December 28, 2007
Named: the al-Qaeda chief who ‘masterminded murder’
Military’s spokesman sparks row over what caused Bhutto’s death Baitullah Mehsud Martin Fletcher
A notorious al-Qaeda leader named Baitullah Mehsud was named by Pakistan’s
Government last night as the mastermind behind Benazir Bhutto’s
assassination.
The security services intercepted a call from Mehsud yesterday morning in
which he “congratulated his people for carrying out this cowardly act,”
Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema, the Interior Ministry’s spokesman, announced.
In a transcript of the call released by the Government an interlocutor named
Maulvi Sahib tells Mehsud that three men were involved in the attack and two
— Badarwala Bilal and Ikramullah — actually carried it out. Mehsud tells
Maulvi Sahib not to tell the men’s families yet and adds: “It was a
spectacular job. They were very brave boys who killed her.”
But Brigadier Cheema also deepened the confusion surrounding Ms Bhutto’s death
by insisting that she had been killed not by her assassin’s bullets or by
shrapnel from his suicide bomb, but from a fractured skull caused by her
head smashing into the lever of her vehicle’s sunroof following the blast.
This directly contradicted accounts given by doctors and security officials on
Thursday who said that she had died from bullet wounds to her head and
spinal cord.
A senior Bhutto aide last night called the Government’s explanation a “pack of
lies”. “Two bullets hit her, one in the abdomen and one in the head,” said
Farook Naik, her top lawyer and a senior official in her Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP).
“Bhutto’s personal secretary, Naheed Khan, and party official Makhdoom Amin
Fahim were in the car and they saw what happened. It is an irreparable loss
and they are turning it into a joke with such claims. The country is heading
towards civil war.”
Brigadier Cheema was speaking at a packed press conference in Islamabad that
seemed designed to allay suspicion that the Government had colluded in the
assassination, or failed to protect Ms Bhutto.
He argued that the PPP leader had ignored the Government’s security advice,
and seemed to suggest that she would have survived had she followed it. The
vehicle was bomb-proof and bullet-proof.
“If she had not come out of the vehicle she would have been unhurt, as all the
other occupants of the vehicle did not receive any injuries,” he said,
adding: “It pains me, I say with a lot of anguish, that we wish she had not
come out of that vehicle to wave to the people.”
Mr Naik also questioned the Government’s claim that Mehsud ordered the
assassination. “The Government is now claiming that Baitullah Mehsud is
responsible. What is the evidence?” he asked.
Hillary Clinton, the US senator and Democratic presidential contender, waded
into the row last night, calling for an independent, international
investigation of Ms Bhutto's death.
“I don’t think the Pakistani Government at this time under President Musharraf
has any credibility at all,” she said. “They have disbanded an independent
judiciary, they oppressed a free press.”
The Interior Ministry released the transcript of its intelligence intercept,
and said that there was “irrefutable evidence that al-Qaeda, its networks
and cohorts are trying to destabilise Pakistan”.
Brigadier Cheema described Mehsud as an al-Qaeda leader who was also behind
the attack on Ms Bhutto’s homecoming parade in Karachi on October 18, which
killed 140 people, and claimed that he was “responsible for most of the
attacks that have taken place in the country”. Other targets had included
President Musharraf, senior government officials and army and intelligence
officers.
Mehsud is thought to be based in the lawless tribal area of South Waziristan,
near the Afghan border, where Pakistani troops have been fighting Islamist
rebels for several years. He has ties to the Taleban as well as to al-Qaeda,
and was quoted in a Pakistan newspaper last autumn as saying that he would
greet Ms Bhutto’s return from exile with suicide bombers.
Not a lot else is known about the man. He reportedly has close ties to Mullar
Omar, the Taleban leader in Afghanistan. He is said to run a “parallel
government” with a private army of 20,000 that imposes strict Islamic law in
Waziristan. Before he kills proGovernment tribal leaders he allegedly sends
them a 1,000 rupee note, a thread and a needle with instructions that the
recipient should buy himself a shroud.
