. They now have that right in Baghdad, as well. (Applause.)

The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island, by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades to fight and end the trade in slaves.

It's rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That's, in part, because the "Good News" was translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example of William Booth. At times, Americans are even said to have a puritan streak -- where might that have come from? (Laughter.) Well, we can start with the Puritans.

To this fine heritage, Americans have added a few traits of our own: the good influence of our immigrants, the spirit of the frontier. Yet, there remains a bit of England in every American. So much of our national character comes from you, and we're glad for it.

The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in economies that reward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of all. And whether one learns these ideals in County Durham or in West Texas, they instill mutual respect and they inspire common purpose.

More than an alliance of security and commerce, the British and American peoples have an alliance of values. And, today, this old and tested alliance is very strong. (Applause.)

The deepest beliefs of our nations set the direction of our foreign policy. We value our own civil rights, so we stand for the human rights of others. We affirm the God-given dignity of every person, so we are moved to action by poverty and oppression and famine and disease. The United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings. Together our nations are standing and sacrificing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour. And America honors the idealism and the bravery of the sons and daughters of Britain.

The last President to stay at Buckingham Palace was an idealist, without question. At a dinner hosted by King George V, in 1918, Woodrow Wilson made a pledge; with typical American understatement, he vowed that right and justice would become the predominant and controlling force in the world.

President Wilson had come to Europe with his 14 Points for Peace. Many complimented him on his vision; yet some were dubious. Take, for example, the Prime Minister of France. He complained that God, himself, had only 10 commandments. (Laughter.) Sounds familiar. (Laughter.)

At Wilson's high point of idealism, however, Europe was one short generation from Munich and Auschwitz and the Blitz. Looking back, we see the reasons why. The League of Nations, lacking both credibility and will, collapsed at the first challenge of the dictators. Free nations failed to recognize, much less confront, the aggressive evil in plain sight. And so dictators went about their business, feeding resentments and anti-Semitism, bringing death to innocent people in this city and across the world, and filling the last century with violence and genocide.

Through world war and cold war, we learned that idealism, if it is to do any good in this world, requires common purpose and national strength, moral courage and patience in difficult tasks. And now our generation has need of these qualities.

On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country, and took the lives of 67 British citizens. With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false. The attacks that followed -- on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Bombay, Mombassa, Najaf, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul -- were not dreams. They're part of the global campaign by terrorist networks to intimidate and demoralize all who oppose them.

These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them. The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial. Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them. (Applause.)

The peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars: First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world, from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation.

Like 11 Presidents before me, I believe in the international institutions and alliances that America helped to form and helps to lead. The United States and Great Britain have labored hard to help make the United Nations what it is supposed to be -- an effective instrument of our collective security. In recent months, we've sought and gained three additional resolutions on Iraq -- Resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511 -- precisely because the global danger of terror demands a global response. The United Nations has no more compelling advocate than your Prime Minister, who at every turn has championed its ideals and appealed to its authority. He understands, as well, that the credibility of the U.N. depends on a willingness to keep its word and to act when action is required.

America and Great Britain have done, and will do, all in their power to prevent the United Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance and inviting the fate of the League of Nations. It's not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions; we must meet those dangers with resolve.

In this century, as in the last, nations can accomplish more together than apart. For 54 years, America has stood with our partners in NATO, the most effective multilateral institution in history. We're committed to this great democratic alliance, and we believe it must have the will and the capacity to act beyond Europe where threats emerge.

My nation welcomes the growing unity of Europe, and the world needs America and the European Union to work in common purpose for the advance of security and justice. America is cooperating with four other nations to meet the dangers posed by North Korea. America believes the IAEA must be true to its purpose and hold Iran to its obligations.

Our first choice, and our constant practice, is to work with other responsible governments. We understand, as well, that the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to forms alone, the tidiness of the process, but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure.

The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to retain* {sic} aggression and evil by force. There are principled objections to the use of force in every generation, and I credit the good motives behind these views.

Those in authority, however, are not judged only by good motivations. The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force.

Most in the peaceful West have no living memory of that kind of world. Yet in some countries, the memories are recent: The victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, those who survived the rapists and the death squads, have few qualms when NATO applied force to help end those crimes. The women of Afghanistan, imprisoned in their homes and beaten in the streets and executed in public spectacles, did not reproach us for routing the Taliban. The inhabitants of Iraq's Baathist hell, with its lavish palaces and its torture chambers, with its massive statues and its mass graves, do not miss their fugitive dictator. They rejoiced at his fall.

