Intelligence

Sarah Bryant was on secret mission in Afghanistan

Sarah Bryant was on secret mission in Afghanistan - Times Online

Michael Smith and Jerome Starkey in Kabul

The woman soldier killed in a bomb attack last week was an intelligence officer on a secret mission to meet an Afghan agent, a military source has revealed.

Corporal Sarah Bryant, of the Intelligence Corps, was meeting the agent for the second time deep inside Taliban territory on the border between Helmand and Kandahar provinces. “The agent had produced very good intelligence the first time around,” the source said.

She was accompanied by a four-man SAS close protection team, three of whom were also killed by the blast.

It was not clear whether the agent had been planted by the Taliban or had been unmasked and forced to reveal details of the meeting, the source said. “But it’s clear that the whole thing was compromised. There is no doubt this was an ambush.”

The team was alone on a remote desert track in an area British troops would
not normally patrol. They were in a lightly armoured snatch Land Rover
because it was less obtrusive than a heavily armoured vehicle but it offered
no protection against the 100lb bomb.

The Taliban confirmed they had planted the bomb on the track and were waiting
for Bryant and her close protection team as they approached.

Zabihullah Mujahed, the Taliban spokesman, said the bomb had been detonated by
remote control by an observer waiting for the Land Rover to pass by.

Bryant, 26, from Cotehill, Cumbria, and two of the SAS team died immediately.
One of the other two SAS soldiers managed to call in a medical emergency
response team. The commander survived but his colleague died shortly after
arriving at the British military hospital at Camp Bastion.

In official statements last week the MoD attempted to conceal Bryant’s role,
claiming that she and the SAS soldiers, from 23 SAS Regiment, were
“mentoring” Afghan police officers.

However, General Mohammed Hussein Andiwal, the Afghan police chief in the
region, denied they were working with his men. “There weren’t any police
there,” he said. “Otherwise I would know.”

The three dead SAS reservists have been named as Corporal Sean Reeve, 28, from
Staines, Surrey; Lance-Corporal Richard Larkin, 39, from Evesham,
Worcestershire; and Paul Stout, 31. They will be flown home tomorrow.

British special forces operations in Afghanistan are normally carried out by
the Special Boat Service but it is conducting cross-border operations into
Pakistan.

Bryant’s father, Des Feely, 55, said that his daughter was so good that MI6
had attempted to poach her but she had opted to stay in the army.

June 21, 2008 at 05:52 PM in Middle East, SAS, Terror groups | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Nuclear Ring Reportedly Had Advanced Weapon Design

Nuclear Ring Reportedly Had Advanced Weapon Design - NYTimes.com

By DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON — American and international investigators say that they have found the electronic blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon on computers that belonged to the nuclear smuggling network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist, but that they have not been able to determine whether they were sold to Iran or the smuggling ring’s other customers.

The plans appear to closely resemble a nuclear weapon that was built by Pakistan and first tested exactly a decade ago. But when confronted with the design by officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency
last year, Pakistani officials insisted that Dr. Khan, who has been
lobbying in recent months to be released from the loose house arrest
that he has been under since 2004, did not have access to Pakistan’s
weapons designs.

In interviews in Vienna, Islamabad and Washington over the past
year, officials have said that the weapons design was far more
sophisticated than the blueprints discovered in Libya in 2003, when
Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi
gave up his country’s nuclear weapons program. Those blueprints were
for a Chinese nuclear weapon that dated to the mid-1960s, and
investigators found that Libya had obtained them from the Khan network.

But the latest design found on Khan network computers in
Switzerland, Bangkok and several other cities around the world is half
the size and twice the power of the Chinese weapon, with far more
modern electronics, the investigators say. The design is in electronic
form, they said, making it easy to copy — and they have no idea how
many copies of it are now in circulation.

Investigators said the evidence that the Khan network was
trafficking in a tested, compact and efficient bomb design was
particularly alarming, because if a country or group obtained the bomb
design, the technological information would significantly shorten the
time needed to build a weapon. Among the missiles that could carry the
smaller weapon, according to some weapons experts, is the Iranian
Shahab III, which is based on a North Korean design.

However, in recent days top American intelligence officials, who
declined to speak about the discovery on the record because the
information is classified, said that they had been unable to determine
whether Iran or other countries had obtained the weapons design.
Pakistan has refused to allow American investigators to directly
interview Dr. Khan, who is considered a hero there as the father of its
nuclear program. In recent weeks the only communications about him
between the United States and Pakistan’s new government have been
warnings from Washington not to allow him to be released.

Dr. Khan’s illicit nuclear network was broken up in early 2004;
President Bush declared that shattering the operation was a major
intelligence coup for the United States. Since then, evidence has
emerged that the network sold uranium enrichment technology to Iran,
North Korea and Libya, and investigators are still pursing leads that
he may have done business with other countries as well.

While Libya gave up its nuclear program, North Korea and Iran have
not, despite intense international pressure, sanctions, and repeated
offers of incentives to do so.

On Sunday, Mr. Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley,
said that the administration remained concerned about the possibility
that additional plans have been disseminated, but he did not address
any of the latest revelations about the Khan network.

“We’re very concerned about the A.Q. Khan network, both in terms of
what they were doing by purveying enrichment technology and also the
possibility that there would be weapons-related technology associated
with it,” he told reporters traveling with Mr. Bush from Paris to
London on Sunday.

“That was a concern. That’s one of the reasons we rolled up the
network here three years or so ago, and fairly successfully. And part
of that rolling up was to roll up the network and part of it was to
pursue what kind of relationship the A.Q. Khan network had to
individual countries with which they are dealing.”

The existence of the compact bomb design began to become public in
recent weeks after Switzerland announced that it had destroyed a huge
stockpile of documents, including a weapons design, that were found in
the computers of a family in Switzerland, the Tinners, who over the
years played critical roles in Khan’s operation.

In May, Switzerland’s president, Pascal Couchepin, announced that
more than 30,000 documents had been shredded, saying the government
acted to keep them from “getting into the hands of a terrorist
organization or an unauthorized state,” according to Swiss news
accounts.

But American and I.A.E.A. officials say that destroying one copy of
an electronic file was more satisfying to the Swiss than it was
reassuring to them. It is unclear whether the Swiss knew that some of
the same material had been found in other countries by I.A.E.A.
investigators.

Some details of the Swiss action and the bomb design have appeared
recently in Swiss newspapers and The Guardian of London and in The
Washington Post on Sunday.

The Swiss have provided little information about exactly what they
destroyed, but I.A.E.A. inspectors watched the destruction and American
intelligence officials were deeply involved. “We were very happy they
were destroyed,” one senior intelligence official said Friday. But he
added that “what else is out there” remains a mystery. The Swiss
destruction of the equipment came in response in the case of Urs
Tinner, who has been in custody for more than four years but has not
yet stood trial.

Two former Bush administration officials said they believed Mr. Tinner had provided information to the Central Intelligence Agency
while he was still working for Dr. Khan, including some of the
information that helped American and British officials intercept
shipments of centrifuges on their way to Libya in 2003.

When news of that interception became public and Libya turned its
$100 million program over to American and I.A.E.A. officials, President
Pervez Musharraf
of Pakistan forced Dr. Khan to issue a vague confession and then placed
him under house arrest. Dr. Khan has since renounced that confession in
Pakistani and Western media, saying he made it only to save Pakistan
greater embarrassment.

It was not until 2005 that officials of the I.A.E.A., which is based
in Vienna, finally cracked the hard drives on the Khan computers
recovered around the world. And as they sifted through files and images
on the hard drives, investigators found tons of material — orders for
equipment, names and places where the Khan network operated, even old
love letters. In all, they found several terabytes of data, a huge
amount to sift through.

“There was stuff about dealing with Iranians in 2003, about how to
avoid intelligence agents,” said one official who had reviewed it. But
the most important document was a digitized design for a nuclear bomb,
one that investigators quickly recognized as Pakistani. “It was plain
where this came from,” one senior official of the I.A.E.A. said. “But
the Pakistanis want to argue that the Khan case is closed, and so they
have said very little.”

In public statements, Pakistani officials have insisted that the
Khan “incident,” as the call it, is now history, and they publicly
declared nearly two years ago that their investigations are over.

A senior Pakistani official, interviewed in Islamabad in April, said
that the information provided by the I.A.E.A. was “vague and
incomplete,” and he insisted that because Dr. Khan’s laboratories
specialized in the manufacture of the equipment needed to enrich
uranium, “he was not involved in weapons designs.”

But investigators have no doubt that he was the source of the
digitized bomb design. “Clearly, someone had tried to modernize it, to
improve the electronics,” one said. “There were handwritten references
to the electronics, and the question is, who was working on this?”

The officials said that parts of the design were coded so that they
could be transferred quickly to an automated manufacturing system for
the production of parts.

June 15, 2008 at 12:18 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Fall back, men, Afghanistan is a nasty war we can never win

Fall back, men, Afghanistan is a nasty war we can never win | Simon Jenkins - Times Online

Britain’s commanders ignored every warning that the Taliban were the toughest fighters on earth Simon Jenkins The American secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, flies to Britain this week to meet a crisis entirely of London and Washington’s creation. They have no strategy for the continuing occupation of Afghanistan. They are hanging on for dear life and praying for something to turn up. Britain is repeating the experience of Gordon in Khartoum, of the Dardanelles, Singapore and Crete, of politicians who no longer read history expecting others to die for their dreams of glory.

Every independent report on the Nato-led operation in Afghanistan cries the
same message: watch out, disaster beckons. Last week America’s Afghanistan
Study Group, led by generals and diplomats of impeccable credentials,
reported on “a weakening international resolve and a growing lack of
confidence”. An Atlantic Council report was more curt: “Make no mistake,
Nato is not winning in Afghanistan.” The country was in imminent danger of
becoming a failed state.

A clearly exasperated Robert Gates, the American defence secretary, has broken
ranks with the official optimism and committed an extra 3,000 marines to the
field, while sending an “unusually stern” note to Germany demanding that its
3,200 troops meet enemy fire. Germany, like France, has rejected that plea.
Yet it is urgent since the Canadians have threatened to withdraw from the
south if not relieved. An equally desperate Britain is proposing to send
half-trained territorials to the front, after its commanders ignored every
warning that the Taliban were the toughest fighters on earth.

Meanwhile Nato is doing what it does best, squabbling. Gates has criticised
Britain for not taking the war against the insurgents with sufficient
vigour. Britain is furious at America’s obsession with spraying the Helmand
poppy crop and thus destroying all hope of winning hearts and minds. Most of
the 37,000 soldiers wandering round Kabul were sent on the understanding
that they would do no fighting. No army was ever assembled on so daft a
premise.

Nato’s much-vaunted 2006 strategy has not worked. It boasted that its forces
would only be guarding reconstruction and training the Afghan police. There
would be no more counterproductive airstrikes against Pashtun villages. The
Taliban would be countered by American special forces, with the Pakistan
army attacking their rear. Two years ago anyone expressing scepticism
towards this rosy scenario was greeted at Nato headquarters in Kabul with
guffaws of laughter. Today that laughter must be music in Taliban ears.

Kabul is like Saigon at the end of the Vietnam war. It swarms with refugees
and corruption while an upper crust of well-heeled contractors, consultants
and NGO groupies careers from party to party in bullet-proof Land Cruisers.
Spin doctors fighting a daily battle with the truth have resorted to enemy
kill-rates to imply victory, General Westmoreland’s ploy in Vietnam.

This is a far cry from Britain’s 2001 pledges of opium eradication,
gender-awareness and civic-governance classes. After 87 deaths and two years
of operations in Helmand, the British Army cannot even secure one dam. Aid
successes such as a few new schools and roads in the north look ever more
tenuous as the country detaches itself from Kabul and tribal elders struggle
to make terms with Taliban commanders.

There is plainly no way 6,000 British troops are ever going to secure, let
alone pacify, the south. More soldiers will simply evince more insurgency.
More American raids across the Pakistan border merely offer propaganda to
Al-Qaeda in its radicalisation of the tribal areas. It was just such
brutalism that preceded the Soviet escalation of the counterinsurgency war
in the 1980s, and the rise of the (American-backed) precursors of the
Taliban.

The best news out of Kabul is the increased disenchantment of the wily Afghan
president, Hamid Karzai. Last week he vetoed the West’s offering of a former
leader of Britain’s Liberal Democrats, Lord Ashdown, to co-ordinate
operations in Kabul, whatever that might mean. Liberal democracy is not high
on Karzai’s priority list.

He attacked the British for drawing the Taliban into his unregulated domain.
When outside agents were thought to be negotiating with Taliban elements
behind his back, he instantly expelled them from the country.

Meanwhile he has taken to making his own choice of provincial governors and
commanders, often warlords enmeshed in the booming drugs trade. That trade
offers Afghanistan its one staple income.

While the international community in Kabul wails that Karzai is too close to
the druglords, the warlords and various sinister Taliban go-betweens, they
are at least his warlords and his go-betweens. When Britain sacked the
ruthless tribal chief, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, as governor of Helmand,
Karzai was furious and rightly predicted it would lead to a surge in Taliban
aggression.

For all his faults, Karzai is both an elected leader and a canny one. He is a
virtual prisoner of the Nato garrison in Kabul but Afghanistan remains his
country and if he thinks he can cut deals across its political heartlands,
let him. If he wants Nato to stop bombing Taliban bases in Pashtun villages
and killing Pashtun tribal leaders, then it should stop.

Withdraw the opium eradication teams from Helmand. Let Karzai barter money for
power and power for peace. The foreign “governance” pundits in Kabul might
dream of Afghanistan as a latterday Sweden, but they are never going to
bring Pashtuns, Baluchis, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks into a stable
federation.

Only an Afghan stands any chance of doing that, and the one Afghan on offer is
Karzai.

Common sense advocates a demilitarisation of the occupation, with a withdrawal
of western troops to Kabul where they can try to protect the capital and the
northern trade routes. In provinces to the south and east, Karzai’s money,
weapons and negotiating skills must deliver what results they can. The West
cannot possibly police Afghanistan with anything remotely like the resources
it has available.

Behind such a policy shift should lie an even more crucial one. For the past
two decades intelligence lore has held that nothing happens along the
Afghan/Pakistan frontier without agencies of the Pakistan army being
involved. The latter’s pro-Taliban strategy through the 1990s was based on
its obsession with “defence in depth” against India. Pakistan wanted
Afghanistan stable, friendly and medieval. The security of the Punjab rested
on the containment of the Pashtun tribal lands straddling the Pakistan/
Afghanistan border.

George W Bush’s reckless elevation of Al-Qaeda after 2001 promoted a small
group of alien Arab guests into global warriors for Islam. It also destroyed
Islamabad’s hold over the Taliban. America bribed the Pakistan president
Pervez Musharraf with $1 billion a year to declare a U-turn and fight his
former allies.

Musharraf duly broke his non-intervention treaty with the Pashtun and sent his
army against them. The Taliban’s influence increases with every attack and
with every American bombing of villages. The Pakistan army is suffering
greater losses in this war than either the British or the Americans.

Wise heads in Islamabad know that they must withdraw from the border and
restore respect for tribal autonomy. Nothing else will incline the Pashtun
and other tribes to reject Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies. The alternative
is a growing insurgency that must destabilise whatever democratic regime
might emerge from this month’s Pakistan elections. That prospect is far
worse than whatever fate might befall Afghanistan.

There is no sensible alternative to ending military operations against the
Pashtun, flying under whatever flag. Like Iraq’s Kurdistan, Pashtunistan is
a country without a state. It has been cursed by history, but it returns
that curse with interest when attacked. Fate has now handed it a starring
role in Britain’s nastiest war in decades, and offered it the power to wreck
an emergent democracy of vital interest to the West.

To have set one of the world’s most ancient and ferocious people on the
warpath against both Kabul and Islamabad takes some doing. But western
diplomacy has done it. Now must begin the agonising process of escaping that
appalling mistake.

February 3, 2008 at 01:46 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Two senior diplomats expelled from Afghanistan

Two senior diplomats expelled from Afghanistan | csmonitor.com

The UN is working for their return, after the government accused the men of talking with the Taliban. By Vaishnavi Chandrashekhar

Technorati Tags: afghanistan

December 28, 2007 at 04:14 PM in Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Bhutto's death rocks Pakistan

Bhutto's death rocks Pakistan | csmonitor.com

The assassination of the former prime minister raises questions about the Musharraf government's security measures. By Shahan Mufti | Contributor to The Christian Science Monitor and Mark Sappenfield | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN; AND NEW DELHI The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by a suicide bomber Thursday threatens to bring to a halt Pakistan's stuttering steps toward democracy.

It is the starkest evidence yet that the forces aligned against law and order, once contained to the remote border region
with Afghanistan, are now spilling into the heart of Pakistan, disrupting the country's ability to function.

The
death of Ms. Bhutto, one of Pakistan's most beloved leaders and head of
its largest political party, is an emotional event for many. Rioting
broke out in several cities late Thursday night. The unrest could lead
to the declaration of martial law, experts say, and the postponement of
parliamentary elections scheduled for Jan. 8, 2008.

It is the sort of instability that Western
nations had sought to avoid by persuading President Pervez Musharraf to
allow Bhutto back into the country – hoping her vows to tackle
terrorism would help in the fight against Taliban militants and put
Pakistan on a more moderate path. Now, they appear to have made her a
target. Her death marks a moment of decision for Pakistan's leaders and
lays bare the terrorists' capabilities.

"Her death in such a manner – when the
government had taken responsibility for her security – tells a lot
about the situation in Pakistan," says Hassan Abbas, a Pakistan expert
at Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass. "What is evident is a
complete lack of command and control."

It brings a close to a year drawn in
persistent, violent turmoil. Details of Bhutto's death – the Muslim
world's first female prime minister – were not yet confirmed at press
time, but reports suggest she was shot before a suicide bomber blew
himself up. The attack took place minutes after she had finished her
address at a large rally in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, near the
capital, Islamabad.

The killing of Bhutto leaves a question
mark over whether elections can go forward. A political field without
her will profoundly affect the larger political dynamic that Mr.
Musharraf has been carefully crafting to remain in power. But more
immediately, the death of one of Pakistan's most prominent political
leaders has shaken the country. "The country has been pushed into
another dark period of uncertainty," says Rasul Baksh Rais, a political
scientist at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.

Riots erupted in Rawalpindi soon after the
news of her death was confirmed. The city has been the site of several
suicide bombings in past months, though most have targeted security
forces. Private television channels also reported riots in major towns
across the country, especially in Sindh, Bhutto's home province.

The magnitude of Bhutto's death obscured another act of political violence Thursday. Four supporters of Bhutto's opposition,
the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N), were shot dead at a political rally in Islamabad.

"I
think the elections will be canceled," says Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani
security analyst and author of "Taliban." "We can't have elections when
the country is in this state of violence. We may see the imposition ...
of extraordinary measures like martial law or a state of emergency."

In an interview with the BBC, PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif also hinted that elections could be postponed: "None of us is inclined
to think about the election."

It is unclear who was responsible for the attack, but initial anger turned against Musharraf's government.

Supporters outside the hospital where Bhutto's body was taken chanted "dog, Musharraf, dog," the Associated Press reported.

It
is an instinctive reaction born of generations of mutual mistrust
between Bhutto and the Army, which Musharraf led until last month.
Bhutto's father, also a prime minister, was hanged after being deposed
by one of Pakistan's previous military rulers, Zia ul-Haq.

Certainly, the threat was not unforeseen.
When Bhutto returned from exile in October in a triumphant procession
through Karachi, she narrowly escaped a suicide bombing that left 150
dead. Moreover, Baitullah Mesud, a Taliban commander in Waziristan, had
several times openly threatened her life.

The circumstances of Bhutto's death, and
the failure of security, will be a subject of immense scrutiny. "There
are going to be very big questions asked," says Najmuddin Shaikh, who
served as foreign minister during one of Bhutto's terms as prime
minister.

Bhutto was the only major political figure
whose campaign included a strong stance against extremism. "Benazir
Bhutto may have been killed by terrorists, but the terrorists must not
be allowed to kill democracy in Pakistan," British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown said Thursday. But Dr. Abbas at Harvard predicts "fewer
people will challenge extremism openly."

Bhutto's life and career followed a trail
of tragedy in her political family comparable to that of the Kennedys,
or Gandhis of India. Bhutto died just a few miles from where her father
was hanged. One brother died from poisoning, and another was killed in
a police shootout. Her two tenures as prime minister (1988 and 1993),
neither of which she could complete, were marred by charges of
corruption and fraud. She went into exile after Musharraf came into
power in 1999 before returning in October.

Bhutto declared herself lifetime chairman of the party she inherited from her father. Observers are unsure who might take
over the reins of the party now.

"It may take months for the party to decide their new leader," says Hassan Aksari Rizvi, an independent political scientist
in Lahore. "I don't see how they can contest an election scheduled in a few days without a coherent leadership."

December 28, 2007 at 04:12 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Musharraf’s Martial Plan | Bhutto | NY Times

Musharraf’s Martial Plan - New York Times

By BENAZIR BHUTTO Published: November 7, 2007 Islamabad, Pakistan NOV. 3, 2007, will be remembered as the blackest day in the history of Pakistan. Let us be perfectly clear: Pakistan is a military dictatorship. Last Saturday, Gen. Pervez Musharraf removed all pretense of a transition to democracy by conducting what was in effect yet another extraconstitutional coup.

In doing so he endangered the viability of Pakistan as an
independent state. He presented the country’s democratic forces with a
tough decision — acquiesce to the brutality of the dictatorship or take
over the streets and show the world where the people of Pakistan really
stand.

General Musharraf also presented the democratic world —
and especially the countries of the West — with a question. Will they
back up their democratic rhetoric with concrete action, or will they
once again back down in the face of his bluff?

In my view,
General Musharraf’s ruling party understood that it would be trounced
in any free elections and, together with its allies within the
intelligence services, contrived to have the Constitution suspended and
elections indefinitely postponed. Very conveniently, the assassination
attempt against me last month that resulted in the deaths of at least
140 people is being used as the rationale to stop the democratic
process by which my party would most likely have swept parliamentary
elections. Maybe this explains why the government refuses to allow the F.B.I. and Scotland Yard to assist in a forensic investigation of the bombings.

As
I write, demonstrations are taking place across Pakistan. Opposition
party members, lawyers, judges, human rights advocates and journalists
have been rounded up by the police without charge. The press has been
seriously constrained. The chief justice of the Supreme Court and many
other judges are believed to be under house arrest.

The United
States, Britain and much of the West have always said the right things
about democracy in Pakistan and around the world. I recall the words of
President Bush in his second inaugural address when he said: “All who
live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not
ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for
your liberty, we will stand with you.”

The United States alone
has given the Musharraf government more than $10 billion in aid since
2001. We do not know exactly where or how this money has been spent,
but it is clear that it has not brought about the defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, nor succeeded in capturing Osama bin Laden,
nor has it broken the opium trade. It certainly has not succeeded in
improving the quality of life of the children and families of Pakistan.

The United States can promote democracy — which is the only way
to truly contain extremism and terrorism — by telling General Musharraf
that it does not accept martial law, and that it expects him to conduct
free, fair, impartial and internationally monitored elections within 60
days under a reconstituted election commission. He should be given that
choice: democracy or dictatorship with isolation.

While the world
must do its part to confront tyranny, the primary responsibility rests
in the hands of the people of Pakistan. It is incumbent on Pakistanis
to tell General Musharraf that martial law will not stand. The
overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are moderate; it is my hope that
they will unite in a coalition of moderation to marginalize both the
dictators and the extremists, to restore civilian rule to the
presidency and to shut down political madrassas, the Islamic schools
that stock weapons and preach violence.

It is dangerous to
stand up to a military dictatorship, but more dangerous not to. The
moment has come for the Western democracies to show us in their
actions, and not just in their rhetoric, which side they are on.

November 7, 2007 at 05:54 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Pakistan | The nation's efforts to straddle the fault line between moderate and militant Islam offer a cautionary tale for the post-9/11 world

Pakistan - National Geographic Magazine

If there is an address, an exact location for the rift tearing Pakistan apart, and possibly the world, it is a spot 17 miles (28 kilometers) west of Islamabad called the Margalla Pass. Here, at a limestone cliff in the middle of Pakistan, the mountainous west meets the Indus River Valley, and two ancient, and very different, civilizations collide. To the southeast, unfurled to the horizon, lie the fertile lowlands of the Indian subcontinent, realm of peasant farmers on steamy plots of land, bright with colors and the splash of serendipitous gods. To the west and north stretch the harsh, windswept mountains of Central Asia, land of herders and raiders on horseback, where man fears one God and takes no prisoners.

This is
also where two conflicting forms of Islam meet: the relatively relaxed
and tolerant Islam of India, versus the rigid fundamentalism of the
Afghan frontier. Beneath the surface of Pakistan, these opposing forces
grind against each other like two vast geologic plates, rattling
teacups from Lahore to London, Karachi to New York. The clash between
moderates and extremists in Pakistan today reflects this rift, and can
be seen as a microcosm for a larger struggle among Muslims everywhere.
So when the earth trembles in Pakistan, the world pays attention.

Travel
8,000 miles (13,000 kilometers) across this troubled country, as I did
recently, and it becomes obvious that, 60 years after its founding,
Pakistan still occupies unsettled ground. Traumatized by multiple wars
with India, a parade of military strongmen (including the current
president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf), and infighting among ethnic
groups—Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Pashtun—Pakistan's 165 million people
have never fully united as one nation, despite being 97 percent Muslim.
To hold the country together, successive governments have spent
billions on the military, creating a pampered and self-serving monolith
of mostly Punjabi generals while neglecting the basic needs of the
people, for justice, health, education, security, and hope. Lately,
these grievances have spilled onto the streets, as lawyers and other
opponents challenge Pakistan's military government and demand a return
to civilian, democratic rule. Meanwhile, six years after 9/11, the
forces of Islamic radicalism are gaining strength and challenging
Pakistan's moderate majority for the soul of the country.

It's
not just the surging homegrown Taliban, which in one two-week period
this year scorched and bloodied the streets of half a dozen cities with
suicide bombs. Or the al Qaeda fighters who prowl the western mountains
of Waziristan, butchering anyone suspected of being an American spy.
Just as chilling are the "night letters" posted on public buildings,
warning that all girls, upon threat of death, must wear head-to-toe
burkas and stop attending school. Or, in a rising tide of intimidation,
the murders of teachers and doctors and human rights workers accused of
"crimes against Islam." But perhaps the most telling evidence of all
was my encounter with a 22-year-old woman named Umme Ayman, who seemed
all too eager to die.

I CANNOT
SEE HER FACE, or even her eyes, but I can tell you that Ayman is an
impressive young woman. She wears glasses under a black veil and speaks
in short, eruptive bursts of English that sound like well-rehearsed
lines in a school play. She and a group of 200 female religious
students have taken over a public children's library in Islamabad. They
are protesting the destruction of mosques run by radical clerics that
the government says were built without permits. Riot police, bristling
with sidearms and batons, have encircled the library and ordered the
students to leave. But Ayman is in no mood to listen.

"We are
not terrorists," she says. "We are students. We wish to spread Islam
over all the world. If America wants to end Islam, then we are prepared
to die defending our faith. We have said our goodbyes." Ayman and the
other women sit around the library's circular tables in tiny chairs
meant for children. Amid shelves lined with children's storybooks, they
have posted signs reading "Allah is for Muslims, not infidels." Across
the street, their parents have been holding an anxious vigil for weeks.


"Our fate is with Allah," Ayman says, as other protesters
gather around, "but if the government grants our demands, there will be
no problem." And what are those demands? "To rebuild the mosques and to
make Pakistan an Islamic state." Half a dozen veiled heads bob in
agreement.

From the start, the founders of Pakistan intended
their nation to be a refuge for Muslims, not an Islamic state. Pakistan
was created when India, a British colony for nearly a hundred years,
gained its independence and was partitioned into two countries along a
hastily drawn border. Pakistan's first leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and
his brain trust of secular intellectuals created a fledgling democracy
that gave Islam a cultural, rather than political, role in national
life. Their Pakistan was to be a model of how Islam, merged with
democratic ideals, could embrace the modern world. "Muslims would cease
to be Muslims, not in the religious sense," Jinnah said in his
inaugural address, but "as citizens of the state."

Sixty years
later, having been educated in schools that teach mainly the Koran, the
young women in the library are stunned when I mention Jinnah's secular
vision for Pakistan. "That is a lie," Ayman says, her voice shaking
with fury. "Everyone knows Pakistan was created as an Islamic state,
according to the will of Allah. Where did you read this thing?" Such is
the certainty of Pakistan's Islamists, whose loud assertions give them
political influence far beyond their numbers.


The women
may be on the front lines of this protest, but it's clear the clerics
in the mosque next door are calling the shots. The children's library
is a few yards from one of the most radical mosques in Pakistan, Lal
Masjid, or Red Mosque, which has posted dozens of lean young jihadists
in black turbans around the library, brandishing swords, staffs, axes,
and AK-47s. The men from the mosque include pro-Taliban clerics and
Javed Ibrahim Paracha, a bearded, heavyset former member of parliament
who has been dubbed "al Qaeda's lawyer" for successfully representing
several hundred jihadists captured in Pakistan after 9/11. He explains
what emboldens these young women to risk their lives for Islam: "This
government has lost all credibility," he says. "People look at
Musharraf and they see a U.S. puppet who's willing to declare war on
fellow Muslims to satisfy America. They also see his generals getting
rich, while they're getting poorer every day. People are losing hope.
Pakistan and its government are becoming two different things. This
will have to change, and soon."

A week later, the standoff
comes to an apparent end after the government backs down and agrees to
start rebuilding the mosques. The children's library is stripped of all
books deemed un-Islamic, and the students take over. In the capital, a
mere ten minutes' drive from the presidential palace, the Islamists
have won. (Months later, as this story goes to press, the government
finally stormed the Red Mosque and killed scores of militants. Umme
Ayman survived.)

More than anyone, it was General Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq who created Pakistan's current generation of Islamic
radicals, and the climate in which they thrive. A Punjabi general with
a pencil-thin mustache and raccoon circles under his eyes, Zia seized
power in a coup in 1977, had the democratically elected prime minister
tried and hanged, and promptly pressed for the Islamization of
Pakistan, calling for more religion in the classroom and the use of
punishments such as flogging and amputations for crimes against Islam.
To Zia, Pakistan's secular founders, with their emphasis on Muslim
culture, had it exactly backward. "We were created on the basis
of Islam," Zia said, and he set out to remake democratic Pakistan as a
strict Islamic state—despite the fact that a large majority of
Pakistanis were, and remain, moderates.

Whether by temperament
or tradition, most Pakistani Muslims are more comfortable with the
mystical and ecstatic rituals of Barelvi Islam, a colorful blend of
Indian Islamic practice and Sufism. For a Punjabi farmer whose crop has
just come in, it has always been more satisfying to hang out at a Sufi
shrine listening to qawwali music and watching dervishes whirl
than reciting the Koran in a fundamentalist mosque. Most Pakistanis,
though powerless to resist, were lukewarm to Zia's Islamization
program, as was much of the outside world.

That all
changed in December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded neighboring
Afghanistan, driving hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees—mainly
conservative Pashtun tribesmen—across the border into Pakistan. Within
months Zia's Islamist dream got a huge boost: The United States and
Saudi Arabia joined Pakistan in a covert alliance to supply arms,
training, and billions of dollars to an anti-Soviet insurgency in
Afghanistan. The motto of Zia's army—Jihad in the Service of
Allah—became a rallying cry for thousands of mujahideen training in
camps funded by the CIA in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.
Over time, Zia's agenda, and that of the United States, became
indistinguishable: If Zia wanted to Islamize Pakistan while mobilizing
support for the anti-Soviet jihad, all the more power to him. Besides,
the fundamentalist madrassas of northwestern Pakistan made excellent
recruiting centers for mujahideen—young fighters who saw the struggle
against the Soviets as a holy war.

During the 1980s, as the
mujahideen prevailed against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the winds of
extremism blowing from the northwest began to chill all of Pakistan.
Millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia flowed into the hard-line Sunni
madrassas clustered along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, which
eventually spread across Pakistan. Not all Pakistani madrassas today
are fundamentalist or radical. Some are shoestring operations run by
moderate clerics to meet the educational needs of the poor. But the
majority—more than 60 percent—are affiliated with the fundamentalist
Deobandi sect, an austere interpretation of Islam that calls for a
rejection of modernity and a return to the "pure," seventh-century
Islam of the Prophet Muhammad. Politically savvy and extremely well
funded, more than 10,000 of these schools operate across Pakistan
today, compared with fewer than 1,000 before General Zia took power.
Thousands more operate unofficially.

By the time Zia died in a
mysterious 1988 plane crash, the Islamization of Pakistan was well
under way. The following year, the Soviet Union, preoccupied with its
own implosion, pulled its demoralized troops from Afghanistan. The U.S.
promptly declared victory and returned home, leaving the Afghan people
to the chaotic rule of the mujahideen warlords. One crucial chapter in
the story of radical Islam's ascendancy had come to a close. The one we
are still living had just begun. Osama bin Laden and other leaders of
the Afghan jihad now moved freely in and out of northwestern Pakistan
and its Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The madrassas swelled with
the children of the Zia Generation. In the rugged mountainous land
shared by Afghanistan and Pakistan, the seeds of the Taliban, and al
Qaeda, had been sown.



"YES,
THERE ARE EXTREMISTS here," says Pakistani novelist Mohsin Hamid. "But
they are a small minority in a nation of 165 million people. Most of us
want nothing to do with violence." This is true. But like moderates
everywhere, those in Pakistan have a hard time being heard over the
racket rising up from their streets and television sets, a raucous
soundtrack of religious sermonizing, Indo-Pakistani saber rattling, and
a general gnashing of teeth that passes for public discourse. Ordinary
people are also stifled by a government and police force that are among
the most corrupt in the world, led by an army that answers to no one.
But it is a measure of the country's underlying goodness, and a sign of
hope, that 60 years after independence the most revered figure in
Pakistan is not a mullah or a sports hero, but a 79-year-old man who
routinely washes dried blood off dead bodies and fishes his clothes
from a donation barrel.

Abdul Sattar Edhi began serving his
fellow citizens a few years after the founding of Pakistan, when he
opened a free clinic in Karachi. Later he bought a dented Hillman
station wagon, its blue paint peeling, and turned it into Pakistan's
first private ambulance. He shuttled poor people to medical care and
collected the bodies of the city's homeless from the gutters, washed
them, and gave them a proper burial. "I felt it was my duty as a human
being," he says, recalling the revulsion he learned to overcome. "It
was obvious the government wasn't going to do it."

Decades
later, that hasn't changed. While the military accounts for a quarter
of the national budget, less than 3 percent is spent on education,
health, and public welfare. And so Edhi still tends to Pakistan's dirty
work, body by body. His one-man charity is now an acclaimed
international foundation. His single, beat-up old station wagon has
grown into a fleet of 1,380 little white ambulances positioned across
Pakistan, tended by thousands of volunteers. They are usually first to
arrive on the scene of any tragedy. In May 2002, when police found the
remains of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter murdered in
Karachi, it was Edhi who gently collected the body parts, all ten, and
took Daniel Pearl to the morgue.

Edhi was born in the Indian
town of Bantva, 250 miles (400 kilometers) from Mumbai. As a teenager,
he'd gone with his father to hear Jinnah, the tall, gaunt, visionary
founder of Pakistan, deliver a speech urging local Muslims to join him
in the new country. At first his father hesitated. But during
partition, when Hindu mobs began marauding nearby, the family joined
the more than 14 million people from both countries—Muslims, Hindus,
and Sikhs—who fled their homes and crossed to the other side of the
line. As many as a million people died in sectarian riots, massacres,
and killings along the way.

Edhi's
family came by ship, landing on September 6, 1947, three weeks after
Pakistan came into being, amid throngs of people shouting "Pakistan zindabad—long
live Pakistan!" Within an hour, as he walked the streets of his new
home, he saw a Hindu man murdered by a mob of young Muslim boys. "They
stabbed him over and over with a knife, and I'll never forget watching
him writhe in pain on the ground. All over Karachi, Hindus were packing
up and running away, exactly as we'd done in India. Just like that, our
joy turned to horror and shame. That's what I remember about
partition."

Edhi's adopted city of Karachi has grown from a
population of 450,000 in 1947 to a surging metropolis of more than 15
million people. It may be the most cosmopolitan of Pakistan's cities,
but it is among the most dangerous as well—a place where Pakistan's
widening gap between rich and poor is on full display. Karachi is a
sprawling universe of ramshackle neighborhoods that radiate north,
west, and east from the glitzy seaside hotels, office towers, and
diplomatic fortresses downtown, where car bombs are an occupational
hazard and personal security a billion-dollar-a-year business. Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups are known to operate in the squalid "no go"
neighborhoods of Karachi, beyond the reach of police and perhaps even
Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's powerful military intelligence
agency.

In the middle of all this sits Edhi, a dignified man wearing a gray shalwar kameez
(Pakistan's national dress) and a furry black cap in the style Jinnah
wore—a fitting touch in a man who describes himself as a "super
patriot." In a neighborhood of litter-strewn streets, Edhi's
headquarters is a cluttered office that adjoins the two small rooms
where he lives with his wife, Bilquis, his partner in the foundation.
Edhi's operation relies on donations; he refuses to accept government
money or even a ride in someone else's car. He travels by ambulance, in
case someone needs help along the way. Outside Edhi's office, a metal
crib is stationed on the stairway beneath a sign reading, "Don't Kill
Your Baby." Every Edhi Foundation office in the country has such a
crib, where a mother can leave an unwanted baby, no questions asked.
Edhi's Karachi office alone receives 90 babies a month, half of them
alive.

Today a young nurse in a head scarf brings in a newborn
left in the crib overnight, a girl wrapped in a soft floral blanket,
perhaps four days old, her arms and legs shrunken and disfigured. The
nurse places her on Edhi's desk, like a gift. He picks up the infant
and gently strokes her malformed hands with his finger, whispering to
her in Gujarati, his native language, his long gray beard tickling her
nose. As this little girl grows, she'll be given medical care in one of
the foundation's clinics, sheltered in its orphanage, educated in one
of its schools, and sent forth into a carefully arranged marriage with
job skills and a dowry. Edhi has given away hundreds of brides at the
foundation's wedding facility, a cross between a Bollywood set and the
Elvis Suite at a Las Vegas hotel, with a bed in the shape of a heart. A
bulletin board in the lobby is filled with dozens of wedding pictures,
each happy bride a miracle child plucked from Edhi's rescue cradle.

Despite his
selfless deeds, Edhi is often attacked as "un-Islamic" by Pakistan's
hard-line mullahs, who cite his policy on infidels. He has none. Edhi
never asks whether an abandoned child, a psychiatric patient, a dead
person, or a battered woman is Sunni or Shiite, Hindu or Christian—or,
for that matter, Punjabi or Sindhi, Baluchi or Pashtun, Mohajir or
Kashmiri. "I'm a Muslim," says Edhi, "but my true religion is human
rights."

In modern Pakistan, that's an increasingly lonely
position. There are many thousands of dedicated doctors, lawyers,
teachers, social workers, and humanitarians—including some in
government—who, like Edhi, are working to move their country forward,
but the space in which they operate is shrinking. Recently, at
Musharraf's bidding, parliament passed a bill to restrict the
activities of NGOs and human rights groups. Even as he promotes
"enlightened moderation," Musharraf accuses such groups of humiliating
Pakistan by publicizing abuses, and declares them a threat to the
national interest.

Such rhetoric only emboldens the Islamists,
whose influence is growing across Pakistan. Edhi gets half a dozen
death threats a week, ranging from crank calls to serious warnings that
made him temporarily flee the country. Religious militants harass his
offices—a campaign orchestrated, Edhi believes, by Pakistan's Islamist
political parties, which compete with him for financial support. A few
years ago, a new Edhi Foundation hospital, which cost three million
dollars to build, was taken over by students from a radical madrassa
north of Karachi. Intimidated by the mullahs, the police refused to act
on Edhi's complaint, and his hospital is now a dormitory, with student
laundry—black turbans favored by the Taliban—flapping from the windows,
like flags over conquered territory.

HIGHWAYS IN PAKISTAN are
a kind of national theater, in which throngs of people, nearly all men,
hunker down on the roadside like spectators at a cockfight, keenly
observing all that passes with an air of amused expectation. Stop along
the roadway for a cup of tea, and you hear things. You hear people talk
about chronic injustice. They tell stories of people losing their land,
their lives, their honor, with no recourse. It is easy to think they
exaggerate. And then you meet someone else who changes your mind.

A
girl called Najma, who is 16, speaks in a cautious monotone, and it is
difficult to know, after what happened, whether she will ever speak
naturally again. She still wears the delicate ring in her nose that
signifies her virginity. On this day she also wears a pink head scarf
wrapped around her face, pretty and round with high cheekbones and
wide-set eyes, though now they are dull and without expression, like a
captive. She sits next to her mother on the bed where the incident
occurred and tries to talk without crying.

Two weeks
ago, at one in the morning, five men, maybe six, burst through the door
of the family's mud-brick home, which sits on a tiny plot of land in
the village of Nizampur in southern Punjab. They identified themselves
as police and said they were searching for weapons. One held a pistol
to her mother's chest while another pinned her nine-year-old brother,
Rizwan, to the floor. And then two men held Najma down on the bed while
a third raped her.

The leader masked his face with a scarf,
her mother says, but she recognized the raspy voice of their neighbor,
a police constable, who lives 200 yards (180 meters) away and wants the
plot of wheat that Najma's family moved here to farm as tenants 40
years ago. According to the complaint Najma's father filed with the
police, the attack resulted from his refusal to vacate the land. After
the rape, the men spent a few minutes ransacking the house. As they
left, they delivered a warning: Leave this place, or we'll be back for
your other daughter.

Rashid Rehman is a veteran human rights
lawyer who volunteered to represent Najma for the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan. Rape is epidemic in parts of the country,
Rehman says, where it is used as a barbaric instrument of tribal
justice; a village might punish a husband's adultery, for example, by
gang-raping his wife. Najma's case is typical in southern Punjab, he
says, where the British rewarded their local allies with grants of land
and autonomy; after partition, these feudal landlords became a law unto
themselves. In their world, rape is a tool of intimidation wielded by
powerful, politically connected landowners to terrorize peasants, to
scare them off their land. If a family doesn't comply, Rehman says,
they are often killed. "Who's going to stop them?" he asks.

In
this case, he says, the family did everything right. They went to the
police the next morning and sought medical help for Najma. She was
examined by a doctor, who submitted a medical report confirming the
rape. But the local police, who are of the same clan as the constable,
refused to file charges. Incensed, Rehman appealed to officials in the
nearby town of Khanewal.

Najma shows great dignity for a
brutalized teenager. Today, as Rehman heads off to hear the outcome of
the appeal, she asks for one last word. "I don't know what my life will
be in the future," she tells him quietly, "but I'm ready to face my
attackers in public and demand justice for what they did." Of the
rapist, she says, "He must be hanged. He must."

At the police
station in Khanewal, Rehman meets first with the acting superintendent,
a stocky man in aviator glasses with a black baton in his hand and a
portrait of Jinnah hanging behind his desk. As Rehman briefs him, the
superintendent glances nervously at the six large men in plainclothes,
intelligence types, who sit against the far wall, sipping tea. The
superintendent takes a few notes, makes a phone call, hangs up. He
turns his baton over and over. Finally, the phone rings. Long
conversation. He hangs up and says that the forensic evidence in
Najma's case has been, unfortunately, misplaced. Rehman asks to see the
supervisor.