Asked why Pakistan’s security services could intercept Mehsud’s calls but not
track him down, Brigadier Cheema said that he moved fast and went to ground
very quickly after contacting followers and was therefore hard to pick up.
The Interior Ministry released a grainy video taken of Ms Bhutto just moments
before she was shot as she left a rally in a park in Rawalpindi on Thursday
afternoon.
It shows her standing up through the sunroof of her stationary sports utility
vehicle and confidently waving to supporters. The film ends abruptly as
shots ring out. One, possibly two, guns can be seen above the heads of the
crowd behind the vehicle. Given the crush around the vehicle it seems
impossible that the assailant — or assailants — were on a motorbike as some
early reports claimed.
Brigadier Cheema said that all three shots fired by the attacker missed Ms
Bhutto. She was killed when she tried to duck back into the vehicle and
shock waves from the suicide bomb rammed her head into a lever attached to
the sunroof, he said.
“The lever struck near her right ear and fractured her skull . . . There was
no bullet or metal shrapnel found in the injury.”
Brigadier Cheema said that Ms Bhutto’s husband had refused to permit a
post-mortem examination on her body — Islam discourages desecration of dead
bodies. But he said X-rays and an external investigation showed that “there
was no bullet that hit her . . . there was no splinter that hit her”.
Pakistan’s Government is facing considerable public anger for failing to
protect Ms Bhutto. Brigadier Cheema sought to deflect that anger by
insisting the Government had done everything in its power to protect her.
He said that everybody at the rally in Rawalpindi had been searched, Ms
Bhutto’s rostrum had been bullet-proof, and “all possible security
arrangements were made within the resources of the Government of Pakistan”.
He insisted that “no political leader in this country has been provided with
as much security”.
Brigadier Cheema announced two inquiries into the assassination — one by a
high court judge and the other by the security services. He also said that
several other prominent Pakistani politicians were under threat from Islamic
militants, and named Nawaz Sharif, leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim
League, as one of them.
The 20 other people who died in the assassination included Tauqee Akram, 35,
the husband of a British woman and active member of Ms Bhutto’s PPP. His
widow, Lubna Akram, lives in Halliwell, Bolton, and the couple have two
children.
‘Congratulations’
This is a translation of the alleged telephone conversation yesterday between
Baitullah Mehsud, a senior al-Qaeda leader, and Maulvi Sahib, another
militant, which the Pakistan Interior Ministry said had been intercepted
after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto:
Maulvi Sahib (MS) Asalaam Aleikum (Peace be with you)
Baitullah Mehsud (BM) Waleikum Asalam (And also with you)
MS Chief, how are you?
BM I am fine
MS Congratulations, I just got back during the night
BM Congratulations to you, were they our men?
MS Yes they were ours
BM Who were they?
MS There was Saeed, there was Bilal from Badar and Ikramullah
BM The three of them did it?
MS Ikramullah and Bilal did it
BM Then congratulations
MS Where are you? I want to meet you
BM I am at Makeen [town in South Waziristan tribal region], come over, I am at
Anwar Shah’s house
MS OK, I’ll come
BM Don’t inform their house for the time being
MS OK
BM It was a tremendous effort. They were really brave boys who killed her
MS Mashallah (Thank God). When I come I will give you all the details
BM I will wait for you. Congratulations, once again congratulations
MS Congratulations to you
BM Anything I can do for you?
MS Thank you very much.
BM Asalaam Aleikum
MS Waaleikum Asalaam
December 28, 2007 at 09:14 PM in Al Qaeda, Current Terrorism, Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Authorities point the finger at militant pro-Taliban leader
Authorities point the finger at militant pro-Taliban leader | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
Rory McCarthy Saturday December 29, 2007 The Guardian Pakistani officials said last night they already had evidence from "intelligence intercepts" linking a pro-Taliban militant commander to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and several other suicide bombings.On the intercept the commander, named
as Baitullah Mehsud, was recorded congratulating his men for the attack
on Bhutto, said Javed Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's interior ministry
spokesman.