In all these cases, military action was proceeded by diplomatic initiatives and negotiations and ultimatums, and final chances until the final moment. In Iraq, year after year, the dictator was given the chance to account for his weapons programs, and end the nightmare for his people. Now the resolutions he defied have been enforced.

And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he held power? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just society and less dangerous without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world. And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes, instead of committing more.

It's been said that those who live near a police station find it hard to believe in the triumph of violence, in the same way free peoples might be tempted to take for granted the orderly societies we have come to know. Europe's peaceful unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there's sometimes an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us never forget how Europe's unity was achieved -- by allied armies of liberation and NATO armies of defense. And let us never forget, beyond Europe's borders, in a world where oppression and violence are very real, liberation is still a moral goal, and freedom and security still need defenders. (Applause.)

The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance.

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development, and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we're fulfilling our moral duties, as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma, in the Sudan and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.

The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.

The movement of history will not come about quickly. Because of our own democratic development -- the fact that it was gradual and, at times, turbulent -- we must be patient with others. And the Middle East countries have some distance to travel.

Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress -- limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, free press, and respect for the rights of women -- have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. Many governments are realizing that theocracy and dictatorship do not lead to national greatness; they end in national ruin. They are finding, as others will find, that national progress and dignity are achieved when governments are just and people are free.

The democratic progress we've seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad, and neither will the greater progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who choose it. Our part, as free nations, is to ally ourselves with reform, wherever it occurs.

Perhaps the most helpful change we can make is to change in our own thinking. In the West, there's been a certain skepticism about the capacity or even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. We're told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture. Yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily struggles, care little for self-government. Yet the poor, especially, need the power of democracy to defend themselves against corrupt elites.

Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it. (Applause.)

We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.

As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard. No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found. (Applause.)

Now we're pursuing a different course, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. We will consistently challenge the enemies of reform and confront the allies of terror. We will expect a higher standard from our friends in the region, and we will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and in Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun.

There were good-faith disagreements in your country and mine over the course and timing of military action in Iraq. Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: to keep our word, or to break our word. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom. (Applause.)

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the people, instead of bullying them. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they're ordered. Schools are open with textbooks free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and are well-supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first battalion of a new army, representative local governments, and a Governing Council with an aggressive timetable for national sovereignty. This is substantial progress. And much of it has proceeded faster than similar efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II.

Yet the violence we are seeing in Iraq today is serious. And it comes from Baathist holdouts and Jihadists from other countries, and terrorists drawn to the prospect of innocent bloodshed. It is the nature of terrorism and the cruelty of a few to try to bring grief in the loss to many. The armed forces of both our countries have taken losses, felt deeply by our citizens. Some families now live with a burden of great sorrow. We cannot take the pain away. But these families can know they are not alone. We pray for their strength; we pray for their comfort; and we will never forget the courage of the ones they loved.

The terrorists have a purpose, a strategy to their cruelty. They view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions. In this, they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers and against innocent Iraqis, will make us recoil and retreat. In this, they are mistaken. (Applause.)

We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties, and liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. (Applause.) We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger.

The forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a difficult period in a part of the world that has known many. Yet, our commitment remains firm. We seek justice and dignity. We seek a viable, independent state for the Palestinian people, who have been betrayed by others for too long. (Applause.) We seek security and recognition for the state of Israel, which has lived in the shadow of random death for too long. (Applause.) These are worthy goals in themselves, and by reaching them we will also remove an occasion and excuse for hatred and violence in the broader Middle East.

Achieving peace in the Holy Land is not just a matter of the shape of a border. As we work on the details of peace, we must look to the heart of the matter, which is the need for a viable Palestinian democracy. Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, who tolerate and profit from corruption and maintain their ties to terrorist groups. These are the methods of the old elites, who time and again had put their own self-interest above the interest of the people they claim to serve. The long-suffering Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders, capable of creating and governing a Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, goodwill and hard effort can bring about a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Those who would lead a new Palestine should adopt peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy.

Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorized outposts, end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people, and not prejudice final negotiations with the placements of walls and fences.

Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel.

Leaders in Europe should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause. And Europe's leaders -- and all leaders -- should strongly oppose anti-Semitism, which poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, we have great objectives before us that make our Atlantic alliance as vital as it has ever been. We will encourage the strength and effectiveness of international institutions. We will use force when necessary in the defense of freedom. And we will raise up an ideal of democracy in every part of the world. On these three pillars we will build the peace and security of all free nations in a time of danger.