The
afternoon light fades from gold to gray as Rehman waits in another
empty office. The electricity is out—yet another rolling blackout.
Finally, the police inspector, a Mr. Khan, arrives and pulls up a
battered chair. Wearing a shalwar kameez the color of old mustard, Khan
is a rangy, loose-limbed speed-talker with a cigarette-scorched voice.
He has studied Najma's case in detail, he says, and he's sure what he's
about to say will please Rehman, since it will resolve the legal issues
once and for all. He pauses, as if waiting for a drumroll.

Najma
is lying, he announces, to protect her father from a previous charge of
having assaulted the police constable. (Her father is a small, defeated
man pushing 70, who can barely walk.) The medical evidence, Khan
continues, reveals Najma to be a "habitual fornicator," based on
certain measurements he is not at liberty to divulge. To conduct his
investigation, he says, he personally traveled to the village and
interviewed "60 or 90 people in the village mosque." All declared the
police constable incapable of committing such a crime. The case, he
says, is closed. It is dark by the time Rehman pulls away from the
police station, musing on what will happen to Najma's family. "If they
don't leave immediately, they will be in danger," he says. "The
constable could send men to rape the other sister, or to rape Najma
again. Or he might kill them all, to make an example of them or to
punish them for going to the police."

It was a similar
lawlessness that drove the people of Afghanistan into the arms of the
Taliban in the mid-1990s. The country was then in the midst of a civil
war and run by warlords, who grew rich on the opium trade, terrorized
the countryside, and seized the lands and daughters of any poor farmer
they chose. One day near Kandahar, a mullah and former mujahideen
commander named Mohammad Omar said enough was enough. With the Koran in
one hand and a Kalashnikov in the other, he rallied his students, or
taliban, and launched a new jihad: to cleanse Afghanistan of
lawlessness and corruption. Backed by Pakistan, the Taliban triumphed
in 1996, took Kabul, and imposed their own extreme vision of Islamic
law. Ordinary Afghans, at first, regarded the Taliban's dictates as a
small price to pay for an end to civil war.

Rashid Rehman
hears stories such as Najma's and fears what lies ahead for Pakistan.
In the car on his way back to his office in the Punjabi city of Multan,
he sits in the dark, looking out the window at the feeble lights of
passing villages. When he speaks, he is calm and clear. "When
government fails them, people get angry," he says. "They lose faith in
the system and look for alternatives. Think how easy it would be for
the Islamists—or Taliban or al Qaeda—to go to the brothers of this girl
now and say, 'What happened to your family is not justice. This man
dishonored your sister, he dishonored your father and your family name.
Join us and we will help you get justice. We will make him pay.' When
citizens are denied their basic human rights, they become radicalized.
When people are powerless, they are easily manipulated. This is what
worries me the most."

MY NEW
FRIENDS want to know why Americans think they are terrorists. It's a
good question, and an innocent one, judging by the young and open faces
of the dozen or so students sharing their evening meal with me. They
don't look like terrorists as they sit in a semicircle on green mats in
the courtyard of Jamia Uloom-ul-Quran, a small Deobandi madrassa
located in a historic downtown mosque in Peshawar. This provincial
capital served as headquarters for the Afghan resistance against the
Soviets, and jihad is still a going concern here. A block away from the
madrassa, at shops selling shoes and used clothes, I'd bought a 50-cent
al Qaeda DVD of a suicide bomber preparing for a mission. At the end of
the disc, over religious music, the bomber is shown in his car at a
distant crossroads, blowing up a convoy. "We know that shop," the
students say. "But we're not terrorists."

A few of the
students appear to be ten or younger, but most are in their late teens
or early 20s. They say their dream for Pakistan is "a peaceful nation,
in which justice prevails, in keeping with Islamic law." But they
believe, as many here do, that Islam is under attack. By America, by
the West, by India, by their own government. Under these circumstances,
they say, jihad is justified. What about suicide bombing? Is it
sanctioned by Islam? "You must think we have classes here in making
bombs or AK-47s!" exclaims one boy, and they all laugh.

"In
any Muslim land that's occupied, suicide bombing is allowed," says a
personable older boy named Rafiullah, who has bright brown eyes and the
beginnings of a beard. A few mention Iraq and Palestine as places where
such bombings are justified. Another boy mentions Afghanistan. "But
it's not allowed in Pakistan," Rafiullah says, "since we're not an
occupied country." ("Not yet!" somebody else interjects, to laughter.)
"Nobody has a right to blow you up, even if you're a non-Muslim, or an
infidel. If you are here as a guest, you are welcome." He reaches to
shake my hand, as if to reassure me.

The call for jihad is
rising across Pakistan, but it is here, in the northwest, that the
Islamists are taking control. Ever since 9/11, thousands of Taliban
fighters have found refuge among their fellow Pashtun tribesmen in
Peshawar, Quetta, and the mountainous tribal areas along the Afghan
border, especially North and South Waziristan. A year ago this month,
the government agreed to a cease-fire with the tribes and abandoned
most of North Waziristan to the militants. It's a sign of the local
Taliban's strength that the agreement was signed not by tribal elders
but by Taliban commanders.

Pakistan's turnabout on the
Taliban, which it had strongly supported since 1994, came shortly after
9/11. When Afghanistan's Taliban government, which had sheltered Osama
bin Laden, disintegrated under the firestorm meted out by the United
States and its coalition partners, President Musharraf confronted a
stark choice: Cooperate or suffer the consequences. He immediately
sided with the U.S. against the Taliban. It was not a popular decision.
Today, Pakistan is under pressure to contain the Taliban and al Qaeda
to the tribal areas along the Afghan border, although it's clear that
they're gaining in other parts of Pakistan. Many Deobandi madrassas are
believed to have an al Qaeda recruiter on the premises. But Muhammad
Hanif Jalandhry, who runs a madrassa in Multan, says the reputation of
Pakistan's madrassas as factories for terrorists is "propaganda. I tell
you, it's the oppressive system we live under that's bringing people to
these seminaries. People are seeking refuge and security—and dignity.
They are seeking a future."

About a third of the students at
the Deobandi madrassa in Peshawar, for instance, are poor kids from
far-flung regions of the North-West Frontier Province or the tribal
areas. They are like Mir Rahman, 16, a sweet-faced boy from a family of
poor herders in the Mohmand Tribal Area. The family lives miles from
the nearest public school, which is so badly run that few kids attend.
It's not unusual in Pakistan to hear of public schools that receive no
books, no supplies, and no subsidies from the government. Thousands
more are "ghost schools" that exist only on paper, to line the pockets
of phantom teachers and administrators. Faced with choosing between bad
public schools and expensive private ones, many poor parents send their
children to the madrassas, where they get a roof over their heads,
three meals a day, and a Koran-based education—for free.

Pervez
Hoodbhoy lives every day with the consequences of the lack of public
education in Pakistan. An MIT-trained professor of nuclear physics at
Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, he was speaking to a
graduate-level class in physics a few days after the huge earthquake
that devastated Kashmir in 2005, describing the geophysical forces that
produced the disaster. "When I finished, hands shot up all over the
room," he recalls. "'Professor, you are wrong,' my students said. 'That
earthquake was the wrath of God.' "

This, he says, is the
legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq, whose education ministry issued
guidelines on bringing an Islamic perspective to science and other
subjects in the public schools. "The Zia Generation has come of age,"
he says. "It isn't Islamic to teach that earthquakes are caused by the
movement of tectonic plates. Instead, you are supposed to say, by the
will of Allah, an earthquake happens." Today a government commission is
working to modernize education, but "it goes deeper than updating
textbooks," he says. "It's a matter of changing society."

A
few miles from Hoodbhoy's classroom, I come upon a crowd of children in
a vacant lot. It turns out to be another school—this one a free school
for hundreds of street children run by a fireman named Muhammad Ayub,
who founded the school 25 years ago because he felt sorry for the kids
running wild in the neighborhoods nearby, dropouts who seemed destined
for a jail cell, or a slab at Edhi's morgue. Ayub hands me his business
card. It bears the name of the school: Second Time Civil Defense
Educational Institution on Self Help Basis. "All my teachers are former
students," he says proudly, gesturing to two men and a young woman with
freckles, standing before the kids, who are laughing and carrying on.
"See the looks on their faces?" he says. "This is the future I want for
our country."

On a small hill nearby, a group of three or four
students from a nearby madrassa, stern young men in their early 20s,
are watching Ayub's class. Perhaps they are drawn to the laughing girl
with the freckles, who isn't wearing a veil, or perhaps it is something
more sinister. They are looking across the divide that runs down the
middle of Pakistan, and it's not clear what they are thinking.

August 29, 2007 at 06:45 PM in Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Big business will pacify the clash of cultures

Big business will pacify the clash of cultures - Times Online

The world will move together as it builds the bodies through which we can all trust each other more

Francis Fukuyama

Professor Samuel Huntington argued in his 1996 book The Clash of Civilisations that, after the cold war, world politics would be dominated not by conflicts between rival ideologies but by conflicts between civilisations and cultures. He wrote that the power of culture would trump the integrating forces of globalisation, and that people’s loyalties would ultimately be defined communally – based on ties of religion, ethnicity and shared history.

Huntington characterised the values of the western Enlightenment, democracy and individual rights prominent among them, as projections of the values of western Christianity, reasoning that other cultures with other values would create different types of institutions.

In the decade since it was published, many have argued that the clash of civilisations hypothesis has been proved right by events. There has been a broad rise in religious energies and identity, particularly notable in the Muslim world with the emergence of radical Islamism, but also evident in south Asia, Latin America, the United States and Russia.

The issues raised by the clash of civilisations thesis are clearly relevant because they raise a key question: Are natural political spaces of trust created by culture, or can we integrate on a more global, perhaps even universal, basis?

I both agree and disagree with the “clash of civilisations” thesis. I agree that cultural factors have become the prism through which many people see international affairs today. On the other hand, I believe that this point of view underestimates the integrating forces driving global development, and the way in which the modernisation process is forcing a convergence of institutions and approaches to governance on an increasingly world-wide scale.

Huntington is right that political identity based on shared culture is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future. It would be profoundly undemocratic if global economic forces stripped local communities of their ability to decide how to structure their common political life.

It is certainly true, too, that different countries must find their own routes to modernity. The specific paths that western Europe, the United States, Japan, Russia and other countries have taken are all different.

Modernisation and development arise from the efforts of the people who live in a given society, not from those of outsiders. Countries can learn from one another, but their ability to shape outcomes in foreign lands is usually very limited. This is something that the United States has painfully learnt over the past four years in Iraq.

The question we need to address, however, is whether we are taking different paths to the same endpoint – an endpoint of a single world civilisation – or whether different human cultures are heading to fundamentally different places.

My view, contrary to Professor Huntington’s, is that modernisation itself in the long run requires the convergence of many types of institutions, regardless of cultural starting points. And economic integration between states is most productive, and results in the most durable forms of trust, when it is based on transparent rule-bound institutions rather than the looser ties of cultural affinity.

The starting point of any country’s development is the state, which Max Weber, the German sociologist, defined as a monopoly of legitimate force over a defined territory. But while the state begins with coercion, the miracle of the modern state is its ability to solve the paradox of power – namely, that a state has to be strong enough to enforce laws and provide order, yet it must constrain its own exercise of power if there is to be long-term economic growth.

It is state weakness that explains anaemic economic growth in many parts of the developing world. All societies need order, rule of law, a government that provides basic public goods and a reasonably fair distribution of resources. If rulers cannot govern effectively, if they are highly corrupt and divert public resources to private ends, if they behave arbitrarily, then they will undercut the savings and investment needed for long-term growth. It is therefore no surprise that by the end of the 1990s, better governance and more competent states became the order of the day.

How does a modern state achieve good governance? Good governance is not a gift given by rulers to the ruled. It ultimately has to be based on accountability mechanisms which ensure that rulers truly serve the interests of the ruled, not just their own interests or those of their friends and families.

Governments can be held accountable in a number of ways. The most familiar are those vertical accountability mechanisms known as elections. But there are also mechanisms of horizontal accountability that work when different parts of a government monitor each other’s performance.

Parliaments and courts, independent of the executive, are of course crucial. Furthermore, there are mechanisms outside the formal political system. Accountability requires transparency regarding the behaviour of rulers, for bad governments seldom report on their own failures and transgressions. That is why good governance requires an independent media and the institutions of civil society to monitor the behaviour of the state.

Thus, effective modern states are as notable for the constraints they put on themselves as they are for their ability to concentrate power.

Whether within or among states, trust can arise from one of two sources. The first is cultural, where trust derives from shared values, traditions and history. In all societies, trust begins with family and kinship and then slowly radiates out to a broader range of social groups. The second form of trust is based on shared interests.

This kind of trust can exist between complete strangers with nothing in common culturally and who may operate in different parts of the world. This kind of trust is based on institutions.

Of the two forms of trust, the cultural version is clearly the most natural and widespread, but it is also more primitive. All human beings organise themselves into primary social groups or cultural communities and nearly all people fall back on such groups in times of trouble or crisis.

The second form of trust expands the potential radius of trust indefinitely. It is more durable because it is based on self-interest and it is the basis of modern economic interdependence. Trust becomes increasingly anchored in reciprocal self-inter-est rather than culture as countries modernise. Globalisation provides the opportunity to expand markets far beyond the limits of one’s own community, requiring development of an impersonal, structured institutional framework by which trust can emerge between complete strangers.

A case in point: businesses in China and in Chinese-speaking societies were traditionally structured around the family. It was difficult to trust strangers or enter into business relationships with someone to whom you were not related.

While this kinship-based form of social capital worked to a degree and for a while, it was limiting. It meant that family-owned businesses could not grow into large, professionally managed companies.

There are many political reasons for countries to decide to align with one another on grounds of cultural, ethnic or historical commonality. But economic rationality demands that trust be based on more impersonal criteria and here the degree to which a country’s institutions are law-governed and transparent takes pride of place.

Integration in the global economy will be more durable and productive of shared prosperity to the extent that it can be based on interests rather than passions, on institutions rather than culture. This is not a western perspective; it is a global one.

© American Interest/ Global Viewpoint 2007

August 12, 2007 at 11:14 AM in Cold War, Middle East, Muslim background, Political | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Radical Islamic party convenes in London

Radical Islamic party convenes in London - International Herald Tribune

By Jane Perlez Published: August 5, 2007

LONDON: A radical Islamic party that has become a
focus of attention in Britain, with calls in Parliament for its
prohibition, began a frontal attack on its critics this weekend at a
carefully stage-managed conference in London that attracted several
thousands of well-dressed, mostly professional Muslims.

Calls of "Allahu Akbar," or God is great, punctuated the leaders'
speeches at the conference held by Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Party of
Liberation, a group that calls for a caliphate in Muslim countries, the
end of Israel and the withdrawal of all Western interests in the Middle
East.

"There is no Islam as a way of life without a Khilafah," said Kamal
Abuzahra, an Islamic academic of Bangladeshi origin, using the Arabic
work for caliphate and earning a roar of approval from the crowd
segregated into his and hers sections.

The conference was titled, "Khilafah, The Need and the Method."

The chairman of the party, Abdul Wahid, a medical doctor in Harrow,
England, took on Britain's political leadership: "They say: 'You preach
hate.' I preach a hatred of the lies of people in this country that
send soldiers to Iraq. I preach a hatred of torture."

Other speakers assailed the British government for linking the group
to terrorism and for too often treating British Muslims as terror
suspects.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, founded in the early 1950s by a Palestinian judge
dissatisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood, has existed in Britain for a
number of years, and remains legal in other Western countries,
including the United States, where it has less appeal than here.

In the aftermath of the botched terror attacks in London and
Glasgow, there were renewed calls for the prohibition of Hizb
ut-Tahrir, on the grounds that although the group proclaims advocating
peaceful means for winning the Caliphate, its rhetoric can encourage
Muslims onto a path toward terrorism.

Some analysts describe Hizb ut-Tahrir as "soft jihadists"; others contend that it veers beyond that.

"The only difference between Islamists from Hizb ut-Tahrir and
jihadists is that the former are waiting for their state and caliph
before they commend jihad, while the latter believes the time for jihad
is now," said Ed Husain, a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir who has
criticized the group in a recent book, "The Islamist."

Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in a number of Muslim countries,
particularly those that feel vulnerable to its calls for the overthrow
of their governments - including Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The group was proscribed by the German Interior Ministry in 2003 for
"spreading hate and violence," under a chapter in the Constitution that
is often used to clamp down on anti-Semitism. Hizb ut-Tahrir is
appealing that ban.

In Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir has waxed and waned, enjoying
considerable strength in the mid-1990s, when members recalled that it
attracted a crowd of many thousands to a meeting at Wembley Stadium.

The party, which does not announce membership numbers, remains
potent on British university campuses, frequently fields speakers on
television talk shows, and runs a slick Web site that falls short of
running into problems with British law.

During Prime Minister Gordon Brown's first question time in the
House of Commons last month, the leader of the Conservative Party,
David Cameron, asked the new Labour leader why Hizb ut-Tahrir had not
been banned.

Cameron said the group was "poisoning the minds of young people and
has said that Jews should be killed wherever they are found."

Brown replied that he had only been in office a short while and would look into it.

But John Reid, the former home secretary, jumped in, saying there
was not sufficient evidence under British laws to ban the organization.

That, say British officials, is the nub of the problem. Even under
the new 2006 anti-terrorism law that prohibits the glorification of
terrorism, Hizb ut-Tahrir cannot be prosecuted, a British government
official said.

"They are very savvy, very sophisticated, they know how far they can push," the official said.

Former Prime Minister Tony Blair was urged last year by the
Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf, to ban the group on the grounds
that it "brainwashes people and that leads to violent acts," a senior
Pakistani official said. The British Foreign Office received a similar
message from Pakistani officials last month.

During a lunch break in the sunny courtyard of the Alexandra Palace,
a 19th-century brick pile in northern London, conference-goers -
information technology managers, bankers and teachers - told of the
appeal of the ideology of a Caliphate in the Muslim world.

"If you look at the political structure in the Muslim world, it's a
police state," said Mohammed Baig, 28, a second-generation British
Indian who is an asset manager specializing in corporate governance.
"You have the public opinion underground, and then staged public
opinion in the media."

Most people in the Muslim world want the introduction of Sharia, or
Islamic law, said Baig, who said he had been a member of the group for
seven years.

"Our feeling is: What gives Western governments the right to impose
a set of values on a people who don't believe in them?" he said,
referring to the United States and Britain pushing for democratic
values in the Middle East.

Asked about Hizb ut-Tahrir as a conveyor belt to terrorism, Baig
said: "I'm not going to say Hizb ut-Tahrir has been a perfect
organization for 20 years. There are people who have come and gone in
the organization. An atmosphere was created in the youth in the mid
'90s, mistakes were made."

Some of the most ardent adherence to the party's ideas about a Caliphate was expressed by women members at the conference.

Rubina Ahmed, 33, a mother of four who came on a charter bus from
Manchester, said, "It's the in-depthness of the caliphate that I like."
Hizb ut-Tahrir "doesn't compromise on the values of Islam and it's not
afraid to speak out for what it wants."

Why did Hizb ut-Tahrir not work for the goal of the Caliphate in
Britain, asked someone in the audience during a question-and-answer
session.

"We focus our work where we can get the quickest results," Abuzahra said.

August 6, 2007 at 09:38 AM in Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Sunni Muslim sheikhs join US in fighting Al Qaeda | csmonitor.com

Iraqi tribal support is linked to drop in violence in Anbar Province. By Sam Dagher | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Ramadi, Iraq Amid fields of wheat and barley, dozens of armed men emerged along a dirt road leading to the fiefdom of the Bu-Fahed tribe in Hamdhiyah, an idyllic corner of restive Anbar Province, just north of Ramadi. "Welcome to our proud sheikhs. Down with terror," read banners on the road.

Source: Sunni Muslim sheikhs join US in fighting Al Qaeda | csmonitor.com

Dozens of sheikhs and tribal elders in flowing gold-trimmed camel-hair cloaks, many clutching colorful worry beads, streamed into a conference hall. Each was frisked by tribesmen to guard against suicide bombs.

The meeting looked to be a typical gathering, but its true purpose was for top sheikhs to issue an ultimatum: quit supporting Al Qaeda and turn in relatives belonging to the group.

Like dominoes, tribes reeling from a campaign of killing and intimidation by Al Qaeda have been joining, one by one, the US-led fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq in this Sunni Arab province. Last month, US Gen. David Petraeus told Congress that violence was down significantly here and that the tribes were key to the transformation.

On Tuesday, the tribes claimed a major victory: the death of Abu Ayub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. While many are skeptical about the claim, the episode underscores the Iraqi government's eagerness to bank on the success of turning tribes away from Al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency. But whether these new allegiances from tribes that once backed Al Qaeda will stick remains to be seen, say analysts.

"I do not think it [the council of tribes against Al Qaeda] goes far enough to weaken other elements of the insurgency," says Zaki Chehab, political editor at the London-based Al Hayat newspaper. "There is also no clear commitment yet from influential tribes on how to deal with the Americans."

But winning over the Bu-Fahed tribe was a coup. It had been one of Al Qaeda's staunchest supporters, and traces its lineage to the birthplace of the puritan form of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism in the Saudi Arabian province of Najd. It formally threw its lot behind Sheikh Abdel-Sattar Abu Risha.

Sheikh Abu Risha

Sheikh Abu Risha is the force behind the so-called Al Anbar Salvation Council of tribes against Al Qaeda, which is now strongly backed by both the US military and Iraqi government, and it includes 17 tribes.

It was Abu Risha who boasted on state TV Tuesday that his kinsmen killed the Al Qaeda in Iraq commander and seven of his cohorts – two Saudis and five Iraqis.

"Our kinsmen in Taji clashed with Abu Hamza, and he has been killed.... There are witnesses, he has been killed," he said, referring to a town northwest of Baghdad. His announcement was then followed by songs praising the "glories of Anbar's tribes."

The US military and the Iraqi government were unable to confirm Mr. Masri's death with the Interior Ministry, which said that it was working on retrieving Masri's body from the Taji tribes. A posting on a fundamentalist website denied it..

Abu Risha's movement emerged last fall in what one sheikh described as the "Anbar Intifada," a reference to the Palestinian uprising against Israeli forces. In posters prepared by the US military in Ramadi, Abu Risha is shown with his rifle slung on his shoulder and looming large over small masked men (meant to represent Al Qaeda) fleeing in fear.

Anbar's provincial seat, Ramadi, which Al Qaeda declared in October to be the capital of its so-called Islamic state in Iraq, is now firmly in the grips of US and Iraqi forces.

US Capt. Jay McGee, intelligence officer with the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment from Fort Worth, Texas, says that the motivation for the tribes to join the council is largely self-serving.

"Everyone is convinced Coalition forces are going to leave and they are saying, 'We do not want Al Qaeda to take control of the area when that happens.' For them, Al Qaeda is a greater threat long term."

Captain McGee's battalion is in charge of the area where the Bu-Fahed is located, and says that many of the tribesmen now joining Iraqi government security forces once fought with insurgent groups like the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Islamic Army, Mohammad's Army, and the Fatiheen Army.

New fight for Bu-Faheds

At the gathering in Hamdhiyah last week, tribal leaders took their place in rows of white plastic chairs in the presence of a handful US military officers.

"The tribe has gone through its most difficult period. We have lost many dear sons. What complicates matters is that some of our same sons have embraced terrorists and carried out their orders," Sheikh Haqi Ismail al-Fahdawi told his fellow tribesmen.

He told them that they must now encourage young men to join the Army and police and write to sheikhs from other tribes in Anbar to pressure them to hand over fugitives from the Bu-Fahed who were Al-Qaeda members and also use their families who remained behind as leverage.

"The days of writs of forgiveness are over," he said.

Another tribal notable, Hussein Zbeir, grabbed the microphone from Sheikh Haqi and spoke more bluntly about Al Qaeda's role: "If it was not for the coyotes among us, no one would have been killed, kidnapped, or bombed. You know who among you brought the Yemeni with the suicide vest."

Sheikh Jabbar al-Fahdawi, a 30-something civil engineer, who is being groomed to assume the tribe's leadership, said in an interview that his brother and hundreds of his kinsmen were killed by Al Qaeda. He said 20 percent of his tribe had, over the years, been recruited by Al Qaeda, while an equal amount joined insurgent groups.

"We have frozen the true resistance, and I told my followers to stop attacking the Americans. We consider the Americans to be our friends at the moment so that we can get rid of the extremists," he said adding that tribe fugitives guilty of killing must be tracked down and executed and their families banished from the tribe.

He rolls up his sleeves to show deep scars from gunshot wounds he sustained in recent battles against Al Qaeda. "I left my work in Baghdad to come and free my tribe," he said.

Soon thereafter, Abu Risha appears. He arrives in a motorcade of SUVs and police pick-up trucks bristling with machine guns.

The door of one of the vehicles is flung open. Abu Risha emerges wearing dark wrap-around sunglasses and dressed in the finest tribal attire.

He hugs Sheikh Jabbar who leads him by hand into the meeting. "Anbar is one tribe and our awakening will sweep through all of Iraq, God willing," he tells the Bu-Faheds.

In an interview later, he proudly pulls out a pistol from a holster tied around his waist. He says it was given to him by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. His father and four of his brothers, he says, were killed by Al-Qaeda.

Al Qaeda ties linger

But throughout Anbar, the ties are still strong to Al Qaeda. Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari, who hails from one of Anbar's most prestigious tribes and heads the antigovernment Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq, called on Osama bin Laden to intervene to stop the rift between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the local insurgency.

He described men like Abu Risha as "agents and conduits of the [US] occupation."

"I call on Sheikh Osama bin Laden in the name of the Islam for which he fights to intervene and to instruct Al Qaeda to adhere to the rules of proper jihad and to respect the people who had previously opened their arms to Al Qaeda," Mr. Dhari said in an interview Sunday with Bahrain's Akhbar al-Khaleej newspaper. Dhari's remarks indicated that the US and Iraqis still have much work ahead to fully dislodge Al Qaeda from all the Anbar tribes.

"If he [bin Laden] has no influence over Al Qaeda in Iraq, then he must say it so that we can decide how to deal with those who have hurt our main cause, which is liberating Iraq," he said

• Tomorrow: Can the US preserve success in Ramadi? Doing so means getting more tribes on board and spreading the formula to other parts of Anbar Province.

Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and related links

May 2, 2007 at 11:30 PM in Iraq, Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power - New York Times

By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER Two years ago, the leaders of Saudi Arabia told international atomic regulators that they could foresee no need for the kingdom to develop nuclear power. Today, they are scrambling to hire atomic contractors, buy nuclear hardware and build support for a regional system of reactors.

Source: Eye on Iran, Rivals Pursuing Nuclear Power - New York Times

So, too, Turkey is preparing for its first atomic plant. And Egypt has announced plans to build one on its Mediterranean coast. In all, roughly a dozen states in the region have recently turned to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for help in starting their own nuclear programs. While interest in nuclear energy is rising globally, it is unusually strong in the Middle East.

“The rules have changed,” King Abdullah II of Jordan recently told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. “Everybody’s going for nuclear programs.”

The Middle East states say they only want atomic power. Some probably do. But United States government and private analysts say they believe that the rush of activity is also intended to counter the threat of a nuclear Iran.

By nature, the underlying technologies of nuclear power can make electricity or, with more effort, warheads, as nations have demonstrated over the decades by turning ostensibly civilian programs into sources of bomb fuel. Iran’s uneasy neighbors, analysts say, may be positioning themselves to do the same.

“One danger of Iran going nuclear has always been that it might provoke others,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an arms analysis group in London. “So when you see the development of nuclear power elsewhere in the region, it’s a cause for some concern.”

Some analysts ask why Arab states in the Persian Gulf, which hold nearly half the world’s oil reserves, would want to shoulder the high costs and obligations of a temperamental form of energy. They reply that they must invest in the future, for the day when the flow of oil dries up.

But with Shiite Iran increasingly ascendant in the region, Sunni countries have alluded to other motives. Officials from 21 governments in and around the Middle East warned at an Arab summit meeting in March that Iran’s drive for atomic technology could result in the beginning of “a grave and destructive nuclear arms race in the region.”

In Washington, officials are seizing on such developments to build their case for stepping up pressure on Iran. President Bush has talked privately to experts on the Middle East about his fears of a “Sunni bomb,” and his concerns that countries in the Middle East may turn to the only nuclear-armed Sunni state, Pakistan, for help.

“It’s a constant source of discussion,” a senior administration official said recently. “But it’s not something the president thinks he can discuss publicly” after the imbroglio over faulty weapons intelligence on Iraq.

The Middle East has seen hints of a regional nuclear-arms race before. After Israel obtained its first weapon four decades ago, several countries took steps down the nuclear road. But many analysts say it is Iran’s atomic intransigence that has now prodded the Sunni powers into getting serious about hedging their bets and, like Iran, financing them with $65-a-barrel oil.

“Now’s the time to worry,” said Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East expert at the Nixon Center, a Washington policy institute. “The Iranians have to worry, too. The idea that they’ll emerge as the regional hegemon is silly. There will be a very serious counterreaction, certainly in conventional military buildups but also in examining the nuclear option.”

No Arab country now has a power reactor, whose spent fuel can be mined for plutonium, one of the two favored materials — along with uranium — for making the cores of atom bombs. Some Arab states do, however, engage in civilian atomic research.

Analysts caution that a chain reaction of nuclear emulation is not foreordained. States in the Middle East appear to be waiting to see which way Tehran’s nuclear standoff with the United Nations Security Council goes before committing themselves wholeheartedly to costly programs of atomic development.

Even if Middle Eastern nations do obtain nuclear power, political alliances and arms-control agreements could still make individual states hesitate before crossing the line to obtain warheads. Many may eventually decide that the costs and risks outweigh the benefits — as South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Libya did after investing heavily in arms programs.

But many diplomats and analysts say that the Sunni Arab governments are so anxious about Iran’s nuclear progress that they would even, grudgingly, support a United States military strike against Iran.

“If push comes to shove, if the choice is between an Iranian nuclear bomb and a U.S. military strike, then the Arab gulf states have no choice but to quietly support the U.S.,” said Christian Koch, director of international studies at the Gulf Research Center, a private group in Dubai.

Decades ago, it was Israel’s drive for nuclear arms that brought about the region’s first atomic jitters. Even some Israeli leaders found themselves “preaching caution because of the reaction,” said Avner Cohen, a senior fellow at the University of Maryland and the author of “Israel and the Bomb.”

Egypt responded first. In 1960, after the disclosure of Israel’s work on a nuclear reactor, Cairo threatened to acquire atomic arms and sought its own reactor. Years of technical and political hurdles ultimately ended that plan.

Iraq came next. But in June 1981, Israeli fighter jets bombed its reactor just days before engineers planned to install the radioactive core. The bombing ignited a global debate over how close Iraq had come to nuclear arms. It also prompted Iran, then fighting a war with Iraq, to embark on a covert response.

Alireza Assar, a nuclear adviser to Iran’s Ministry of Defense who later defected, said he attended a secret meeting in 1987 at which the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said Iran had to do whatever was necessary to achieve victory. “We need to have all the technical requirements in our possession,” Dr. Assar recalled the commander as saying, even the means to “build a nuclear bomb.”

In all, Iran toiled in secret for 18 years before its nuclear efforts were disclosed in 2003. Intelligence agencies and nuclear experts now estimate that the Iranians are 2 to 10 years away from having the means to make a uranium-based bomb. It says its uranium enrichment work is entirely peaceful and meant only to fuel reactors.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns peaked when inspectors found evidence of still-unexplained ties between Iran’s ostensibly peaceful program and its military, including work on high explosives, missiles and warheads. That combination, the inspectors said in early 2006, suggested a “military nuclear dimension.”

Before such disclosures, few if any states in the Middle East attended the atomic agency’s meetings on nuclear power development. Now, roughly a dozen are doing so and drawing up atomic plans.

The newly interested states include Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen and the seven sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates — Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn.

“They generally ask what they need to do for the introduction of power,” said R. Ian Facer, a nuclear power engineer who works for the I.A.E.A. at its headquarters in Vienna. The agency teaches the basics of nuclear energy. In exchange, states must undergo periodic inspections to make sure their civilian programs have no military spinoffs.

Saudi Arabia, since reversing itself on reactors, has become a whirlwind of atomic interest. It recently invited President Vladimir V. Putin to become the first Russian head of state to visit the desert kingdom. He did so in February, offering a range of nuclear aid.

Diplomats and analysts say Saudi Arabia leads the drive for nuclear power within the Gulf Cooperation Council, based in Riyadh. In addition to the Saudis, the council includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — Washington’s closest Arab allies. Its member states hug the western shores of the Persian Gulf and control about 45 percent of the world’s oil reserves.

Late last year, the council announced that it would embark on a nuclear energy program. Its officials have said they want to get it under way by 2009.

“We will develop it openly,” Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, said of the council’s effort. “We want no bombs. All we want is a whole Middle East that is free from weapons of mass destruction,” an Arab reference to both Israel’s and Iran’s nuclear programs.

In February, the council and the I.A.E.A. struck a deal to work together on a nuclear power plan for the Arab gulf states. Abdul Rahman ibn Hamad al-Attiya, the council’s secretary general, told reporters in March that the agency would provide technical expertise and that the council would hire a consulting firm to speed its nuclear deliberations.

Already, Saudi officials are traveling regularly to Vienna, and I.A.E.A. officials to Riyadh, the Saudi capital. “It’s a natural right,” Mohamed ElBaradei, the atomic agency’s director general, said recently of the council’s energy plan, estimating that carrying it out might take up to 15 years.

In all, 85 percent of the gulf states — all but Iraq — have declared their interest in nuclear power. By comparison, 15 percent of South American nations and 20 percent of African ones have done so.

One factor in that exceptional level of interest is that the Persian Gulf states have the means. Typically, a large commercial reactor costs up to $4 billion. The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are estimated to be investing in nonnuclear projects valued at more than $1 trillion.

Another factor is Iran. Its shores at some points are visible across the waters of the gulf — the Arabian Gulf to Arabs, the Persian Gulf to Iranians.

The council wants “its own regional initiative to counter the possible threat from an aggressive neighbor armed with nuclear weapons,” said Nicole Stracke, an analyst at the Gulf Research Center. Its members, she added, “felt they could no longer lag behind Iran.”

A similar technology push is under way in Turkey, where long-simmering plans for nuclear power have caught fire. Last year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for three plants. “We want to benefit from nuclear energy as soon as possible,” he said. Turkey plans to put its first reactor near the Black Sea port of Sinop, and to start construction this year.

Egypt, too, is moving forward. Last year, it announced plans for a reactor at El-Dabaa, about 60 miles west of Alexandria. “We do not start from a vacuum,” President Hosni Mubarak told the governing National Democracy Party’s annual conference. His remark was understated given Cairo’s decades of atomic research.

Robert Joseph, a former under secretary of state for arms control and international security who is now Mr. Bush’s envoy on nuclear nonproliferation, visited Egypt earlier this year. According to officials briefed on the conversations, officials from the Ministry of Electricity indicated that if Egypt was confident that it could have a reliable supply of reactor fuel, it would have little desire to invest in the costly process of manufacturing its own nuclear fuel — the enterprise that experts fear could let Iran build a bomb.

Other officials, especially those responsible for Egypt’s security, focused more on the possibility of further proliferation in the region if Iran succeeded in its effort to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

“I don’t know how much of it is real,” Mr. Joseph said of a potential arms race. “But it is becoming urgent for us to shape the future expansion of nuclear energy in a way that reduces the risks of proliferation, while meeting our energy and environmental goals.”

Home

• World
• U.S.
• N.Y. / Region
• Business
• Technology
• Science
• Health
• Sports
• Opinion
• Arts
• Style
• Travel
• Jobs
• Real Estate
• Automobiles
• Back to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

April 14, 2007 at 04:10 PM in Iran, Iraq, Israel, Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Detente Is the Talk of Town In Damascus - Forward.com

Syria Claims Mediation Role in West's Standoffs With Hamas and Iran Marc Perelman | Fri. Apr 13, 2007 Damascus - While Republicans and Democrats in Washington trade blows over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Syria last week, officials and pundits in this ancient capital describe the political feuding as a distraction from a more important truth. From their viewpoint, Pelosi's visit was not a freelance bid for American-Syrian thaw but rather the latest step in a larger Syrian-Western rapprochement that has been under way for months.

Source: Detente Is the Talk of Town In Damascus - Forward.com

Sources here acknowledge that the substance of Pelosi’s talks with President Bashar al-Assad hardly deviated from American policy: demands that Syria stop supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups, help secure the release of Israeli soldiers, refrain from meddling in Lebanon’s politics, and prevent arms and militants from crossing into neighboring Iraq.

For the Syrians, all this was less important than Pelosi’s mere presence. The visit by the highest American official in two years was taken by the regime as evidence, the clearest to date, that a Western policy of isolating Syria — prompted by accusations that Damascus was behind the February 2005 slaying of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri — was on its last legs. Coming on the heels of a slew of visits since last summer by Western European officials and by legislators of the United States, the Pelosi junket was interpreted here as evidence that the growing chorus of calls in Washington and Jerusalem to engage Syria was making inroads despite the reluctance of the Bush administration.

“What mattered to the Syrians was that she was in Damascus,” said political scientist Sami Moubayed of al-Kalamoun University. “Whether she came with a peace offer from Israel or a truce from Washington, they welcomed her as a guest of honor, with red carpets in the Syrian capital.”

Syrians point to two hardly known recent diplomatic events as evidence of their eagerness to join the pro-Western fold. Damascus played a key role in pushing Hamas and Fatah to reach an agreement earlier this year on a Palestinian national unity government, which Syrians view as a Hamas concession toward Israel. Even though the deal was signed in Mecca under the auspices of Saudi King Abdullah, a Western diplomat confirmed Syrian claims that most of the heavy lifting was done by Damascus, where Hamas leader Khaled Meshal resides.

In addition, Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem told Arab media that Damascus had helped, at Britain’s request, to mediate the release of the 15 British sailors captured last month by Iran for allegedly entering its territorial waters.

The guarded optimism here is better understood when compared with the jittery mood that prevailed in 2005, when a United Nations probe into the Hariri murder pointed fingers at the Assad regime. Syrian troops were then forced to withdraw from Lebanon under American and French pressure, and talk of forcing a regime change in Damascus was in full swing.

But pressure on Syria has eased since then. Iraq has descended into sectarian chaos, and the American administration’s democratization agenda is in shambles. Israel’s military onslaught in Lebanon last summer bolstered pro-Syrian forces. In addition, the escalating tensions over Iran’s nuclear program have taken some pressure off Damascus, even prompting calls to woo the regime back into the Arab mainstream, so as to isolate Tehran.

In Washington, meanwhile, talk of engagement with Syria gained credibility with the release last fall of the bipartisan report issued by the Iraq Study Group. Since then, the pace of congressional trips to Damascus has stepped up; in addition to the Pelosi delegation, three Republican legislators met Assad a couple of days earlier, and another did so the following day.

As a result, Syrian officials are hoping that Washington and Jerusalem will heed their message: Syria is ready not only to make peace with Israel but also to distance itself from Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran — but it sees these as results of negotiations and not as preconditions. In exchange, Damascus wants to obtain the full return of the Golan Heights, a less hostile government in Lebanon and, most crucially, renewal of strong relations with the United States.

“The Syrians are really ready and serious about making peace with Israel,” said Ibrahim Hamidi, longtime Damascus bureau chief of the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat. “Syria is also ready to discuss Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran as part of the endgame with Washington.”

A Western diplomat in Damascus seconded the view that the regime is not pursuing any ideological goal but is motivated exclusively by Syria’s national interest and its self-preservation. As a result, the diplomat said, Syria appears ready to discuss even such sensitive issues as Lebanon.

Syria signaled its openness in secret peace talks between a Syrian intermediary and a former senior Israeli diplomat, according to published accounts that have been confirmed publicly by the Israeli negotiator, former Foreign Ministry Director-General Alon Liel. Both Syria and Israel have denied involvement in those discussions, but the participants claim that both governments were updated regularly. Well-informed sources add that this is especially true with regard to key Syrian officials, and that Damascus eventually pulled out when Israel refused to allow officials to participate in the talks.

A related development has been the warming of relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia after years of deterioration. Ties hit a low point during last summer’s war in Lebanon, when Assad blasted Arab countries that initially criticized Hezbollah — most notably Saudi Arabia — as “half-men.” Both sides made efforts to iron out their differences before the recent summit of the Arab League held in the Saudi capital, where Syria endorsed the renewed Saudi initiative calling for normalization with Israel.

Still, another Western diplomat said that Western countries remained uncertain about Syria’s willingness to distance itself from Hezbollah or from Iran.

Early this week, France began circulating a draft statement at the U.N. Security Council expressing concern about continuing Syrian weapons shipments to Hezbollah.

While the Bush administration maintains that the regime’s negative role in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories does not warrant a full-fledged engagement, it nonetheless sent a State Department official to Damascus last month to discuss the fate of Iraqi refugees. American officials also participated in a conference in Baghdad that was attended by officials from both Syria and Iran.

Moreover, the administration has quietly used European diplomats and Saudi officials to assess whether Syria is ready to change course.

Last August, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos became the first Western official to visit Damascus since the Hariri murder. He was followed by several European diplomats, including Britain’s top foreign policy adviser and, most symbolically, E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana. The British diplomat, Nigel Sheinwald, arrived in Damascus last November with a set of requests after a trip to Washington and meetings with State Department officials. He called on Syria to support the Western-backed governments in Iraq and in Lebanon, to pressure Hamas to enter a Palestinian unity government with Fatah, to fight Islamic terrorism and to downgrade relations with Iran.

Syria moved on the Iraq front by re-establishing diplomatic and intelligence ties with Baghdad, welcoming senior Iraqi government officials, intensifying a security crackdown on jihadist networks and coaxing Sunni leaders to participate in national reconciliation efforts. Syria helped broker the Palestinian government accord. It signaled that its growing ties with Iran were the result of its isolation rather than an ideological stance — and, as such, could be easily reversed. But Lebanon, which was the main focus of the Solana visit and of recent discussions with Saudi Arabia, remains the sticking point.

The Western- and Saudi-backed Lebanese government has locked horns with pro-Syrian factions over the creation of an international tribunal to judge the culprits of the killings of Hariri and other anti-Syrian politicians. For months, pro-Syrian forces have blocked a parliamentary vote to create the court, citing Damascus’s claims that the U.N. probe is a political ploy by Western powers rather than a fair judicial process.

Some observers believe that both sides have now realized that a compromise was needed to avoid a civil war in Lebanon. The Solana visit, in particular, fueled speculation that a proposal was in the offing to spare the most senior Syrian officials in exchange for Damascus’s acceptance of the tribunal.

Compared with Lebanon, Israel is a fairly straightforward problem. Both sides nearly clinched an agreement in 2000 but ultimately failed to reach a compromise on the tracing of the border. After insisting for years that future talks would need to start where they left off, Syria formally dropped that condition, beginning with a 2003 Assad interview in The New York Times. Syrian officials claim that a deal would be within reach if only they had partners in Jerusalem and in Washington. After Pelosi announced that she had conveyed a peace message from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the administration blasted her for encouraging a rogue regime and Olmert’s office quickly denied that Israel had made any overture.

But while the regime officially laments the lack of Israeli and American response to its repeated peace overtures, it also serves a purpose. “They understand Olmert is very weak and that there will be no resumption of full-fledged negotiations under a Bush administration,” one local commentator said. “So their repeated calls for peace are a way of embarrassing Israel and the U.S., because they know there will be no answer.”