So much good has come from our alliance of conviction and might. So much now depends on the strength of this alliance as we go forward. America has always found strong partners in London, leaders of good judgment and blunt counsel and backbone when times are tough. And I have found all those qualities in your current Prime Minister, who has my respect and my deepest thanks. (Applause.)

The ties between our nations, however, are deeper than the relationship between leaders. These ties endure because they are formed by the experience and responsibilities and adversity we have shared. And in the memory of our peoples, there will always be one experience, one central event when the seal was fixed on the friendship between Britain and the United States: The arrival in Great Britain of more than 1.5 million American soldiers and airmen in the 1940s was a turning point in the second world war. For many Britons, it was a first close look at Americans, other than in the movies. Some of you here today may still remember the "friendly invasion." Our lads, they took some getting used to. There was even a saying about what many of them were up to -- in addition to be "overpaid and over here." (Laughter.)

At a reunion in North London some years ago, an American pilot who had settled in England after his military service, said, "Well, I'm still over here, and probably overpaid. So two out of three isn't bad." (Laughter.)

In that time of war, the English people did get used to the Americans. They welcomed soldiers and fliers into their villages and homes, and took to calling them, "our boys." About 70,000 of those boys did their part to affirm our special relationship. They returned home with English brides.

Americans gained a certain image of Britain, as well. We saw an island threatened on every side, a leader who did not waver, and a country of the firmest character. And that has not changed. The British people are the sort of partners you want when serious work needs doing. The men and women of this Kingdom are kind and steadfast and generous and brave. And America is fortunate to call this country our closest friend in the world.

May God bless you all. (Applause.)

END 2:03 P.M. (Local)

November 19, 2003 at 04:11 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

BBC NEWS | Politics | Key points: Bush's speech

BBC NEWS | Politics | Key points: Bush's speech

Here are the key points from President George Bush's keynote speech in London on the first day of his state visit.
Three pillars of peace and security

International institutions: "Like 11 presidents before me I believe in international institutions... they must be alert to the dangers facing our world... from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation... (but) it's not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions."

Willingness to use force as last resort: "Those in authority are not judged only by good motivation. The people have given us the duty to defend them. That duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases the measured use of force is all that protect us from a chaotic world ruled by force."

The expansion of democracy: "The third pillar is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy" as an alternative to "instability and hatred and terror"...It was "condescending" to see democracy and Islam as incompatible

Iraq

The US honoured the sacrifice of British troops in Iraq.

Mr Bush contrasted the rise of international terrorism with the rise of Hitler's Germany
He said: "Free nations failed to recognise, much less confront, the aggressive evil in plain sight."

Mr Bush highlighted some of the changes in Iraq since the invasion including a burgeoning media and school textbooks free of propaganda.

He said the failure of democracy in Iraq would throw the country back into chaos.

Force against Iraq had only followed after diplomatic attempts had failed.

Mr Bush said that the people of Iraq had rejoiced at the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us

George W Bush

The US president said that sometimes the measured use of force became necessary, such as in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.
"We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties and liberate 25 million people only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins".

He said the reconstruction of Iraq was happening at a quicker pace than in Germany and Japan after World War Two.

United Nations and Nato

Nato and the European Union had to work together in order to thwart future dangers.

Mr Bush said Nato was the "most successful multilateral organisation in history".

Mr Bush said the global demands of terror required a global response - that required the UN to be credible.

Mr Bush said it was not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions - they must be met with resolve.

Mr Bush acknowledged the "principled objections" of some to the use of force but people in authority were not just judged by their good motives.
Middle East

Decades of failed Western policy in the Middle East must now be abandoned.

"Your nation and mine in the past have been too willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability."

"This bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold."

Mr Bush said that by extending trade, prosperity would spread and with it freedom would flourish.

The universal appeal of freedom was one of the weapons in the fight against international terrorism.
We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East - your nation and mine in the past have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability

George W Bush

Mr Bush said that he wanted a viable Palestinian state and security for Israel.

By resolving that issue a major excuse for hatred and resentment in the Middle East would be removed, said Mr Bush.

The Palestinian people deserved real leaders who were capable of bringing about a Palestinian state.

Israel should dismantle unauthorised outposts and stop the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people.

All leaders should strongly oppose anti-Semitism which poisoned hopes for progress in the Middle East.

"The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom doesn't flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export."

"As we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and our way of life."

British-American Relations

President George Bush said he was honoured to be in the United Kingdom and said he brought the good wishes of the American people.

The US president joked that demonstrations to mark his visit showed freedom of speech was alive in London.
America has always found strong partners in London, leaders of good judgment and blunt counsel and backbone when times are tough

George W Bush

Mr Bush said the UK and US had an "alliance of values".