April 12, 2007 at 09:53 PM in Middle East, Syria | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

The face: Sir Nigel Sheinwald-News-Politics-TimesOnline

Penny Wark The release of 15 British sailors and Marines from Iran is both the Prime Minister's triumph and further evidence that Margaret Beckett lacks credibility as Foreign Secretary. On this occasion Tony Blair is indebted to his foreign policy adviser, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who held secret talks with Ali Larijani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. The telephone call between the two men is regarded as the breakthrough encounter.

Source: The face: Sir Nigel Sheinwald-News-Politics-TimesOnline

A diplomatic success for a seasoned career diplomat, then. But the curious thing about Sir Nigel is that for all his cool-headed skill and the experience accrued during a 31-year career, he is not noted for having a delicate touch.

Rather, those who have worked with him describe him as outspoken, abrasive and ambitious. Yet if this is all that he is, he would not have pulled off a succession of sensitive, clandestine missions involving visits to such cities as Damascus, Tripoli, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Ramallah and Khartoum. Most notably he was involved in the secret negotiations that resulted in Libya’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.

He is certainly brusque, says one who knows him, and he is regarded with awe. Another says he is all right if you stand up to him; he is fun too, he can be indiscreet, and as the father of three sons he is a dedicated family man. A nanny once called him a pussycat, which might surprise those who have seen only the rottweiler, but which indicates that there is more to Sir Nigel than a fierce front — and we all know that being forceful and scary is a way of keeping people at a distance.

He sees himself as someone who asks the tough questions and has no time for prevarication. A Middle East analyst recalls that his first comment to him was: “Are you in fa-vour of suicide bombers?”

After an education at Harrow County School for Boys and Balliol, Oxford, he joined the Diplomatic Service in 1976. A Moscow posting ended suddenly after an accident in which a Russian was killed by the car he was driving. He has since worked in Washington, done two stints in Brussels, and a range of policy jobs in London, where he headed the Foreign Office news department from 1995 until 1998.

He served as spokesman for Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind, but the turning point of his career was the arrival of new Labour in 1997. He quickly established a good relationship with Robin Cook, then Foreign Secretary, though his job was not to represent his Foreign Office colleagues but to implement the Prime Minister’s views. At 53 his appointment as the next Ambassador to the US makes it clear that he is very much Blair’s man. Will he be Brown’s too? Certainly it is easy to imagine that they will understand each other.

April 12, 2007 at 09:51 PM in Iran, Middle East, Syria | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Guardian | Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace

 

Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Michael Howard and John Hooper Saturday April 7, 2007 Guardian The US offered to take military action on behalf of the 15 British sailors and marines held by Iran, including buzzing Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions with warplanes, the Guardian has learned.

Source: Guardian | Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace

In the first few days after the captives were seized and British diplomats were getting no news from Tehran on their whereabouts, Pentagon officials asked their British counterparts: what do you want us to do? They offered a series of military options, a list which remains top secret given the mounting risk of war between the US and Iran. But one of the options was for US combat aircraft to mount aggressive patrols over Iranian Revolutionary Guard bases in Iran, to underline the seriousness of the situation.

The British declined the offer and said the US could calm the situation by staying out of it. London also asked the US to tone down military exercises that were already under way in the Gulf. Three days before the capture of the 15 Britons , a second carrier group arrived having been ordered there by president George Bush in January. The aim was to add to pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme and alleged operations inside Iraq against coalition forces.

At the request of the British, the two US carrier groups, totalling 40 ships plus aircraft, modified their exercises to make them less confrontational.

The British government also asked the US administration from Mr Bush down to be cautious in its use of rhetoric, which was relatively restrained throughout.

The incident was a reminder of how inflammatory the situation in the Gulf is. According to some US and British officers, there is already a proxy war under way between their forces and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Meanwhile, the Iranians are convinced that separatist guerrilla attacks in Khuzestan and Baluchistan provinces are the work of British and US intelligence respectively. Earlier this week, ABC television news reported that a Baluchi group, Jundullah, based in Pakistan and carrying out raids inside Iran, had been receiving advice and encouragement from American officials since 2005.

A senior Iranian source with close ties to the Revolutionary Guard, told the Guardian: "If this had been between Iranian and American soldiers it could have been the beginning of an accidental war."

With the crisis now over, a remarkable degree of consensus is emerging among British, Iranian and Iraqi officials about what happened over 13 nervous days - namely that the decision to seize the Britons was taken locally, and was not part of a grander scheme cooked up in Tehran.

"My best guess is that this was a local incident which became an international incident," said one British source closely involved in the crisis.

Both sides had been watching each other closely for years across the disputed line separating the Iranian and Iraqi sides of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the northern Gulf beyond and British officials say that Iranian boats regularly infringe on foreign waters.

The senior Iranian source meanwhile, claimed there had been three British incursions into Iranian waters in the three months leading up to the capture and that the decision to detain the British naval crew on March 23 was taken by a regional Revolutionary Guard commander, responsible for the waterway.

Once the 15 captives were brought back to Iran, their stay was guaranteed to be unpleasant. The Pasdaran (as the Revolutionary Guards are universally known in Farsi) are a law unto themselves, feared within Iran for their thuggish methods.

There is also general agreement in London and Tehran that once the crisis had been triggered it took nearly two weeks to untangle, because their release had to be agreed by all the key players in the perpetual poker game that passes for government in Tehran. But those players could not be reached because they were scattered around the country for the No Rouz (new year) holiday.

"Nobody who counted was answering the phone," said one senior British official. "By the time the Iranian leaders got back from the holiday [on Tuesday] the phone was ringing off the hook, including from people they didn't expect, calling on them to release the captives quickly."

Among those unexpected callers were their closest allies, the Syrians, as well as leaders from far-flung states with no direct stake in the Gulf. Even the Colombian government issued a protest.

Another surprise intervention came from the Vatican. Hours before Wednesday's release, a letter from Pope Benedict was handed to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It said the Pope was confident that men of goodwill could find a solution. He asked the supreme leader to do what he could to ensure that the British sailors and marines were reunited with their families in time for Easter. It would, he said, be a significant religious gesture of goodwill from the Iranian people.

What impact the Pope's message had is impossible to assess. But some of its language was reflected at the press conference at which the release of the 15 Britons was announced. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the decision to "forgive" the sailors and marines had been taken "on the occasion of the birthday of the great prophet [Muhammad] ... and for the occasion of the passing of Christ".

The Iraqi government also played a critical role, pushing for consular access to five Iranians who had been arrested by US forces in Irbil and had been in custody since January, and helping organise the mysterious release of an Iranian diplomat who had been in captivity since February.

In the first days of the crisis, Iraqi officials also helped the British to identify the exact boundaries of Iraqi waters, the Guardian has learned, suggesting the British were not as certain of their case as they had publicly claimed.

But it was the unexpected release of Jalal Sharifa, the second secretary at the Iranian embassy, that raised most eyebrows, fuelling speculation that some kind of bargaining was going on. The diplomat had been missing since he was plucked from the streets of Baghdad on February 4. Iran blamed US forces in Iraq for ordering the diplomat's abduction, but US military officials denied the claims. Baghdad's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, however, has insisted that negotiations over Mr Sharafi had been under way long before March 23.

Some credit for the abrupt release of the British naval crew has also been given to Tony Blair's top foreign policy adviser, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who got through to his Iranian counterpart, Ari Larijani for the first time the night before Mr Ahmadinejad made his surprise announcement. The opening of a Sheinwald-Larijani channel of communication is being hailed as one of the few pluses to emerge from the affair.

The crucial decision for release was taken on Tuesday by the supreme national security council. It includes representatives of the presidency, the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard, and Tuesday was the first day they could all be brought together following the No Rouz holiday.

"I think they realised pretty quickly the game was not worth the candle," a senior British government source said.

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2007

April 8, 2007 at 07:20 PM in Middle East, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Jews and their troubles: Churchill - unpublished article

 

Sat Mar 10, 7:08 PM ET LONDON (AFP) - The Second World War prime minister Winston Churchill argued that Jews were "partly responsible for the antagonism from which they suffer" in an article publicised for the first time Sunday.

Source: Jews 'partly responsible' for their troubles: Churchill - Yahoo! News

Churchill made the claim in an article entitled "How The Jews Can Combat Persecution" written in 1937, three years before he started leading the country.

He outlined a new wave of anti-Semitism sweeping across Europe and the United States, which was followed by the deaths of millions of Jews in the Holocaust under the German Nazi regime.

"It would be easy to ascribe it to the wickedness of the persecutors, but that does not fit all the facts," the article read.

"It exists even in lands, like Great Britain and the United States, where Jew and Gentile are equal in the eyes of the law and where large numbers of Jews have found not only asylum, but opportunity.

"These facts must be faced in any analysis of anti-Semitism. They should be pondered especially by the Jews themselves.

"For it may be that, unwittingly, they are inviting persecution -- that they have been partly responsible for the antagonism from which they suffer."

The article adds: "The central fact which dominates the relations of Jew and non-Jew is that the Jew is 'different'.

"He looks different. He thinks differently. He has a different tradition and background. He refuses to be absorbed."

Elsewhere, Churchill praised Jews as "sober, industrious, law-abiding" and urged Britons to stand up for the race against persecution.

"There is no virtue in a tame acquiescence in evil. To protest against cruelty and wrong, and to strive to end them, is the mark of a man," he wrote.

The article was discovered by Cambridge University historian Richard Toye in the university's archive of Churchill's papers.

At the time, Churchill's secretary advised him it would be "inadvisable" to publish it and it never saw the light of day.

Churchill was voted the greatest Briton ever in a nationwide poll held by the BBC in 2002.

March 11, 2007 at 01:40 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Lawrence of Arabia takes on the Taliban-News-World-TimesOnline

 

Inspired by the legendary leader, key Washington adviser David Kilcullen tells Christina Lamb how he is reshaping strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq

Source: Lawrence of Arabia takes on the Taliban-News-World-TimesOnline

 

As Nato’s biggest offensive against the Taliban gets under way in Helmand, many of the 4,500 soldiers involved will be recalling the words of an 11-page e-mail that has circulated like wildfire among those fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

“You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life,” it starts. “But how does [all the theory] translate into action at night, with the GPS down, the media criticising you, the locals complaining in a language you don’t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people?”

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency is written by David Kilcullen, a 40-year-old Australian social scientist who is trying to redefine America’s war on terror. It is based on TE Lawrence’s Twenty-Seven Articles, a guide for British officers working with Arabs during the first world war.

Despite being Australian — he remains a reserve lieutenant-colonel in the Australian army — and an anthropologist, Kilcullen is the chief strategist on counterterrorism in the US State Department. He was given the job advising secretary of state Condoleezza Rice 18 months ago after writing an influential paper that said Iraq and Afghanistan should not be treated as a terrorism problem but as a globalised insurgency.

“My fundamental argument was that counterterrorism is enemy-centric — try to destroy the terrorists then the problem goes away,” he says. “That’s clearly not the case. Even if we kill Bin Laden, that’s not going to resolve the conflict. The problem is a quiescent population which is preyed on by a hostile element, so instead of going after that, you should go and protect the population and try to win their allegiance.”

It is a view taking hold both in Washington and London. More than five years after September 11, the US military is coming to accept that “shock and awe” is not the answer in theatres such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Troops are now issued with a counterinsurgency field manual, the first to be released by the American military since Vietnam.

Counterinsurgency has been made a key part of the curriculum on the Armor Captains’ Career Course for young US officers. In Whitehall, too, suddenly everyone in the Foreign Office Afghan group is talking about “coin”, shorthand for counterinsurgency.

So influential is Kilcullen’s thinking that he has also been appointed as chief adviser on counterinsurgency to General David Petraeus, the new US commander in Iraq. He will head a group of so-called warrior-intellectuals whose thinking was once regarded as subversive but who are now charged with finding the best way out of Baghdad. “A patient on intensive care,” is how Kilcullen describes Iraq, “not lost yet but . . .”

Kilcullen’s views were developed largely in East Timor, where he commanded an infantry company in the United Nations intervention force during the struggle for independence, and in Indonesia where he studied Islamic extremism for his doctorate.

When he was just 12, his father — a philosophy professor — gave him a copy of Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which he has carried ever since. “It’s fairly battered now!” he laughs. “I do believe we can learn a great deal from him.”

Another unconventional source is the cult 1999 film Fight Club starring Brad Pitt about alienated young white men in America going through the process of radicalisation, creating an ideology and forming terror cells. At the end they carry out a widespread terrorist attack.

“If you show a film about Islamic terrorism to people who are not Muslim, all they will see is the Islam and they will conflate the two,” he explains. “You’ve got to show people the phenomenon in its natural condition in their own society.”

Last month Kilcullen was in London, advising on how to take on the Taliban. He pulls no punches over the difficulties that British troops are facing. “I work in Iraq and various other theatres in the war on terror and have seen the enemy up close and I can tell you this enemy we face in Afghanistan is the toughest we face anywhere,” he said.

His 28 principles start with “diagnose the problem”. He explains: “The hardest thing in counterinsurgency is to know what’s going on. It’s not like world war two where you just look at a map and see Hitler’s forces are there and the allies are here.”

The new US commander in Afghanistan, General Dan McNeill, who launched the Nato offensive last week, preempting an expected Taliban spring strike, seems to have followed another of his principles — “seek early victories to stamp your dominance”.

Perhaps most important is “know your turf”. Kilcullen is critical of senior European officers who believe that gratitude for reconstruction will bring people over to their side. “It’s a very naive Hollywood view of counterinsurgency that you go in, speak the language, be nice to them and they’ll like you,” he said.

“People will be grateful for what you’ve done but when the enemy turn up with weapons and threaten them they will slide back to the enemy side. In Afghanistan the population don’t exercise choice individually, it’s collectively. You win or lose this place a village or valley at a time.”

According to Kilcullen, after more than five years in Afghanistan, the US military now understands that. “If you watch the way American forces operate, the first thing they do before they even deploy a soldier is engage with the local population and talk to their leaders. A lot of American operations now are planned by sitting down with the provincial governor, the military and police chief and local villagers. That would have been unimaginable back in 2001.”

He gives the example of a US commander in Kandahar who talked to villagers for weeks before carrying out a military operation. “He had prepositioned tailored aid packages designed to meet specific requests,” he says. “Within a few hours of the firing finishing that package was rolling so villagers could see an immediate benefit to cooperating.

“That pattern didn’t emerge by accident. America, unlike European countries, has rotated its troops back to the same areas each time so you have people operating in Afghanistan who have done two or three stints in the same place. They know the villages, know the valleys, know the people and know what not to do from mistakes made last time.”

That is not his only criticism of Europe. Referring to last year’s high casualty rate in which more than 4,000 Afghans were killed, he says: “The Europeans have been making a lot heavier use of air power than the Americans. Most people killed by American troops — which is relatively low compared with the Europeans — have been killed in direct rifle fire, in one-on-one engagement where people are actively shooting at the Americans and they’ll take them out, so there’s a pretty high chance they are killing the right people.”

He is keen to dispel comparisons with Vietnam, pointing out that the Taliban are all from Pashtun tribes. “The potential appeal of the Vietcong was unlimited. All Vietnamese could see something for them in the Vietcong agenda. But that’s just not the case with Taliban. The Pashtun population of Afghanistan is between 23% and 40% at most.

“Even in the worst-case scenario of Talibanistan to the south and east, Afghanistan would not fall. It has a whole area north of the Hindu Kush which would be viable as a state; Kabul would still be viable as capital.

“That’s not to say that things are rosy but that the fundamentals of the Afghan state are very sound compared with other insurgencies,” he says. “Look at the approval ratings of the Afghan government — still more than 50%. Tony Blair would be very happy to get that.”

March 11, 2007 at 10:21 AM in Middle East, UK | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Job done: Taliban ‘are on the run’

Christina Lamb Kabul

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2583182_1,00.html

British Nato commander claims military victory even as insurgents come back fighting

“MY aim today is to convince you that we actually won the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, contrary to popular belief,” said Colonel Dudley Giles as he showed a group of officers and diplomats inside Kabul’s Bala Hissar fort last week.

The fort is in ruins, destroyed by British troops in 1879 in retaliation for the murder of the British envoy. Giles is an accredited battlefield guide and in between heading Britain’s military police in Kabul for the past nine months, he has led a series of tours emphasising British military prowess on Afghan soil.

Down below in Kabul’s Nato headquarters, the most recent British general to attempt to tame the Afghans is engaged in a similar exercise of persuasion.

As General David Richards hands over control of all 31,000 Nato troops in Afghanistan to his American successor, General Dan McNeil, this morning, the message is very much “mission accomplished”. It is a message somewhat tarnished by the loss of the key southern town of Musa Qala to the Taliban.

Recent visitors to Richards’s office have been given a presentation entitled “2006 Achievements” that claims Nato “has gained the psychological ascendancy”. It goes on to cite statistics ranging from 6m children in school to 22m calls a month being made on the Afghan mobile phone system.

“In many respects I think we’ve been more successful than I anticipated,” Richards said last week. “At the start of the summer there was huge scepticism about Nato — could we fight, would we even still be here by now? Not only has Nato unequivocally proved it can fight but actually, militarily, it has defeated the Taliban.”

The fall of Musa Qala, where British troops had withdrawn after a much criticised peace deal with local elders, has nevertheless cast a pall over Richards’s farewells.

The attack was prompted by an airstrike near Musa Qala 10 days ago that was aimed at a Taliban commander named Mullah Ghafour but killed his family instead. He retaliated last weekend by invading the town centre but was driven out by local elders. On Friday he returned with more than 200 men and captured the town.

At Nato headquarters in Kabul yesterday, they were putting a rather desperate spin on events, saying the incursion proved to critics such as the Americans that the Musa Qala agreement had not been a peace deal with the Taliban. “We will take it back but in a manner and timing of our choosing,” said Mark Laity, a spokesman. “It’s a question of if, not when.”

Whoever ends up with their flag flying over Musa Qala, the general will not be returning home as “Richards of Afghanistan” as he clearly hoped when he arrived last April. But he has acquired widespread respect from both Afghans and diplomats as well as a nasty bout of whooping cough topped with viral pneumonia.

“General Richards has done a good job,” said President Hamid Karzai yesterday. “He’s tried hard and the situation is much better. But I don’t think we can declare victory.”

In fact he has overseen Afghanistan’s most violent year since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, with more than 4,000 Afghans and 191 coalition soldiers killed. The general, who before taking command had criticised the American forces for being “too kinetic”, ordered more than 650 airstrikes in September.

The number of strikes has now fallen to one or two a day, though this is partly because of the traditional winter lull in fighting by the Taliban.

“I am very unhappy about all this bombing and have told Nato this repeatedly,” Karzai said. “As we speak, there is a little girl of four being operated on in Germany because of Nato bombing in which 22 innocent people were killed. Rather than going in Afghan villages and sometimes bombing without really checking, making mistakes, we should go to the sources of terrorism, the places where they are trained and financed.”

Many of the casualties, including the girl, were sustained in Operation Medusa, when Nato forces battled for two weeks in September to stop Taliban forces taking the key city of Kandahar. Richards describes the battle, which left more than 500 dead, as “the turning point of the whole campaign” and insists Nato has won Kandahar. “There is very little Taliban activity there now,” he said.

Furthermore, Richards claims that had he had the extra troops he pleaded for but which are only now are being sent by Britain and the US, he could have won the war.

“I don’t really feel bitter because I’m a professional soldier,” he says with a laugh. “But I would love to have had them. During Operation Medusa if I’d had that reserve I would have prevented the Taliban getting out of the neck of the bottle (back to Pakistan) and swung them into Helmand and done the things already we’re about to do in Helmand.

“If I’d had that reserve I could have made it a more conclusive victory. I could have defeated them and accelerated progress in Helmand.”

Although Richards insists that he always expected to have to fight hard in Afghanistan, he concedes that he was surprised by the intensity. However, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, Afghanistan’s portly and genial defence minister, insists last summer’s heavy fighting could have been avoided.

“What people now call last year’s resurgence of the Taliban was the result of three or four years of preparation,” he said. “The Taliban believed the international community were not firmly committed to Afghanistan and would disengage. So from day one when the West started arming our army and police with those old weapons of the Soviet era that we’d fought with for 30 years with their barrels malfunctioning, etc, it did not give a very good message.

“The Taliban also chose a critical time to emerge — both militarily, just when there was a handover of command, and politically, when there was a lot of questioning in European capitals about the wisdom of deploying their forces here.”

This, the minister said, was what gave them the confidence to try to take Kandahar. “Militarily, it made no sense to send irregular troops against sophisticated conventional forces and compel them to engage in conventional battles. It was a big military gamble and they lost. But it stretched us to our limit.”

Not only is Nato beefing up its forces with an additional 1,000 Polish troops and 800 more British, but the US has extended the stay of 3,200 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Brigade.

There is renewed focus on doubling the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 70,000.

Just as Afghanistan started unravelling because attention had switched to Iraq, it is Iraq that is prompting a realisation in Washington that Afghanistan could go the same way. The past two weeks have seen visits to Kabul from Senator Hillary Clinton and Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House. President George Bush has asked for an extra $10.6 billion (£5.3 billion) in assistance.

On Thursday a beaming Wardak took delivery of 230 Humvee armoured vehicles and 800 army trucks, part of a massive new military consignment from the US.

“Building up the ANA is far cheaper than deploying international forces,” he said. “It was a mistake not to have invested more in the ANA before.”

The big question now is whether the Taliban were dealt a mortal blow by Operation Medusa, as Richards believes, and will not be able to muster their threatened spring offensive.

A Taliban spokesman claimed last month that they have 2,000 suicide bombers. Reports from across the border in Pakistan are of active recruitment. In Quetta, where the Taliban leadership is based, posters exhort: “Come and fight the British.” In Peshawar, prayers in mosques have been followed by impassioned speeches about the infidels in Afghanistan and requests for contributions to buy explosives.

Once again, the focus is on the southern province of Helmand, the Taliban heartland. It is also the centre of the opium trade, whose profits are thought to fund terrorism. Last year Afghanistan was responsible for 92% of world opium production and a quarter of this came from Helmand. Officials believe this year’s output will be higher.

Richards admits that his biggest disappointment has been the lack of progress in Helmand, where 5,000 British troops continue to be engaged in heavy fighting. He long ago stopped talking of the “ink spots”, or areas of development, that he once planned enthusiastically. According to the recently ousted governor of Helmand, Engineer Mohammad Daoud: “Since the British arrived the province has seen far more destruction than reconstruction.”

Many locals see British forces as threatening their livelihood.

Norine MacDonald, of the Senlis Council, a European think tank, has spent the past two weeks interviewing villagers in Helmand while handing out blankets and food aid, and is convinced that Nato has lost the battle for hearts and minds.

“If you’re a 26-year-old man and you see your house destroyed or your daughter killed, you’d turn against the British,” she said. “It’s not about global jihad.”

It was the fear of further alienating the population against the troops that prompted Britain’s refusal to allow ground spraying of the poppy fields in Helmand that was due to start this week.

US officials were furious, believing this to be why Karzai changed his mind about allowing spraying, particularly as the Dutch then insisted it could not take place in Uruzgan either, where their troops are based.

“The Brits really put a spanner in the works,” said one US counter-narcotics official. “How could it go ahead if they wouldn’t allow it in the biggest poppy-growing province?” British officials argue that 10 of Karzai’s ministers spoke out against spraying. Whatever the reason, few expect manual eradication to result in more than a 5% cut. British counter-narcotics officials are reduced to talking of projects such as growing mint.

The eradication force of Afghans and their international advisers, DynCorp, drove into Helmand’s main city of Lashkar Gah on Tuesday, protected by helicopter gunships. They have come under attack every night since and have yet to leave their compound.

In Kabul, many Afghans feel there is too much focus on the south. Although the capital feels far more secure than a few months ago and has seen no suicide bombs for five months, United Nations security officials point out that much of the neighbouring provinces of Wardak and Loghar are no-go areas.

Just last week, as Richards was talking up Nato, a school was burnt down in Loghar.

From today as the British flag goes down and the US flag goes up, this is no longer his problem, though he is thought to covet a role as regional envoy for Tony Blair. Many of his officers believe they will be back soon. Britain is in discussions to take command again next year. Colonel Dudley Giles is one of many who would like to return and perhaps add another chapter to his battlefield tours. He may not convince many Afghans that Britain really did defeat them in the past but most would agree with his message. “We won the war but we lost the peace,” he said.

Copyright 2007 Times Newspapers Ltd.

February 4, 2007 at 12:10 PM in Middle East, Terror groups, UK | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Pakistani Role Seen in Taliban Surge at Border - New York Times

QUETTA, Pakistan

The most explosive question about the Taliban resurgence here along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is this: Have Pakistani intelligence agencies been promoting the Islamic insurgency?

Source: Pakistani Role Seen in Taliban Surge at Border - New York Times

The government of Pakistan vehemently rejects the allegation and insists that it is fully committed to help American and NATO forces prevail against the Taliban militants who were driven from power in Afghanistan in 2001.

Western diplomats in both countries and Pakistani opposition figures say that Pakistani intelligence agencies — in particular the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence and Military Intelligence — have been supporting a Taliban restoration, motivated not only by Islamic fervor but also by a longstanding view that the jihadist movement allows them to assert greater influence on Pakistan’s vulnerable western flank.

More than two weeks of reporting along this frontier, including dozens of interviews with residents on each side of the porous border, leaves little doubt that Quetta is an important base for the Taliban, and found many signs that Pakistani authorities are encouraging the insurgents, if not sponsoring them.

The evidence is provided in fearful whispers, and it is anecdotal.

At Jamiya Islamiya, a religious school here in Quetta, Taliban sympathies are on flagrant display, and residents say students have gone with their teachers’ blessings to die in suicide bombings in Afghanistan.

Three families whose sons had died as suicide bombers in Afghanistan said they were afraid to talk about the deaths because of pressure from Pakistani intelligence agents. Local people say dozens of families have lost sons in Afghanistan as suicide bombers and fighters.

One former Taliban commander said in an interview that he had been jailed by Pakistani intelligence officials because he would not go to Afghanistan to fight. He said that, for Western and local consumption, his arrest had been billed as part of Pakistan’s crackdown on the Taliban in Pakistan. Former Taliban members who have refused to fight in Afghanistan have been arrested — or even mysteriously killed — after resisting pressure to re-enlist in the Taliban, Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders said.

“The Pakistanis are actively supporting the Taliban,” declared a Western diplomat in an interview in Kabul. He said he had seen an intelligence report of a recent meeting on the Afghan border between a senior Taliban commander and a retired colonel of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence.

Pakistanis and Afghans interviewed on the frontier, frightened by the long reach of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, spoke only with assurances that they would not be named. Even then, they spoke cautiously.

The Pakistani military and intelligence services have for decades used religious parties as a convenient instrument to keep domestic political opponents at bay and for foreign policy adventures, said Husain Haqqani, a former adviser to several of Pakistan’s prime ministers and the author of a book on the relationship between the Islamists and the Pakistani security forces.

The religious parties recruited for the jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan from the 1980s, when the Pakistani intelligence agencies ran the resistance by the mujahedeen and channeled money to them from the United States and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Mr. Haqqani said.

In return for help in Kashmir and Afghanistan the intelligence services would rig votes for the religious parties and allow them freedom to operate, he said.

“The religious parties provide them with recruits, personnel, cover and deniability,” Mr. Haqqani said in a telephone interview from Washington, where he is now a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Inter-Services Intelligence once had an entire wing dedicated to training jihadis, he said. Today the religious parties probably have enough of their own people to do the training, but, he added, the I.S.I. so thoroughly monitors phone calls and people’s movements that it would be almost impossible for any religious party to operate a training camp without its knowledge.

“They trained the people who are at the heart of it all, and they have done nothing to roll back their protégés,” Mr. Haqqani said.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, President Pervez Musharraf, under strong American pressure, pledged to help root out Islamic extremism, and, as both head of the army and president, he has more direct control of the intelligence services than past civilian prime ministers. But according to several analysts, Pakistani intelligence officials believe it is more prudent to prepare for the day when Western troops leave Afghanistan.

Pakistan has long seen jihadi movements like the Taliban as a counter to Indian and Russian influence next door in Afghanistan, the Western diplomat and other analysts said, and as a way to provide Pakistan with “strategic depth,” or a friendly buffer on its western border.

In Pashtunabad, a warren of high mud-brick walls and narrow lanes in Quetta, the links of the government, religious parties and Taliban commanders to a local madrasa are thinly hidden, said a local opposition party member who lives in the neighborhood.

Three students from the madrasa went to Afghanistan recently on suicide missions, he said. The family of one of the men admitted that he had blown himself up but denied that he had attended the school. The man’s brother suggested that he had been forced into the mission and that someone had recruited him for payment.

“Nowadays people are getting money from somewhere and they are killing other people’s children,” he said. “We are afraid of this government,” he said. His father said he feared the same people would try to take his other son and asked that no family names be used.

President Musharraf relies on the religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, or J.U.I., which dominates this province, Baluchistan, as an important partner in the provincial and national parliaments.

At a madrasa, called simply Jamiya Islamiya, on winding Hajji Ghabi Road, a board in the courtyard proudly declares “Long Live Mullah Omar,” in praise of the Taliban leader, and “Long Live Fazlur Rehman,” the leader of J.U.I.

Members of the provincial government and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam are frequent visitors to the school, the local opposition party member said, asking that his name not be used because he feared Pakistan’s intelligence services. People on motorbikes with green government license plates visit at night, he said, as do luxurious sport utility vehicles with blackened windows, a favorite of Taliban commanders.

Maulvi Noor Muhammad, a Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam representative from Baluchistan in the National Assembly, recently received a guest barefoot while sitting on the floor of a grubby district office in Quetta, a map of the world above him painted on the wall to represent his belief in worldwide Islamic revolution.

He denied providing the militants any logistical support. “The J.U.I. is not supporting the Taliban anymore,” he said. “We are only providing moral support. We pray for their success in ousting the foreign troops from the land of Afghanistan.”

On a recent morning, the deputy director of the Jamiya Islamiya madrasa, Qari Muhammad Ibrahim, declined to meet a female reporter for The New York Times but answered a question from a local male reporter.

He did not deny that some of the madrasa’s 280 students had gone to fight in Afghanistan. “In the Koran it is written that it is every Muslim’s right to fight jihad,” he said. “All we are telling them is what is in the Koran, and then it’s up to them to go to jihad.”

NATO officials and Western diplomats in Afghanistan have grown increasingly critical of Pakistan for allowing the Taliban leaders, commanders and soldiers to operate from their country, which has given an advantage to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan. In September, Gen. James L. Jones, then NATO’s supreme commander, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Quetta remained the headquarters of the Taliban movement.

Still, Pakistan has insisted that the Taliban leadership is not based in Quetta. “If there are Taliban in Quetta, they are few,” said Pakistan’s minister for information and broadcasting, Tariq Azim Khan. “You can count them on your fingers.”

American officials and Western diplomats noted that, when put under enough pressure, Pakistan had come through with flashes of cooperation. But that only seems to reinforce the view that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies are more in touch with what is going on in the Taliban insurgency than the government lets on publicly.

For instance, a senior Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Osmani, who operated on both sides of the border, was killed in an airstrike in Afghanistan on Dec. 19, after Pakistan helped track him, an American official in Afghanistan said.

At the same time, a kind of dirty war is building between Afghan and Pakistani intelligence agencies. A senior Afghan intelligence official said one of its informers in Pakistan was recently killed and dumped in pieces in Peshawar, a border town. The Afghan intelligence service has also recently arrested two Afghan generals, one retired, who have been charged with spying for Pakistan, as well as a Pakistani suspected of being an intelligence agent.

President Musharraf has acknowledged that some retired Pakistani intelligence officials may still be involved in supporting their former protégés in the Taliban.

Hamid Gul, the former director general of Pakistani intelligence, remains a public and unapologetic supporter of the Taliban, visiting madrasas and speaking in support of jihad at graduation ceremonies.

Afghan intelligence officials recently produced a captured insurgent who said Mr. Gul facilitated his training and logistics through an office in the Pakistani town of Nowshera, in the North-West Frontier Province, west of the capital, Islamabad.

NATO and American officials in Afghanistan say there is also evidence of support from current midlevel Pakistani intelligence officials. Just how far up that support reaches remains in dispute.

At least five villages in Pishin, a district northwest of Quetta that stretches toward the Afghan border, lost sons in the recent fighting in Kandahar between the Taliban and NATO forces, opposition politicians said.

One village, Karbala, is a main center of support for the jihad, local people say. Unlike the other villages, which blend into the stark desertlike landscape with their mud-brick houses and compound walls, Karbala has lavish houses, mosques and madrasas, suggesting an unusual wealth.

Farther on, in the village of Bagarzai, lies the grave of Azizullah, a religious scholar who used only one name and acquired fame as a Taliban commander.

Only 25, he was killed with a group of 15 to 20 men in an airstrike in the Afghan province of Helmand on May 22, said his father, Hajji Abdul Hai. Thousands of people attended his funeral, including senior members of the provincial government, the father said.

Mr. Hai, 50, who is a Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam member, denied that his son had been persuaded to fight by anyone. “From the start it was his spirit to take part in jihad,” his father said. “It’s all to do with personal will. If someone agrees, then he goes. Even if someone wishes to, no one can stop him.”

It is an argument that supporters of the jihad use frequently. But for some of the families mourning their sons, there is no doubt that the madrasas and the religious parties are the first point of contact.

That was the conclusion reached by the family of Muhammad Daoud, a 22-year-old man from Pishin who disappeared more than a year ago.

“In our search we went to many places and everyone said different things,” said his father, Hajji Noora Gul. “We went to the madrasa in Pashtunabad, but no one was ready to tell us his whereabouts.”

“Even the madrasa people did not know,” he added. “Behind the curtain of the madrasa, maybe there are other people who do this. Maybe there are some businessmen who take them.”

Then, he said, a Taliban propaganda CD came out showing his son with a group of others taking an oath before the Taliban commander, Mullah Dadullah.

“He had a shawl over his head and was preparing for a suicide bombing,” Mr. Gul said. “He said, ‘I am fighting for God, and I am ready for this.’ ”

His eldest son, Allah Dad, 33, blamed the jihadi groups and the Inter-Services Intelligence. “We don’t know how he made contact with those jihadi groups,” he said. “There are some groups active in taking people to Afghanistan and they are active in Quetta.

“All Taliban are I.S.I. Taliban,” he added. “It is not possible to go to Afghanistan without the help of the I.S.I. Everyone says this.”

David Rohde contributed reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan.

January 21, 2007 at 11:16 AM in Al Qaeda, Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Report: Syrian network planned to kill Lebanese officials

Report: Syrian network planned to kill Lebanese officials - News from Israel, Ynetnews

Al-Mustaqbal newspaper reports Lebanese security forces exposed network of 200 members which trained in refugee camps in Lebanon, planned to assassinate 36 senior Lebanese officials

Ali Waked
Published: 11.29.06, 08:20

The Lebanese security forces exposed a network which planned to assassinate 36 senior anti-Syrian Lebanese officials, the Lebanese newspaper al-Mustaqbal reported Wednesday morning.

The newspaper, which belongs to the family of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated last year, reported that the Lebanese security forces managed to arrest two of the network's key members.

According to the report, the investigation revealed that the network trained in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and planned to execute a plot initiated by the Syrian government to assassinate 36 senior Lebanese officials.

According to the newspaper, the Syrian intelligence appointed a group belonging to the Fatah-Intifada organization to implement the plan.

The organization split from the Fatah movement in the 1970s and is led by Colonel Abu Moussa.

According to the report, about four days ago two detainees admitted to having been sent from Damascus to the al-Badawi and El-Bureij refugee camps in order to coordinate the activity with the Fatah-Intifada movement.

Most blatant violation of UN resolutions

The detainees, a Syrian and a Saudi, noted that they were part of a 200-member network which planned to execute the plan. The two were arrested by Lebanese security forces after they were suspected of a criminally-motivated murder at the al-Badawi refugee camp.

According to the report, the investigation revealed that the Syrian government, through this plan, carried out the most blatant violation of United Nations Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and interfered in internal Lebanese issues.

The report does not mention who the names of the officials the network planned to assassinate.

In addition, it should be noted that Saad Hariri, Rafik Hariri's son and head of the faction that constitutes the majority in the Lebanese parliament, recently harshly criticized President Bashar Assad and the Syrian regime and claimed that they were operating in an attempt to damage the political stability inside Lebanon and were even inciting an internal Lebanese war.

December 2, 2006 at 10:02 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Shift in Lebanon's sectarian politics

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Shift in Lebanon's sectarian politics

By Alex Klaushofer
Lebanon analyst, Beirut

In the aftermath of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, new divisions are fracturing Lebanese society which cut across the usual sectarian boundaries.

On the one side is the "14th March group", an alliance representing the country's political elite which pushed for the departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon.

The coalition, which takes its name from the date of last year's anti-Syrian demonstration, comprises Sunni Muslims and some Christian and Druze groups.

On the other side are Hezbollah and their allies, including the followers of the Christian leader, former general Michel Aoun, who has given the Shia party his political backing.

In the weeks since the ceasefire, political tensions have risen as politicians argue about the direction the country should now take.

The Hezbollah alliance has been calling for a national unity government to replace Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet, a move likely to usher in pro-Syrian groups and electoral reforms giving Shia Muslims more power.

They accuse their political opponents of emasculating Lebanon by forging relationships with Western powers instead of uniting with Arab countries against Israel.

New battle lines

"This isn't a conflict across sectarian lines," says Abdo Saad, a pollster who runs the Beirut Center for Research and Information.

"You have the axis of America and France, and you have the axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. There are deep divisions."'

The debate is running right through Lebanese society.

Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah
Critics accuse Hezbollah of plunging Lebanon into an unnecessary crisis

Hanadi Charaff Deen, a 20-year-old student from Tyre who fled her family home during the recent conflict, supports the Hezbollah alliance.

"We so appreciate them. Without Hezbollah, we would be killed by Israel in a very terrible way," she says.

Her sister Farah, 16, says that maintaining good relations with Syria is essential.

"Syria defended us. We cannot forget this. She's our neighbour, one of the Arab countries. The 14th March coalition want to end the relationship, but that's not good for Lebanon. Instead of one enemy, we would have a lot of enemies."

Plunged into war

But those from the opposing viewpoint blame Hezbollah for plunging the country back into war with Israel and putting defence at the top of the national agenda.

"They are so attached to the Arab-Israeli conflict," says Diana Bou Ghanem, a telecommunications expert from Beirut. "They are not focusing on the internal issues; they are focusing on the war with Israel."

They always fight about silly things; every one of them loves Lebanon, but in his way - they could meet and decide what is best for Lebanon
Hanadi Charaff Deen
Student
She worries about the effects of conflict on the economy. "We have lost the trust of investors. They fear that in a few years we will have another war. What kind of market is that?"

Experts differ as to the implications of the new divide for Lebanon's internal stability.

"We need to build a state," says Mr Saad, the pollster. "But I cannot foresee it happening in the near future, with this very strong polarisation. I fear that we may go to war now."

Bickering

But Ridwan al-Sayyid, professor of Islamic studies at the Lebanese University, denies that the split will lead to a Sunni-Shia conflict in Lebanon.

"The Sunnis are of the opinion that the Shia are making wars with Israel and putting the whole country at risk," he says.

"The Shia say the Sunnis are working with the US and France, even in some cases with Israel, against Islamic goals. Both views are exaggerated."

"The Shia in Lebanon are genuine Lebanese; no-one can have a suspicion about their integrity. On the other side, the Sunnis were in modern history the people who allied themselves to the Palestinian resistance against Israel. So I don't think it will come to a civil war."

Meanwhile, most ordinary Lebanese are fed up with the bickering from the politicians.

"They always fight about silly things," says Ms Deen.

"Every one of them loves Lebanon, but in his way. They could meet and decide what is best for Lebanon, not to say "Hezbollah is not good", or "the 14th March is not good". We all love Lebanon."

December 2, 2006 at 01:02 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Michel Aoun: Former Lebanese Prime Minister

Dossier: Michel Aoun (January 2001)

by Gary C. Gambill

Michel Aoun
Michel Aoun
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Michel Aoun continues to be many things to many people. To Lebanese political elites, he is a populist rabble rouser whose mass appeal continues to undermine the foundations of political clientalism in Lebanon. The late Syrian President Hafez Assad bore a particularly acute and personal hatred of Aoun, whose success in bridging sectarian divisions in Lebanon has stifled Syrian attempts to "divide and conquer" Lebanon's pluralist society.

For most ordinary Lebanese, however, Aoun remains the most salient symbol of secular Lebanese nationalism, a revolutionary commanding almost messianic adoration in the streets of Beirut. Many have questioned Aoun's judgement in launching his 1989 "war of liberation" against Syrian military forces, but few have questioned his integrity. Even his critics acknowledge that Aoun's refusal to compromise his principles in the face of overwhelming adversity struck a very powerful chord in the hearts of millions of Lebanese. "He was a David to an infinite Goliath," recalls former Foreign Minister Elie A. Salem, "and this image was well received by all the non-sophisticated in Lebanon, irrespective of religion and locale."1

Background

Aoun, a Maronite Christian, was born in 1935 to a poor family in Haret Hraik, a mixed Muslim-Christian suburb south of Beirut. He is remembered by many as an intelligent, hardworking child who transcended the difficult conditions of his youth. At age six, British and Australian allied forces evicted his family and occupied their house. As a child, he was forced to withdraw from school for an entire year for economic reasons and take a free apprenticeship in industrial drawing (he completed two years of coursework when he went back to school the following year so as not to fall behind).

Although his family was deeply religious and he attended Catholic schools, Aoun established close friendships with many Muslims during his early years. "We never distinguished between Ali and Peter, or between Hasan and Michel," he later recalled. "We ate together and slept at each other's homes. Their holidays were ours and our holidays were theirs."2

Aoun finished his secondary education in 1955 and enrolled in the Military Academy as a cadet officer. Three years later, he graduated as an artillery officer in the Lebanese Army. He later received additional training at Chalons-sur-Marnes, France (1958-59), Fort Seale, Oklahoma in the U.S. (1966) and the Ecole Superieure de Guerre, France (1978-80).

During the course of his military career, Aoun earned a reputation for honesty, integrity, and sectarian impartiality that was unrivaled at that time. In 1961, when two Army officers affiliated with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) were arrested for attempting to launch a coup, Aoun personally intervened to stop Army Intelligence from torturing the two men, a practice he felt to be inhumane and immoral. Later, after returning from an assignment and finding that the two men had been tortured while he was away, Aoun condemned the intelligence apparatus for practicing "unacceptable Nazism."

As Lebanon slipped into civil war in the mid-1970's and the army fractured along sectarian lines, Aoun devotion to the central government remained unshaken. In the early 1980's Aoun was head of the "Defense Brigade" of the Lebanese army, a unit stationed along the "Green Line" separating East and West Beirut which engaged in sporadic fighting with Syrian military forces. During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Aoun commanded his troops to block Israeli forces advancing on the presidential palace and was prepared to open fire until President Elias Sarkis personally ordered him to stand down. No other Christian officer attempted to confront the invading army. In late 1982, Aoun was assigned the task of forming and commanding a new multiconfessional unit, the 8th Brigade.

In 1983, Aoun's 8th Brigade defeated Syrian-backed militia forces attempting to overrun the strategic Souk al-Gharb pass overlooking the capital, a battle which one scholar called "the closest thing to real combat the Lebanese Army had ever experienced."3 In recognition of his heroic defense of the capital, Aoun was appointed Brigadier-General.

In June 1984, following the Luzanne reconciliation conference in Switzerland, Lebanon's new "national unity" government fired the commander of the Lebanese Army, Gen. Ibrahim Tannous, who was considered to have sectarian biases. Aoun was handpicked with strong consensus to replace him.

Aoun concentrated his efforts on preserving the strength and unity of the army, which remained in its barracks for the next four years amid the chaos of Lebanon's civil war, laying in wait for the day when it would be called upon to enforce a peace settlement. He intentionally stayed out of the public spotlight--aside from the armed forces' magazine, Aoun gave no interviews to the media between 1984 and 1988.

The Revolt Against Syria

In the fall of1988, Syria and the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia brought about a political crisis by preventing parliament members in areas under their control to convene and elect a new president. Damascus, which staunchly opposed the election of any candidate unwilling to sign a treaty recognizing Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, wagered that the demise of the Lebanese Republic would create a political vacuum in which it could dominate the entire country. However, fifteen minutes before the expiration of his term, outgoing president Amin Gemayel appointed a military caretaker government, headed by Aoun as interim prime minister, to run the country until parliament could elect a new president. Although his government was clearly constitutional, 4 the Syrians backed the formation of a rival regime, supported by their client militias, in West Beirut. While Aoun's government was officially and implicitly recognized by several countries, most countries declined to formally recognize either regime.

At the time of Aoun's appointment, the Lebanese government controlled only a small area of the country, comprising parts of East Beirut and the surrounding suburbs. Arguing that the democratic process could not function while the vast majority of the country remained occupied by rival militias and the military forces of Syria and Israel, Aoun resolved to restore the authority of the state. In February 1989, Aoun traveled to a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Tunisia and received strong support for the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. After his return, Aoun responded to provocations from the LF militia by ordering the 15,000 Lebanese army troops under his command into action. After a series of engagements, Lebanese army units seized the port of Beirut and other economically vital facilities. This was the first time that government authority had been restored to a militia-controlled area since the beginning of the civil war in 1975. That Aoun chose to target the main militia of his own Maronite community evoked expressions of surprise and satisfaction from Lebanese Muslims, whose victimization at the hands of the LF had never before elicited state intervention.

Next, Aoun enforced a maritime blockade of illegal ports run by Syrian-allied Druze and Shi'ite militias in West Beirut. When the Syrians responded by shelling civilian areas of East Beirut, Aoun declared war on Syria's occupation forces on March 14, 1989. "The question is no longer one of ports," he proclaimed, " . . . we have passed this and defined the ceiling--Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon." The Syrian and Lebanese armies clashed intermittently over the next six months amid fruitless mediation efforts by the Arab League, destroying much of Beirut and instigating an exodus of over one million inhabitants from the city.

Despite the enormous destruction visited upon the inhabitants of the 300-square mile enclave controlled by his forces, popular support for Aoun's war against the Syrian military skyrocketed. The Washington Post eloquently captured the revolutionary spirit prevailing in East Beirut and across the country:

The horror of those who survived has given way to a sense of defiance and exultation that is not easy to comprehend except for those touched by Aoun's cry for freedom . . . While giving the appearance of being only a professional soldier and officer, Aoun nevertheless has reached across religious boundaries and into the hearts of many Lebanese. If the groundswell of his public support endures through more war and destruction, many observers say, Aoun could go down as a revolutionary hero in Lebanon's history.5

Michel Aoun
Aoun, at a press conference in the presidential palace
"We have decided to fight and we are sure to win," Aoun explained in an April 1989 interview. "If we lose, at least we will be giving our children the right to claim their country, but we are not going to concede it to the Syrians." Aoun acknowledged that Syria had U.S. support in its war against Lebanon, but insisted that American democratic ideals would ultimately prevail. "Even if the United States is supporting Syrian policy in Lebanon for the moment, it cannot go much further if there is a Lebanese leader, with some strength and popular support from public opinion, asking for the liberation of his country."6

By the end of the summer, however, it was clear that intervention by the international community was not forthcoming, so Aoun agreed to an Arab League-brokered cease-fire in September 1989. After the cease-fire, a Saudi and American-sponsored meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians was organized in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to approve an agreement that would provide for the unification of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from the country. The final agreement did not, however, call for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (Syrian officials objected to such wording, claiming that it would give Aoun a moral victory); rather, it stipulated only a limited redeployment to the Beqaa Valley within two years, after which "the Syrian government and the Lebanese national accord government shall decide on the redeployment of the Syrian forces" in the future. After heavy doses of intimidation by Syrian intelligence,7 followed by the verbal promises of American officials to rein in Damascus after Aoun's departure, the Lebanese delegates signed the so-called "Ta'if Accord."

Aoun rejected the agreement for a number of reasons, mainly because it failed to provide for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The agreement also stipulated constitutional changes which, according to Aoun, required the democratic consent of the Lebanese people--not merely the rubber stamp approval of delegates from the traditional political class which bore responsibility for the war (parliamentary elections had not been held since 1972). The Syrians and their allies in West Beirut steadfastly refused to either subject the agreement to a popular referendum or permit modification at a later date by a legitimately-elected parliament. In accordance with the Ta'if Accord, the remaining members of the Lebanese parliament met at a Syrian-controlled air force base in November 1989 and elected Rene Mouawad as President of Lebanon. After his assassination just weeks after assuming office, Elias Hrawi was elected to succeed him.

Michel Aoun
A 1989 rally in support of Aoun
Aoun remained defiantly entrenched in the presidential palace and, despite (or perhaps because of) having incurred the united hostility of Lebanese militia commanders and traditional elites, still commanded an unprecedented level of popular support. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese flocked to the presidential palace in late December 1989 to form a "human shield" around the compound after Syrian military forces surrounding the free enclave began massing for an imminent invasion. The presence of thousands of Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim Lebanese at these demonstrations illustrated the multi-confessional appeal of Lebanon's first popular nationalist movement. Sunni religious leaders in West Beirut sent a "Muslim Solidarity Delegation," led by Sheikh Hassan Najar, who gave numerous rousing speeches during the demonstrations.

Despite his continuing popular support within Lebanon, however, outside developments doomed Aoun's "revolution" to failure. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the American government desperately sought Syria's participation in the U.S.-led coalition against Baghdad. In return for Syrian support, the Bush administration gave Syria a green light to complete its conquest of Lebanon.8 On the morning of October 13, 1990, Syrian air and ground forces launched an all-out invasion of East Beirut and the surrounding areas controlled by Aoun's government. Realizing that further resistance would only lead to needless loss of life, Aoun went to the French embassy to negotiate a cease-fire under French auspices. As the scale of massacres and mayhem escalated and the presidential palace fell into the hands of the Syrians, Aoun accepted the French ambassador's offer of political asylum. Declaring that Aoun's safety was a "matter of honor," French President Francois Mitterand negotiated the beleaguered general's departure for exile in France ten months later.

After the Fall

Since his departure for exile in France, Aoun's predictions about what would become of Lebanon under Syrian tutelage have proven to be hauntingly accurate. Rather than withdrawing as promised, Syrian military forces have become more entrenched over the last ten years. Rather than restoring Lebanese sovereignty, Syrian officials asserted direct control over the Lebanese political system. Rather than experiencing a respite from the "disappearances" of the civil war, Lebanese have endured arbitrary arrests and detention by Syrian intelligence.

Despite his continuing exile in France, Aoun has remained the country's most prominent opposition figure. Although support for Aoun is most visible within the Christian community, where criticism of the Syrian occupation is less taboo, he has also retained considerable popularity among Lebanese Muslims in the decade following his ouster. According to a 1996 study by Judith Palmer Harik of the American University of Beirut, Aoun ranked third among Shi'ite respondents asked to name their most preferred Lebanese leader in an open-ended survey. In light of the high religiosity of the Shi'ite community, it is not surprising that two prominent and influential clerical leaders ranked above Aoun. What is surprising is that Aoun ranked above Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the country's leading Shi'ite politician.9

Until recently, Aoun's followers in Lebanon neglected to establish a highly-structured organization, in part to escape persecution by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence. Around 4,000 "Aounists" have been arrested and detained since 1990. In recent years, as the scale of persecution gradually declined, the movement became consolidated as the Free National Current (Al-Tayyar al-Watani al-Hurr). The FNC has become particularly active in professional and academic circles, counting over 600 teachers, 730 engineers, 300 lawyers and 250 dentists among its members. Since April of last year, the FNC has organized numerous demonstrations drawing thousands of Lebanese into the streets. In addition, FNC student activists have launched a highly successful campaign to protest the continuing presence of nearly 1 million Syrian workers in the country by performing menial labor tasks typically done by Syrians laborers.

As public opposition to Syrian hegemony has intensified since the spring of 1999, Lebanese politicians across the ideological and ethnic spectrum have begun pandering to the public by openly calling for Aoun's return. Most recently, on January 2, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri pledged on state television to "guarantee that he will not be arrested" if he returns to the country. However, Damascus quickly stepped in to thwart the initiative. Sources in Syria say that the Assad regime is not expected to take the risk of permitting Aoun's return in the foreseeable future.

Notes

1 Elie A. Salem, Violence and Diplomacy in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), p. 272.
2 Pierre Raffoul, The Betrayal of Lebanon (Lebanese Coordination Bureau of Victoria, October 2000), p. 1-2.
3 R.D. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," in Edward E. Azar (ed.), The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 103.
4 In his widely acclaimed study of the Lebanese civil war, historian Theodor Hanf writes: "There can be no doubt about the constitutionality of this government. Article 53 states that the president appoints the ministers, 'one of whom he chooses as prime minister'. The premier does not have to resign; the president can dismiss him and appoint a new prime minister. Moreover, the Aoun government kept the rules of the National Pact. If the presidency is vacant, the cabinet is the sole executive . . . There was a precedent for this: in 1952, President Beshara al-Khoury appointed the commander of the army, Fouad Chehab, who was a Maronite, Prime Minister of an interim government [until elections could be held]." See Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993), pp. 570-571.
5 The Washington Post, 12 April 1989.
6 The Washington Post, 12 April 1989.
7 Muslim MP Nazim Qadri was assassinated two days before the Ta'if conference convened after making public statements calling for a Syrian withdrawal. During the Ta'if negotiations, a Sunni MP from Tripoli, Abdel Majid al-Rafei, told reporters that "the presence of Syrian troops on Lebanese territory is a contravention of the Arab league charter" and that "since 1976, the Syrian regime has not only interfered [in Lebanon], but also massacred and destroyed cities." Within 24 hours, Syrian forces had arrested around 200 of his followers in and around Tripoli. [Lebanon Central News Agency, 9 October 1989]
8 An advisor to President Hrawi later paraphrased the U.S. message as follows: "If the battle is prolonged, we will have to express our regret over the continued violence in Lebanon. If you fail, we will not condemn the action but call on the Lebanese to resort to dialogue to sort out their differences . . . Israel will not interfere as long as Syria does not approach south Lebanon or threaten [Israel's] security interests." See "US Agreed Not to Block Move By Syria on Aoun, Lebanon Says," The Washington Post, 16 October 1990.
9 See Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," The Journal of Conflict Resolution ( Vol. 40, No. 1), March 1996, p.52.

© 2001 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. All rights reserved.

December 1, 2006 at 02:00 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

United Press International - Security & Terrorism - Eye on Iraq: Enter the Saudis

By MARTIN SIEFF UPI Senior News Analyst WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 (UPI) -- The collapsing security situation in Iraq is producing a dramatic realignment of nations in the Middle East, with the United States is being pushed to protect Sunnis in Iraq against Shiites by an unlikely combination of its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Elliot Abrams, the U.S. deputy national security adviser and one of the most influential policymakers in the Bush administration, is now energetically pushing boosted security cooperation with the Saudis, U.S. and Middle East intelligence sources have told UPI.

Source: United Press International - Security & Terrorism - Eye on Iraq: Enter the Saudis

Abrams was a driving force in the policy of toppling Saddam Hussein and creating a new, democratic government in Iraq.

Abrams, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and David Welch, the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, wants to encourage the Saudis to play a more active role in trying to stabilize Iraq, the sources said. Welch's growing influence is a triumph for traditional Arab and Middle East experts at State and it reflects the confusion as well amid the loss of prestige that neo-conservative activists in the administration are experiencing.

The fall of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his announced replacement by former CIA Director Robert Gates is also expected to boost intensified U.S.-Saudi cooperation. Gates served as Director of Central Intelligence under President George Herbert Walker Bush, the current president's father, in the early 1990s during what was a golden age of U.S.-Saudi strategic cooperation.

The new policy is part of the sweeping turnaround in U.S. policy on Iraq and the Middle East. Until this summer, Rice was still driving hard for a policy of spreading democracy throughout the Arab world. That policy has never been formally abandoned, but the growing mayhem in Iraq and finding ways to contain it and dampen it down has now becoming the overriding strategic priority for administration policymakers.

Ironically, it was the Bush administration's democracy-building policies in Iraq that created a chaotic power vacuum there, bogged down 135,000 U.S. troops there in an exhausting and escalating civil war and emboldened Iran. Iran's growing power and potential nuclear capabilities now alarms both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

As previously reported in these columns, Saudi Arabia is building a high-tech, state-of-the-art multi-billion dollar fence to try and protect its country from infiltration by Islamist extremists in Iraq.

But privately, Saudi leaders and their advisers now say that will not be enough. If the United States pulls out of Iraq, or if it fails to protect the 5.5 million Sunni minority community in Iraq from escalating Shiite retaliation attacks, the Saudi sources told UPI that Riyadh would be forced by its own public opinion to intervene with financial and possibly other aid for the endangered Sunni community in Iraq.

Such a course of action could bring the Saudis into conflict with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But Maliki's government has close ties with the increasingly assertive Shiite militias in Iraq and is increasingly dependent upon them. Maliki has also energetically been strengthening his ties with both Iran and Syria, nations that the Saudis and the Israelis both fear.

Syria remains the one major conventional military threat that Israel faces. By itself, the Syrian army is regarded by almost all U.S. and Middle Eastern military analysts as no match for the Israeli army. But if Hezbollah in Lebanon could use its refilled inventories of Katyusha rockets and mortars to try and disrupt an Israeli Army military mobilization for a head-on clash with Syria, it to could pose a serious problem. Iran supports and equips Hezbollah via Syria, and the Iranian nuclear threat alarms the Israelis even more than it does the Saudis.

On the positive side, the alarm that Israel and Saudi Arabia share about the growing Iranian threat and the collapse of any pretension to effective stable government in Iraq should be a boon for U.S. policymakers. But ironically, Israel and the Saudis are alarmed precisely because previous U.S. policies in Iraq have failed so disastrously, leading to the current crisis.

The Saudis hope that their growing influence on the Bush administration may reduce the risk of the United States going to war with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program.

"There is great concern (in Riyadh) that the United States could stumble into a war with Iran," Nawaf Obaid, managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, told UPI.

The Saudis therefore, want the United States to succeed in deterring and containing Iran and stabilizing Iraq without seeing the crisis there escalate out of control into a wider conflagration that could engulf the entire region.

November 27, 2006 at 11:55 PM in Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

United Press International - Security & Terrorism - Eye on Iraq: Enter the Saudis

By MARTIN SIEFF UPI Senior News Analyst WASHINGTON, Nov. 27 (UPI) -- The collapsing security situation in Iraq is producing a dramatic realignment of nations in the Middle East, with the United States is being pushed to protect Sunnis in Iraq against Shiites by an unlikely combination of its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Elliot Abrams, the U.S. deputy national security adviser and one of the most influential policymakers in the Bush administration, is now energetically pushing boosted security cooperation with the Saudis, U.S. and Middle East intelligence sources have told UPI.

Source: United Press International - Security & Terrorism - Eye on Iraq: Enter the Saudis

 

Abrams was a driving force in the policy of toppling Saddam Hussein and creating a new, democratic government in Iraq.

Abrams, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and David Welch, the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, wants to encourage the Saudis to play a more active role in trying to stabilize Iraq, the sources said. Welch's growing influence is a triumph for traditional Arab and Middle East experts at State and it reflects the confusion as well amid the loss of prestige that neo-conservative activists in the administration are experiencing.

The fall of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his announced replacement by former CIA Director Robert Gates is also expected to boost intensified U.S.-Saudi cooperation. Gates served as Director of Central Intelligence under President George Herbert Walker Bush, the current president's father, in the early 1990s during what was a golden age of U.S.-Saudi strategic cooperation.

The new policy is part of the sweeping turnaround in U.S. policy on Iraq and the Middle East. Until this summer, Rice was still driving hard for a policy of spreading democracy throughout the Arab world. That policy has never been formally abandoned, but the growing mayhem in Iraq and finding ways to contain it and dampen it down has now becoming the overriding strategic priority for administration policymakers.

Ironically, it was the Bush administration's democracy-building policies in Iraq that created a chaotic power vacuum there, bogged down 135,000 U.S. troops there in an exhausting and escalating civil war and emboldened Iran. Iran's growing power and potential nuclear capabilities now alarms both Israel and Saudi Arabia.

As previously reported in these columns, Saudi Arabia is building a high-tech, state-of-the-art multi-billion dollar fence to try and protect its country from infiltration by Islamist extremists in Iraq.

But privately, Saudi leaders and their advisers now say that will not be enough. If the United States pulls out of Iraq, or if it fails to protect the 5.5 million Sunni minority community in Iraq from escalating Shiite retaliation attacks, the Saudi sources told UPI that Riyadh would be forced by its own public opinion to intervene with financial and possibly other aid for the endangered Sunni community in Iraq.

Such a course of action could bring the Saudis into conflict with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But Maliki's government has close ties with the increasingly assertive Shiite militias in Iraq and is increasingly dependent upon them. Maliki has also energetically been strengthening his ties with both Iran and Syria, nations that the Saudis and the Israelis both fear.

Syria remains the one major conventional military threat that Israel faces. By itself, the Syrian army is regarded by almost all U.S. and Middle Eastern military analysts as no match for the Israeli army. But if Hezbollah in Lebanon could use its refilled inventories of Katyusha rockets and mortars to try and disrupt an Israeli Army military mobilization for a head-on clash with Syria, it to could pose a serious problem. Iran supports and equips Hezbollah via Syria, and the Iranian nuclear threat alarms the Israelis even more than it does the Saudis.

On the positive side, the alarm that Israel and Saudi Arabia share about the growing Iranian threat and the collapse of any pretension to effective stable government in Iraq should be a boon for U.S. policymakers. But ironically, Israel and the Saudis are alarmed precisely because previous U.S. policies in Iraq have failed so disastrously, leading to the current crisis.

The Saudis hope that their growing influence on the Bush administration may reduce the risk of the United States going to war with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program.

"There is great concern (in Riyadh) that the United States could stumble into a war with Iran," Nawaf Obaid, managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, told UPI.

The Saudis therefore, want the United States to succeed in deterring and containing Iran and stabilizing Iraq without seeing the crisis there escalate out of control into a wider conflagration that could engulf the entire region.

November 27, 2006 at 11:52 PM in Middle East, Muslim background | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Nuclear steps put region on brink of most fearful era yet

Nuclear steps put region on brink of most fearful era yet - World - Times Online

By Richard Beeston
The Middle East is poised for a headlong rush into a new age. The players, their motives and the risks are analysed by our correspondent
IT IS one of the world’s most unstable regions, where conflicts over land, ideology and religion have raged for centuries.

Yet the Middle East may now be entering the most precarious era of its history, with the sudden rush by Arabs, Iranians and Turks to master nuclear technology and one day unlock the secrets to the atomic bomb.

Yesterday’s disclosure that Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and smaller states such as Tunisia and the UAE want to acquire nuclear technology was suspected for some time, but the headlong race into the atomic age came as a shock.

For months Arab leaders have been speaking out against nuclear proliferation in the region. Most wanted a nuclear-free zone to force Israel to give up its nuclear arsenal and to discourage Iran, which is pursuing a controversial atomic programme many suspect will give the regime a nuclear weapons capability.

But the calculations in the region changed dramatically this year. A far more strident Iran, under the leadership of President Ahmadinejad, defied pressure from the international community and began uranium enrichment work, which could be used to produce the fissile material needed to make an atomic weapon.

Then last month North Korea detonated a nuclear device, proving that even a country with limited resources can build an atomic weapon and use its nuclear status to blackmail the international community. In the case of North Korea the world did unite to place sanctions on the regime in Pyongyang. But so far the United Nations Security Council has failed to find a common approach on Iran, which defied a UN ultimatum more than two months ago and has yet to suffer any consequences.

Last night Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said proposals by the European Union to impose very limited sanctions on Iran were too strong. Western diplomats fear the talks will drag on without any serious action being taken against the Iranian regime, which recently announced it had expanded its enrichment work.

The rest of the world has been watching these events with alarm, and nowhere more closely than in the Middle East. It is widely accepted that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. Tehran has most vocally spoken out against Israel and Mr Ahmadinejad once remarked that the country should be “wiped off the map”.

But even greater concern exists in Arab states. They fear the rise of Iran’s brand of Islam and the impact it is having on Shia brethren in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

An Iran that is a member of the nuclear club would have far more clout in the region.

There is no evidence that the sudden interest by Iran’s neighbours and across the Arab world in nuclear technology is directly connected to Tehran’s own nuclear ambitions. But the coincidence is too great to ignore, particularly in a region blessed by huge oil reserves where costly nuclear energy has never been needed before.

A civilian nuclear programme would not give any of the countries automatic access to nuclear weapons but building up nuclear knowhow and training a core of nuclear physicists and technicians is a vital first step in that direction.

The first country to signal an interest in nuclear power was Turkey. In June Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister, announced the country planned to build three power stations by 2015, the first near the Black Sea coast town of Sinop by 2014.

Next came Egypt. President Mubarak told members of his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in late September that the time had come “for a serious debate” about a nuclear programme, which Egypt abandoned 20 years ago.

This week it became clear that the debate was over. During a visit to Moscow his Russian hosts were delighted to learn that he had decided to build up to four nuclear power stations and would consider bids from Moscow.

The first Egyptian nuclear power plant is due to be completed at Dabaa by 2015.

Algeria is expected to be next in line. It already explored the possibility of nuclear power in the 1980s and is ready to pick up where it left off.

Most interest will be focused on Saudi Arabia, traditionally Iran’s main rival for control of the Gulf. The leadership has consistently cautioned about the dangers of nuclear expansion in the region. Now it has signalled that it too wants to join the club.

This year Prince Saud alFaisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, said that he was opposed to all nuclear expansion in the Middle East, be it for power stations or for weapons. Prince Saud told The Times: “We are urging Iran to accept the position that we have taken to make the Gulf, as part of the Middle East, nuclear-free and free of weapons of mass destruction. We hope they will join us in this policy and assure that no new threat or arms race happens in this region.”

Those hopes now appear doomed. In their place is the first evidence of a nuclear race beginning in the region and with it fears that the Middle East is entering the most dangerous period of its history.

November 5, 2006 at 08:18 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition by Narendra Singh Sarila

Telegraph | Expat | The ill-fated battle for Indian independence

Jad Adams reviews The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition by Narendra Singh Sarila.

The partition of India was one of the great humanitarian disasters of the 20th century, the massacre of perhaps half a million people, a number that seems all the more terrible because it had been preceded by a liberation campaign that stressed non-violence, and it followed a peaceful transfer of authority by the British.

Narendra Singh Sarila, a former ADC to Lord Mountbatten and a senior Indian civil servant of penetrating intelligence, shines a light on the diplomatic world of hints, pressures and concealed motives on the route to partition that he has uncovered through painstaking research in archives in the USA and Britain. A refreshing number of his sources have the feel of the recently released or long-hidden about them.

This story has been told as a tale of heroes (Nehru and Gandhi) and villains (Jinnah and Churchill), but Sarila presents it as a series of blunders: by Nehru and the Congress Party, mainly, for relinquishing their political control over the majority of the country in a petulant refusal to join with the British in the war effort in 1939; and for their rejection of the British offer of eventual self-government in 1942. Every retreat they made was an advance for Jinnah and the Muslim League, which at the start of the war did not represent even a quarter of Muslim voters yet was able to demand the partition of the nation on religious lines at the end of it.

Sarila charges Congress leaders, some of whom he knew personally, with 'arrogance', 'inconsistency,' 'poor political judgement' and a fatal lack of interest in foreign affairs and defence. These are tough words, but they needed to be said by someone who has India's interests at heart.

Gandhi's blend of mysticism and Hindu reformism kept India enthralled but not all Indians were bewitched; it is salutary to see the Mahatma being referred to by the prime minister of Travancore as a 'dangerous, semi-repressed sex maniac'.

Sarila is contemptuous of Jinnah's vanity and love of luxury but always gives him his due; when Congress Party leaders were vacillating, uncertain whether non-violence or independence was more important to them, Jinnah was direct and single-minded: only an independent Pakistan would do. He was a man with whom the British could do business, the Congress leaders were not.

Sarila's contribution to scholarship is to emphasise the role of British strategic interests in the region; a continuation of the 'Great Game' of keeping Russia out of the subcontinent, in order to safeguard the oil fields of the Middle East, the 'wells of power'. Thus the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, put forward a plan as early as February 1946 for the creation of a Pakistan which would accept British military requirements when it was uncertain whether a new India under the Congress Party would even be in the Commonwealth.

Pathetically, Congress leaders actually believed their own propaganda, that independence for India would inaugurate a period of high-mindedness in government and principled interactions between nations. Even before full independence, the Indian delegation to the United Nations was exercising the moral scourge in attacking South Africa over apartheid, at a time when divisions at home were about to break out in bloody madness.

Real diplomacy was less idealistic: Sarila has uncovered communications showing how Churchill deliberately misled our American allies as to the proportion of Muslims in the Indian army when the US were lobbying for Indian independence. Playing on American self-interest, he stressed the need to keep the Muslims 'on side' in the war against Japan; something it would be harder to do if they felt they were fighting for a Hindu-ruled India.

Thus was India dismembered, with a little help from its princes. The Maharaja of Kashmir was asked by Mountbatten's chief of staff about the future of his province but 'all he would talk about was polo ... and the prospect of his colt in the Indian Derby'. Of such derelictions of duty are massacres made.

September 4, 2006 at 10:33 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Bomb blasts knock Turkey off balance

Blasts knock Turkey off balance - World - Times Online

Foreign Editor's Briefing by Bronwen Maddox
THE latest terrorist blasts in Turkey are more serious than many in the past because the stakes are now higher.

The Kurdish Freedom Falcons, the offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which claimed responsibility, says that it wants to destroy Turkish tourism. But it might trigger an even more destructive change, driving a wedge between Turkey and its allies in the US, Israel, Nato and Europe.

If you fly north from Baghdad to Turkey, the miles of brown scrubby land end sud- denly in the 10,000ft (3,050m) wall of the Kandil mountains. This is where the territory of Iraqi Kurds meets that of Turkish Kurds. To many there, this should be Kurdistan: a single, undivided country of its own.

For Turkey, the problem is hardly new. Its Kurds, in the southeast, have long felt allegiance to this notional “Kurdistan” rather than to Turkey. The PKK, in spasms of activity, has expressed this violently.

But the latest blasts come at a difficult time in Turkish relations with the rest of the world. Turkey, for so long valued by the West as a secular, Muslim ally, as a member of Nato, as a pioneering Muslim ally of Israel — generally, as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia — is finding the ambivalence a strain. The European Union, which has long assumed that Turks craved membership, has only slowly become alert to the danger that, at some price, they would not — as polls now show.

One test will come later this week, when parliament will vote on the controversial decision by the Prime Minister. Recep Tayyip Erdogan. to deploy peacekeeping troops in Lebanon.

Its passage is all but certain, as the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) dominates parliament. But the prospect has split opinion.

The Justice Minister, Cemil Cicek, has said that “Turkey cannot remain just a spectator, like a country which is distant from events . . . in the Middle East”. Those who want Turkey to the EU also see the deployment as essential.

But others (calling the move “neo-Ottomanist”) find it offensive. Turkey’s President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, said last week that he did not believe the conditions warranted it.

Sezer’s role is largely ceremonia but he is a leading secular figure and has clashed with the Islamist-leaning Erdogan over several proposed laws. His opposition could still be costly to the Prime Minister.

The move will also show whether the Army is wholeheartedly behind the action; plenty of rumblings suggest it is not.

Monday’s blast in Antalya coincided with the swearing-in of the new chief of the Armed Forces, General Yasar Buyukanit. He has a reputation as a hardline secularist and has said cracking down on the PKK will be a priority.

The US’s appointment of General Joseph Ralston, former Nato Supreme Commander, as a special envoy on Kurdish terrorism should also help to warm up relations.

The frostiness in US-Turkish relations stems from 2003, when the Turkish parliament refused to allow the US to use Turkey as a base for a northern invasion of Iraq. US commanders have often argued since that much of the insurgency might have been avoided if they had fought their way to Baghdad from the north, through the “Sunni triangle”.

The past three years have not done a lot to repair relations, other than making this single decision seem less crucial, because of the proliferation of troubles in Iraq. Turkey, which feels taken for granted, says the US has paid too little attention to its fears of Kurdish separatism in giving its blessing to Iraqi Kurds’ efforts to run their own territory. Turkey also accuses the PKK of using northern Iraq to mount attacks in the Turkish southeast.

The PKK assault this week was carried out in the name of a territorial cause, not a religious one. But even so, they strain Turkey’s already fraught relations with the West.

August 29, 2006 at 11:43 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

A rebel's killing roils Pakistan: group seen as a counterweight to extremism represented in the region by a resurgent Taliban

A rebel's killing roils Pakistan | csmonitor.com

By David Montero | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
QUETTA, PAKISTAN – For years, Nawab Mohammed Akbar Khan Bugti battled the Pakistan Army. The 80-year-old renegade hidden in the mountains of Balochistan became a legend in his fight for greater autonomy against what he saw as colonial brutality.

Bugti was both hated and revered. But as a former federal minister and governor, he symbolized a political as well as a violent struggle. And his death this weekend, during a fierce three-day battle that left more than 30 dead, could prove a serious blow to Pakistan's stability.

It could also close a door to a group seen as a counterweight to extremism represented in the region by a resurgent Taliban, analysts say.

"This is not a good sign," says Samina Ahmed, South Asia director of the International Crisis Group. "Just a few years ago [Nawab Bugti] was talking to the government. Keeping that door open was the way to go. Now that door has been slammed shut."

Bugti's death could also reverberate in the region, some analysts say. The Balochis are spread across several countries, with millions living in parts of Iran and Afghanistan that border Pakistan.

"They will provide sanctuary to Baloch militants. There will be a lot of sympathy," says Lt. Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, a defense analyst in Islamabad.

In recent weeks, the volley of attacks in Balochistan had increased, pitting thousands of Pakistani troops - the number is not disclosed - against a loosely organized but formidable federation of separatist militants.

On Friday, the day before Bugti was killed, two car bombs exploded in Quetta, wounding 13 people and shattering windows. Smoking ruins are a regular sight in Quetta and its environs as militants target military installations and government gas pipelines.

The Army has responded with aerial bombings and helicopter gun ships, Baloch leaders say, a claim Islamabad denies.

But Mohammed Anwar, a poor tribesman from Dera Bugti, Bugti's home, says he recently fled because of the Army's bombardment. Now he lives in a squalid refugee camp on the outskirts of Quetta.

"Why is the government saying we should leave our homes? It's our property," says Mr. Anwar. "The Pakistani constitution gives us that right."

Violence paralyzed parts of Balochistan Sunday, and Baloch leaders vowed to launch a nationwide strike.

The consequences of this escalation for the broader battle against terrorism could be serious, analysts say.

"This is disastrous," says General Masood. "It will divert attention from the war on terror ... by engaging the Pakistan forces in Balochistan in a much bigger way."

The Taliban are said to be growing in influence in Balochistan, allegedly using the province's capital, Quetta, as a base for directing operations in southern Afghanistan.

But the Baloch people are widely recognized as fiercely opposed to the Taliban. With the killing of their most respected leader by government forces, the prospects for peace are dim for the foreseeable future, many here say.

At the root of the longrunning insurgency is a sense of inequity over the distribution of natural resources. Balochistan, Pakistan's largest but most impoverished province, is as rich in mineral wealth and natural gas as it is in bloodshed.

Natural gas was first discovered in Balochistan in the 1950s, but it has mostly been shipped to Islamabad and parts of Punjab; some regions of Balochistan are still without it.

With demands for greater political autonomy and control of resources consistently rejected by the state, Nawab Bugti and other Baloch leaders have fought a succession of wars against Islamabad since the 1970s.
(Map) RICH CLABAUGH - STAFF

Balochistan, cut off by rough terrain and political differences from the central government, has pockets of extremism that the Taliban have long exploited. The province also shares hundreds of miles of unmanned border with Afghanistan, giving the Taliban a sprawling front for their operations.

The solution, such as it exists, masks a potent irony. The most effective counterbalance to the Taliban, observers say, are the very people the Army is targeting in its military operations.

Baloch nationals have acted as a countervailing force to extremists, espousing democratic and liberal political values, observers say. In the arena of the provincial assembly, Baloch leaders argue, they regularly battle against measures that create an amenable atmosphere to the Taliban.

Their struggle for autonomy and greater political rights, they add, dovetails with the broader agenda of the war on terror. "We are fighting in the same atmosphere as the United States," says Akbar Mengal, a member of the provincial assembly from the Balochistan Nationalist Party.

But instead of encouraging the Baloch parties, leaders and analysts charge, the government has actively undermined them, targeting them - and not the Taliban - with their weapons.

"All those weapons and aid that the US has given to Pakistan to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban, [the Pakistan Army] is using against the nationalists in Balochistan," adds Mr. Mengal. US officials have conceded as much to the Western media in the recent past, saying it cannot always control how the Pakistani Army uses its weapons.

These are troubling realities often overlooked by Washington and other Western powers, Ms. Ahmed and others say.

"If the menace of the Taliban are to be dealt with in Balochistan, the Baloch are a credible ally. It is in everyone's interest - Afghanistan, the United States - to see that there is peace in Balochistan," she cautions.

August 27, 2006 at 06:04 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

"Hezbollah came in to launch their rockets, then within minutes the area was blasted by Israeli jets," he said

Photos that damn Hezbollah | Herald Sun

Chris Link

July 30, 2006 12:00am
Article from: Sunday Herald Sun

Font size: + -

Send this article: Print Email

THIS is the picture that damns Hezbollah. It is one of several, smuggled from behind Lebanon's battle lines, showing that Hezbollah is waging war amid suburbia.

The images, obtained exclusively by the Sunday Herald Sun, show Hezbollah using high-density residential areas as launch pads for rockets and heavy-calibre weapons.

Dressed in civilian clothing so they can quickly disappear, the militants carrying automatic assault rifles and ride in on trucks mounted with cannon.

The photographs, from the Christian area of Wadi Chahrour in the east of Beirut, were taken by a visiting journalist and smuggled out by a friend.

They emerged as:

US President George Bush called for an international force to be sent to Lebanon.

ISRAEL called up another 30,000 reserve troops.

THE UN's humanitarian chief Jan Egeland called for a three-day truce to evacuate civilians and transport food and water into cut-off areas.

US SECRETARY of State Condoleezza Rice returned to the Middle East to push a UN resolution aimed at ending the 18-day war, and:

A PALESTINIAN militant group said it had kidnapped, killed and burned an Israeli settler in the West Bank.

The images include one of a group of men and youths preparing to fire an anti-aircraft gun metres from an apartment block with sheets hanging out on a balcony to dry.

Others show a militant with AK47 rifle guarding no-go zones after Israeli blitzes.

Another depicts the remnants of a Hezbollah Katyusha rocket in the middle of a residential block blown up in an Israeli air attack.

The Melbourne man who smuggled the shots out of Beirut and did not wish to be named said he was less than 400m from the block when it was obliterated.

"Hezbollah came in to launch their rockets, then within minutes the area was blasted by Israeli jets," he said.

"Until the Hezbollah fighters arrived, it had not been touched by the Israelis. Then it was totally devastated.

"It was carnage. Two innocent people died in that incident, but it was so lucky it was not more."

The release of the images comes as Hezbollah faces criticism for allegedly using innocent civilians as "human shields".

Mr Egeland blasted Hezbollah as "cowards" for operating among civilians.

"When I was in Lebanon, in the Hezbollah heartland, I said Hezbollah must stop this cowardly blending in among women and children," he said.

July 30, 2006 at 03:48 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Arab leaders fear rise of Hezbollah

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Arab leaders fear rise of Hezbollah

By Roger Hardy
BBC Middle East analyst
Hezbollah is riding a wave of popularity on the Arab street. Not since it played a role in forcing Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000 has it enjoyed such adulation.

Its leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is enjoying something akin to a personality cult.

At a time when Arab governments are seen as largely powerless to influence events, Hezbollah is seen as taking on the Israelis - and behind the Israelis, the American superpower.

This has put Arab leaders - in particular those allied to the United States - in a difficult quandary.

At the start of this crisis the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan did not hide their view that Hezbollah's capture of two Israeli soldiers was "reckless adventurism".

This was unusual enough, but they also openly directed their displeasure at the group's backers, Syria and Iran.

Their stance pleased the Bush administration but was roundly criticised at home.

They were seen as siding with the Israelis against the new champions of the Palestinian cause.

Dark warnings

Now there is a distinct shift.

Washington's Arab friends are pressing urgently for an immediate ceasefire.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has warned darkly of the danger of a wider regional war.

Saudi television this week organised a day-long appeal - or "telethon" - which raised some $29 million (£15.55 million) for Lebanon.

Jordan protest
Protestors in the Arab world have shown support for Hezbollah

The Saudi media made much of the fact that the king and the crown prince made handsome personal donations.

In addition the Saudi state has given $1.5 billion (£800 million) to support the Lebanese pound and help rebuild the shattered country.

It is not that these rulers have changed their minds.

They fear the growing influence of Iran and Hezbollah.

They believe the regional balance of power is shifting in Iran's favour.

They think Iran and Hezbollah are trying to hijack the Palestinian cause.

Some Saudi religious figures have gone much further. For them the issue is not so much political as sectarian.

One well-known sheikh, Abdullah bin Jabreen, has issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, declaring it illegal for Muslims to join, support or even pray for Hezbollah.

This reflects the view of conservatives in the Saudi religious establishment that the Shia are not proper Muslims and are not to be trusted.

Joining the bandwagon

But the critics of Hezbollah find themselves in the minority.

Al-Qaeda does not want to be upstaged

The predominant view in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world is overwhelmingly supportive of Hezbollah.

For most people, the Palestinian cause transcends sectarian differences.

Even al-Qaeda, no friend of the Shia, has felt obliged to speak out.

The group's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has issued a video saying no Muslim can stay silent in the face of events in Lebanon.

Al-Qaeda does not want to be upstaged.

July 29, 2006 at 03:36 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

UN and Hezbollah flags are seen at a UN post

Canadian Jewish News

Canadian parliamentary assistants gather at UN post (top) as UN and Hezbollah flags are seen at a UN post (above).

http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2006/07/26/what_happens_in_war.php

Courtesy of Harrys place

July 26, 2006 at 06:51 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Brutal one-legged fanatic who loves the limelight

Telegraph | News | Brutal one-legged fanatic who loves the limelight

By Michael Hirst
(Filed: 02/07/2006)

The camera pans in on a black-turbaned mullah, who solemnly signs a slip of paper and hands it to the young fighter sitting beside him. It turns out to be the recipient's own death warrant: the slip identifies him as "Suicide bomber 116".

Off goes yet another volunteer to die in the Taliban's increasingly savage campaign against coalition troops in Afghanistan, but the cleric who sends him on his way remains alive and very dangerous. Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the ruthless fanatic in charge of the Taliban's new campaign, is fast becoming to Afghanistan what Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was to Iraq.

Just like Zarqawi, his starring role in propaganda DVDs has successfully drawn in scores of suicide bombers and thousands of fighters to the cause. And just like Zarqawi, his fondness for beheadings means his followers fear him almost as much as his enemies.

Dadullah has developed almost mythological status among his compatriots, which is partly why he was dispatched by the Taliban leadership to front the current recruitment campaign for jihad in the seminaries of northern Pakistan's Baluchistan province.

Recruitment DVDs on sale across Afghanistan and Pakistan show the one-legged guerrilla commander in various poses - blasting a target with a heavy machine gun, dishing out blessings and ordaining a succession of would-be "martyrs". The success of his recruitment campaign can be seen in the surge in suicide bombings, school burnings and guerrilla ambushes that have killed more than 100 Afghan civilians and at least 40 coalition soldiers this year.

Dadullah boasts that he has 200 suicide bombers awaiting his orders as well as 12,000 fighters on the ground. So effective is his campaign that Taliban guerrillas have for the first time captured government installations in Afghanistan's remote south, if only for brief periods.

Afghan villagers testify that increasing numbers of Taliban fighters are roaming the countryside with impunity, warning locals not to cooperate with coalition troops, on pain of death.

To emphasise the point, one of Dadullah's videos shows his fighters slitting the throats of six men accused of spying for the Americans.

Dadullah is aged about 40 and is said to come from the Kakar tribe, from the Kandahar region, which is renowned for its fighting prowess. He lost one of his legs after stepping on a landmine shortly after joining the Taliban in 1994.

Despite the disability he became renowned as a fearless fighter, leading major battles against the rival Northern Alliance forces throughout the

1990s.

So vicious was he that during one particularly brutal assignment in 1998 to "pacify" ethnic minority Hazaras, a Shia group in Bamian province, he massacred hundreds of civilians. It was too much even for Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban's one-eyed spiritual leader, who relieved him of his command.

Soon he was back in battle though, his reputation so fearsome that Taliban radio would often report his presence on the front lines even when he was days away from the fighting, to unnerve opposition fighters. He also has a propensity for killing subordinates who disobey his orders.

Having escaped to Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, he helped rebuild the movement from there and was recently promoted to overall commander of the Taliban's military wing, enjoying complete operational freedom.

Unlike other Taliban leaders who never allow themselves to be photographed for religious and security reasons, Dadullah seems to crave the attention, giving television interviews and calling foreign journalists on his satellite phone.

He now operates mostly out of Afghanistan's Helmand province, where Britain has about 3,300 troops. He never spends the whole night in one place, fearing coalition air strikes.

He is a shrewd strategist whose current plan is not to regain control of Afghanistan, but to turn it into a graveyard for foreign troops, forcing their retreat.

"We have the strength to take over Kabul in a single day, but what we lack is the strength to sustain this control," he said.

July 20, 2006 at 07:58 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

"For each Taliban you kill, I can find 20 more to fill his place"

Telegraph | News | 'For each Taliban you kill, I can find 20 more to fill his place'

By Massoud Ansari
(Filed: 02/07/2006)

With his neat moustache and casual clothing, Hafiz Ihsanullah is the new face of the Taliban. The 28-year-old former fighter has eschewed the trademark turban and prayer beads of the ultra-conservative Islamic group since he took on a new and powerful role.

He has switched from being a frontline warrior to front man for Mullah Dadullah Akhund - the one-legged Taliban commander in Afghanistan, renowned for his viciousness and cruelty.

Dadullah is believed to be spearheading the Taliban's biggest offensive since they lost Kabul in 2001, killing at least 100 Afghan civilians and 40 coalition soldiers this year, including two SAS troops during a fierce firefight in southern Afghanistan last week. After the leaders of al-Qaeda itself, Dadullah is at the top of the coalition's wanted list.

Yet, just across the border in neighbouring Pakistan, a supposed ally of the West in the war on terror, Ihsanullah is leading an apparently untroubled life, beating the drum for new Taliban recruits, co-ordinating volunteers and supervising the flow of dead -Taliban fighters as their bodies are returned for burial as heroes in their home villages.

"Every time you bring one dead, you will find 20 more volunteers willing to join the fighting," he boasted to The Sunday Telegraph.