The UK and US shared a mission in advancing freedom and the peace that came with it.

Mr Bush said the US had always found good allies in London and he said Tony Blair had his "respect and deepest thanks".

The US was fortunate to call the United Kingdom its closest ally in the world.

November 19, 2003 at 01:42 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Times - Bush told to tame his warring aides

Times Online - Newspaper Edition

Times Online - Newspaper Edition

Tony Allen-Mills, Washingon

ASKED recently which of his squabbling aides was in charge of policy towards Iraq, President George W Bush replied: “The person who is in charge is me.”
After a month of bureaucratic backstabbing, malicious leaks and steadily disintegrating discipline at the heart of his administration, Bush will come under pressure this week to prove that he is not losing his grip.

A series of embarrassing rows over his handling of both the international war against terrorism and the economy has raised new questions about Bush’s ability to forge a coherent policy that will secure his re-election next year.

Returning to Washington on Friday after a week-long tour of Asia, Bush found the capital seething with resentment and revolt at the increasingly erratic antics of Donald Rumsfeld, his veteran defence secretary.

The Treasury secretary, John Snow, was also in bad odour after remarks about possible interest rate rises triggered a wave of selling in government bonds and obliged the White House to issue a correction.

Compounding the sense of raggedness in a once formidable administration, 19 Republican senators defied the White House by voting to reject Bush’s policy of restrictions on Americans travelling to Cuba; an even bigger Republican revolt added $1 billion to his budget deficit problems in a vote increasing aid for local election costs.

With attacks mounting on US forces in Iraq — five soldiers were injured yesterday when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down by ground fire near Tikrit — and yet another row over a Pentagon general who compared Islamic militants to satanic forces, some of the president’s supporters were urging him to crack his whip.

“The president has to come back and get his house in order,” said a Washington source close to the administration. “He has to call these guys in and tell them: this is the policy, now get behind it.”

The main threat to the president’s authority last week came from the Pentagon, where Rumsfeld has been fighting a losing battle to control the war against terrorism. Earlier this month Rumsfeld was snubbed when Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, rearranged responsibilities for Iraq and Afghanistan without consulting the Pentagon.

Rummy’s revenge — as many insiders in Washington saw it — came in the form of a leaked memo in which the 71-year-old defence secretary questioned whether America was “winning or losing” the war on terror. In a startling departure from his previous insistence that everything has gone according to plan, Rumsfeld admitted to “mixed results” against Al-Qaeda and warned that ultimate victory would require “a long, hard slog”.

For White House aides who have been battling to persuade America that it has been misled by the media focus on bad news from Iraq, Rumsfeld’s memo amounted to a slap in the face. For the rest of Washington, the fact that it was leaked at all signalled a dangerous new phase in administration infighting.

Some reports suggested Rumsfeld was “furious” that a memo addressed to only four people should have turned up in USA Today, a national newspaper. Others suspected Washington’s wiliest operator had orchestrated the leak himself.

Several commentators noted that the memo showed Rumsfeld in a good light. Criticised in the past for triumphalist views, he instead appeared to be offering an honest assessment of the problems that still lie ahead. Putting a brave face on the leak last week, Rumsfeld said of his handiwork: “I reread the memo in the paper, and thought, ‘Not bad’.”

The problem for Bush is that his defence secretary is still trying to direct a policy debate that is now Rice’s responsibility. The new tension between the White House and the Pentagon is further confusing US policy objectives and overshadowing a long-standing rivalry between Rumsfeld and Colin Powell, the secretary of state.

Adding to the president’s headache are continuing complaints from Capitol Hill about Rumsfeld’s cavalier disregard for bureaucratic niceties. When the evangelical Christian views of Lieutenant-General William Boykin were made public this month, Senator John Warner, a leading Republican, wrote a private letter to Rumsfeld, questioning the appropriateness of a senior army officer publicly denigrating Islam.

Rumsfeld not only failed to reply but declared he had not bothered to read the letter. “It may be somewhere around the building,” he said. One senior congressional official was quoted last week as warning the White House that Rumsfeld had become “a millstone around the president’s neck”.

With FBI agents combing the White House for signs of a mole who leaked the identity of an undercover CIA agent, and with Bush’s Democratic rivals feasting on evidence of disarray, senior Republicans are beginning to call for some form of mid-term shake-up.

Few Republicans would complain if the president decided to sack Rumsfeld. Other sources doubt Bush would even consider it — not least because it would amount to an admission that Iraq has become a mess.

October 26, 2003 at 01:36 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home