An 11,000-strong, US-led force - including 3,300 British soldiers, newly based in the restive southern province of Helmand - are battling to re-assert control across southern Afghanistan as part of operation Mountain Thrust. More than 1,000 fresh Taliban fighters have reportedly poured in from the Pakistani province of Balochistan in recent weeks to face them.

Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, has accused Pakistan of failing to curb the Taliban militia operating from within its borders, and of not doing enough to control the frontier with its neighbour.

Pakistan's insistence that it has cracked down on cross-border activity is hard to square with the ease with which Ihsanullah, acting as Dadullah's "chief co-ordinator", shuttles regularly between Afghanistan and the Pakistani province of Balochistan, where the Taliban have found safe haven since they were routed five years ago.

He visits religious seminaries in Balochistan, in effect the main enlisting centres for insurgents, and collects lists of new recruits whom he subsequently dispatches to the front line. His only concession to his own security is his insistence that he must not be photographed.

As the fighters go one way across the border, the bodies of their predecessors, killed by coalition troops, go the other, brought by Ihsanullah's men to be buried in their Pakistani home towns.

In the Balochi district of Pasheen alone, 24 corpses have been returned for burial in the past two months, according to Ikramullah Khan, a local resident. They included the body of Molvi Azizullah Agha, a Taliban commander who was among several dozen killed by a US airstrike on their Kandahar safe house in May. His funeral was attended by several thousand Taliban supporters, including six local and national Pakistani politicians from Balochistan, all of whom vowed to avenge Agha's "martyrdom".

"Mountain Thrust", the joint coalition and Afghan operation aimed at smashing the extremist presence in Afghanistan's four southern provinces, has chalked up more than 90 militants killed since it was launched in May - but has met a fierce surge in Taliban violence.

"It was a do-or-die situation for Taliban," said Ihsanullah. "Had we not responded to their call, the volunteers who were ready to join the Taliban's ranks in the last few months might have dubbed us cowards, and switched over to other groups. It was a must for the Taliban to respond to the fresh call."

He outlined the Taliban's propaganda campaign, aimed at galvanising potential recruits. Markets across the region have been flooded with cheap DVDs, sold for as little as 30p, in which Taliban militia are shown fighting Americans. Meanwhile, Taliban preachers have stepped up their promotional strategy through broadcasts on low-frequency FM radio, inciting listeners to take up the fight against the "infidel army".

Much of the recruitment propaganda is aimed at Pakistani recruits, he said, and it has had an immediate impact. Many of the 34 suicide bombers who have struck targets in Afghanistan this year have been Pakistani.

Taliban insiders also claim that Arab and central Asian militants, who had earlier left Afghanistan to join compatriots fighting in Iraq, have now returned to resume the original -struggle.

"Dozens of Arabs have returned to Afghanistan to reinvigorate the militia's fight against coalition troops," said Nawabzada Haji Lashkari, a tribal chieftain in Quetta.

Consequently, some of the training videos show Arab militants in Afghanistan demonstrating to new recruits how to make explosives. In one, a masked man - believed to be the Egyptian militant Abu Ikhlas - explains in Arabic how to turn a pressure cooker into an improvised explosive device (IED), and how to convert a washing machine timer into a detonator.

"They want to keep the momentum alive," said Lashkari. "Even if the number of these militants who die during the insurgency is more than the coalition troops, they know they are causing dents against the West's economy." He added that part of the Taliban's strategy was to force the West to spend billions of dollars defending its ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Pakistan intelligence officials admit that "Pakistani Talibs" have joined Afghan and Arab fighters for "suicide squads".

A senior counter-terrorism official told The Sunday Telegraph that a group of militants planning to join these units had recently been arrested in Karachi. Under interrogation, the men disclosed that would-be suicide bombers are taken to seminaries in the lawless tribal areas of Balochistan, or southern Afghanistan, where they are mentally fortified for the task ahead.

President Karzai claims that he has handed over extensive intelligence dossiers to Pakistan leader Gen Pervez Musharraf, detailing how suicide bombers who attack targets in Afghanistan are recruited, trained and equipped in Pakistan, but little is being done to clamp down on their Pakistani strongholds.

Pakistani officials, though, claim it is impossible to monitor radical activity across the northern region.

"There are thousands of seminaries across the country which they are using as a shelter and it is no easy job to monitor every seminary," said one. "These schools look very ordinary. They do not impart any kind of physical training, but make them mentally strong in order to cause maximum impact when they strike their targets."

He added that many of the militants' safe houses were in the lawless tribal belts, where it was almost impossible for the intelligence agencies to operate effectively.

"These tribal areas have always acted as a harbour for the militants," he said.

July 20, 2006 at 07:57 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Death trap

Death trap - Sunday Times - Times Online

Christina Lamb has spent 20 years covering Afghan wars and was lucky to escape with her life after a firefight 10 days ago. Afghanistan is littered with the debris of invading empires – so why do we refuse to learn from history?
When you twice stare death in the face in ditches in southern Afghanistan, first with Afghans and then fighting Afghans, you start to wonder what it is about this country that keeps drawing us back.

The first time I was 22, in and out of love, and thought I was indestructible. I was with a young, chubby and then unknown Hamid Karzai and a band of turbanned mullahs who would later go on to become founding members of the Taliban.

Armed and funded by the Americans and British, they had gone on an ill-conceived operation to attack a Russian base at Kandahar airport that had ended with us pinned down in a trench by Soviet tanks with hot dust and rubble raining on us and several dead.

Had anyone told me then that 18 years later Karzai would be the president of Afghanistan and I would end up under fire in a similar ditch with British soldiers in the neighbouring province of Helmand fighting Afghans, I would never have believed it.

Yet 10 days ago in the mud-walled village of Zumbelay, I accompanied British paratroopers on a hearts and minds patrol and ended up in a Taliban ambush. This time, crouching in an irrigation ditch, surrounded on three sides, with bullets pinging just past my ears and mortars landing nearby, and by now a wife and mother, I thought I was going to die.

It was impossible not to wonder whether any of those attacking us could be the same men as those I was with back in early 1988. And how, when Moscow had got such a bloody nose in Afghanistan, losing more than 15,000 men in what is seen as Russia’s Vietnam (and a defeat that had played a crucial role in the collapse of communism), had the British ended up taking on the same enemy?

It’s not as if we don’t have a history. When the paras moved into Camp Price just outside Gereshk in May and their commander had his first meeting with local officials, it took the Afghans just 10 minutes to bring up the battle of Maiwand. One of the worst defeats ever suffered by the British Army in which more than 1,000 men were slaughtered by the side of the Helmand River, the battle may have happened in 1880 but Afghans in Helmand talk about it as if it were yesterday and all claim that their forefathers were there.

If any further reminder were needed that one gets involved in Afghanistan at one’s peril, the Kabul headquarters of the Nato-led peacekeeping force is on the site of the old British cantonment. Its entire strength fled from here in January 1842 after a tribal revolt against the British-imposed ruler.

Of the 16,000 soldiers, wives, children and camp followers who left, only one got away; the rest were massacred or taken prisoner by Ghilzai tribesmen. Only Dr William Brydon was deliberately left alive to tell the tale and warn people back home of the consequences of getting involved in Afghanistan.

In a country that has ended up as a graveyard for so many thousands of British soldiers, why don’t we learn from history?

This time the politicians tell us that we have gone to make peace, not war — to “secure the area so that development can take place and extend the reach of the Karzai government”. But we are woefully underequipped for either: already six British soldiers have lost their lives within 24 days, victims once more of the Ghilzai Pashtuns.

Last month saw 53 “TICs” — troops in contact, in other words under Taliban attack — and last week there were two nights during which all but one of the British bases and outposts in Helmand came under attack.

How did it all go so wrong? Why does a senior British military officer talk despairingly of “military and developmental anarchy”?

AFGHANISTAN was supposed to be the success story. Two months of precision bombing by American B52s — in revenge for the Taliban’s refusal to throw out Al-Qaeda after the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001 — soon had the Taliban fleeing over the border into Pakistan.

By December 2001 the Taliban had been ousted and a new English-speaking, westernised Afghan was president. The fact that most Afghans outside Kandahar had never heard of Karzai, that he dared not venture outside his palace and even inside had to be protected by US soldiers, and that he had once been chief fundraiser for the Taliban were all conveniently ignored.

By August 2002 Donald Rumsfeld, the US secretary of defence, was describing events in Afghanistan as “a breathtaking accomplishment”. He pointed to Afghanistan as “a successful model for what could happen to Iraq if individuals were liberated, allowed to vote freely and to work”.

In some ways there has been remarkable progress from the days when women were forced to wear burqas and were banned from working, studying or laughing out loud.

Last year a parliament was elected in which a quarter of the MPs are women, including a voluptuous gym instructor from the city of Herat. They sit side by side with mullahs and former Taliban commanders to the astonishment of Afghans watching the proceedings on television. Their first debate was over their own pay.

An estimated one-third of the male MPs are warlords, gross violators of human rights or drug smugglers; but, as Karzai says, “better to have them inside rather than outside doing damage”.

But while George W Bush and Tony Blair insisted on declaring Afghanistan a success — and a model for the pacification of Iraq — they apparently forgot one crucial lesson that the British had learnt years before. “Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over” were the sage words of Sir Olaf Caroe, the last British governor of North West Frontier Province.

Far from Afghanistan being a model for Iraq, Iraq has become a model for Afghanistan. There have been 41 Afghan suicide bombings in the past nine months, compared with five in the preceding five years. IEDs — improvised explosive devices — have become a fact of life. Three were left in roadside handcarts in Kabul last week to detonate as buses went past.

According to United Nations officials, not a day passes without a school being burnt down or a teacher being murdered, often in front of schoolchildren.

If there is one factor most responsible for the Taliban resurgence it is the war in Iraq, which distracted the attention of London and Washington at a critical time. While US marines were toppling statues of Saddam Hussein and then finding themselves fighting a bloody insurgency, the Taliban regrouped and retrained in Pakistan.

From just a few hundred guerrillas last year, Mullad Dadullah, the Taliban commander, now claims that he has 12,000 men under arms in the southern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan.

The southern third of the country, which British troops are supposed to “secure for development”, has long been ungovernable and a no-go area for aid agencies. It is all too easy here for the Taliban to tell local people that the West — and the pro-western government in Kabul — promised aid but has done nothing for them. Where the Taliban are not openly controlling districts, they have set up shadow administrations that assume power as soon as dusk falls.

More alarmingly, the Taliban are no longer just in the south but have even moved into the province of Logar, 25 miles from Kabul. Among their Afghan victims they particularly target police and their relatives as well as guards, road builders and interpreters for western contractors. About 1,500 Afghans were killed by the Taliban last year; 400 have died this year.

Last week an Afghan friend travelling from Kandahar to Kabul on a bus was shocked when a bearded passenger got up, walked to the front and replaced the music cassette that had been playing with a tape of Taliban chanting: “For the next 2½ hours we all sat listening to this terrible stuff and nobody said a word. Two years ago that would have been unthinkable.”

So confident are the Taliban that leaders of the once secretive group have started giving interviews on Afghanistan’s new US-funded Tolo television station. This prompted Karzai last month to impose reporting restrictions that he was forced to rescind by the international community, which felt “censorship” did not sit well with attempts to showcase Afghanistan as a liberal democracy.

“People are scared when they see the Taliban on TV,” said Jamil Karzai, MP for Kabul and a nephew of the president. “Every day I get constituents coming and asking: what does this mean, are the Taliban coming back? We could never have imagined we would get in a situation where such a thing was conceivable.”

“We need to realise that we could actually fail here,” warns Lieutenant-General David Richards, British commander of the Nato-led peacekeeping force. “Think of the psychological victory for Bin Laden and his ilk if we failed and the Taliban came back. Within months we’d suffer terror attacks in the UK. I think of my own daughters in London and the risk they would be in.”

UNLIKE Iraqis, most Afghans welcomed foreign troops, seeing them as the only guarantee of peace after years of civil war. Also, unlike the war in Iraq, Afghanistan has been an international effort involving soldiers from 36 countries.

Right from the beginning, however, there have been conflicting objectives. Commanders and politicians talk loosely of “coalition” forces but there are two command structures with different goals.

By far the largest contingent of forces is from the United States, which recently increased its numbers from 19,000 to 23,000 to pursue Operation Enduring Freedom, a key part of the global war on terror. Its main objective is to hunt down and destroy Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, even though they are believed to have long fled across the border into Pakistan. It is commanded by Karl Eikenberry, an American general who takes his orders from home.

Then there is the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, now under Nato control and the command of Britain’s Richards. Its main purpose, as the British government keeps telling us, is to make Afghanistan safe for development.

Until two years ago ISAF was only 4,000 strong and was limited to Kabul where it was widely derided as the International Shopping Assistance Force for its tendency to hang around Chicken Street, centre of carpet shopping. Even now, with 9,700 troops, it is far smaller than the peacekeeping missions in Liberia or Kosovo, countries with a fraction of Afghanistan’s 25m population.

To add to the confusion, ISAF has no control over troops in the south, including the British in Helmand, who come under a Canadian general in Kandahar.

Some of this will change at the end of this month when Nato/ISAF will take control of all operations in Helmand and the south. But the strategic contradiction will endure.

One crucial point of conflict is over warlords and militias, a symptom of Afghanistan’s old agony.

The Karzai government is so worried about the deteriorating security situation that it is allowing local Afghan commanders to re-create militias, even though it was popular anger over child abductions and extortion by these private armies that first led to the emergence of the Taliban a decade ago.

Foreign diplomats are trying to put a gloss on this retreat by referring to the militias euphemistically as “community police”, but there is no doubting the alarm of Richards and others who see it as undermining their efforts to create a national army and police.

To British dismay, one of those forming a militia is Sher Akhundzada, the former governor of Helmand, who was forced out by the British because of his alleged links with the drugs mafia.

“He and around 100 people, including the former chief of police and some district chiefs who were sacked went to Kabul for a big meeting to demand to form a militia,” said Engineer Mohammed Daud, the new governor. “They say they need to protect themselves.”

Failure to deal with the warlords has been one of the biggest criticisms of the Karzai administration. Back in December 2001 the warlords were running scared, discredited because of the damage they had wrought on the country.

Karzai and his elder brother Qayyum joked about what to do with them, the latter suggesting they could run guided tours of Kabul, each showing the destruction for which he was responsible.

“I will not tolerate warlords,” insisted the new president to me in 2002, adding jokingly, “I’ll hang them all!” Yet they have found themselves named as ministers, governors and police chiefs.

Yet while ISAF commanders regard the warlords as part of the problem, the Americans have seen them as the best source of local intelligence and paid them millions of dollars.

Just as damaging have been the continuing air raids across Afghanistan, sometimes on wedding parties or innocent villagers, which have led to the loss of thousands of civilian lives. In May this year there were an astonishing 750 bombing raids, according to American Central Command.

Karzai has repeatedly complained to the Americans about the bombers and the lack of cultural sensitivity of raids on the ground — doors kicked down in the middle of the night, male soldiers entering women’s quarters or taking in dogs which are considered unclean.

Another bitter complaint is of American convoys driving too fast and not stopping when they run someone down. It was such an incident in Kabul that provoked a six-hour riot last month — yet two weeks later a US truck ran over a child in exactly the same place.

“How can we go in offering school sets and candy to people when the Americans have just bombed someone’s family or run over their daughter?” asked an exasperated senior ISAF officer.

Few Afghans see any difference between ISAF activities and America’s Operation Enduring Freedom. The result is that even in the mosques of Kabul, mullahs have started preaching that ISAF are “infidels here to destroy Islam”.

Against such a backdrop, it seems hopelessly naive for the British to hope that locals in Helmand will differentiate between them and the Americans. At every meeting I attended, para commanders started off by telling local elders, “we’re British, not Americans”, an odd comment for such close allies.

At a shura or traditional meeting in Gereshk, elders complained about soldiers bursting into their women’s quarters.

“It’s not us, we’ve had endless cultural training about this,” said Major Paul Blair, the local British commander. “But of course they don’t see the difference.”

“You don’t even differentiate between Pashtuns and Tajiks, let alone different Pashtun tribes,” replied a local teacher. “Why should we?”

Back at the camp after this discussion we found that a convoy of Americans had arrived. They were laughing about running over some goats on the way in. “Now I’m going to have to make another phone call to the district chief to sort it out,” grumbled Blair.

To add to the confusion, while the men of Blair’s C company of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment are pursuing hearts and minds in Helmand, their fellow paras in A Company are taking part only a few miles away in a US-led offensive called Operation Mountain Thrust.

This is actively seeking out the Taliban, something British ministers have never said was part of the mission. Three members of A Company were killed in the small town of Sangin last week.

I was with the paras a few days after they first went in to Sangin late last month after a Taliban massacre of local people. The paras were on patrol by foot and in soft hats, yet the hostility to them was palpable. This is the heartland of the country’s narcotics industry — which is encouraged by the Taliban — and nobody wants to be seen as a friend of the British.

The soldiers set up base in the local district commissioner’s mud-walled house. It has been attacked almost every night since.

British commanders in Helmand admit that they have been taken by surprise by the Taliban’s numbers and sophistication. “In every contact they lose maybe 15 or 20 yet they just keep coming,” said Colonel Charlie Knaggs, commander of the Helmand taskforce.

The greatest shock for me in the two-hour firefight in which I found myself in the village of Zumbelay — south of Sangin — was the cunning employed by the Taliban to outflank and surround us.

My memories of travelling with the mujaheddin in the 1980s were mostly of disorganisation and chaos. I always felt that one of the reasons why the Russians found it so difficult to outwit them was that the Afghans had no idea themselves of what they would do next.

Last week was different. “They used the tactics we would use,” said Captain Alex Mackenzie, commander of C Company’s fire support group, when we finally escaped from the ambush.

“Maybe they learnt them in the same place,” said a fellow officer, pointing out that many senior Pakistani officers have been trained at Sandhurst.

Karzai himself has repeatedly insisted to Blair and Bush that the Taliban are once again receiving training from Pakistani military intelligence, ISI, which was behind the creation of the movement in the 1990s.

Foreign journalists have long been barred from going to Quetta, the Pakistani border city, where local people report that the Taliban stroll in the streets. “If you British really wanted to end insecurity in Helmand you would do something about Pakistan,” a white-bearded man insisted last week to Knaggs. “The fact that you don’t makes us think you are not interested in solving the problem.”

Western intelligence on Helmand is also seriously flawed. “The British don’t have good field intelligence,” said Zia Mojadeddi, one of Karzai’s national security advisers.

“The past formulas do not work. You have to know every village and who is in the village, otherwise they are doomed to failure.”

THERE are few even among the most on-message British senior officers who do not privately concede that the mission in Helmand is two years too late. Not only has the distraction of war in Iraq allowed the Taliban to regroup, but the British forces are telling locals that they have come to help the Afghan government at a time when the credibility of the Karzai administration is at an all-time low.

Just as the international community has not been committed or consistent enough in its military support, so there has been chaos in aid for economic development. The amount of aid has not been enough. At about £5 billion, it is far less than that spent in East Timor, Haiti or Kosovo; yet Afghanistan has a much bigger problem.

There has also been a lack of co-ordination and a focus on First World priorities such as gender rights rather than basic health or infrastructure. There has been an endless stream of American feminists intent not only on sweeping away the tyranny of the burqa but also on introducing western concepts of sexual equality. Yet in a country where children regularly die of malnutrition, all the Afghan mothers I know are far more interested in food, clinics and security. Liberation can wait.

More than 1,000 NGOs have pushed up rents and put a lot of concrete blocks around their offices, but it is hard to see where else the aid money has gone.

Not a single new dam, power station or water system has been built in the five years since the Taliban fell. Only one important highway has been completed. Kabul still has no sewerage system. Its streets remain piled high with rubbish and running with green effluent. Only 6% of the population has electricity and Afghanistan remains at the bottom of all social indicators.

There may be 5m children at school, as the politicians like to say, but many have their lessons in tents which they attend in shifts for just one or two hours’ tuition a day. This is not just in rural areas but also in Kabul where the Saluddin Ansari school has 3,700 children sharing a cluster of tents and one pit as a toilet.

“People just treat the children like garbage,” complained Asadullah, a Pashto teacher. “Every so often some foreigner comes by and says how shocking, but they don’t do anything.”

“The international community must start working better together to deliver,” warned Richards. “The West has been guilty of applying western precepts on an almost post-medieval economy. We need to address a basic economy with basic solutions. The lack of amenities is staggering. A quarter of children die by the age of five. Worrying about civil service reform and gender rights are really tomorrow’s problems.”

In recognition that development was failing, the so-called Afghanistan Compact was signed in London in February, agreeing that far more aid would be channelled through the Afghan government. Contractors say this has simply resulted in widespread corruption, with ministries regularly demanding a “gift” of between 20% and 30% of a contract. One deputy minister refused a $120,000 armoured vehicle paid for by USAID, demanding instead the $230,000 model with the latest electronic windows and DVD player.

The irony is that there has been a private financial boom. Kabul now boasts shiny blue-glass office blocks. But officials say most of the new money is from drugs. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that Afghanistan earned $2.8 billion from opium production last year — more than it received in aid.

Given the international community’s failure to create any alternative economy, it is not surprising that the people of Helmand, who depend on the poppy and grow a quarter of the country’s total, will fight to safeguard their income.

It did not have to be this way. Just as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda would never have taken hold if the West had not abandoned Afghanistan after the Russians withdrew in 1989, so we would not be in the mess we are today if London and Washington had focused on Afghan nation-building after 2001 instead of pursuing other foreign adventures.

If only they had remembered their history, maybe British blood would not once again be spilt on Afghan fields and I would not have once more ended up in a muddy ditch cowering from a rain of fire.

Christina Lamb’s memoir of Afghanistan, The Sewing Circles of Herat, is published by HarperCollins

Click here to find out more!

Copyright 2006 Times Newspapers Ltd.

July 9, 2006 at 03:03 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Jimmy Carter: Give Hamas a chance

CNN.com - Jimmy Carter: Give Hamas a chance - Feb 1, 2006

Former president says U.S. should not cut off aid to Palestinians

Thursday, February 2, 2006; Posted: 7:12 a.m. EST (12:12 GMT)
(CNN) -- Hamas deserves to be recognized by the international community, and despite the group's militant history, there is a chance the soon-to-be Palestinian leaders could turn away from violence, former President Jimmy Carter said Wednesday.

Carter, who monitored last week's Palestinian elections in which Hamas handily toppled the ruling Fatah, added that the United States should not cut off aid to the Palestinian people, but rather funnel it through third parties like the U.N.

"If you sponsor an election or promote democracy and freedom around the world, then when people make their own decision about their leaders, I think that all the governments should recognize that administration and let them form their government," Carter said. (Watch the former president cautiously defend Hamas -- 4:35)

"If there are prohibitions -- like, for instance, in the United States, against giving any money to a government that is controlled by Hamas -- then the United States could channel the same amount of money to the Palestinian people through the United Nations, through the refugee fund, through UNICEF, things of that kind," he added.

Carter expressed hope that "the people of Palestine -- who already suffer ... under Israeli occupation -- will not suffer because they are deprived of a right to pay their school teachers, policemen, welfare workers, health workers and provide food for people."

As president, Carter brokered a 1979 peace accord between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. That effort helped earn him the Nobel Peace Prize. Through his work at the Carter Center in Atlanta, he regularly monitors elections in numerous countries.

Hamas, which has called for the destruction of Israel and has long been considered a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department, was expected to fare well in last week's elections. But it dominated them, winning 76 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Fatah, which had been in power for decades, earned only 43.

The U.S. Senate on Wednesday passed a resolution saying that no aid should be provided to the Palestinian Authority "if a ruling majority party within the Palestinian Parliament maintains a position calling for the destruction of Israel."

Carter said "there's a good chance" that Hamas, which has operated a network of successful social and charitable organizations for Palestinians, could become a nonviolent organization. (Watch how democracy and religion coincide among Palestinians -- 2:30)

The 39th U.S. president said he met with Hamas leaders in Ramallah, in the West Bank, after last week's elections.

"They told me they want to have a peaceful administration. They want to have a unity government, bring in Fatah members and independent members," Carter said. But he added that "what they say and what they do is two different matters."

However, Carter noted, Hamas has adhered to a cease-fire since August 2004, which "indicates what they might do in the future." He said Hamas is "highly disciplined" and capable of keeping any promise of nonviolence it might make.

February 2, 2006 at 09:28 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Hamas prepares for office

Hamas prepares for office | Economist.com

an 27th 2006
From The Economist Global Agenda
The Islamist group Hamas won a victory beyond its dreams in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, taking 76 out of the 132 seats and sweeping aside the former ruling party, Fatah. Minds now turn to the question of who forms the new government, and how the rest of the world deals with it

A CURIOUS little scene is being repeated on street corners and in cafés all over the West Bank and Gaza. Two friends come together, exchange the traditional greetings—“issalaam aleikum”, “w’aleikum issalaam”—and crack up with laughter. For secular Palestinians, who normally hail one another with a casual “marhaba”, the Islamic salutation is piece of wry black humour in the face of an election result that has left the nation in shock.

Barring a couple of fistfights, Wednesday, January 25th was a model of enthusiastic and civilised voting. Turnout was 75%, a sign of how eager Palestinians were to make changes to the corrupt, hidebound, Fatah-run parliament that they had endured since the last election ten years ago. Five polling firms predicted a Fatah victory by anything from 2% to 11% in the days leading up to the election. Two exit polls gave similar results. But all fell flat on their faces. The Islamist Hamas movement not only won most of the local-constituency seats in the Palestinian dual voting system—as expected, since it was more careful than Fatah in selecting candidates. It also, in defiance of all the polls, won six more of the national seats than Fatah. The final result: Hamas 76 seats, Fatah 43, out of the 132-seat total.

That, though, was a vote as much against Fatah as for Hamas. Polls suggest (though who trusts polls any more?) that Hamas’s core support hovers somewhere around a quarter to a third of the population. A majority of Palestinians disagree with two of Hamas’s ideological tenets: the non-recognition of Israel and the imposition of Islamic sharia law. Even though a high percentage believe that “armed resistance” by militants from Hamas and other factions drove Israel to dismantle its settlements in the Gaza strip last summer, almost as many still believe in a two-state solution to the conflict. Hamas adjusted its campaign platform to fit. It made no mention of destroying Israel, as outlined in the movement’s charter, but concentrated on domestic issues: the disunity and corruption within Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the poor state of the economy and public services.
Click here to find out more!

But the size of its victory is greater than even Hamas dreamed—and probably greater than it wanted. Ideally, it would have won a healthy share of the legislature and demanded a few domestic ministerial portfolios. That would have allowed it to showcase its reputation for honesty and efficiency, while leaving the difficult and controversial jobs that entail dealing with Israel and the rest of the world to Fatah to mess up further. Now Hamas is calling for a national-unity government. The snag is that Fatah officials have refused to take part.

That puts Hamas in a tricky spot. Bad enough that it would have to deal all alone with the mess that Fatah has left: the PA’s acute fiscal crisis; the unwieldy bureaucracy; ill-disciplined security services; severe unemployment; corruption. Worse, the PA risks being excluded from contact with Israel, the United States and the European Union, all of which define Hamas as a terrorist group. And for the same reason, the Palestinians would stand to lose a lot of foreign aid money—though not all, as a lot of it does not go directly to the PA itself.

Yet Hamas’s dilemma is shared by the rest of the world. So precarious are the PA’s finances that it expects to fall short on salary payments within days. Deprived of its traditional donors the PA will either collapse, taking with it any chance of peace talks with Israel, or have to look elsewhere for money. Donors might deliberate whether to grit their teeth and give money to a PA run by a “terrorist organisation”, rather than see it become dependent on funds from the likes of Iran.

Everything depends on what the next few days will bring. Hamas has asked Salam Fayyad, the respected former finance minister who ran on his own ticket for parliament, to take over as prime minister. He reportedly said that he would do so only if Hamas disarms and recognises Israel—which it, for the moment, refuses to do. Mahmoud Abbas, the PA president and a Fatah man, who was elected separately last year and appoints the cabinet, will meet Hamas leaders in Gaza at the end of January. He has asked Hamas to form a government, but they might yet reach a bargain whereby some Fatah people take on key ministries, like foreign affairs, interior (responsible for the security services), and civil affairs (relations with Israel).
Naked, self-serving

Fatah’s desire to dump all the PA’s problems on Hamas is so nakedly self-serving that it could backfire with the public. And not everyone in Fatah may share it. Marwan Barghouti, the most popular of Fatah’s younger generation of leaders, spoke out before the election in favour of a coalition. Indeed, in some ways the situation is a gift to Mr Abbas, who had previously failed to squeeze unpopular older Fatah leaders out of the government.

Meanwhile, the rest of the world is watching and waiting. In a statement the “Quartet”—the UN, the EU, the United States and Russia—said there is a “fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state”. Individual European leaders uttered similar phrases. George Bush reiterated that the United States will not deal with Hamas unless it dismantles its militias and recognises Israel. But he would not be drawn on precisely how Hamas’s participation in the cabinet would affect things, noting that Mr Abbas remains president. And more interestingly, he took pains to note that he welcomed the democratic process, the “competition of ideas”, and the message that the Palestinians were sending to their leaders.

After the cabinet is formed, foreign donors will start to figure out how much support they can give the PA. At the very least, Hamas will be expected to continue the ceasefire it has more or less kept for the past year. Given the Palestinian desire for calm, that will be in Hamas’s interests too, as long as Israel does not turn more belligerent. Some diplomats hope that Hamas will eventually change, as Irish republicans laid down their weapons in favour of political means after years of armed struggle.

Among Israeli officials, though, that notion gets short shrift. A commoner model is Hizbullah, the Lebanese group which has roles in parliament and government but retains its armed wing—something that, in Hamas’s case, would rule out Israel agreeing to talks with the PA. An even more apocalyptic view is Hamas as the Nazi party in the 1930s, democratically brought to power but gradually adopting ever-more repressive, undemocratic policies.

Facing their own election in two months’ time, Israeli leaders have been striving to outdo one another in hawkishness. Ehud Olmert, the acting prime minister and successor to Ariel Sharon, who remains in a vegetative state in hospital, said: “If a government led by Hamas or in which Hamas is a coalition partner is established…Israel and the world will ignore it and make it irrelevant.” He has hinted that if peace talks fail, he will continue Mr Sharon’s policy of unilateral withdrawal from occupied territory, so that Israel may rid itself of responsibility for the Palestinians while setting whatever borders it sees fit for its own security. Even Amir Peretz, his contender from the left-wing Labour Party, this week hinted at the unilateral option.

But a newspaper poll before the Palestinian election also showed that 48% of Israelis would support peace talks even with a Hamas-led PA. And views among the Israeli security establishment vary too. Earlier in the week, Mr Olmert had asked for two separate sets of proposals on Hamas: one from his more hardline intelligence and defence chiefs, another from the national-security adviser, Giora Eiland, who is said to favour seeking out Hamas’s moderate elements. Everything will turn on how moderate they seem to be over the next few months.

January 28, 2006 at 09:22 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Hamas election victory hits `like an earthquake'

TheStar.com - Hamas election victory hits `like an earthquake'

Jan. 27, 2006. 01:00 AM
MITCH POTTER
MIDDLE EAST BUREAU

RAMALLAH, West Bank— Left standing was a president who still wants peace. But behind Mahmoud Abbas, the defeated Palestinian leadership was in shambles last night, vowing it would have nothing to do with a government led by the unexpected triumph of Hamas.

The militant Islamic group, in its first-ever bid for a role in national politics, collected more than 50 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections Wednesday and will claim a majority 76 seats in the 132-seat Palestinian Legislative Council, according to official, near-complete results released yesterday.

Four victorious independents were also backed by Hamas. Fatah, which has dominated Palestinian political life since the 1960s but alienated voters because of rampant corruption, got 43 seats. The remaining seats went to smaller parties.

The numbers numbed the international community, contradicting all estimates, including earlier exit polls that suggested a narrow victory for Fatah, and ending four decades of virtual one-party rule over the stateless Palestinians.

Yesterday's stunning turnaround triggered immediate fears of clashes, as jubilant Hamas loyalists and their embittered Fatah rivals spilled into the streets. One such confrontation ended in a brawl on the steps of the Palestinian parliament in the de facto West Bank capital of Ramallah, as marching Hamas supporters scaled the walls to drape the green flag of Islam.

As the region's leaders absorbed what amounts to a Palestinian revolution, diplomatic gridlock took hold. Acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, facing his own election in the race to succeed a comatose, stroke-stricken Ariel Sharon, ruled out contact with Hamas, warning Palestinians face an era of international isolation unless the group responsible for the majority of suicide bombings against Israel renounces such attacks.

"If a government led by Hamas or in which Hamas is a coalition partner is established, the Palestinian Authority will be turned into an authority that supports terror," Olmert said. "Israel and the world will ignore it and make it irrelevant."

Fatah leaders conceded defeat, with Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia and his cabinet submitting their resignations and other party officials calling the outcome more a scathing indictment of government corruption than an endorsement of political Islam.

"It hit us like an earthquake. We wanted a democratic life and it was built on our corpse," said Abdel Fateh Hamayel, a Fatah official associated with the party's young guard.

"I hope that our brothers in Hamas rise to the occasion. Let them now say what they will do. But Fatah must bear full responsibility for what happened. The people have spoken out against a party whose agenda has made room for thugs, robbers and corrupt, dishonest people."

Hamas leaders appeared taken aback by the extent of victory, initially rebuffing media requests for interviews. The movement, which operates under a charter calling for Israel's destruction, had mounted a near-perfect campaign under the banner of Change and Reform, promising to focus singularly on domestic issues while hinting at a new willingness to negotiate with Israel.

Abbas, who will continue to hold the presidency he assumed after winning election one year ago, said in a televised speech he intends to push forward toward peace with Israel, even as consultations begin with Hamas for the formation of a new government.

`We wanted a democratic life and it was built on our corpse,' Fatah backer says
"I am committed to implementing the program on which you elected me," Abbas said. "It is a program based on negotiations and peaceful settlement with Israel."

Hamas leaders issued a series of statements offering an olive branch to their secular Palestinian counterparts and Israelis alike. The movement's overall leader Khaled Mashal called Abbas from exile in Damascus, announcing Hamas would seek a political partnership.

Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar, speaking to reporters in Gaza, said the group was prepared to extend the period of tadiyah (calm) agreed to last February if Israel will reciprocate.

"If they are going to continue commitment to what is called quietness, then we will continue," Zahar told Associated Press. "But if not, then I think we will have no option but to protect our people and our land."

Palestinian political insiders predicted weeks of back-channel negotiations are likely before a new government can emerge, as a reluctant Hamas grapples with the predicament of assuming a degree of power that exceeds its ambitions.

In Ramallah last night, tensions outside parliament offered the first unnerving glimpse of the destabilized relationship between mosque and state. The clash between Hamas and Fatah activists resulted in minor injuries, and a volley of stones left a dozen windows broken on the façade of the Palestinian legislative chambers.

One participant, Hamas loyalist Saleh Mikdar, 40, blamed a Fatah supporter for triggering the melee by breaking over his knee a green flag bearing the slogan: "There is no God but God."

"He provoked the feelings of the entire Islamic nation. A fight broke out and they beat the hell out of him," said Mikdar, a printer from Al-Amari Refugee Camp, outside Ramallah.

"But I hope this is an isolated incident. I don't think it will be the start of problems, because we are brothers, Hamas and Fatah."

As Palestinian security officials replaced national flags dislodged by the rioters, a police officer fired in the air to restore order. One police captain seized a microphone from his cruiser, enraged by the spectacle. "The Palestinian Authority still exists," he warned the crowd. "If you touch the nation's flag, you will be hanged on the spot."

Reaction to the Hamas landslide included fears that civil liberties taken for granted in Ramallah will eventually fall prey to the ideological dictates of the emerging government.

"Nothing will happen for six months or maybe a year," said restaurateur Bassem Khoury, a member of the Palestinian Christian minority and the operator of Pronto, known to serve alcohol.

"But eventually, I worry they will force my wife to wear the abbayah and I don't know what else. In Arabic we have a saying, `Never invite a bear into your garden.' Now the bear is here."

January 27, 2006 at 08:37 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Jimmy Carter's secret Hamas summit

TheStar.com - Jimmy Carter's secret Hamas summit

Tried to bring Hamas to table
Summit fell aparta decade ago
Jan. 27, 2006. 05:08 AM
MITCH POTTER
MIDDLE EAST BUREAU

JERUSALEM—The mood was disaster-in-progress when the unflappable Jimmy Carter stepped into the room yesterday to share a few quiet moments with the Toronto Star.

The official returns were flowing in, showing a Hamas victory almost beyond anyone's calibration.

The hard fist of political Islam didn't just enter the Palestinian parliament. It is the parliament.

As the numbers sunk in, CNN, BBC, Sky and Fox went into "breaking news" mode, quickly bulking up with pundits uttering obituaries for peace. The greening of Palestinian politics now had consigned the region to another hopeless eternity, it seemed.

At 81, clear-eyed and calm, America's most beloved ex-president — who yesterday sanctified the Palestinian election as head of the 950-strong international observer mission — took the earthquake in stride.

With the debate turning to whether the Palestinians' major international benefactors, the European Union and the United States, should allow themselves to maintain contact with a government led by Hamas — a group that has not unequivocally abandoned its founding principle of the destruction of the state of Israel — Carter let us in on a fascinating anecdote he has never spoken of publicly.

Ten years ago, Carter himself sat down with Hamas in an attempt to bridge the gap between PLO chief Yasser Arafat and the then-fledgling militant Islamic group.

As a personal favour to the late Palestinian leader, and in the spirit of the newly minted Oslo Accords, Carter went hunting for Hamas, to lasso them into the political process.

"Arafat asked me if I would contact Hamas and see if they would accept the new government with him as president, and to find out what their demands might be," Carter said.

A series of meetings ensued with various Hamas leaders in the Israeli-occupied territories, and Carter initially found himself confounded by the multi-headed hydra of leadership, Hamas-style. But some of those he spoke to showed interest.

Even 10 years ago, there were indications Hamas might be ready to make the great leap forward into reason and rationality — and perhaps even to accept Israel as its legitimate partner in a future that would become two states living side by side.

Finally, a secret summit was arranged for Cairo involving every voice that mattered to Hamas. And just as Carter was preparing for the flight to Egypt, Hamas called it off.

"They cancelled the meeting. Either they decided no, or they decided I wasn't the right person. But they cancelled," said Carter.

"That's the way it was then. Clearly there was no discernable person who could speak on behalf of Hamas and I'm not sure there is yet."

Carter didn't rule out modern-day disaster in the 17 minutes and 29 seconds he gave the Star yesterday. But he would like everyone to take a deep breath and consider an opposite scenario. To his way of thinking, any notion of peace was already a political fiction long before Hamas came calling. Maybe, just maybe, confronted with the reality of responsibility, Hamas will be the one to awaken it.

"Firstly, nobody knows what will happen now. The Palestinian government just resigned a few minutes ago. I suspect even Hamas doesn't know," said Carter. "My guess is right now (Hamas) are trying to absorb the enormity of their unexpected victory. They are assimilating what has happened.

"So it means everything is in Hamas's hands. And how they'll deal with it is quite interesting to consider. It might be a healthy thing for them to have the responsibility. Ask yourself, `Can Hamas maintain order among their own people?' If so, that will be a notable achievement, and it's something Fatah has not been able or willing to do."

Carter, the broker of peace between Israel and Egypt, has never really let go of this part of the world.

He was here almost exactly a year ago, in the same capacity as chief election monitor, when Mahmoud Abbas was elected to succeed Arafat. On that occasion he stayed up till 4 a.m. reviewing the count. Then, rather than making for bed, he chose to go birding, rounding up his binoculars to catch the dawn on the leafy grounds of Hebrew University, secret service guardsmen in tow. It is unlikely he will be birding today. Carter is off to see Abbas one more time this morning, to survey what's left of the broken pieces of Fatah.

As for the death of peace hopes, Carter offered a steely gaze, and unleashed a laundry list of reasons why the question is ridiculous.

"Remember, we're not interrupting a major, successful, promising peace process. There haven't been any peace talks for the last 3 1/2 years. For almost three years, the elected leader of the Palestinian people (Arafat) was imprisoned in two or three rooms in Ramallah and was not permitted to leave his office," said Carter.

"And then once Mahmoud Abbas was elected a year ago, we thought this would open a fairly immediate opportunity for peace talks. But there haven't been any peace talks. There hasn't been any real effort to strengthen Abbas's international stature, or his economic ability to manage his government's needs or meet his people's needs. There hasn't been any willingness on the part of outside forces to equip his security people with the ability to control violence.

"He's been put into a holding pattern. So we're not interrupting a peace process by this election. And it may be that what I consider to be a stalemate could possibly be invigorated. I won't say reinvigorated because there's no vigour there now."

But if a victorious Hamas is to take the Palestinians forward, a discernable voice must arise. Hamas can no longer be a multi-headed hydra, saying both yes and no to negotiations from its many mouths. A cohesive leadership is essential, and it must say what it really wants. That will require some breathing space as the dust over Ramallah settles, and the newly elected work toward forming a new government. But time is of the essence, insofar as the Palestinian Authority is destitute.

By Carter's reckoning, the Authority will run out of funds to pay its workers — everyone from policemen to schoolteachers, at the end of February.

He's urging Western donors to find a way to work around their objections to Hamas and continue giving, at least until Hamas makes its intentions known. And he's calling on the cash-rich Arab world, now "inundated with oil revenues," to step up with financing to get Palestinians through this crisis.

Former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, one of Carter's colleagues in the mission to Jerusalem, yesterday framed the situation thus: "The motives for a two-state solution can be said to be even strong in a situation where, after all, what we have asked for — the establishment of democracy in these territories — has occurred.

"The fact that we got democracy functioning should not really be used as an argument for withdrawing our engagement."

Carter professes no insight into whether Hamas is capable of the challenge of leadership. But he's old enough to have seen many in this region make the transition from terror to power with aplomb."Despite the concerns expressed about the character of Hamas, we have to hope for the best. My prayer is the Hamas leaders, now serving in positions of unprecedented authority, will lead the Palestinian people on a peaceful, non-violent path toward a two-state solution."

January 27, 2006 at 08:36 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Interview: Jasper Gerard meets Colin Powell

Interview: Jasper Gerard meets Colin Powell - Sunday Times - Times Online

Yes, Iran is like Iraq ... but let’s not rush in
There is no cavalcade, no parade, no men in braid. Just an old boy in a trench coat wandering alone down windy streets. He could be any lost American tourist.

Except this is Manchester and he is attracting way too many gawpers: “I have had a row with my mate,” burbles a taxi driver. “I swore I just saw Colin Powell, but my mate said, ‘What would he be doing in Manchester?’” A fair question. One Powell — until recently among the most powerful men on the planet — must have asked himself when the taxi collecting him was too small for his luggage. The general who held the world enthralled at the United Nations when he produced “irrefutable and undeniable evidence” that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction is now on the speaking circuit.

He has spent the past week in Britain, and whenever he orates you are reminded why he had been so damned persuasive. Outside his hotel there are protesters, but inside only eulogies.

Everyone respects Powell: the one Bushite who even Euro cheese-munchers thought they could do business with. Iraq might have left him isolated in the Bush administration, but he is the war’s only politician whose reputation didn’t take a hit. Powell oozes charm. As guest of the Jewish National Fund he smiles through an excruciating rendition of Imagine (strangely missing the line about imagine no religion) before he does his stuff — brilliantly.

He recalls how, in the run-up to war in Iraq, whenever he felt exasperated with France he had to remind himself: “France has been with us since 1776, and we have been in marriage guidance ever since.” He recalls a Kremlin showdown with Mikhail Gorbachev, who suddenly smiled and said: “General, you are going to have to find yourself a new enemy.” To which Powell thought: “I don’t want a new enemy: I am happy with the one I got.”

Having retired as secretary of state he no longer needs to be the constant diplomat, so in our interview he speaks frankly of his disagreements with George W Bush and his doubts about British intelligence. He almost giggles over how he saw off Jeremy Paxman in a recent interview: “I’d heard of his reputation but I think I escaped with a nil-nil draw.”

Next year he will be 70 but the married father of three grown children remains a powerful physical force: broad as a tank with searching almond eyes. The old warhorse doesn’t do retirement: “I’m busy: I don’t play golf.”

His presence turns minds to war: does the ramping up of pressure on Iran remind him of the build-up to invading Iraq? “The parallel is both countries pursuing a nuclear programme: the big difference is there is little dispute this time over the evidence.” Yikes.

Isn’t the irony that Iran is a greater threat than Iraq but after the political deception and military stalemate there is no appetite for aggro this time? “Even if there hadn’t been Iraq I do not believe there would have been an immediate leap from anyone for military action. I’m fascinated everyone here wants to talk about military options: just slow down. Iran is some years off a nuclear weapon. One of the papers said ‘if they had the material they could (make bombs in a couple of months’; well, they don’t. If I had the material, so could I.”

He may be sanguine but after the rift on Iraq with “old Europe” he can’t resist a dig at Euro efforts to cow Iran. He calls the unsuccessful European foreign ministers who have been involved in the negotiations, including Jack Straw, “my three tenors”: “They wanted to take the lead so I said, ‘Fine, it might even be better if (Americans) are not seen as part of your group’, and they came up with a couple of agreements, but they did not hold. Dr (Condoleezza) Rice (his successor) gave more support to EU efforts but it still didn’t produce results.”

However, Powell offers scant alternative. He even cautions against mild sanctions: “Banning sports tends to disappoint athletes, who are not building nuclear programmes. Rather than being mad at their regime they might be mad at us. Plus the Iranians have no doubt had their own national security council meetings and have factored in likely sanctions.”

His wry scepticism about European posturing also comes through when talking about “rendition”, where America shuttles terror suspects to Third World interview centres to loosen tongues. After an outcry Straw wrote to Rice demanding details of exactly when and where prisoners had been taken, but Powell suggests the foreign secretary and the “tenors” knew the score all too well: “Such things have benefited us and Europe. To suggest renditions are such a shocking thing to everyone’s sensibilities is a bit much. There are two parties to a rendition, if not more. So I thought Europe overreacted.”

We turn to Iraq. America initially sought war simply to oust Saddam; it was Tony Blair who ramped up the iffy intelligence about weapons of mass destruction. What did Powell make of Blairite claims such as Niger being in the market to supply Saddam with material to build a nuclear bomb? “I believe the British government still stands by that.” Which is amazing! “Yeah. I didn’t use Niger, except perhaps once early on at Davos. It just didn’t hold up.”

Wasn’t the inaccuracy of the intelligence the fault of politicos pressuring spooks to produce smoking guns? “I wanted to know what the truth was. When I prepared my UN speech I sat there for four days and nights: we went through everything, to make sure this huge presentation I was giving, watched by the whole world, was accurate. Every word was approved by the CIA with no political pressure. I tossed out things because they weren’t sufficiently sourced.”

Like Niger? “Niger being one. There were also some remotely piloted vehicles found but which didn’t pass my instinct. So I went into the UN with a fair degree of confidence.”

Still, his UN presentation turned out to be almost as dodgy as Blair’s intelligence dossiers. Are British records accurate that purportedly detail a meeting Powell attended with Bush and Blair where Blair dissuaded the president from bombing the Arab television station Al-Jazeera? “I have no vivid recollection,” he says. “Whether something was said in jest or in passing, certainly I don’t think it was ever seriously in the president’s mind. Remember (Al-Jazeera) is located in a friendly country.” Hmm: so was the village in Pakistan that America bombed to bits the other day.

Powell, though, refuses to be a “referee” over claims by Sir Christopher Meyer, our former ambassador to Washington and “a great guy”, that Blair failed to use his “leverage” over the president in the period leading up to the war, but he insists Blair was no poodle. “Britain always comes to the table as a sovereign nation with a strong prime minister ever since I have been involved, going back to the days of Mrs Thatcher.

“Every administration I have been in has respected the views of the UK and has never taken it for granted. And I have yet to meet a British prime minister who is a shrinking violet.”

But then he could hardly say anything else.

On Iraq he says: “I think Blair felt as strongly as Bush.” The question is: did Powell? He laughs uproariously, saying the failure to find weapons of mass destruction was due to the success of that much-derided earlier war, Operation Desert Storm, as it destroyed Saddam’s nuclear programme — even if not Saddam himself.

The suggestion is that Powell was sceptical of the war from the start as he did not buy Donald Rumsfeld’s dream that it could be won with a tiny force. “There were enough troops to defeat the army. (But that) was only part of the battle. The difficult part was taking control of a very large country with 25m people and you have just taken out the whole government. And guess what: who then becomes the new government? You do, under the laws of land warfare. We were not able to take control, nor did we have the right political approach.

“We were characterising the insurgents as a few dead-enders and saying, ‘This isn’t all that bad’. A larger troop presence would have been helpful. I raised the question. The Pentagon says that is not what the generals thought. But the generals were working under political direction that said ‘this is not going to be that bad’. But it did turn out that bad — we were unable to strangle the insurgency in its crib — and now it is raging.”

From one so close to the action, that is quite an indictment. Wasn’t the trouble with President Bush that he wanted solutions not problems, so he only recognised the difficulty too late? “You can have that analysis. I know in the course of my conversations with colleagues and the president they were aware of the potential for a problem.”

So why wasn’t there a plan? “You will have to ask others,” he smiles pointedly. “We worked on a plan and it was available but there was a view that once we got there all we had to do was make sure food was flowing and the oilfields were secured, things would fall into place; but things did not fall into place.”

As Powell warned? Pause. “Er, the president was aware of all the possibilities. I will leave it there.” This is all the more powerful for Powell’s greatest talent is making everything sound not “so bad”. The July 7 bombings were okay because “by sundown, the London people, with that great stiff upper lip you have always had, were back to normal, the terrorists were hunted down and you had moved on”.

Similarly he admits that after September 11 America backed “unpleasant regimes” in the “Stans”, but dictators are learning “there is a limit to how much they can use their geopolitical card in the face of pressure for human rights”. And rather than sinking into an inferno of terrorism he says the world is looking good: war is at an all-time low and struggling countries will follow eastern Europe’s example and embrace the West: “I joke with these eastern European leaders, ‘You used to be on my target list, now we are sitting down talking democracy’.” All of which is true: though residents of Guantanamo might struggle to see the rosy vista.

As we part I ask if he regrets not running for president. “Oh no. I have no psychic need to be on stage. Yesterday was Martin Luther King’s birthday and he helped create the conditions under which I could go from being thrown out of hamburger bars because I was black to being the first black secretary of state. Besides, I am still in my own mind an obscure infantry officer.”

Hardly; but with that he steps out for his lonely walk.

January 22, 2006 at 02:52 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Defusing the nuclear Middle East

Defusing the nuclear Middle East | thebulletin.org

It would take some doing, including the imposition of an effective enforcement mechanism, but a nuclear-free zone could be the best answer to proliferation in the Middle East.

By Bennett Ramberg
May/June 2004 pp. 45-51 (vol. 60, no. 03) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Subscribe today!

magine the following: Despite having agreed to additional inspections of its nuclear-related facilities, Iran continues to hide and build its nuclear weapons program. The United States continues to raise objections, but the international community, in its deliberations, reaches an impasse. As a reflection of its military and political exhaustion in Iraq, the United States hesitates to act militarily. Meanwhile, Tehran silently progresses toward the bomb. Recognizing the threat to its security, Israel decides to respond with force. A regional political, military, and economic earthquake follows.

More than a few assumptions factor into this hypothetical sequence of events, but the fundamental conditions reflect the lessons of recent history and an imposing reality. The Middle East is at a nuclear crossroads.

Iran's growing capacity to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to test the world's tolerance. Despite Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program, tensions are high in Washington, Jerusalem, and elsewhere.

By pocketing Iran's tentative commitment to transparency, the international community might be able to leverage Tehran's veiled nuclear ambitions to transform the Middle East.

A new nonproliferation architecture would emerge. Elements could include a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone enforced by a nuclear contraband elimination authority. NATO and the United States would provide Israel with distinct security guarantees. A separate international action template would provide additional insurance. Collectively, these redundant safeguards would both reduce the risk of nuclear violence and ease underlying political tensions.

In this sense, Tehran's posture opens a rare opportunity to fashion a grand bargain that will leap over deficient nonproliferation remedies.

Iran's nuclear progress

What is striking about Iran's nuclear journey is how similar it is to the course others pursued to attain the bomb. India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Africa, Libya, Israel, and Iraq all went down the same road.

Each country misrepresented its program as solely for peaceful purposes, while developing domestic human and material resources, and importing dual-use technology. Nuclear activities were secreted to prevent international snooping and impede international inspection.

In Iran, political leaders, including President Mohammad Khatami, repeatedly declared their country's commitment to the peaceful atom even as it violated NPT safeguards.

Only after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued several non-compliance reports and exposed Tehran's duplicity did diplomatic coaxing make progress. In an unprecedented October 2003 collective visit by the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to open its nuclear activities to international inspection and "voluntarily to suspend" its nuclear enrichment activities. [1]

Then in December 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol, which gives IAEA personnel the right to inspect both undeclared and declared nuclear sites in a timely fashion. In coming to its decision, Tehran conceded that it had made mistakes in its reporting.

Hopes that Tehran had turned the corner were dashed in February, when the IAEA revealed more discrepancies in Iran's reporting. [2] Despite the evidence that it was not complying with its obligations under the NPT--the IAEA's March statement "deplored" Iran's actions--the agency's board of governors gave the mullahs yet another chance to take "pro-active steps" toward resolving outstanding issues. [3]

Critics were not mollified and suspect that Iran is simply buying time. Tehran's reluctance to reveal its activities in the first place, its resistance to "coming clean" once questions arose, and its insistence on keeping certain details of its nuclear program off limits cloud its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

Some fear that the commencement of power generation at the Bushehr nuclear reactor is Iran's next step toward building nuclear weapons. Although Tehran will be obligated to return the spent fuel to Russia, should it begin domestic enrichment--which could provide fuel as well as weapons-grade material--the repatriation obligation would cease. And, should Tehran go forward with its proposed natural uranium reactor, it could extract plutonium from that plant.

As Iran and the IAEA declared a truce, Tehran's neighbors watched anxiously. Jerusalem is on record that it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state. [4] Saudi Arabia has reportedly explored Pakistani assistance to get the bomb, and new concerns have emerged about Syria. If this were not enough, some believe that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers will seek to take advantage of imperfections in nuclear safeguards to get their hands on the materials necessary to make nuclear weapons.

A mix of remedies

The fact is Iran's behavior has put the NPT in jeopardy by exposing the difficulties in applying traditional remedies.

With more than 180 parties, the NPT is one of the most widely adhered-to of international agreements. Enforcement, however, is weak. The IAEA can monitor activities at declared nuclear sites, and, under the 1997 Additional Protocol, it can attempt to ferret out undeclared sites. Once it uncovers violations, however, it relies on publication to embarrass the transgressor. The IAEA does not have the ability to force a violator to change its ways, although the next step is to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council for action. But the council has been reluctant to grapple with proliferation and will continue to flounder in the absence of agreed guidelines.

Historically, given the Security Council's weakness, nations combating proliferation have utilized other methods and forums. Each of the strategies has generated its own dilemmas and none alone, or even several collectively, will resolve Tehran's nuclear weapons ambitions.

Diplomatic pressure coupled to economic and military "carrots and sticks" have a mixed record. Applied or mobilized largely by the United States, these measures succeeded in holding down the nuclear aspirations of West Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, and now Libya. This strategy failed in Israel, Pakistan, and apartheid South Africa, because security concerns were so great. North Korea and 1980s Iraq were isolated and led by megalomaniacal leaders who sought nuclear weapons to enhance their prowess. In both countries, diplomacy bought the regimes time to further their nuclear aspirations.

In regions characterized by the absence of international conflict or a scientific core to support nuclear technology, nuclear-free zones emerged. In addition to multilateral zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and those proposed for central Asia and the southern hemisphere, the international community prohibited nuclear weapons in the rather pristine environments of the seabed, Antarctica, and outer space. Other nations acted unilaterally, with New Zealand and Mongolia declaring themselves nuclear free.

Nonproliferation enforcement clearly is the objective of military action, the third approach. Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor marks the sole attack on the nuclear war-making potential of an adversary. Despite its success, the attack provided a cautionary note, as the results were short lived. Military action, like a vaccination, needs a booster shot or the support of some other means to eradicate threats. Saddam Hussein reconstituted his nuclear program, as inspections revealed following his defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But for that conflict, Baghdad might have the bomb.

Nuclear deterrence marked the Cold War and continues to ensure tranquil relations between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. But it runs up against an uncertain history, because crises happen. The Cuban missile crisis, the Sino-Soviet border dispute, the 1973 nuclear alert, and the recent Indo-Pakistani confrontations provide cold comfort that events will always work out. Then there is the new ingredient--terrorism--against which deterrence has no impact.

Regime change promises a more reliable option, assuming that the new regime's nuclear weapons policies also change. [5] Peaceful transformation worked in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and South Africa to eliminate nuclear weapons. War worked in Iraq and also stopped Nazi Germany. But in general, peaceful regime change is difficult to anticipate, while forceful change is difficult to execute. No doubt, the latest Iraq experience will discourage the latter.

There is one final option, for which precedent exists: sit tight, do nothing, and hope for the best. Despite concerns about a Chinese bomb, the United States and the Soviet Union accommodated, as they did in the case of France and Britain. Similarly, India and Pakistan may be moving toward a permanent, stable nuclear standoff.

These traditional nonproliferation strategies provide important insights for the Middle East generally and Iran specifically. Diplomatic leverage and economic incentives prompted Iran to be more cooperative and may work in the long run. A nuclear-free zone would be an attractive option for the Middle East if effective enforcement mechanisms were in place. The most dramatic remedy, military action, could set back Iran's program, but it risks a conventional war in response and would not halt nuclear reconstruction. Doing nothing may work only as long as Israel remains the sole nuclear power in the region.

Despite their imperfections, elements of these remedies woven with new approaches may provide a viable nonproliferation path for the Middle East. Fabricating this matrix is the challenge.

A nuclear-free Middle East

By declaring that it would never be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, Israel cast the onus on other states to "throw the first stone" and be subject to the opprobrium of the international community. Its immediate neighbors never took up the challenge. In Egypt, historically Israel's most significant adversary, there were economic and technical barriers to development. Egypt's leaders also concluded that nuclear weapons would decrease their own security by inviting nuclear attack from their uneasy neighbor. There is no evidence that Jordan seriously considered the bomb. Syria may toy with the idea, but to date there is little evidence that it has made important progress.

Geographic separation from Israel may have encouraged Libya, Iraq, and Iran to take another course. Libya led the way, attempting to acquire a bomb from China and, once it failed, to seek component parts. Iraq--clearly a nuclear aspirant from the 1970s through the 1980s--is now no longer a player. Then there is Iran.

The proliferation repercussions of an Iranian nuclear program could be serious. Beyond stimulating Israel to respond, it is uncertain whether other Arab states or Turkey would follow suit and build their own nuclear weapons program. Were these countries to act, the risk of nuclear materials being diverted to terrorists would increase.

As international attention has focused on Iran, Arab states have called for "fairness" in the battle to halt proliferation. Led by Egypt, they have urged the international community to pressure Israel to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Mohamed El Baradei, pointing to the risk of regional proliferation, joined the chorus in his December 2003 visit to Israel. [6] Washington, being the only government with clout over Jerusalem, has turned a blind eye. At the same time, it is only too cognizant of the implications of a nuclear Middle East for regional security, and, after 9/11, its own.

Only one foolproof solution resolves the challenge, namely denuclearization. As historically crafted, existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWZ) lack the necessary safeguards that would satisfy the volatile Middle East. Unprecedented multi-tiered measures could be the answer.

Mideast denuclearization is not a new concept. Ironically, Iran initiated the idea in the 1970s. On December 9, 1974, Egypt and Iran co-sponsored a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly that called upon all nations in the region to reciprocally agree not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. [7] It also called for adherence to the NPT as a prerequisite for a Mideast NWZ.

In the period that followed, Cairo annually led the drumbeat for the zone in the General Assembly. Early on, Israel attempted to use the initiative for another purpose, recognition. It called upon its neighbors to sit down and negotiate. Arab states declined, arguing that the political relationship with Israel had to be resolved first. In subsequent years, Jerusalem turned the tables. It proclaimed that denuclearization could not advance apart from the peace process and the end of the "active state of war." [8] Israel reiterated these sentiments, as Egypt led the Arab world in calling on the Jewish state to abandon its nuclear program and join a NWZ in the aftermath of Libya's announcement. [9]

A Mideast NWZ would require the resolution of at least seven issues: geography, prohibitions, verification, the role of outside powers, duration and withdrawal, relationship to other agreements, and requirements for entry into force. Envisioned here, the zone would include the 22 members of the Arab League plus Iran and Israel. [See map on page 47.]

All nuclear weapons, weapons technology, weapons-usable material, and machinery that could produce such material would be prohibited. Outside powers would be prohibited from introducing weapons into the zone, and dual-use technology would be subject to IAEA safeguards. Nuclear power would not be excluded from the region, but each plant would have a resident international inspector who also could assume responsibility for monitoring the safe operation of the plant. Custodial responsibility for fresh fuel would rest with the provider country, which would repatriate the spent nuclear fuel.

The IAEA would furnish first-tier enforcement through a new nuclear contraband elimination authority. In order to build confidence in the zone, inspectors' responsibilities would be broadened. Each country or cluster of countries would be assigned resident inspectors, who would be free to visit declared, undeclared, or suspected nuclear sites and also sites containing dual-use technology. They would be granted the right to interview a country's nuclear scientists as well. The authority would command its own fleet of surveillance aircraft modeled after the planes dedicated to the Open Skies regime, which the former Soviet Union and NATO negotiated, or the aerial surveillance that flew over Iraq. This surveillance would supplement intelligence provided by IAEA member states. These aircraft would have sensors capable of ferreting out suspect activity, which ground inspectors could then verify. Inspectors would have the authority to destroy or export contraband to disposal sites in the United States, Europe, or Russia.

The NWZ's duration would be indefinite and there would be no withdrawal right. Although freestanding, all parties in the zone would be subject to the NPT. Before the NWZ would enter into force, all parties in the zone would be required to adopt and ratify the agreement. To add to the zone's luster, the United States or Europe could include economic and diplomatic incentives that would normalize Iran's position in the international community.

A role for NATO

As the Middle East's sole nuclear weapon state, Israel would assume the largest sacrifice under the NWZ. Its nuclear program would be dismantled and it would be expected to be a party to the zone and the NPT. The South African, Ukrainian, and Libyan experiences may provide a model for the disassembly of its program.

But why should Israel bear the burden of Iran's violation of the NPT? The sacrifice only makes sense if it is compensated appropriately. The challenge is to fashion a strategy to supplement the NWZ with compensation that will benefit all parties.

NATO membership would offer Israel a key. For the first time in the Jewish state's history, it would find itself under the strategic umbrella of a family of nations formally dedicated to its survival, an ambition that goes back to the founding of the state. [10] This, in turn, would ease the way for Israel to make territorial concessions with the Palestinians and Syrians and end the state of war.

At first blush the merits of this proposal are obvious. The parties, however, would have to overcome significant hurdles. NATO must be convinced that a permanent out-of-theater responsibility in the volatile Middle East serves its interests, and Israel must learn to trust NATO members.

There is nothing in NATO's charter that prevents Israel's membership. Turkey, a Muslim state residing outside the North Atlantic theater, entered the alliance in 1951. Largely forgotten was the membership of another Muslim state, Algeria, also located outside the traditional boundaries of the alliance. Throughout the Cold War the alliance considered extending its reach to other areas, but as long as the Soviet threat dominated Europe's concerns, NATO was stuck on the continent. [11]

The alliance morphed in a new direction as events unfolded. The demise of the Soviet Union prompted concerns that NATO had lost its raison d'être. Its involvement in the former Yugoslavia reinvigorated the alliance, as did its expansion into Eastern Europe. Then 9/11 sent a shockwave through the membership. NATO provided aerial surveillance of the United States and in August 2003 it deployed its first out-of-theater contingent to Afghanistan. Concern about events in the Middle East generated public discussion about the expanded role NATO could have in the region. [12]

Protecting national security propels both Israel and NATO to suppress nuclear proliferation and Mideast terrorism. [13] Israel's continuing conflict with its Arab neighbors--and Iran--is an open sore that risks nuclear metastasis. Washington's nuclear alert during the 1973 war in Israel serves as a precedent for nuclear spillover. Prudence won out then, but the oil embargo that followed demonstrated how events in the Middle East are capable of impacting the world.

The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated yet a different sort of spillover. Speculation about what motivated the attack centers on Muslim rage toward globalization, culture shock, regional political corruption, and economic discontent. But the Arab-Israeli conflict, always casting a shadow, nourishes the motivation to terrorize. The November 2003 terrorist bombings in Istanbul and the March attacks in Madrid further demonstrated that no NATO partner is safe.

Assuring Israel, motivating Iran

For the Mideast NWZ to work, Israel must be reassured. Under this proposal, NATO's commitment to Israel's nuclear defense would precede full membership, and provide a nuclear deterrent. NATO-manned aircraft and ballistic missile defenses could counter Iran's growing capacity. Full membership would add ground forces to assist in the defense of Israel's permanent borders, once they were established as part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The lure of full membership would encourage this achievement. Following the precedent of excluding nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO's new central European membership, the alliance would not place nuclear weapons on Israeli soil or territorial waters, hence preserving the NWZ.

Mindful of the alliance's reluctance to defend Turkey before the 2003 Iraq war, NATO's commitment must be detailed and iron clad. Still, Israel may not be assured by this, or by Article 3 of the NATO charter, which preserves a member nation's right to self-defense without alliance encumbrances. A formal American security guarantee to respond in the event the alliance fails could tip the balance.

Of course, Israel will continue to maintain the Middle East's most robust conventional forces and is the strategic beneficiary of recent history. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Israel's adversaries without a military benefactor. Then came the end of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, followed by Syria's increasing political isolation. Of course, history is dynamic. Syria remains hostile, and the pacific relationship with Egypt and Jordan could change dramatically as a result of political upset. All the more reason Israel's integration into NATO makes sense.

Because Israel cannot comfortably deter a nuclear Iran or nuclear-armed terrorists, its atomic program would best serve as a bargaining chip to eliminate the threat.

What could motivate Iran to go along? The U.S. invasion of Iraq and collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime presents the mullahs with the unexpected presence of U.S. forces on their borders. The Bush administration does not flinch from preemption and has made it clear to Tehran that it will meet its continued violation of the NPT with all resources at its disposal, including military force. Israel has taken a similar position.

The situation in North Korea adds impetus. It demonstrates the imprudence of waiting too long to prevent a rogue challenger from getting the bomb. The implications for Tehran should be clear. Iran would have much to benefit from a NWZ sweetened by incentives--assistance in building its nuclear power plants, repatriation of nuclear fuel, and better access to international commerce generally.

Punishing violators

New international standards that enforce nonproliferation would provide another layer of insurance and further legitimize a Mideast NWZ. The failure of the NPT to include a compliance mechanism gives cheaters license to "game the system." Once caught, cheaters hope to use international diplomatic inertia to buy time. Knowing that there are no enforcement standards in place, they will use the time to better secrete their nuclear activities.

A template of enforcement mechanisms would help resolve the problem and would deter a violator by placing it on notice that its action would be met by a fair, sure, and swift response. This principal was first introduced in the 1946 Baruch Plan. [14]

Implementation would require an IAEA declaration of safeguards noncompliance. Upon receipt, for example, the Security Council would have two weeks to green-light the template. Approval would require the consent or abstention of permanent members plus a majority of the remainder.

The template would include a set of increasingly severe sanctions with a strict timetable for implementation: suspension of international commerce (week 3), cessation of all commercial air travel (week 5), naval blockade (week 7), military action (week 9). Parties to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), George W. Bush's program to interdict the illicit trade of weapons technologies, would be responsible for blockades, and NATO's rapid reaction force would engage in additional military support. An NPT violator could halt these measures by allowing thorough international inspection and destroying its contraband--the route recently taken by Libya.

No doubt the negotiation of such a template would be difficult. Some may argue that the U.N. Security Council must reserve the right to modulate its response to circumstances. This would defeat the template's deterrent impact and fail to combat nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, it would undermine the template's potential to enhance the NPT. One option would be to place the template's enforcement responsibilities directly into the hands of the PSI and NATO.

A necessary step

The fraying of the nonproliferation regime calls for an ambitious proposal. Given the political instability of the Middle East, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region risks unleashing the armageddon the Soviet Union and the United States avoided during the Cold War. The proximity of adversaries, the intensity of political differences, and a growing tendency toward unconstrained terrorism makes the abolition of nuclear weapons--along with the means to fabricate them--a regional imperative. Multilayered safeguards are a sine qua non.

This proposal will no doubt prompt objections. Let's consider six:

Iran can't be trusted; Israel will never give up the bomb; NATO, already stretched thin, will balk; Israel's NATO membership would discriminate against others in the region; and the U.N. Security Council is not up to the task of providing insurance. All are valid, but beside the point.

The NWZ would not rely on trust. Rather, it would build on unprecedented intrusive safeguards and multiple layers of insurance, establishing a new benchmark to reinforce the NPT. No longer concerned with Iraq as a lethal adversary but confronted by the portent of nuclear terror and proliferation in Iran, Israel would be motivated to turn its nuclear arsenal into a bargaining chip to combat a risk that it cannot fully deter.

NATO's military thinness reflects the absence of political will, not a lack of resources. The prospect of Mideast nuclear terrorism and proliferation presents a clear and present danger that the alliance--in conjunction with a vigorously enforced NWZ--can reduce by granting Israel membership. Finally, the U.N. Security Council's dithering over Iraq provides the rationale for an action template that can deter proliferation by mapping a strategy to defeat it. If this rationalization appears unduly optimistic, consider the plausible alternatives.

1. "The Declaration," Arms Control Today, November 2003, p. 25.

2. Director General, IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2004/11 (Vienna, February 24, 2004).

3. Board of Governors, IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2004/21 (Vienna, March 24, 2004).

4. Bennett Ramberg, "Iran May Hide Its Nuclear Ambitions from Some, But Not from Israel," Los Angeles Times, Dec. 10, 2003; Conal Urquhart, "Israel Warns Iran on N-Weapons," The Guardian, Dec. 22, 2003.

5. Robert S. Litwak, "Nonproliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change," Survival, Winter 2003-2004, p. 11.

6. "'Scrap Nuclear Arms,' Israel Urged," BBC News, December 12, 2003.

7. United Nations, Resolution 2373 (XXII, 1974).

8. U.N. General Assembly; the subject was addressed in document A/58/137 (Part I) July 11, 2003.

9. "Mid-East Call on Israel to Disarm," BBC News, December 21, 2003.

10. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion: A Biography (New York: Adama Books, 1978), pp. 193-195; see also Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 123.

11. Marc Bentinck, "NATO's Out-of-Area Problem," Adelphi Papers, no. 211 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1986).

12. Jim Hoagland, "Fences and Fairness," Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2003; Thomas Friedman, "Expanding Club NATO," New York Times, Oct. 26, 2003.

13. Comments by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer accentuate the point. Speaking at a security conference in Herzliya, Israel, he stated, "It would be a nightmare not just for Israel but also for the whole region and indeed Europe if the Middle East were to acquire nuclear capabilities," Agence France Presse, Dec. 17, 2003.

14. The Baruch Plan reads, "We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude."

Bennett Ramberg served in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the first Bush administration. He can be reached at bennettramberg@aol.com.

January 18, 2006 at 11:48 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Dubai's formidable new ruler

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Dubai's formidable new ruler

By Julia Wheeler
BBC Gulf correspondent

Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Sheikh Mohammed has been Dubai's heir apparent since 1995

Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE defence minister, has succeeded his elder brother as Ruler of Dubai, according to officials in the United Arab Emirates.

Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who had ruled since 1990, died on Wednesday while visiting the Gold Coast of Australia - one of the newly-favoured destinations of many wealthy Emiratis.

There was never any real doubt that his brother, the powerful and well-respected Crown Prince Sheikh

Mohammed would succeed him as ruler of the tiny emirate.

With his older brother's blessing, Sheikh Mohammed has been in de facto charge of Dubai's direction and fast-paced development for at least a decade.

Sheikh Maktoum appeared content to allow Dubai's economic and political decisions to be taken by others.

UAE leadership decisions

The successor to the posts of vice-president and prime minister of the UAE will be decided at a meeting of the country's Supreme Council which is a body made up of the rulers of all seven Emirates in the UAE.

Government officials indicate that the council elects a vice-president and that President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi nominates a prime minister.

[Sheikh Mohammed] is not a man generally satisfied with the status quo

The prime minister must be approved by the council and will then form a cabinet.

The Supreme Council meeting to make the decisions may happen as early as Thursday. When the former president, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, died just over a year ago, the decisions were taken straight after his funeral.

The posts of both vice-president and prime minister have always been held by Dubai and there has been a long term understanding that this will continue to be the case, although officials say the constitution does not specify the fact.

Crown Prince question

Sheikh Mohammed is one of the most formidable and impressive sheikhs within the UAE - something which has sparked envy as well as admiration by some in other Emirates.

They have seen the success his policies have brought economically, with Dubai diversifying away from its reliance on limited oil supplies.

Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Sheikh Maktoum died aged 62 while visiting Australia

Under the guidance of Sheikh Mohammed, the tiny emirate has built on its position as a trading hub and developed new sectors such as tourism, construction and finance.

The seven emirates which make up the UAE tend to run their own business and political affairs and this is unlikely to change if Sheikh Mohammed fills his brother's posts at a federal level.

However, he is not a man generally satisfied with the status quo and will undoubtedly have plans if he does take a more central role in the UAE's government.

It is not clear who would become UAE minister of defence or if the portfolio would stay with Sheikh Mohammed.

His sons, who are in their late teens or early twenties are still relatively inexperienced in the ways of government, although he appears to have been grooming them for public roles.

Within the Gulf, Sheikh Mohammed is seen as someone who knows what he wants and who gets things done. Again this has manifested itself both in feelings of esteem and, at times, in veiled criticism.

Internationally, Sheikh Mohammed is perceived as someone with whom the West can do business. He is seen as trustworthy and a serious player in the region.

Perhaps the most interesting question is who will become Crown Prince of Dubai - Sheikh Mohammed's older brother, the deputy ruler of Dubai and UAE Minister of Finance and Industry, Sheikh Hamdan, or one of Sheikh Mohammed's sons?

Although the transition is expected to be smooth, the implications for Dubai and the UAE are perhaps more significant than they at first appear.

January 5, 2006 at 12:05 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Middle East in turmoil as Sharon collapses

Middle East in turmoil as Sharon collapses - World - Times Online

From Ian MacKinnon in Jerusalem
THE peace process in the Middle East was in turmoil last night as Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister who sought accommodation with the Palestinians, was in a critical condition after suffering a massive stroke.

Doctors at the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem, where Mr Sharon was rushed from his ranch in the Negev Desert, said that the Prime Minister was on a respirator. There were reports that he had suffered some paralysis.

Prime ministerial powers were transferred to Ehud Olmert, the deputy leader, while Mr Sharon, 77, was undergoing surgery to alleviate pressure on his brain after a cerebral haemorrhage, just over two weeks after he suffered a minor stroke. The grave nature of Mr Sharon’s condition — 11 weeks before the general election sparked by his own dramatic split from his ruling Likud Party — threatens not only to disrupt Israeli politics but also to destabilise the whole region.

Mr Sharon had formed a new party, Kadima, to escape the straitjacket of the right-wing activists in Likud who had dogged his every step through the withdrawal from Gaza last summer and to contest the forthcoming election. But despite polls that just two days ago predicted that Kadima would win most seats, 42 out of 120 in the Knesset, political analysts said that the party was a “one-man band” whose fortunes could dip dramatically without Mr Sharon.

Polls said that if the party were to lose Mr Sharon before the election support could drop by as much as a third, immediately changing the face of Israeli politics. Kadima’s popularity derived much from Mr Sharon’s strength of character and the hints that he would build on his Gaza withdrawal to set Israel’s borders with the Palestinians and make a concerted effort to resolve the conflict.

As with Mr Sharon’s mild stroke on December 18, doctors and advisers last night initially tried to play down the scale of the difficulties he had suffered. In the days that followed his first stroke, while Mr Sharon underwent tests and remained in hospital for 48 hours, doctors were eventually forced to reveal the Prime Minister’s health records in an effort to allay fears about his health and prevent it from becoming an election issue. They concluded that the 2mm hole in his heart, due to be repaired in a 30-minute operation today, was the cause of the “transient clot” that had cut off the blood flow to his brain and caused him difficulty in speaking.

His weight, 118kg (260lb), on his 170cms (5ft 7in) frame had also caused concern. Mr Sharon was also given two injections of blood-thinning drugs daily to reduce the risk of a reoccurrence.

Last night he arrived at Hadassah Hospital shortly after 10.30pm after being taken there by ambulance. Doctors who at first said that he had been conscious admitted that his stroke had been a serious event, and the Israeli media said that he was suffering paralysis of his lower limbs.

A hospital spokesman said that he had suffered massive bleeding of the brain and had been put on a respirator under general anesthetic, before being wheeled into the operating theatre to try to repair the damage and drain the fluid. Surgeons said the operation could take several hours.

Doctors said that the blood-thinning medication with which he was being treated may have complicated the procedure as it increased the risk of haemorrhage. Cerebral haemorrhages account for only about 10 per cent of strokes and can result either from rupture of blood vessels or leaking because of too much blood-thinning medication.

“It’s among the most dangerous of all types of strokes,” with half of victims dying within a month, said Robert A. Felberg, a neurologist who directs the stroke department at Ochsner Clinic in New Orleans.

Mr Sharon was given blood thinners to prevent clots such as the one said to have caused his mini-stroke last month.

"Any time they give blood-thinners to prevent clots there is a risk that too much can cause a haemorrhage," Dr Felberg said.

The stroke suffered earlier by Mr Sharon — a former general known affectionately as “the bulldozer” — had forced aides and political allies to contemplate his incapacitation and powers were granted to transfer his authority for up to 100 days.

President Bush said last night that “we are praying for his recovery”. Mr Sharon is crucial to the US leader’s hopes of pushing ahead with the Middle East peace process.

“Laura and I share the concerns of the Israeli people about [Mr] Sharon’s health, and we are praying for his recovery,” Mr Bush said in a written statement.

“Prime Minister Sharon is a man of courage and peace. On behalf of all Americans, we send our best wishes and hopes to the Prime Minister and his family.”

Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, said: “Our thoughts and prayers are with [him], his family, and the Israeli people. We wish the Prime Minister a full recovery.”

# Click here to read The Times interview with Ariel Sharon from November 2002

January 4, 2006 at 08:44 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Death of a ruler will not detract from Dubai

Death of a ruler will not detract Dubai - News and Comment - Times Online

The ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum, who died today, did much to promote tourism since his rise to power in 1990. His ambition to become the world's biggest single tourist resort will be taken forward, reports Online Travel Editor Steve Keenan

THEY opened an indoor ski slope in Dubai last month. There are two indoor slopes in the world that are slightly longer - one in Holland, the other in Germany - but none can match Dubai's surface area.

The cost of generating all the snow and keeping it there is about the same as heating an office block in the UK. The insulation is so good that you could turn the power off for three days and still find the snow pretty much as you left it when you flicked the switch back on.

A ski slope in Dubai? Well, why not? If they can build offshore islands, seven-star hotels and the tallest building in the world, then a cavernous hall with artificial snow is a doddle.

It's another small step in Dubai's plan to become the single biggest tourist resort in the world, a Miami and Disneyland rolled into one, catering for visitors from all over the world.

The national airline, Emirates, was only launched two decades ago. Yet its most recent addition of routes - to Shanghai, Glasgow, Vienna, New York and Christchurch - now means it flies in tourists from 54 countries in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, Africa, Asia, Australia and New Zealand.

And it is the airline that is funding the world's tallest building, at 70 storeys or 800 metres high, which will open in 2008. Emirates says it hopes to break architectural boundaries with the property, which will have rooms jutting out from the main tower in curved wings and a rooftop bar.

It is thanks largely to Sheikh Rashid Al-Maktoum that the Dubai dream is being achieved - and it's all about oil. Looking to lessen its dependence on black gold, Dubai plans to attract 15 million hard-cash customers within five years, three times the number that visit today.

When I visited in 2002, the Emirate's ruler boasted that Dubai's impact on tourism "has hardly been felt yet" - and no one doubts for a minute that it will happen.

*
<A TARGET="_blank" HREF="http://ad.uk.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v5|3364|3|0|%2a|s%3B25357929%3B0-0%3B0%3B8862987%3B4307-300|250%3B14167560|14185456|1%3B%3B%7Esscs%3D%3fhttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/section/0,,5110,00.html"><IMG SRC="http://ad.uk.doubleclick.net/720796/eatout_300x250.jpg" BORDER=0></A>
Around 100,000 Britons will visit in the first three months of 2006 and while the organisers of one of Dubai’s main tourist attractions, the January Shopping Festival, said all festivities would now be cancelled, the tourists will find plenty to amuse themselves.

Most are there simply for sun anyway, staying at one of the burgeoning number of glitzy hotels strung along the coast. There are 25 per cent more hotels than there were five years ago - and in the next five years there are plans for another 26 developments boasting over 8,000 more rooms and suites, 800 apartments and numerous villas. The cost of ten of these new developments alone will be £3.8bn.

British expats I meet described the spirit of Dubai: "Ambition, motivation, resources," says one. "It is Dubai plc," says another.

And it appeals to many different sorts of tourists. Some observers point out its spectacular "chavdom," which has encouraged neighbouring emirates such as Oman and Abu Dhabi to develop differing tourism strategies, hoping to pick up disaffected high spenders.

But Dubai does have broad appeal to middle-aged families who want security with their simple sun. And Dubai has also made its name as a haven for sports tourists and footballers wives.

West Ham's Teddy Sheringham and his wife Nicola are regular visitors to the Al Maha desert resort, Michael Owen chooses the Royal Mirage and England relaxed before the 2002 World Cup at the Jumeirah Beach Club.

The Mirage looks out on the 1,000ft Burj al-Arab hotel, which charges non-guests £20 just to look at the towering fish tanks off the lobby. The billowing, sail-shaped hotel is the world's tallest and the landmark of Dubai - but not for much longer. Three miles off the beach, a floating battalion of cranes is finishing work on Dubai's most audacious project.

Palm Jumeirah is one of two giant, palm-tree-shaped islands being built. When complete this year, they will add 100 hotels, 6,000 homes and 75 miles of beach to Dubai. Visible from space, they are the largest man-made islands in the world. Michael Owen and the Beckhams have both bought homes on the islands.

Everyone has come to town. Gordon Ramsay opened a restaurant, Verre, at the Hilton Dubai Creek (£90 for lunch for two, with drinks), Colin Montgomerie designed a golf course and the Schumacher brothers regularly drive buggies in the dunes at Al Maha.

They shop at the gold souk souk, which sells guaranteed 24-carat jewellery at prices a third lower than in the UK - and tax-free. On my visit, I started to see why Dubai proves so popular with footballers. With a limited holiday season, they need and demand top-quality hotels that are safe. There are good beaches, restaurants, shopping and a water park for the children.

It is perfect for busy people who need to unwind with no guilt about avoiding culture - which is just as well, as there is no concert hall, theatre or opera in Dubai. There is a mosque that non-Muslims can visit and a museum, easily seen within an hour.

Several glossy, English-language magazines such as What's On, Time Out and Emirates Woman reflect the outlook. During my visit, What's On listed 29 places for Friday brunch, a very Dubai experience, and devoteed 14 pages to restaurant awards and nightlife on the "Jumeirah Strip". "OK," admits the magazine, "it's not quite Miami yet."

But, boy, are they trying. Looking down from the 11th floor of my air conditioned suite at the Fairmont, I watched a gang toil in 40C to lay a pipe under the Florida-style freeway. Rather than dig the road up, a tunnel was bored underneath and the gang was pulling the cables through.

Mentioning this to a friend working in Dubai, he pointed out the obvious: there are no overhead cables or wires on the streets. Everything obtrusive or ugly is buried. It is Sim City come alive, with new zones in Dubai built for the 21st century, such as Internet City (where all homes are wired for the web), Festival City and Marina City.

Down at the Jumeirah Beach Club, general manager Doris Greif reeled off her S-list to explain the explosion in Dubai's popularity. "Sun, safety, sailing, surfing and shopping," she quotes. She doesn't mention sex and I'm not sure it's an oversight. Dubai seems too sanitised for that.

Half the customers are British, mostly couples in their 40s, here to chill out. But one of the three pools is for children, with waterslides, climbing frame and The Stingrays, an activity club for kids aged four to ten. Like La Manga in Spain, the resort looks to provide sport in the sun, with six floodlit tennis courts and golf at Dubai Creek, a ten-minute drive away. A sauna, steam room and gym are all here.

Not that a sauna is used much in summer. Just sit outside when the air temperature in August hits 45C. It's so hot that the sea is warmer than body temperature, and every morning hotels have to pump cold water into swimming pools.

But that hasn't stopped the Brits - hotels are regularly more than 80 per cent full even in the highest temperatures. And four day breaks, unthinkable only five years ago, are now easily available for around £500 a time.

"Dubai is the new Barbados. A lot of Sandy Lane people are coming here," a hotelier tells me, referring to the showy hotel in Barbados. Well, there are similarities, with diving, sailing, boating, riding and golf as common currency. However, sandboarding and camel racing set Dubai apart. Nor can Barbados boast a snowdome.

A sense of surreality dogged me throughout my stay. It doesn't surprise me to learn that Dubai is the world's biggest consumer of caviar - but it does to discover that there is only one bar outside the hotels. Inevitably, it is an Irish bar. It was also extraordinary to learn that of a population of one million, only 12 per cent carry UAE passports. The rest are on working visas, with the vast majority from the Indian subcontinent.

Hotel staff are highly trained, qualified and have bags of personality. The Fairmont recently interviewed 10,000 people for 100 places. The fact that three of the five check-in staff at the Jumeirah Beach Hotel spoke Russian says as much for the staff as it does for the clientele, but it is not just the Russians who come to what is fast becoming the biggest multicultural playpen in the world.

The nationalities of the hotel chains also mirror the diverse appeal of Dubai. Shangri La, Swiss chain Movenpick, Taj of India, Kempinski of Germany and Dusit of Thailand have all moved in, each looking to attract its own nationals to Dubai.

With this rate of change, the death of Emirates' ruler will not slow progress. Indeed, the automatic succession of his younger brother brings to the fore the man who more than any reflects and enjoys Dubai's international status. The forecasts and predictions will come to pass.

January 4, 2006 at 07:26 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Mideast still key to a more peaceful world

TheStar.com - Mideast still key to a more peaceful world

But U.S. pact with India fuelling fears of a new `cold war' with China, warns Gwynne Dyer
Dec. 30, 2005. 01:00 AM

First, the good news. In October, a comprehensive, three-year study led by Andrew Mack, former director of the Strategic Planning Unit in the office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, concluded there have been major declines in armed conflicts, genocides, human rights abuses, military coups and international crises worldwide.

The survey, commissioned by Canada, Britain, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland and conducted by the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, revealed a drop of more than 40 per cent in the number of armed conflicts since 1992 — and for the biggest conflicts, involving more than 1,000 battle-deaths per year, the drop was 80 per cent.

The international media, by their very nature, will always offer us an image of global chaos. But, in fact, the Americas, Europe and Asia were almost entirely at peace during 2005 with Colombia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Nepal and the southern Philippines being the major exceptions.

The Middle East was also at peace, except for the American war in Iraq. Even sub-Saharan Africa, home to over half the world's remaining wars, saw some major improvements during the year.

The peace agreement in Sudan in February ended the continent's longest and worst civil war, and the death of southern leader John Garang in a helicopter crash only weeks afterwards did not upset the deal. By the end of the year, millions of southern refugees were making their way home, and even the separate and more recent conflict in Darfur in western Sudan, which has killed some 200,000 people and made up to 2 million homeless, was abating in intensity.

Africa

Africa is still the poorest continent, and the most turbulent one. Ethiopia's first free election ended in violence in May, the threat of another border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea grew throughout the year, and the attempt to recreate some sort of central government in Somalia after 14 years of anarchy was falling apart at year's end. Ivory Coast, cut in half in 2002 after a failed coup led to a civil war, made only halting progress towards reconciliation, and sporadic outbreaks of violence continued to interrupt the peace-building process in eastern Congo.

But southern Africa was entirely at peace. Almost every southern African country was not only democratic but also making significant economic progress, Zimbabwe under aging dictator Robert Mugabe being the horrible exception.

Middle East

The only other region of the world that rivalled Africa in political turbulence was the Middle East. But almost all the killing was confined to the cauldron of Iraq; elsewhere, the upheavals were mainly political.

The biggest changes by far were in Israel and Palestine, where a series of radical shifts altered the whole political landscape.

The death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 brought Mahmoud Abbas, a much cannier and more presentable leader, to the presidency of the Palestinian Authority last January. But a new Palestinian parliamentary election was repeatedly postponed (it is now scheduled for Jan. 9) because of fears that Hamas, which rejects territorial compromise with Israel in return for peace, would win a majority in the new parliament. This did not much matter so long as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government was determined to impose a unilateral peace on the Palestinians, but now the balance of forces has become much more fluid and unpredictable. Right down to August, when Sharon forced the evacuation of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip against strong opposition from within his own Likud party, his strategy seemed to be working.

The Gaza withdrawal guaranteed that he would face no serious pressure from the United States for further concessions for at least a year or two, and, meanwhile, the "security fence" that would define the new de facto border between Israel and the occupied territories continued to snake its way across the West Bank. But then his own Likud party hard-liners mounted a serious assault on his leadership, pushing his long-standing rival Benjamin Netanyahu as his replacement, and his Labour party ally, Shimon Peres, was overthrown as leader of his own party by Amir Peretz.

Peres quit Labour and, faced, with the prospect of being pushed out by Netanyahu, Sharon also quit Likud. Together he and Peres founded the new Kadima ("Forward") party.

Israel will now go to the polls shortly after the Palestinians and the possibility exists that it could elect a Labour government led by Peretz that is ready to open genuine peace talks with Abbas. But the possibility also exists that Hamas and other Islamist radicals will launch another suicide bombing campaign in Israel designed to drive Israelis into the arms of Likud and/or Kadima, and thus avert the threat of a durable compromise peace.

The other potentially epochal event in the region was the opening of talks for Turkey's membership in the European Union on Oct. 3. It may be a decade or more before these talks conclude, but if they are successful, they will begin to heal a wound that has divided the old classical world around the Mediterranean ever since half of it fell under Muslim rule a millennium ago.

Developments elsewhere in the region were less dramatic.

In Iran's presidential election in June, more than half the population refused to vote for the heavily vetted list of candidates presented to it by the conservative religious authorities, and a simplistic nationalist and religious radical, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, managed to win the presidency.

The assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in February (probably by Syrian intelligence operatives) triggered a non-violent democratic movement in Lebanon and forced a Syrian military withdrawal from the country. And then there was Iraq.

The "turning points" in Iraq came thick and fast, from elections in January to a new government in May (after four months of negotiations), a new constitution in August, a referendum on the constitution in October, and new elections in December, but no corners were actually turned.

At the end of the year, the resistance was as strong or stronger than it had been at the start, American military dead had passed the 2,000 mark, the U.S.-backed Iraqi army and police were still largely unable or unwilling to fight on their own, and the possibility that the Iraqi state might actually break up had ceased to be mere fantasy. But the impact of the Iraq conflict on the rest of the region has so far been surprisingly limited: heightened anti-American sentiment, some terrorist bombs in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and an upsurge in recruiting for Islamist extremist organizations.

The impact in the U.S. has been considerably greater.

"We will never give in, and we will never accept anything less than complete victory," said President George W. Bush in a speech last month, and he will doubtless continue to tough it out, because admitting that invading Iraq was a ghastly mistake would have huge political consequences for him and his party.

However, American public opinion, long insulated from the reality of failure in Iraq by uncritical media coverage of the war, began to lose faith in the administration when confronted with its arrogant and incompetent response to the disaster of Hurricane Katrina in September.

By December, Bush's rating in opinion polls had reached an all-time low.

With three years of his second mandate still to run, the president does not yet face overwhelming political or popular pressure to change course on Iraq — but he is at risk of becoming a premature "lame duck," seen as an electoral handicap by his own party and therefore unable to command obedience in Congress.

Latin America

The most remarkable result of the Bush administration's obsession with remaking the Middle East has been Washington's astonishing failure to pay attention to Latin America. The Free Trade Area of the Americas, once a pet Republican project, has withered as more and more Latin American countries elect left-wing parties that are profoundly hostile to it. But, apart from half-hearted support for a coup that tried to overthrow Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez two years ago, Washington has not once acted to block or remove these governments.

Well over half the population of Latin America is already ruled by leftist governments whose relations with official Washington are very cool — up from only 10 per cent when Bush first took office — and the proportion might reach two-thirds during this coming year if the Mexican election also swings that country to the left.

Europe

Europe had a relatively uneventful year, apart from the rejection of the new EU constitution in the spring referendums. There were bombs on London underground trains and buses in July, but apart from that Europe remained almost as free from the alleged terrorist threat as the United States itself.

The poorest parts of Paris, and subsequently of other French cities, erupted in riots in November that were widely misrepresented as an uprising by the country's disadvantaged Muslim minority, but were actually an incoherent, apolitical revolt by all the country's neglected and discarded minorities, including the bottom end of the old white working class.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair scrambled back into office in a spring election with a majority cut in half because of popular discontent with Britain's involvement in the Iraq war, but the Irish Republican Army's decision to destroy its entire arsenal in September, putting a definitive end to the armed campaign in Northern Ireland that it suspended 11 years ago, was a success for Blair's patient diplomacy.

The premier media event of the year was undoubtedly the death of Pope John Paul II in March and the selection of Joseph Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVI in April, but it is unlikely that there will be any substantial changes of Catholic doctrine or policy as a result.

And the great new global anxiety, driven by growing numbers of cases of bird-to-human transmission of avian influenza viruses in south-east Asia, was the possibility of an influenza pandemic as lethal as the one that killed 50 million-100 million people in 1918-19. It may not strike in 2006 or even 2007, but most experts are convinced that something very nasty is on the way.

Asia

Bhutan became a world leader by becoming the first nation to ban smoking everywhere outside private homes, the ruling Burmese generals abruptly moved the country's capital from Rangoon to a sleepy up-country town called Pyinmana, and China revalued the yuan — by a very small amount.

But the most shocking event was the devastating earthquake that struck northern Pakistan. The shock was not that it killed more people than last December's Indian Ocean tsunami (though it did), but that the international aid was so much less and so much slower to arrive. Now many of the roads are blocked by snow, and unknown numbers of quake survivors are dying of exposure and malnutrition every day in cut-off mountain villages where few buildings remain standing.

Afghanistan held an election of sorts in September, but it mainly served to confirm the power of the regional warlords who took over from the Taliban in most places after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

Sri Lanka's long civil war seemed likely to reignite after an election in that same month in which Mahinda Rajapakse, a candidate who vows never to recognize the Tamil minority's demand for an autonomous region, won the presidency by the narrowest of margins.

On the positive side, the long-running crisis over North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons came to an apparently satisfactory conclusion in November, when Kim Jong-Il's regime finally got what it had been after all along: a U.S. commitment not to invade the Stalinist dictatorship, and some foreign aid. But it had always been a fairly implausible crisis anyway, as North Korea had no conceivable use for nuclear weapons except to deter an American attack, which had never been part of the Bush administration's plans despite all the heated rhetoric.

April saw anti-Japanese riots all over China, in state-encouraged protests against new Japanese textbooks that minimize the crimes committed by Japan when it invaded China in 1937-45.

Junichiro Koizumi's centre-right government in Tokyo, undaunted by this demonstration of Chinese displeasure, went right ahead with strengthening its military alliance with the United States.

None of this did Koizumi any harm with the voters, and he won a national election in September by a landslide.

The one truly worrisome development of the year, not just for Asia but for the whole world, was the 10-year military agreement between the U.S. and India that was signed in Washington in July.

While not a formal military alliance that commits the two countries to fight together against any foe, it has all the hallmarks of an alliance intended to "contain" China.

Indeed, it looks like the capstone in a series of such alliances and agreements between the U.S. and Asian countries that now virtually encircle China to the east, south and west.

That is certainly how it will be viewed in Beijing, and the concern is that the Chinese will respond to this perception of being surrounded and threatened by racing to build up their own military forces, thereby confirming their neighbours' anxieties and setting up a positive feedback loop.

This is, in fact, the way most arms races get started, and the last thing Asia and the world need in the early 21st century is a Cold War between China on one side, and the U.S., India and Japan on the other.

But don't despair. This is just a possibility so far, not a reality.

Gwynne Dyer is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 countries.

December 30, 2005 at 02:10 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Six persons killed in terrorist attack in J&K

Six persons killed in terrorist attack in J&K : HindustanTimes.com

Press Trust of India
Srinagar, December 16, 2005
Six persons including two terrorists and a security man were killed in Jammu and Kashmir since Thursday night, an official spokesman said in Srinagar on Friday.

Two terrorists were killed in an encounter with security forces at Gumo Wali Dhok in Darhal sector of Rajouri district, the spokesman said.

A security jawan was also killed in the gunbattle which lasted for over an hour, he said.

People's Democratic Party (PDP)leader Shaukat Ahmad Banday, who was grieviously injured in a terrorist attack at Baramulla town on Thursday, succumbed to injuries during the intervening night, the spokesman said. One person was killed and a woman was injured in the attack.

Police recovered bullet ridden body of Mohammad Shaban dar from Shatmuqam Mawar in Kupwara district on Friday. Dar, a farmer by profession, had been kdnapped by terrorists few days ago and later shot dead, the spokesman said.

Police recovered another bullet ridden body from Sooch Nihalpora in Pattan area of Baramulla district last evening. The deceased has been identified as Shabir Ahmad Shiekh, resident of Rajpora in Kunzar area of the district, he said.

During search operations, security forces recovered 363 pika rounds, four hand grenades and six packets of RDX from Dhoba Mukrari Dhok in Sawjian sector of Poonch district, he added.

December 16, 2005 at 05:44 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Palestinians take over key border

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Palestinians take over key border

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has presided over a ceremony marking the official re-opening of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.

Declaring the crossing at Rafah open, Mr Abbas said it was "a dream come true" for Gaza's 1.3 million residents.

For the first time, Palestinians will control a gateway to the outside world that is vital for Gaza's economy.

Israel passed control of the border to the Palestinian Authority - under the supervision of EU monitors.

The crossing will actually be opened to Palestinians coming from and going to Egypt on Saturday.

The EU's envoy to the Middle East, Marc Otte said the opening would mean an "enormous step forward toward the freedom of the Palestinian people".

Gaza has no sea port and the Israel has not agreed to allow the international airport to re-open, so the Rafah border is Gaza's gateway to the outside world.

BBC Gaza correspondent Alan Johnston says Palestinians have always hated having to pass through Israeli hands at the frontier, where they were often subjected to delays and questioning.

Israel closed the Rafah crossing on 7 September shortly after withdrawing from Gaza, citing concerns that it would be used to smuggle weapons and militants from Egypt into the Palestinian Territories. Since then, the crossing has barely been open at all.

The Israelis worry that Islamic militants might infiltrate Gaza and threaten Israel. They have insisted on the right to monitor the crossing point on television screens from a base a few kilometres away.

Last-minute deal

Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brokered a deal between Israel and Egypt allowing key border crossings into the Gaza Strip to be re-opened.

Under the agreement, there are limits to Palestinian authority at the border.

Palestinians will control the border, but EU monitors will have the authority to detain vehicles or individuals if they feel they have not been properly checked.

Map showing Gaza border crossings and planned port

Israeli security officials will watch all movements at the crossing on TV screens, but they will not have veto power over individuals moving through.

While exports will not be supervised by the Israelis, the flow of goods into Gaza will remain entirely under its control at the border crossing at Kerem Shalom.

Palestinians will be able to travel in bus convoys between Gaza and the West Bank from December, and in lorry convoys a month after that.

There are plans for a sea port, although the Israelis have refused to allow the international airport to re-open.

EU mission

On Wednesday, the head of the team of EU monitors, Italian military police General Pietro Pistolese, said the crossing would only be open for four hours a day until the number of monitors increases from 20 to between 50 and 70.

European officials have described their role as one of the most important missions the EU has ever undertaken.

It is the first time the EU has been so directly involved in efforts to ease the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As the Europeans are also expecting to play a role at the start of next year in training the Palestinian police force, there is a sense in Brussels that this is a mission that cannot be allowed to fail, correspondents say.

November 26, 2005 at 10:57 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Jordan a Target Because of Links to U.S.

Guardian Unlimited | World Latest | Jordan a Target Because of Links to U.S.

Saturday November 12, 2005 9:31 PM
By JAMAL HALABY, Associated Press Writer
AMMAN, Jordan (AP) - Squeezed in a precarious corner in the volatile Mideast, tightly secured Jordan enjoyed a kind of calm its blood-soaked neighbors Israel and Iraq could only dream of. But this week's triple hotel bombings in Amman shattered that illusion.

Perhaps most surprising is that such attacks have not happened before, because Jordan presents any number of reasons why al-Qaida in Iraq might single it out as a target.

Jordan has been a key backstage support for U.S. and other international operations during the Iraq war. For the past several years, it has carried out a crackdown on Islamic militants - including members of al-Qaida in Iraq. It is a longtime U.S. ally, it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and its King Abdullah II has been a vocal proponent of religious moderation.

Moreover, al-Qaida in Iraq's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is Jordanian and has spent time in the country's prisons.

Al-Qaida in Iraq said it attacked three Western-operated hotels Wednesday because Jordan was ``a backyard garden for the enemies of the religion, Jews and Crusaders ... a filthy place for the traitors ... and a center for prostitution.''

Its Internet claim said the attacks put Washington on notice that the ``camp for the Crusader army is now in the range of fire of the holy warriors.''

Since the 2003 invasion that toppled Iraq's Saddam Hussein, Jordan has played a low-key, but vital role as the doorstep into Iraq.

U.S. military officials enjoy brief respites from Iraq's battlefield, rubbing shoulders in Amman's British-style bars and trendy nightclubs with foreign diplomats and secret service agents from countries like the United States, Israel, Britain, France and Russia. Some watering holes have hired Iraqi, Eastern European and Russian women to work as barmaids and, in many cases, prostitutes.

Diplomats and many foreign workers for non-governmental organizations have fled Iraq to operate out of Amman due to the campaign of kidnappings, beheadings and suicide bombings by al-Qaida in Iraq.

Jordan played a key role in the U.S.-led war, too, offering logistical facilities to American forces. It now hosts the U.S.-led training of Iraqi army and police recruits, aimed at building up Iraqi forces to help quell the insurgency waged by al-Zarqawi followers and Saddam loyalists.

Amman, a city of 1.8 million people, has become a hub for international conferences on war-ravaged Iraq's reconstruction. And Jordan's relative security is also valuable to foreign intelligence services monitoring Mideast hotspots like Israel, Iraq and Iran.

Jordan's own fierce intelligence agency is considered by the United States and other countries to be the region's most efficient. It has boasted foiling numerous terror plots and attacks blamed on al-Zarqawi and Saudi militant Osama Bin Laden in recent years.

In August, Jordan's sole sea outlet, Aqaba, was attacked by militants - believed to be al-Qaida operatives - who fired three Katyusha rockets. One narrowly missed U.S. Navy warships docked in its harbor, while another landed in neighboring Israel's seaport of Eilat.

One of the most serious, yet bungled, threats was a planned chemical attack on the Amman headquarters of Jordan's General Intelligence Department, which officials said would have killed thousands if not foiled in April 2004.

The prime suspect in the plot, Azmi al-Jayousi, reportedly told interrogators al-Zarqawi bore a personal grudge against his homeland's government, ordering al-Jayousi to put aside all other plans, including attacking Israel, and focus on targeting Jordan's intelligence services.

Al-Zarqawi, who has a $25 million bounty on his head by the U.S. military, was jailed for four years in Jordan for militant activities before being freed in 1999.

He may also be aiming to silence Jordan's rulers, who are vocal opponents of his fanatic ``takfiri'' ideology, bent on killing anybody considered an infidel.

Jordan, whose Hashemite rulers trace their lineage back to Islam's 7th century Prophet Muhammad, has a moderate approach to Islam and politics. Deputy Premier Marwan Muasher said after Wednesday's attacks that Jordan is paying the price for promoting a ``true version of Islam'' calling for respect for diversity and religious, social and political openness.

``That is in direct contradiction with the policies of hatred that Mr. al-Zarqawi and his likes are trying to propagate,'' he said.

November 13, 2005 at 01:05 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Islamic Jihad steps out from Hamas shadow

Islamic Jihad steps out from Hamas shadow | csmonitor.com

Wednesday's attack in Israel underscores militia's commitment to radical path.
By Joshua Mitnick | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
TEL AVIV – Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promised Thursday a "broad and nonstop" retaliation a day after an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber set off an explosion killing at least five people and wounding dozens in the northern Israeli city of Hadera.

The attack highlighted how the small, hardened militia of Islamic fundamentalists has stepped to the forefront as the leading spoiler of a nine-month-old calm in violence between Israel and the Palestinians.

Of the four suicide attacks to strike inside Israeli cities this year, Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for the deadliest pair - Wednesday's explosion in an open-air market and the February bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub that killed five.

The Damascus-headquartered radicals have stepped out of the shadow of the Islamic militant group Hamas, which has eased up a five-year bombing campaign for fear of sparking an escalation with Israel that would scuttle their campaign for Palestinian parliament.

That vote has sown at least a temporary division among gunmen who seek to gain influence at the ballot box and those who have chosen to remain outside of politics. The Associated Press reported that leading Islamic Jihad members have said privately their group continues to carry out attacks because it wants to be seen as less willing to compromise than Hamas.

"The calm has isolated not only Islamic Jihad, but all the philosophies of radicalism and violence," says Mohammed Dejani, a political science professor at Jerusalem's Al-Quds University. "They are hoping that Israel will respond so we'll return to square one."

Blaming the Palestinian Authority (PA) for not helping prevent the bombing, Mr. Sharon said Israel would act on its own to prevent terrorist attacks. An Israeli military spokesperson said the retaliation could include the first incursion into the Gaza Strip after Israel withdrew last month.

"The Palestinian Authority hasn't taken any serious step in the struggle against terrorism," Sharon said. "We aren't willing in any way for a continuation of terrorist acts, so our actions will be broad and nonstop until we bring about a cessation of terrorism."

A marginal player in Palestinian political and social life, Islamic Jihad's inspiration and orders mainly come from beyond the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli experts and officials say. The group's commanders are based in Syria while its ideology is inspired by Iran's fundamentalist regime.

While Hamas built up a social welfare organization alongside its armed wing to offer itself as political alternative to the ruling Fatah party, Islamic Jihad has remained focused on its military operations and isn't expected to run in the legislative election scheduled for January.

"Hamas has a much wider world view. Their goal is to have Islam ruling all echelons of life,'' says Mordechai Kedar, a former military intelligence officer and a research associate at Bar-Ilan University's Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. "The Islamic Jihad doesn't bother with all those issues of social work, welfare, clinics, and food. They only care about the jihad, and everything else will be dealt with afterward."

Founded in Egypt in the 1970s, Palestinian Islamic Jihad was started as a radical splinter from the Muslim Brotherhood, the forerunner of Hamas. During the first Palestinian uprising a decade later, their leadership was exiled to Lebanon.

The group has a reputation for being small and highly secretive, making it less prone to infiltration by Israeli intelligence. It is believed to have been responsible for more than 40 attacks that have killed more than 100 Israelis, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.

Earlier this year the group joined a PA-brokered pact among militants to observe a tahadiyeh, Arabic for a state of calm, bowing to public sentiment that favored President Mahmoud Abbas's effort to restart peace talks with Israel.

But the group has made exceptions in order to retaliate against Israel's military offensives. The Israeli army's killing earlier this week of Islamic Jihad chief Louay Saadi in Tulkarem offered the militia a convenient trigger to fire rockets from Gaza into Israel and to launch the Hadera bombing, which wounded dozens.

The online edition of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, Ynet, quoted an anonymous Islamic Jihad spokesperson from the northern West Bank who called the bombing a "natural" response to the killing of Mr. Saadi.

The Wednesday bombing was an affront to Mr. Abbas, who told the Palestinian legislature just hours earlier that armed groups who invite Israeli retaliation by ordering attacks were injuring the Palestinian people and the prospects for statehood.

Israeli spokespeople are using the bombing to spotlight the link between Palestinian militant groups and Iran. In a surprisingly serendipitous remark, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Wednesday praised Palestinian militants and expressed hope that their activities would help "wipe Israel from the map."

Shmuel Bar, a Middle East expert at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Institute, says Islamic Jihad is used by Syria and the Iranians as a proxy. "From the point of view of the Iranians and the Syrians, to drag Israel into a military conflict in Gaza would take the heat off the Syrian issue," he said. Islamic Jihad "doesn't have very much to lose domestically."

October 27, 2005 at 05:00 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Analysis: Behind the Palestinian attack

United Press International - Intl. Intelligence - Analysis: Behind the Palestinian attack

By JOSHUA BRILLIANT
UPI Israel Correspondent

JERUSALEM, Oct. 27 (UPI) -- Just a few hours passed from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' emphatic public demand for an end to attacks on Israel and the moment 21-year-old Hassan Muhammad Abu Zeid detonated his powerful charge at a falafel stand in Hadera, halfway between Tel Aviv and Haifa.

The blast killed four Jews who were between the ages of 53 and 68, a 48-year-old Israeli Arab and the bomber, and wounded more than 30 others.

"I am not here to defend the Israelis," Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, told the Legislative Council members. "It is so easy for someone to say the occupation is the cause of problem but we should not give them the excuse to attack us," he stressed.

Those who take the law into their owns hands "should be confronted with an iron first," he warned in an addressed broadcast on Al-Jazeera TV.

The Islamic Jihad assumed responsibility for the Hadera attack. Khaled Al-Batsh, one of its leaders, told the Palestinian Ramatan news agency the bombing was "a natural retaliation to the Israeli ongoing violations of truce, including the assassination of Loai al-Sa'di and Mohammed Sheikh Khalil."

The two were killed in a gun battle in Tul Karem earlier this week.

The Islamic Jihad's explanations need not be taken at face value. The group was behind this year's suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and Netania, the killing of a settler in the West Bank, and the planning of more attacks. Eleven Israelis were killed in the earlier attacks.

It accepted the intra-Palestinian agreement to maintain quiet this year, but Israeli specialists maintained its acceptance was limited and it looked for excuses to strike.

Unlike Hamas that has a social agenda, that wants to enter politics and that does not insist Israel be liquidated now -- something that opens the door for understandings -- the Islamic Jihad's raison d'etre is the fight against Israel and the aim to eradicate it. Not just push it out of the occupied West Bank, but kick it out of the entire land.

In its view, "there can be no foreign sovereignty in an area that Islam had ruled," noted Yohanan Tzoreff, a senior research fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism.

Islamic Jihad gained some popularity during the intifada, but Palestinian and Israeli experts maintain it remained small. According to Israeli military and foreign assessments, its armed wing, the al-Quds Brigades, has a "few hundred" members.

It is not yet clear how the bomber reached Hadera since Israel has an effective security barrier there. He might have crossed in the Jerusalem area, where the barrier is not complete, or gone with an Israeli who smuggled him through one of the many crossings that Israeli soldiers maintain. Security checks in those crossings are usually cursory.

The attack underlines also the Palestinian Authority's weakness.

Abu Mazen genuinely opposes terror. He criticized the armed struggle even when it was not popular to say so. However, the Palestinian government has failed to enforce law and order. His hopes for "one gun" in the Palestinian Authority are, so far, just dreams.

According to a recent public opinion poll by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 77 percent of the public support continuation of the cease-fire. The vast majority also wants an end to anarchy. Still, the Palestinian security services have failed to sustain that.

Prime Minister Ahmad Qureia readily admitted the shortcomings in Wednesday's address to the Legislative Council. "I tell you in all honesty that no one side alone can control the security situation," he said.

The security services' shortcomings are not an excuse the Israelis would accept and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government has authorized a series of military measures from airstrikes to artillery shelling of areas from which Qassam rockets have been launched. Tanks were positioned near the Gaza Strip, only Palestinians with special humanitarian needs would be allowed into Israel, and more targeted killings are to be expected.

"The Palestinian Authority takes no steps ... to fight terror so we decided that we shall conduct the struggle against terror," Sharon declared Thursday.

"Our activity will be broad, without letup until we bring terror to an end," he added.

Unless the Palestinian Authority takes real, serious action against terror, "there will be no political progress ... I shall not meet Abu Mazen and the Palestinians will lose all their national dreams," he stated.

The danger of deterioration is clearly there. Israeli attacks would probably prompt Palestinian "retaliations." Targeted killings have generated a Palestinian sense of solidarity and a desire for revenge, noted Tzoreff. Very often innocent people have been hurt in those attacks. Closing the Gaza Strip and West Bank towns worsens people's economic conditions that are already awful with wide spread unemployment.

Palestinian parliamentary elections are scheduled for Jan. 25 and all this could hurt the Fatah Party. As it is 84 percent of the Palestinians believe Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was a victory for the resistance to the occupation. Most of them credit Hamas. Clearly it was not a result of Abu Mazen's negotiating skills. The Israeli withdrawal was unilateral, and Palestinians despairing of any deal with Israel might turn to Hamas.

On the other hand, if conducted wisely, if Israel convinces the people it is only after the militants trying to poison any deal, its strikes might produce the desired results.

Since the Islamic Jihad is adamant on liquidating Israel, there is no room for a compromise with it. Fighting will continue until Israel, or the Palestinians, put an end to that movement.

The Islamic Jihad does not have a widespread popular following. If it is crushed, if its leaders are killed or jailed and quiet is restored, even temporarily, Abu Mazen might have a chance to exercise his strategy and prove to his people there is more to gain more by following him.

© Copyright 2005 United Press International, Inc.

October 27, 2005 at 02:04 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

The UN report on the Rafik Hariri murder in Beirut

This quote from the Executive summary sums it up.

8. Building on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.

Download file

October 22, 2005 at 12:17 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

UN accuses Syria of leading plot to murder ex-Lebanese premier

Top Syrian officials named in report on Hariri killing - World - Times Online

By James Bone and Richard Beeston
President al-Assad's brother-in-law is implicated by inquiry into Beirut attack

THE UN last night accused Syria of involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister, setting the stage for a showdown with Damascus.

The unprecedented inquiry, led by the German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, implicated General Assef Shawkat, the brother-in-law of President al-Assad of Syria and his military intelligence chief in the plot to murder Mr Hariri.

One witness told the inquiry that two weeks before the assassination General Shawkat forced a scapegoat, who was later killed, to record a videotape claiming responsibility for the suicide bombing.

The report also identified Ahmad Abdel-Al, a prominent figure in a pro-Syrian Lebanese charity as a key player in the plot.

It said that Mr Abdel-Al had been in contact with Syrian intelligence officers on the day of the blast, as well as with Brigadier-General Faysal Rasheed, chief of Lebanese state security.

Minutes before the bomb blast on February 14, Mr Abdel-Al’s brother also made a call to the mobile phone of President Lahoud of Lebanon.

“There is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act,” the report concluded.

“Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.

“There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security official [sic] and could not have been further organised without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services.”

Herr Mehlis complained, however, that several Syrians interviewed by the investigators had provided “false or inaccurate statements”.

Mr Hariri’s killing along with 22 others in a massive truck bombing outside Beirut’s St George Hotel precipitated mass demonstrations and the withdrawal of thousands of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

The UN report describes growing tension between Mr Hariri and the Syrian President al-Assad over Syria’s decision to extend the term of President Lahoud.

Mr Hariri told one contact, Jubran Tueni, that Mr al-Assad threatened to “blow him up” if he opposed the extension of President Lahoud’s term.

An unidentified witness, who claims to have been a former Syrian intelligence officer in Lebanon, said that Syrian and Lebanese officials decided to assassinate Mr Hariri about two weeks after the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

He claimed that a senior Lebanese security official visited Syria several times to plan the assassination, meeting once at the Meridian Hotel in Damascus and at the presidential palace and the office of a senior Syrian security official.

The last meeting was held in the house of the same senior Syrian security official approximately seven to ten days before the assassination and included another senior Lebanese security official.

The report will have profound ramifications for the region. It leaves President al-Assad isolated and might force his Lebanese ally President Lahoud out of office.

Britain, America and France are already preparing follow-up action, to be debated in the UN Security Council next week, that will demand those responsible be placed in custody to stand trial.

In Lebanon, there were fears last night that blaming Syria could unleash a new round of violence.

About 10,000 Lebanese soldiers and police were deployed around Beirut. Soldiers deployed along main roads and at key intersections. The UN headquarters in Beirut was ringed with troops and a towering wall of sandbags erected to guard against car bombs was reinforced with concrete.

THIRTY YEARS OF CONFLICT

April 1975 Fighting erupts after Christian gunmen ambush a bus of Muslims and Palestinians in Beirut

March 1978 Israel occupies south Lebanon

June 1982 Israel invades rest of Lebanon. Syrian Army ousted from Beirut and Palestinian guerrillas leave by sea after ten-week siege

May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign peace treaty. Syria opposes it

February 1984 Muslim fighters seize West Beirut

March 1984 Peace agreement with Israel is cancelled. Hezbollah makes first public appearances

August 1990 Parliament enacts Taif Accord, later Lebanon’s new constitution. Militias agree to leave Beirut

October 1992 Rafik Hariri elected Prime Minister

1996 Mr Hariri re-elected

1998 Emile Lahoud becomes President and Mr Hariri resigns

May 2000 Israel ends occupation

October 2000 Mr Hariri chosen as Prime Minister

June 2001 Syria completes surprise pullout of its troops from Beirut

Feb 14, 2005 Mr Hariri assassinated

March 7 Syrian troops start withdrawing

April 26 Withdrawal completed

October 12 General Ghazi Kanaan, the former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, “commits suicide”

October 21, 2005 at 06:38 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

A top Syrian minister commits suicide days before UN report

A top Syrian minister commits suicide days before UN report | csmonitor.com

Damascus says longtime head of Syria's military intelligence in Lebanon killed himself Wednesday.
By Nicholas Blanford | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
BEIRUT – The Syrian general who effectively ran Lebanon for 20 years was found dead Wednesday morning in Damascus, just nine days before the release of a potentially explosive United Nations report that could implicate senior Syrian officials in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri last February.

Ｔhe Syrian government said that Ghazi Kenaan, 63, the interior minister and former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, committed suicide in his office in central Damascus.

"The relevant agencies are investigating," according to a statement published by Syria's official news agency (SANA).

Gen. Kenaan's death is a stunning development as the UN-backed investigation into the killing of Mr. Hariri reaches a nail-biting climax.

"It's certainly related to the Hariri inquiry and absolutely will have an impact because a major witness has disappeared," says Marwan Hamade, Lebanese minister of telecommunications and a close friend of the slain premier who narrowly survived an assassination attempt a year ago.

Aside from the connection to the Hariri investigation, Kenaan was a powerful figure from the Alawite community, an off-shoot of Shiite Islam which forms the backbone of the Baathist regime in Syria. As such, some analysts say that the wily and experienced general was a potential candidate to replace Syria's youthful President Bashar al-Assad, especially as he may well have been considered an acceptable figure in American eyes.

"Washington has been talking about the adults taking over from the children, and Kenaan was one of the last of the so-called Old Guard still left. He was considered a real force," says Joshua Landis, a history professor at the University of Oklahoma presently based in Damascus and author of the influential Syriacomment.com weblog.

"It's hard to believe that Kenaan would commit suicide," adds Landis. "He was an active hardworking man who saw many hard times in his life and overcame them."

Detlev Mehlis, a German prosecutor, and his 100-strong team of investigators and technicians have spent four months doggedly tracking Hariri's killers, and interviewing hundreds of people, including three weeks ago Kenaan and other key Syrian officials involved with Lebanon. The findings of the investigation are to be submitted to the UN Security Council next week amid wide speculation that Syria will be held responsible.

Damascus, however, already under intense pressure from the United States over Iraq, insists it had nothing to do with the Feb. 14 bombing in central Beirut that killed Hariri and 19 others. This assassination provoked massive anti-Syrian demonstrations in Beirut which, combined with unrelenting international pressure, led to Syria's disengagement from Lebanon in April.

What will the UN report reveal?

The Lebanese media has been agog with speculation over the results of the report. On Tuesday night, Lebanon's New TV broadcast allegations that General Kenaan had admitted to Mr. Mehlis that he had amassed millions of dollars during "my reign of Lebanon."

"[Hariri] had at the time given me a $10 million check," New TV quoted Kenaan as saying in his testimony to the UN investigators. "We were making money from [Hariri] so how could we possibly kill him and close the flow of his riches?"

On Wednesday morning, Kenaan spoke to the Voice of Lebanon radio station to refute the allegations aired the previous evening.

'Last statement'

"My testimony [to the UN investigators] was to shed light on an era during which we served Lebanon," he said. "Sadly, some media outlets have reported lies to mislead public opinion. I want to make clear that our relation with our Lebanese brothers in Lebanon was based on love and mutual respect."

He ended his comment by saying "I think this is the last statement I might give."

His body was found three hours later.

Kenaan, who headed Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon from 1982 to 2002, possessed a ruthless acumen which helped him confront the multiple challenges facing Syria in the war-torn Lebanon of the 1980s, successfully thwarting the ambitions of both the United States and Israel.

From his headquarters in the town of Anjar near the Syrian border, observers say Kenaan skillfully cajoled, threatened, and manipulated Lebanese politicians to ensure the interests of Syria were safeguarded.

He had established a good rapport with Hariri, the billionaire construction tycoon who as prime minister in the 1990s spearheaded Lebanon's postwar reconstruction drive.

October 12, 2005 at 08:34 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Planning for a Palestinian State Should Not Await a Final Settlement

RAND Review | Summer 2005 | Peace Entrenched

If Israelis and Palestinians agree to a peace settlement, then the difficult task of building a successful Palestinian state would be achievable and affordable, according to a series of RAND studies. However, a Palestinian state would require considerable and sustained support from the international community — particularly the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Researchers analyzed key challenges that would confront a Palestinian state on the morning after peace, developed policy alternatives to meet the challenges, and then estimated the investments needed. The challenges included internal security, water, health, education, and infrastructure.

To help a Palestinian state meet the challenges in these and other key areas, the new state was estimated to require at least $33 billion in gross public and private capital investment over the first ten years of statehood, according to a growth model used by the researchers. In estimating costs, the researchers considered the demographic, economic, and political factors at play.

The $33-billion estimate includes the cost of a rail and road infrastructure that would constitute the physical backbone of an economically prosperous and environmentally sustainable state. Building the transportation infrastructure would invite the parallel construction of infrastructures for water, energy, telecommunications, and open space for a linear chain of Palestinian cities and their offshoots. The researchers refer to the envisioned collection of infrastructures simply as “the Arc.” From the air, the Arc and its offshoots would resemble an olive branch.

Beyond its financial needs, a new Palestinian state will be more likely to succeed (1) the greater its territorial contiguity; (2) the more open its borders, allowing free movement of people and goods between Palestine and its neighbors; (3) the greater the security within Palestine and for its neighbors, including protection against political violence; and (4) the better its governance, including a commitment to democracy and the rule of law. If these conditions are met and wise policy choices are made, then the international investments outlined below could bear great fruit, according to recent spending precedents.

The $33-billion estimate was found to be comparable, on an annual per-capita basis, to the investments made by the international community in two of the most successful nation-building endeavors of the recent past: Bosnia and Kosovo (see Figure 1). Moreover, the RAND proposals outline a set of sorely needed priorities to help focus international and domestic activities.

Although the premise of the RAND studies was a peace settlement between Palestine and Israel coupled with Palestinian statehood, many of the recommendations could — and should — be implemented now. Doing so would not only improve the daily lives of Palestinians, it would also empower the current moderate Palestinian leadership and thereby improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Internal Security: Prerequisite for Success

The success of a Palestinian state is inconceivable in the absence of peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis alike. These conditions must be established from the moment of independence. Unlike infrastructure or industry, security is not something that can be built gradually.

Successful arrangements for internal security range from protecting borders that surround a state to maintaining law and order within it. Even under the most favorable conditions, success will probably require extensive international assistance for several security agencies. The money would pay for everything from rebuilding courthouses and police stations to training personnel to supplying them with computers and other equipment (see Figure 2).
Water: Lacking in Supply and Efficiency

Rapid population growth will stretch the ability of a Palestinian state to provide water for homes, commerce, industry, and agriculture. Already, the supply of clean water is inadequate, and its current use is unsustainable. Current water and waste management practices are degrading streams, rivers, and aquifers.

Most water in the Palestinian territories, which consist of the West Bank and Gaza, comes from springs and wells fed by aquifers that are shared with Israel (see Figure 3). The amount of water that Palestinians and Israelis are extracting today from most of the region’s aquifers exceeds the replenishment rate (see Figure 4).
Increased efficiency could reduce the ten-year costs for water and sanitation by more than $1.1 billion.

A smart water strategy for a Palestinian state would be to simultaneously increase the water supply and use it more efficiently. Palestinians can increase their water supply by increasing groundwater use (accommodated by Israel’s reduction in use); increasing rainwater capture; and, when no other options exist, expanding costly desalination capabilities. Meanwhile, Palestinians can manage their water demand by investing in drip irrigation systems for crops; switching from water-intensive crops to less-water-intensive crops; installing water-efficiency devices in homes; recycling household wastewater from sinks and showers (“graywater”) to flush toilets, to water yards, and to wash cars; and improving the water and wastewater infrastructure.

Increased efficiency could reduce the ten-year costs for water and sanitation by more than $1.1 billion. Figure 5 shows that small investments in water efficiency could lead to large savings.

The health system of a future Palestinian state begins with many strengths, including a relatively healthy population (see Figure 6), a high societal value placed on health, many highly qualified health professionals, national plans for health system development, and a strong base of governmental and nongovernmental institutions. Nonetheless, important areas of concern include poor systemwide coordination of programs and considerable deficits in operating budgets.

Future investments from international donors should be directed toward two areas of priority: (1) integrating the health system more closely, with input from all relevant governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, and (2) improving health care programs, particularly in public health and primary care. These programs include immunization, micronutrient fortification and supplementation, prevention and treatment of chronic and noninfectious diseases, and treatment of developmental and psychosocial conditions.

The Palestinian health system could constructively absorb between $125 million and $160 million per year in new, additional international support over the first decade of an independent state. This support, combined with increased Palestinian spending for health care, would raise the level of spending on health care per person to an internationally respectable level (see Figures 7 and 8).

Education: More Students, More Investments

Despite having a strong foundation, the Palestinian education system faces notable challenges. These include rising levels of malnutrition, homelessness, and poor health among children; inadequate facilities and supplies; unsafe schools and routes to schools; lack of special-education options for students with special needs; and the absence of life-long learning opportunities. The system is severely underfunded. Meanwhile, student enrollment is expected to increase substantially over the next decade (see Figure 9).

But with proper investment from the international community, a Palestinian state could become a powerful player in the region’s knowledge economy. A stronger education system will be an indispensable down payment on future economic success. Investments should be directed toward expanding enrollments in early childhood programs and secondary schools, making special education available, stressing development of civic skills and social responsibility, modernizing vocational education to produce workers with needed skills, and expanding science and engineering programs at universities.

The Palestinian education system will need between $1 billion and $1.5 billion per year in financing over the first decade of statehood to support national ambitions for development (see Figure 10). This investment level, about four times the current spending level, is based on international benchmarks for spending per pupil in successful education systems.

Infrastructure: An Arc of Roads, Rails, and Other Trails

Palestine’s infrastructure, inadequate even for current needs, will soon be called upon to support perhaps twice as many people. The population of the West Bank and Gaza, now at 3.6 million people, could grow to about 6.6 million by 2020 (see Figure 11).
The model for growth should be a compact and sustainable urban form and not an unbounded sprawl.

Population density in Palestine already places it near the top of the world’s densest nations. In 2020, its density is expected to exceed even that of Bangladesh (see Figure 12). Therefore, the model for growth should be a compact and sustainable urban form and not an unbounded sprawl.

The key to a successful Palestinian state could lie within its own topography. The West Bank is divided down the middle by a curving north-south line, or “arc,” of mountain ridges. Because rainfall is much higher on the western side, people and agriculture have concentrated there for millennia. The ridgeline is the natural unifying component of a Palestinian state (see Figure 13).

Economic development requires the creation of rapid north-south transportation links for goods and people, both in the West Bank and between the West Bank and Gaza. Combining the need for a north-south link plus the opportunity afforded by the north-south topography creates the prospect for a major new project parallel to the ridgeline. Construction of a transportation line, including a railroad and toll road, along the ridgeline would encourage concurrent construction of parallel lines for electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, and water. A national linear park could weave back and forth across the line as influenced by the landscape (see Figure 14).

The full ensemble, “the Arc,” could have great symbolic power for the new nation. Construction of just the railroad, toll road, and privately funded housing around the transit lines would also employ between 100,000 and 160,000 Palestinians per year over a five-year span.

The researchers assumed that Gaza would be the site of an international airport as well as an international seaport connecting Palestine to the rest of the world. The Arc’s rail and road links would provide rapid access for people and freight to and from the ports for all parts of Palestine. The rail line would link almost all of the primary cities of Gaza and the West Bank in just over 90 minutes (see Figure 15).

Growth Corridors: Accommodating Millions More
Figure 16 -- Because Each New Station Would Be Some Distance from a City Center, the Arc Would Promote New Businesses and Create New, Sustainable Living Spaces

Figure 17 -- About $6 Billion over Ten Years Would Fund the Transit Infrastructure, Both the Trunk Line and Its Branches

Each new rail station should be set at a considerable distance, anywhere from 2 to 15 miles, from historic urban cores. Remote stations would encourage compact, regulated forms of expansion designed to meet the needs of long-term growth, stretching from historic urban cores along new boulevards equipped with public transit, either bus or light rail lines (see Figure 16).

New neighborhoods along the boulevards could accommodate as many as 3 million people in the next 15 years. The linear neighborhoods would encourage transit use and discourage dependence on the automobile.

Construction of the main section, or “trunk,” of the Arc railway would cost about $3.3 billion, including railcars. Total costs of the rail and road infrastructure, along with stations and branch roads, was estimated to be about $6 billion (see Figure 17).

The Arc offers the promise of a system of national open space that could merge two existing environmental systems: the extensive landscape of agricultural fields, terraces, groves, and the farms and villages associated with them; and the collection of protected forests and nature reserves already designated throughout the West Bank. It ought to be possible to take a brief walk or bike ride along the linear park within any single metropolitan area or, more ambitiously, to undertake a hike or ride along the full extent of the Arc.

The RAND Corporation acknowledges its partner, Santa Monica-based Suisman Urban Design, for leadership in the development of the Arc concept and design. The combined tactics of urban density, public transit, and protected open space should be capable of supporting a sustainable, livable environment for generations (see Figure 18).square
Related Reading
The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State, Doug Suisman, Steven N. Simon, Glenn E. Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, Michael Schoenbaum, RAND/MG-327-GG, 2005a, 106 pp., ISBN 0-8330-3770-6.
Full Document Full Document
The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State, RAND/RB-9119-GG, 2005b.
Full Document Full Document
Building a Successful Palestinian State, The RAND Palestinian State Study Team, led by Steven N. Simon, C. Ross Anthony, Glenn E. Robinson, David C. Gompert, Jerrold D. Green, Robert E. Hunter, C. Richard Neu, Kenneth I. Shine, RAND/MG-146-DCR, 2005a, 452 pp., ISBN 0-8330-3532-0.
Full Document Full Document
Building a Successful Palestinian State, RAND/RB-9072-DCR, 2005b.
Full Document Full Document
Helping a Palestinian State Succeed: Key Findings, The RAND Palestinian State Study Team, RAND/MG-146/1-RC, 2005, 84 pp., ISBN 0-8330-3771-4, includes the Arabic translation.
Full Document Full Document
Strengthening the Palestinian Health System, Michael Schoenbaum, Adel K. Afifi, Richard J. Deckelbaum, RAND/MG-311-1-DCR, 2005, 118 pp., ISBN 0-8330-3730-7.
Full Document Full Document

September 7, 2005 at 05:07 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Egypt bloggers spearhead anti-Mubarak dissent

Egypt bloggers spearhead anti-Mubarak dissent - Yahoo! UK & Ireland News

CAIRO (AFP) - Baheyya is Egyptian, pillories President Hosni Mubarak and heaps scorn on his regime daily. But this fiery dissident who says aloud what others don't dare to think has no face: Baheyya is a blog.
In an Egyptian presidential campaign that has failed to generate much enthusiasm, one of the hottest debates is taking place online in the country's burgeoning political blogosphere.

"In every normal election, people have their eyes trained on the result: who wins, who loses, and how things will change. In this election, however, we all know Hosni Mubarak is going to 'win' barring some miraculous deus ex machina," writes Baheyya (http://baheyya.blogspot.com/).

She comments on a quaint picture of the "new Mubarak" sharing afternoon tea with a peasant woman in the Nile Delta during a carefully choreographed stop of his campaign last week.

"Mubarak and his handlers sordid efforts to negate 24 years of his well-known aloofness and indifference to ordinary Egyptians have surpassed all decency," she says.

Her identity is shrouded in mystery and the subject of much speculation among the blogging community but her diatribes have earned a cult albeit restricted following.

In a country where most major newspapers are state-owned or affiliated to a party, the Internet is offering an unprecedented freedom and platform for an increasingly bold opposition to the regime.

On a blog calling itself "The wordmonger", 36-year-old artist and blogger Abdo indulges in a satirical ode to "Mubarak, Prince of the believers", a title which usually refers to the Prophet Mohammed.

"God must love him so much: the more we curse him, the longer his reign lasts," he remarks.

Another Egyptian blogger explains he is posting his comments "so that future generations cannot accuse us of having remained silent when there was a need to speak out."

Accustomed to an autocratic regime that has severely restricted freedom of expression in the past, many Egyptians in the street are still keeping a lid on their exasperation, but bloggers are now letting off steam on the Internet.

"Wanderer of the big wide open" heckles his president directly: "Who are you Hosni? Are you not an Egyptian like all other Egyptians? Are you of holy ancestry?"

"What if he just vanished in the haze," he fantasises. "Imagine if the same face you've seen for 24 years on television screens and newspaper front pages suddenly disappeared.."

"Manal and Alaa" is a more militant blog written in both Arabic and English which lashes out at the regime's repression of opposition demonstrations by what they brand the state's "terrorist karate units".

Manal Hassan and Alaa Abdel Fattah, both aged 23, are among the few bloggers who accept to reveal their identity.

"This corrupt regime has reached its sell-by date and its stench has become unbearable," says Alaa, a young activist with a thick mane of long curly black hair and whose blog serves a bulletin board for announcing rallies and protests.

The year 2005 has seen anti-Mubarak street protests which were unimaginable even a year ago, but most of the country's 300-odd political bloggers are anonymous.

"They disguise their identities and it gives them a platform to say things they can't say in public," explains Joshua Stacker, a Cairo-based American political researcher.

"If the state wanted to go after them they could, but it's only the elite who reads them," he adds.

Mohammed, who runs a blog entitled "From Cairo With Love", is equally realistic on the impact of Internet dissent.

"What I don't believe, is that blogs and the Internet will reform the Arab world and make the people rise up. I think it could be used as a tool for better connection and dissemination of information," he says.

Amid a climate of heavy suspicion over the transparency of the upcoming poll, many bloggers see themselves as election monitors. "We are not players, we are observers," says Alaa Abdel Fattah.

August 30, 2005 at 01:29 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Egyptian Security Forces Search for Militants in Sinai

Egyptian Security Forces Search for Militants in Sinai - New York Times

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: August 28, 2005

Filed at 5:58 p.m. ET

CAIRO, Egypt (AP) -- Army sappers joined a 5,000-strong security force Sunday in a sweep through the Sinai, as authorities stepped up their search for militants behind recent bombings of tourist centers on the rugged peninsula.

Security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because the operation was still underway, said at least two army units responsible for clearing mines and one border-guard unit had joined the hunt, which entered its second week Sunday.

The force was focused on Halal mountain, a 5,900-foot peak near the Israeli border that is full of caves and deep ravines.

The security force suffered a major blow on Thursday, when a police major general and a lieutenant colonel were killed in a land mine explosion. Those killed were believed to be the highest ranking police officers to die in a conflict since Egypt put down a violent Islamist insurgency in the mid-1990s.

Police have said they believe some of the suspects holed up in the rugged mountain area are linked to the triple July 23 attacks in the southern Sinai resort of Sharm el-Sheik that killed at least 64 people, as well as the Oct. 7 bombings of two Egyptian resorts near the Israeli border that killed more than 30 people.

On Sunday, masked gunmen in a vehicle opened fire at a security checkpoint near Halal but no one was hurt. The gunmen fled into the mountains.

Since the sweep began, more than 700 Egyptians have been detained with many subsequently released. It is not known if any charges have been filed. An additional 15 people were arrested on Sunday.

Two pro-government newspapers, al-Ahram and al-Akhbar, reported Sunday that the explosive material in the mines was similar to that used in the July and October bombings. They cited forensic reports as saying the explosives were imported.

One security official has said that a key suspect believed to have harbored militants linked to the October attack -- Salem Khadr el-Shenoub -- was thought to be among militants hiding in the area.

Sinai's mountains and desert plains have long been a haven for criminals, fugitives and Bedouin tribesmen involved in smuggling and drug trafficking. Israel also complains that weapons smugglers used the region to smuggle weapons to Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip.

August 29, 2005 at 03:30 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

A momentous day for peace: why Gaza matters to us all this morning

The Times Online guest contributors Opinion

Shimon Peres
DISENGAGEMENT BEGINS today. So does the day after. History never rests. Not anywhere, and clearly not in the Middle East. For many months disengagement was looming large over Israel’s public life. Disengagement also became a focus of the international community’s relations with Israel and the Palestinians. For more than a year it pushed aside other initiatives and considerations. But now it is happening, and it is time to refer to what will be the day after.

Disengagement will not be the last phase of the political process with the Palestinians. It is an important first step. It demonstrates the moral decision we have taken not to turn our nation that escaped slavery in Ancient Egypt into a nation of masters in the Land of Israel. Disengagement reinforces the power of Israel’s moderates to make decisions, and exposes the true size and political power of the extreme Right. It proves Israel’s capacity for taking the initiative in correcting the mistakes it made in the past in building some of the settlements, and it opens the door to future steps towards peace.

In the Middle East it is wiser to make long jumps rather than high jumps. By taking long jumps, we can proceed to our desired goal one jump at a time. But if we take the risk of taking one major high jump to the end goal, as we tried in Camp David in 2000, we will break our back, and require years of recovery to try again. Disengagement is a long jump. Now it is time for another jump. It too will not be the last.

We will continue building on the momentum created by this current step. In doing so, we will open the door for the Palestinians to establish a state with provisional borders on evacuated territories in Gaza and the West Bank. We can then proceed to negotiate with the Palestinians the permanent borders between Israel and the Palestinian state. The questions of Jerusalem and refugees are a matter for the future. Our bitter experience has proven that these issues are too explosive to settle in the next jump we make. We should not hold ourselves hostage to our inability to reach an agreement on these matters at the present. We must move forward on the things on which we can reach an agreement, such as the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, and opening negotiations on permanent borders based on UN resolutions 242 and 338. The “road map” is there in place to help us to realise this shared vision of two states living side by side, peacefully and in security.

The Palestinians at their end have to move rapidly to establish law and order in the evacuated territories as well as a capability to prevent terrorism. Gaza should set the stage for the future. The Palestinians should succeed in establishing a functioning authority in Gaza. The world will be watching. Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority) has demonstrated his commitment to a vision of a coherent, legitimate, democratic rule that has its citizens’ welfare at heart, and to unifying security forces. In a world divided between terror and anti-terror, the Palestinians also cannot afford to be on the wrong side of the dividing line.

But the world should not only watch. It should help, as it has done in the past. It should do so by privatising peace. Privatisation and globalisation are moving in lock step. A global world needs to be a peaceful world. So corporations should mobilise to help to build and secure the peace. Governments have budgets, but corporations have money. Governments are unwieldy and corporations are nimble. Corporations can become an agent of peaceful relations between nations. As we make peace with each other, we should also make peace with the age. In an age of open borders, global communications, human mobility, and wealth that is extracted from the mind rather than the land, economics is the new politics. Private corporations can help to bring this age to the Middle East. Every company that opens a branch, a factory, an office in Gaza and the West Bank is making future conflicts and wars a little less likely.

Today and the day after, Israel will continue to change its internal priorities as well. After we disengage from Gaza, we need to re-engage in strengthening our society, our economy, our relationships with each other. At the same time, we are developing two regions important to Israel’s future — the Negev and Galilee. We intend to invest greatly in further revitalising both regions, including improving education, health and transportation, and paving the way for further economic development and the promotion of industry. Thus, we are investing in our “many days after” so that we will be stronger economically, socially and geopolitically.

The Labour Party entered the National Unity Government to support disengagement. It was the responsible thing to do. Without our consistent support for disengagement in government and in parliament, it would not have taken place. We did so in line with our long-standing world view that calls for a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians based on moral principles, mutual recognition and the establishment of two states. This continues to be our policy. We will work to make it happen. History stops for no one. There is not enough ice in the world to freeze its march. We can only hope to take the right steps necessary to make sure that history books will one day tell the tale of Israeli and Palestinian reconciliation.

Shimon Peres is the Vice-Prime Minister of Israel

August 15, 2005 at 01:09 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Oil bonanza offers new opportunity for wealth distribution

World news from The Times and the Sunday Times - Times Online

By Bronwen Maddox
THE good news is that the Gulf states are keeping far more of the oil bonanza at home than they have done before — and investing some of it in new businesses, schools and universities.

That offers a flicker of hope that the region is finally about to tackle its own urgent need for educating its young people, and for creating jobs that will save them from unemployment and the lure of militancy.

The bad news is that a torrent of cash is also pouring into fanciful property developments as well as into the region’s embryonic stock markets, which rose by between a quarter and 88 per cent last year.

Dubai, already constructing the world’s tallest building, is now working on “City of Arabia”, with 35 skyscrapers, and the $7.5 billion “Dubailand” theme park, twice the size of Disney in Florida, with a ski slope and dinosaur park.

It would be daft to talk of a bubble bursting soon. The oil price shows no sign of falling, and so the pressure of cash looking for a home may well keep prices high.

But this kind of investment hardly offers the social transformation these countries need.

The Gulf “is in the midst of a period of exceptional economic performance” because of soaring oil prices, notes a report by the International Institute of Finance, a US-based association.

For the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman — it forecasts economic growth of nearly 25 per cent this year. Most of that is due to record oil prices, which have trebled since 1999. Howard Handy, IIF director for the Middle East and Africa, said he expects that those countries’ revenue from exporting oil will rise by 49 per cent this year to $291 billion.

Of course, there have been booms before. Much past wealth was soaked up by palaces, Bentleys and trappings coveted by those in power. A lot went into US stock markets.

The spectacle spawned a vigorous academic debate on whether wealth in resources always fosters corruption.

But the IIF report is one of several saying, cautiously, that this time, the use of the windfall looks promising. Charles Dallera, IIF managing director, notes that this boom “appears to be having more dynamic effects across the region”.

This time, much more of the cash is staying at home, encouraged by tighter financial controls in the US and Europe since September 11. According to the Basle-based Bank for International Settlements, “oil revenues have not been channelled into the international banking system” — overseas bank deposits of the main oil countries have barely risen.

According to the IIF, more than $120 billion will be invested in building projects this year, including hospitals and universities. Harvard Medical School is building a medical school in Dubai and Cornell University is backing an offshoot in Qatar.

In the past, wealthy Gulf Arabs have often sent their children to the West for education and spent much of their summer in Western medical clinics.

There are signs that the wealth is spilling over to the wider region: Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan.

Even if some of the investment has simply inflated asset values, some has gone to improve infrastructure and lay foundations which will attract other businesses.

Will it do the trick in helping the region wean itself off its dependence on oil, and at the same time move towards greater political stability? The question is most critical in Saudi Arabia, where the sight of fabulous spending by the Royal Family is a provocation to the growing population, and the ranks of young, unemployed men.

Although Saudi Arabia produces almost half as much oil again as the other GCC countries, its income per head is less than a third of that in Qatar, and half of that in Kuwait.

The Saudis perhaps should take a leaf out of the book of President Chavéz of Venezuela, who has tried to demonstrate to poor people the benefits of the oil boom. But unless the Royal Family fritters away the bonanza on its own pleasures as conspicuously as in the past, the investment stimulated by this boom must take the edge off unrest, for a while at least.

August 12, 2005 at 12:17 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Cruise missile is tested without warning

World news from The Times and the Sunday Times - Times Online

From Chiade O'Shea in Islamabad
PAKISTAN has test-fired its first cruise missile, with President Musharraf heralding the event as a success in the country’s arms race with nuclear rival India.

Congratulating the scientists on a successful test, General Musharraf said: “We were feeling there was an imbalance because of the acquisition of Patriot missiles by India, but this improves the balance.”

The President said the Hatf VII Babr cruise missile could be fired with “pinpoint accuracy”.

The weapon is capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads over 300 miles and can adjust its path to fly low over the target area. This is intended to help the missile to avoid increasingly sensitive detection systems.

India was not told of the test before it took place, despite the high-profile announcement over the weekend that the countries would warn each other before test launches. Major-General Shaukat Sultan, a military and presidential spokesman, said that Pakistan was not obliged to advise India because the terms of the agreement did not cover the new cruise missile technology.

“We are only supposed to give pre-warning for ballistic missiles,” he said.

In a dig at India’s acquisition of a US-imported weapons system, General Musharraf said: “This missile is totally indigenous and I’m proud of our scientists.”

The missile was tested as Iran, Pakistan’s western neighbour, came under increasing pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend all nuclear-fuel related activities.

Pakistan itself has been the centre of investigations into a nuclear black market run by Dr A. Q. Khan, who led the country’s nuclear programme. Last year he confessed to providing nuclear secrets to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

Sabre-rattling rhetoric is frequently exchanged between Pakistan and India , and missile tests are considered cause for great celebration in Pakistan, a highly militarised nation. News of the successful test was fêted on national television throughout the day between special programming leading up to Pakistan’s Independence Day celebrations on Sunday.

“It also happens to be the President’s birthday,” Major-General Sultan said.

There was no immediate reaction to the test from Delhi. India unveiled its first cruise missile, a supersonic joint venture with Russia named the BrahMos, in 2001.

August 11, 2005 at 11:34 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Pakistan fires new cruise missile

BBC NEWS | World | South Asia | Pakistan fires new cruise missile

Pakistan says it has fired its first cruise missile, describing the launch as a "milestone" in its history.

The Babur missile is capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads and has a range of 500km (310 miles), a military spokesman said.

Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said the launch was a birthday gift to President Pervez Musharraf.

The launch comes days after Pakistan and India agreed to give each other advance notice of future nuclear ballistic missile tests.

India was not informed about Thursday's test because the agreement did not cover guided missiles, a Pakistan military spokesman said.

Mr Ahmed said the "milestone" launch had been a success, adding: "The nation is proud of its team of scientists who have raised the country's prestige in the comity of nations."

He said it was a gift from scientists to Gen Musharraf, 62 on Thursday.

Cruise missiles are usually low-flying guided missiles.

"The technology enables the missile to avoid radar detection and penetrate undetected through any hostile defensive system," the Pakistan military said in a statement.

Pakistan has its own range of intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles which are test-fired quite regularly.

Army spokesman Maj Gen Shaukat Sultan said Pakistan had now joined the few countries "that can design and make cruise missiles".

Reversal

Separately, the UK has said it will ease curbs on the export of nuclear technology to India.

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw cited Delhi's improved relations with Islamabad, its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation standards and to tackling climate change as reasons for the decision.

Last month, US President George W Bush said he would seek congressional approval for a plan to help develop India's civilian nuclear programme, reversing existing US policy.

The UK Foreign Office said it was also discussing co-operation on nuclear issues with Pakistan.

Scrutiny

The BBC's Zaffar Abbas in Islamabad says Pakistan's cruise missile test is likely to ring alarm bells in many countries.

Pakistan has been under close scrutiny by the international community since its leading nuclear expert, AQ Khan, was found to have leaked nuclear secrets two years ago.

India and Pakistan routinely test-fire their missiles.

In March, Pakistan successfully tested a long-range nuclear-capable missile - the Shaheen II, with a range of 2,000km (1,250 miles).

The two countries have twice veered close to war since their nuclear tests in 1998 - over Kashmir in 1999 and again in 2002.

Both countries have limited command-and-control structures, and neither has developed the technology to recall a nuclear-tipped missile fired in error.

August 11, 2005 at 05:55 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Obituary: King Fahd

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Obituary: King Fahd

King Fahd's rule saw Saudi Arabia ally itself closely with both the United Kingdom and the United States. Domestically, he had to contend both with the impact of falling oil revenues and an increasingly fragmented society.

King Fahd, who ascended the Saudi throne in 1982, was one of seven sons of the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdel-Aziz, and his favourite wife, Hassa.

He was the fourth of his siblings to be king. Two of his brothers lost power violently - one was deposed in a coup; the other was assassinated.

Experienced politician

He had a reputation as a playboy in his youth, with allegations of womanising, drinking and gambling to excess. Indeed, it is claimed that he once lost more than $6m in one night at the Monte Carlo casino.

But he settled down in the 1950s to take ministerial positions in the Saudi administration.

When he became king, he already had a great deal of political experience. He had been a reforming minister of education, playing a role in furthering the education of women in Saudi Arabia.

The young Fahd was known as a technocrat and political wheeler-dealer. He knew about internal security and about how the kingdom needed to be defended from within.

He also had a reputation as something of a diplomat, who understood the intricacies of foreign policy, especially the importance of the Saudi dynasty's relationship with the United States.

Land of plenty

Such political finesse was valuable when Fahd had to steer the kingdom through the leaner and more troubled period following the oil boom of the 1970s.

Saudi Arabia is home to the world's greatest oil reserves and, during the 1970s, the petro-dollars flooded in.

There was a joke that new Cadillacs were dumped as soon as their ashtrays were full. King Fahd himself amassed a personal fortune estimated at $18bn.

Such a boom could not be sustained. By the early 1980s, just when King Fahd came to power, annual oil income began to fall.

Saudi Arabia, with its huge oil production and massive reserves, had always been a paternalistic state which prided itself on giving its citizens cradle-to-grave care.

Fahd was forced to introduce some austerity measures to stem state spending. Other threats to his authority came from outside.

Enemies at home and abroad

The 1979 Revolution in Iran led to fears that Islamic upheaval could spread to Saudi Arabia. King Fahd spent vast amounts supporting Iraq in its war with Iran.

He also tried to strengthen his own Islamic legitimacy. In 1986, he took the title Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn (Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques) to indicate his protection of the sacred Muslim sites in the cities of Mecca and Medina.

But the greatest threat was still to come.

In 1990, Iraq invaded neighbouring Kuwait. King Fahd made the sensitive decision to invite Western forces onto Saudi soil to protect the kingdom.

He told his people, "These forces are participating in joint exercises with Saudi Arabia. Their presence will be temporary."

After the war, though, US forces did not leave. A bomb explosion at their desert headquarters in 1996 killed 19 and appeared to signal the depth of popular resentment.

Catalogue of crises

But many Saudis, and Muslims further afield, believed that the stationing of non-Muslim soldiers in the birthplace of Islam went directly against an explicit ruling of the Prophet Muhammad.

That impression intensified after the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Fifteen of the hijackers were thought to have been Saudi nationals.

And the Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden had often pledged to drive the "infidels" out of Saudi Arabia.

At times, popular movements opposed to the royal family within the country have raised their colours, a dangerous activity in what remains a highly-repressive country.

The huge cost of the Gulf War meant that the king had to take some even more stringent economic austerity measures.

King Fahd found himself faced with a whole series of interlocking crises - economic, political and military - which the ailing leader seemed ill-equipped to keep under control.

Experienced successor

King Fahd's health had long been a problem. He was diabetic, for many years a heavy smoker and suffered a stroke in 1995.

Officially, after a relatively short break at the time, he resumed many of his duties using a wheelchair and stick.

His chosen successor, his half-brother Abdullah, is the head of the National Guard, the tribal army largely responsible for the kingdom's internal security.

An austere and respected figure, Crown Prince Abdullah is untainted by corruption, while being regarded by many as less enthusiastically pro-American than King Fahd.

And among watchers of the opaque world of Saudi statecraft, Crown Prince Abdullah is thought already to have been de facto ruler for much of the past five years.

August 2, 2005 at 08:27 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Arrests after Egyptian bombings

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Arrests after Egyptian bombings

Egyptian security forces have arrested 35 people following Saturday's bomb attacks in Sharm al-Sheikh, which killed at least 88 people.

The arrests came after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak vowed to hunt down those behind the bombings.

In the worst attacks in decades in Egypt, three explosions - including two apparent car bombings - devastated a hotel, a car park, and a market.

Most of the dead are Egyptians, but foreigners are among the victims too.

An Italian man on his honeymoon and a Czech citizen have been confirmed dead and at least 20 of those injured are thought to be foreign.

The BBC's Heba Saleh in Sharm al-Sheikh says Bedouins are among those detained.

She says police want to question them about unusual movements in the mountains of the Sinai.

Our correspondent says this is an area with few asphalted roads but there are many desert routes between the mountains which are used by the Bedouins.

She says police will also be seeking information about possible recent purchases of explosives in a region where they are heavily used in quarrying and for construction.

Mubarak anger

The blasts came within minutes of each other in the early hours of Saturday, when the bars and markets of the Red Sea resort were busy.

In the most devastating attack, a bomber rammed his car into the Ghazala Gardens hotel in Naama Bay, according to an eyewitness.

Hosni Mubarak at the scene of the Sharm al-Sheikh attacks
Our battle with terrorism will continue with all the strength, resolve and will that we have
Hosni Mubarak

Press agonises over attacks
The front of the luxury hotel was destroyed in a huge explosion.

A few hundred metres away, a bomb went off in a car park near the Moevenpick Hotel, causing widespread damage and casualties.

In the Old Market area, about 4km (2.5 miles) away, 17 people - believed to be Egyptian - were killed by another suspected car bomb, rescue officials said.

The bombings happened at the height of the summer tourist season, and coincided with an extended holiday weekend to mark the anniversary of the 1952 Egyptian revolution.

They came less than a year after attacks at a resort further north in the Sinai peninsula left 34 people dead.

Egyptian Interior Minister Habib al-Adli said he cannot exclude a connection between the two incidents.

Egypt blamed the 2004 attack on a Palestinian man leading an unaffiliated group.

Tourism fears

In a statement posted on an Islamic website, a group calling itself the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, al-Qaeda, said it carried out the bombings.

However, the statement did not appear on well-known al-Qaeda websites and it was impossible to authenticate the claim.

President Mubarak has vowed to hunt down the perpertrators.

"This will only make us more determined to pursue terrorism and eradicate it," said President Mubarak after visiting the bomb scenes.

"We will not give in to its blackmail, or seek a truce."

US President George W Bush has meanwhile condemned the "barbaric terrorist attacks", which he said were an "assault on the civilised world".

The previous worst attack in Egypt was in 1997, when Islamic militants killed 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians near the southern city of Luxor.

The tourism industry - Egypt's most lucrative - has slowly recovered since that attack, but there are widespread fears that these latest bombings will deal it a fresh blow.

July 24, 2005 at 11:28 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Bombers travelled around Pakistan for three months

London bombs terror attack The Times and Sunday Times Times Online

By Simon Freeman, Times Online

Three of the four suicide bombers who carried out the July 7 attacks on London had visited Pakistan in the previous 12 months it was confirmed today, lending weight to theories that the terrorists were trained by extremists from the country's lawless border province.

Detailed arrival and departure records from Karachi Airport have been issued which give the exact times and dates that the trainee terrorists arrived and left Pakistan. Pictures taken at the time show the men looking confident and relaxed as they entered the country.

Authorities said, however, that despite speculation there was no official evidence to suggest the men had visited madrassas - the religious schools - or terrorist camps during their stay.

Pakistani security officials privately told The Times that Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain — all from Leeds — met known al-Qaeda suspects during their trip. They spent most of their time in the company of figures from outlawed militant groups.

Immigration officials in Pakistan today released pictures which show Tanweer, 22, and Khan, 31, at Karachi Airport on November 19 last year. They arrived on a Turkish Airlines flight TK 1056, via Istanbul.

Travel records suggest that the pair travelled on by train to Lahore, the capital of the eastern Punjab province, seven days later. The local Daily News reported that the pair stayed at a hotel in the central Saddar area.

Both remained in Pakistan for about three months before taking the Turkish Airlines flight 1057 on their return to London on February 8, 2005, officials of the Federal Investigation Agency said.

According to the records, the youngest suspect Hussain, 18, landed in Pakistan on July 15 last year on board a Saudi Arabian airliner from Riyadh. No record of his departure was kept at the airport and it is believed that he returned home from either Lahore or Islamabad.

The three men, all from Leeds, were tracked by Personal Identification and Evaluation System (Pisces), introduced following the September 11 attacks, under which everyone who enters Pakistan legally is photographed.

The security officials said that they had not yet been able to trace the three men’s movements while they were in Pakistan. It is believed the timing of their visits overlapped and that all three met up at some stage during their travels.

Shahid Hayyat, a deputy director at the Federal Investigation Agency, said: "I have no such information, but I know that our security agencies are trying to get such details."

Asked if the trio may have had come into contact with a group led by alleged al-Qaeda number three Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who was arrested in northwestern Pakistan in May, one of the officials, said: "It is possible but again we have no confirmation."

Unpicking the Pakistani arm of the British al-Qaeda network is seen as the key to the London investigation and preventing further bomb attacks. The toll from the July 7 bombings now stands at 55 but is expected to rise; 47 of the dead have been formally identified.

The Pakistani authorities have arrested more than a dozen suspects over the weekend in connection with the bombings and with possible links to Khan, Tanweer and Hussain.

Telephone contacts between the bombers and Pakistan are being closely analysed.

Investigators in London and Islamabad are in constant communication but the suspected mastermind of the London bombings continues to elude them.

The 33-year-old Briton entered Britain at Felixstowe on a ferry from the Netherlands or Belgium a fortnight before the bombings. He flew out from Heathrow hours before his recruits embarked on their deadly missions.

Inquiries into the background of the other bomber, the Jamaican-born Jermaine Lindsay, 19, have taken British police in a different direction.

Former schoolfriends of Lindsay, who grew up in Huddersfield, said that he visited Afghanistan four years ago and returned to Britain as a hardline Muslim. Scotland Yard sources said last night that officers were looking closely at Lindsay’s connections in the Luton area.

One officer said that Lindsay appeared to have links with criminal activity in the town.

Luton has also been a hotbed of radical Islamist activity for several years, with extremist groups such as al-Muhajiroun having an influence over young Muslims there. Last year several arrests were made in the town in connection with another anti-terrorist operation. Details of that cannot be reported because it is the subject of a forthcoming criminal trial.

According to British and American intelligence sources, investigators conducting that operation are believed to have encountered the names of Lindsay and Khan "on the periphery" of the inquiry.

Luton was also the setting off point for the four bombers. They were captured on CCTV at about 7.20am. They boarded a train to London, and disembarked at King’s Cross.

Khan detonated his bomb at Edgware Road, Tanweer at Aldgate and Lindsay on a Piccadilly Line train at King’s Cross. The three Tube bombs exploded at 8.50am. Hussain set off his rucksack bomb on a No 30 bus at Tavistock Square almost an hour later.

The bombers left behind a cache of high-explosives and bomb components that could have been used to make at least three or four more devices.

Detonators and enough of the acetone peroxide-based explosive to make two bombs were found in Lindsay’s car at Luton, along with a gun and ammunition, a senior anti- terrorist source said.

At one of the properties being searched in Leeds, policehave recovered enough explosives to make two devices similar to those used on July 7.

The discovery of the weapons and explosives poses a series of difficult questions for those leading the investigation, who say they are pursuing a wide range of inquiries.

Detectives have to consider whether there may be a second bomb team equipped with further explosives and ready to strike again.

They are also examining the possibility that some or all of the London bombers did not know they were taking part in a suicide attack and thought they would be returning to the car.

The investigation team is still trying to determine where the bombers spent the night before the attacks.

The inquiry is the country’s biggest criminal investigation will stretch anti-terrorist and intelligence resources. According to The Sunday Times, MI5 made "a quick assessment" of Khan last year but judged that he was not a threat to national security. Police were not involved in that process.

The paper reported a senior government official saying: "MI5 is fair game at the moment. We’ve only got finite resources. You can only concentrate resources on those people who are a direct threat to national security."

Shehzad Tanweer: The 22-year-old son of a chip shop owner from Beeston, Leeds. Studied religion in Pakistan. Forensic evidence linking him to Aldgate blast.

Mohammad Sidique Khan: Teacher, aged 30, from Beeston, Leeds, who had recently moved to Dewsbury, married with baby. ID found at Edgware Road blast site.

Hasib Hussain: Tearaway 18-year-old who lived in Holbeck, Leeds. Reported missing on day of bombings by his parents. Said to have become devoutly religious two years ago. ID found in No 30 bus.

Jermaine Lindsay: Jamaican-born man living in Buckinghamshire. Believed to have carried out King's Cross attack.

July 18, 2005 at 04:27 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Hitmen killed Israeli, court told

BBC NEWS | UK | Hitmen killed Israeli, court told

An Israeli drug dealer with a gambling problem, who was found dead in a London hotel in March, was murdered by two hitmen, the Old Bailey has heard.

Michael Antoneli and Andrei Melnikov allegedly lured Simon Turkov to the Marriott Hotel in Marble Arch before smothering him with a pillow.

The men, who were arrested in July last year, both deny murder.

The court heard a driver saw two men disposing of evidence at a service station near Gillingham, Kent.

DNA clue

Richard Whittam, prosecuting, told the jury: "It is only... because of the vigilance of a member of the public who witnessed the disposal of evidence which allowed police to detect the murder of Mr Turkov far earlier than they would have done."

The court heard that Mr Turkov was married with a family in Poole, Dorset, but lived with a Russian mistress in London's Belgravia.

He was a heavy gambler and lost about £200,000 between September 2003 and March 2004, the court heard.

He is likely to have died from manual asphyxiation and there was DNA matching that of Mr Turkov on the pillow
Richard Whittam, prosecutor

On 28 March 2004 Mr Antoneli, 52, and Mr Melnikov, 32, are said to have checked into the Marriott Hotel in Marble Arch after arriving in Dover on a ferry from Calais.

Mr Melnikov is then said to have walked outside to a nearby phone box and called Mr Turkov's mobile phone.

Mr Turkov then turned up in a taxi looking "anxious" and "agitated", according to the taxi driver.

Mr Melnikov and Mr Turkov were captured on CCTV embracing in the hotel lobby and drinking coffee and whiskey before going up to the room, the court heard.

While inside Mr Melnikov and Mr Antoneli are said to have wrapped duct tape around Mr Turkov's ankles and suffocated him with a pillow.

They then took his blood-stained jeans, Versace belt and jacket from him and left his body in the bath, it is claimed.

Mr Whittam said: "A pathologist later identified marks on the ankles consistent with tape on the outside of the jeans constraining him.

"He had not died of natural causes. He is likely to have died from manual asphyxiation and there was DNA matching that of Mr Turkov on the pillow."

Marigold gloves

Mr Melnikov and Mr Antoneli left the hotel separately but are said to have driven back to Dover together in a Mercedes.

They were seen dumping evidence by motorist Michael Runter as he washed his car at the Tollgate service station near Gillingham, jurors heard.

Mr Whittam said: "The front passenger got out of the vehicle and what drew Mr Runter's attention was he appeared to be wearing some yellow Marigold gloves."

"He opened the boot and one door and took out a yellow carrier bag and walked over to a rubbish bin."

Mr Melnikov is said to have dumped Mr Turkov's bloodstained clothes in the bin, along with other items from the hotel room, including the swipe card for the door.

Mr Runter found the items inside the wheelie bin and called police, who took the door card back to the hotel room and discovered Mr Turkov's dead body in the bath.

Mr Melnikov and Mr Antoneli are said to have got a ferry back to Calais that day.

Mr Melnikov, who has an Israeli passport, was arrested in Tel Aviv on 29 July 2004 while Mr Antoneli, who has Israeli and Greek passports, was arrested in Belgium on the same day.

The trial continues.

July 6, 2005 at 10:22 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Hi-tech SAS troops take on Taliban

Hi-tech SAS troops take on Taliban - World - Times Online

Michael Smith

UP TO two squadrons of British special forces are preparing to go to Afghanistan within weeks to provide the reconnaissance for an expected British deployment of more than 5,000 troops.

The men from the SAS and the new Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) will form a combined joint taskforce with members of the Australian SAS, according to senior defence sources. A company of British paratroopers will provide backup.

The British special forces of about 120 men will be based in the southern province of Kandahar ahead of a 5,500-strong infantry battle group expected to be sent early next year. There are currently 1,100 British troops in Afghanistan.

The British and Australian special forces will fan out across the territory to be covered by the British battle group. They will identify the most serious threats in the region and gather intelligence on any Taliban activity.

The troops face a hostile environment, with Taliban fighters regrouping in southern Afghanistan backed up by members of Al-Qaeda, including specially trained suicide bombers.

Last week RAF Harriers based at Kandahar joined US aircraft in providing support to American and Afghan forces in clashes in which 132 Taliban fighters were reported killed.

During their operations the SAS troopers will be assisted by the improved intelligence provided by a squadron from the SRR, which was formed this year to help in the fight against international terrorism.

Special forces commanders were warned months ago that they should be ready for Afghanistan. Senior commanders prepared what one source last week described as demands for “new Gucci kit” — requests for the latest equipment to spy on and fight the enemy.

The equipment, bought as a result of lessons learnt from the first SAS deployment during the war in Afghanistan, includes a spy plane the size of a child’s glider.

The American-made drone is launched by hand, can reach heights of about 100ft and operates to a range of more than five miles.

The SRR intelligence operators also have lightweight signals equipment capable of picking up mobile phone and radio communications.

The British will also be taking so-called “fire-and-forget” electronic jammers that can be planted at various strategic points to provide blanket disruption of Taliban and Al-Qaeda communications.

The intelligence operators will have laptop computers linked to the larger US drones such as the Predator and Global Hawk and to American aerial reconnaissance satellites to download imagery of Taliban positions.

They are also expected to take a number of Supacat six-wheel, all-terrain vehicles, which have powerful turbocharged V8 diesel engines. The vehicles will be fitted with a grenade launcher that acts like a scatter gun, allowing the SAS to regain the initiative if they are ambushed by Taliban or Al-Qaeda fighters.

The composition of the battle group heading for Afghanistan has not yet been decided. Military commanders were hoping to send 19 Light Brigade, the new light infantry formation, to form the main British force. But Brigadier Chip Chapman, its commander, has said he does not believe it will be operational in time.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to a change in tactics for the SAS, which has traditionally worked in small patrols of four men. Teams now vary in size and some of the operations during the Afghan war were the largest mounted since the 1970s.

Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.

July 5, 2005 at 09:49 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Rice Criticizes Allies In Call for Democracy

Rice Criticizes Allies In Call for Democracy

Egypt, Saudi Arabia Challenged to Embrace Rights

By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, June 21, 2005; Page A01

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, June 20 -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Monday sharply criticized Egypt and Saudi Arabia for democratic failings, mounting a direct challenge to autocratic U.S. allies in the Middle East and calling on governments in the region to embrace "certain basic rights for all their citizens."

"Throughout the Middle East, the fear of free choices can no longer justify the denial of liberty," Rice told an invitation-only audience of government officials, academics and diplomats at the American University in Cairo. "It is time to abandon the excuses that are made to avoid the hard work of democracy."

She later traveled to Saudi Arabia, where "many people pay an unfair price for exercising their basic rights," she said.

President Bush has made promotion of democracy a hallmark of his second term, but this was the first time a senior U.S. official has delivered that message in the heart of the Middle East. Rice mixed tough-minded rhetoric with assurances that the Bush administration was not planning to impose democracy. The United States, she said, "has no cause for false pride and we have every reason for humility," because of its history of slavery and racism.

Rice was much tougher on Iran and Syria, two countries often in disagreement with the United States, than she was on Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two longtime U.S. partners with virtually no history of representative government. She denounced the "organized cruelty of Iran's theocratic state" and called on Syria "to make the strategic choice to join the progress all around it."

Rice offered mild praise for President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, who has ruled since 1981, for having "unlocked the door for change" by agreeing for the first time to allow an opposition candidate to run against him. The move was "encouraging," she said, but now "the Egyptian government must put its faith in its own people." She called on Mubarak to end violent attacks on pro-democracy demonstrators, stop "arbitrary justice" and lift emergency decrees allowing the police to break up gatherings of more than five people.

First lady Laura Bush, in Egypt last month, described Mubarak's move as a "very bold step," infuriating opposition groups that regard it as a sham. Rice's carefully calibrated message appeared designed to mitigate criticism following the first lady's remarks.

Rice spent nearly an hour talking to leaders of sanctioned opposition parties in Egypt. But she said the United States would obey Egyptian law and maintain no contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is Egypt's largest opposition movement and has been banned from political activity since 1954. The refusal to meet with the Brotherhood was a nod to the sensitivities of the Egyptian government, since Rice has riled other governments -- such as Belarus's two months ago -- by meeting with dissidents.

In her remarks on Saudi Arabia, Rice noted that three people who petitioned the monarchy to adopt a constitutional system had been jailed on charges of trying to encourage dissent. "That should not be a crime in any country," Rice said.

In the speech, the secretary said governments must protect "certain basic rights for all their citizens," including "the right to speak freely, the right to associate, the right to worship as you wish, the freedom to educate your children -- boys and girls -- and the freedom from the midnight knock of the secret police."

She also made an impassioned plea for women's rights in the Middle East. "Half a democracy is not a democracy," she said.

Meanwhile, Rice decried groups such as Hamas, a militant Islamic movement labeled a terrorist organization by the United States that has been successful in recent local Palestinian elections. "For all citizens with grievances, democracy can be a path to lasting justice," Rice said. "But the democratic system cannot function if certain groups have one foot in the realm of politics and one foot in the camp of terror."

After the address, Rice met for nearly an hour with Ayman Nour, the Egyptian opposition candidate whose campaign has been repeatedly harassed by the government, as well as seven other representatives of opposition parties and civil groups. There were no representatives from Kifaya, or Enough, the coalition of human rights, professional and legal organizations that began a drive last fall to unseat Mubarak.

In February, Rice canceled a planned visit to Egypt when the government did not immediately release Nour from jail on what U.S. officials said were trumped-up charges.

While in Egypt, Rice met with Mubarak at Sharm el-Sheikh, a resort area on the Sinai Peninsula. After the session, Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit told reporters that the Egyptian government was committed to "free, fair and transparent" elections.

In Riyadh, the Saudi capital, Rice met with Crown Prince Abdullah, the kingdom's de facto ruler, and other officials. She later told reporters that she had raised the issue of the three jailed petitioners with the crown prince, reiterating that their actions "should not be a crime." But the foreign minister, Prince Saud Faisal, responded that they had broken Saudi laws and that the matter was therefore in the "hands of the court." Saud, who said he had not read a transcript of Rice's Cairo speech, asserted that Saudi Arabia would undertake reform at its own pace and in accordance with its traditions.

"I don't understand what the row is about, asking what type of reforms and what speed of reforms," Saud said.

Rice delivered her 25-minute speech in Cairo in workmanlike fashion, eliciting no applause from the audience of 600 until it was completed. She then took questions for 40 minutes.

After one questioner raised the reported mistreatment of the Koran, the Muslim holy book, by U.S. soldiers, Rice said the United States was built by people who fled religious persecution and that it "would never sanction for its personnel to somehow disrespect the great book of a great religion." She said the incidents involving the Koran were "overwhelmingly, simply mistakes by people, not intentioned." Her response brought loud applause.

As is her style, Rice was forceful in the question-and-answer session in both defending U.S. policy and acknowledging shortcomings in the U.S. past. At one point, she cited the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., who she said was responsible for her having the position she holds now. He "always talked about making America true to ourselves," she said.

June 22, 2005 at 08:29 PM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home

Suicide bomber kills 24 at shrine

World news from The Times and the Sunday Times - Times Online

A SUICIDE bomber killed 24 people and injured more than 150 at a Shia Muslim shrine yesterday.

The bomber blew himself up in the Bari Imam shrine where thousands had gathered to pay homage to a 17th-century Sufi saint. Witnesses said that they saw the body of the bomber flying through the air after he detonated his explosives close to a podium where a sermon was being given on the last day of a five-day annual festival.

The shrine is near the official residence of Pakistan�s Prime Minister and diplomatic compounds in Islamabad.

Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam. Sunni and Shia Muslims revere Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi, Islamabad�s patron saint, but some conservative Sunni groups regard it as un-Islamic to celebrate him. Hundreds of people have been killed in sectarian attacks in the past year but this was the worst attack so far in the capital.

The bodies of most of the victims were so disfigured that they could not be identified.

Munazar Abbasi, who was slightly injured in the bombing, said: �We were listening to a sermon when there was a huge blast. Everything went black and I couldn�t hear anything.�

Hundreds of demonstrators blocked the roads after the attack and raised anti-government slogans.

President Musharraf expressed shock and grief at the killings and called for those responsible to be punished.

No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 29, 2005 at 12:22 AM in Middle East |