He described Mehsud as an "al-Qaida leader". Mehsud,
who is one of Pakistan's most wanted militants, is known to be a
pro-Taliban commander based in the violent tribal region of South
Waziristan. Before Bhutto flew back to Pakistan in October he was
reported as threatening a wave of suicide attacks against her, but he
later denied making the threat.
Pakistani officials said they believed Mehsud was also behind the
suicide bomb attack on the day of Bhutto's return which left 130 of her
supporters dead. Mehsud was "behind most of the recent terrorist
attacks that have taken place in Pakistan," Cheema said.
The
announcement came as police began the gruesome task of trying to
identify the suicide bomber behind the assassination at the start of a
fraught and difficult investigation.
The bomber's badly burned
head was recovered from the scene of the blast. Saud Aziz, the city's
police chief, said investigators would reconstruct the head and take
DNA samples from other body parts found nearby in the hope that they
could quickly identify the killer.
However, there is already deep
mistrust in Pakistan among many, not just Bhutto's supporters, who
doubt that a small cell of extremists alone was responsible for her
death. At the heart of these fears lies the long and dangerous
association of the Pakistani government and its military with Islamic
militants, in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Bhutto herself warned
before her death that there were powerful figures in Pakistan plotting
to kill her. Yesterday disturbing new evidence emerged of concerns that
Bhutto voiced two months ago.
On October 26, a week after her
return to Pakistan was marred by a first suicide bombing which killed
138 of her supporters, she sent an email to her spokesman in the United
States saying she was anxious that she was not being given enough
security. The email was passed to Wolf Blitzer, a CNN presenter, to be
published if she was killed. In the email Bhutto said if she was killed
it would be the responsibility of Pervez Musharraf, the general who
seized power in a coup and became Pakistan's president.
"Nothing
will, God willing happen. Just wanted u to know if it does in addition
to my names in my letter to Musharaf of Oct 16nth, I wld hold Musharaf
responsible," the email said. "I have been made to feel insecure by his
minions and there is no way what is happening in terms of stopping me
from taking private cars or using tinted windows or giving jammers or
four police mobiles to cover all sides cld happen without him. B."
Two
days before her return, Bhutto sent Musharraf a letter, giving names
and telephone numbers of several men she believed were plotting against
her. Reports in the Pakistani press said the men included an official
in the Pakistani intelligence agencies, a member of the National
Accountability Bureau, which has long investigated corruption cases
against her, and a former provincial government official. Then after
the first attack on the day of her return, Bhutto asked for
international investigators to be assigned to the case. Her request was
rejected.
Al-Qaida, or militants allied to the group, might have
had a lot to lose if Bhutto had as expected, won next month's
elections. She had spoken repeatedly of her plans to take on the tide
of militancy sweeping Pakistan. Ayman al-Zawahri, al-Qaida's No 2,
spoke out against Bhutto's return in a video this month and called for
attacks on all candidates in next month's election.
Bruce Riedel,
a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former senior director
for south Asia on the national security council, said al-Qaida had been
trying to kill Bhutto for many years. "If it's not them, it's certainly
one of the groups that are sympathetic with them," he said. "They all
work together and share a common antipathy to Bhutto because she's a
woman, an advocate of secularism, a supporter of democracy and
everything they stand against."
Others say it may be more
complex. "It's going to be very difficult to establish the truth of who
was behind this," said MJ Gohel, the executive director of the
Asia-Pacific Foundation, a security and intelligence thinktank in
London.
"As well as the Taliban and al-Qaida elements, there are
many other candidates - there are elements within the military and
elements within the intelligence services, which never had a good
relationship with Bhutto."
The transcript
A
transcript released by the Pakistani government yesterday of a
purported conversation between militant leader Baitullah Mehsud, who is
referred to as Emir Sahib, and another man identified as a Maulvi
Sahib, or Mr Cleric. The government alleges the intercepted
conversation proves al-Qaida was behind the assassination of Benazir
Bhutto
Maulvi Sahib Peace be on you.
Mehsud Peace be on you, too.
MS How are you Emir Sahib?
Mehsud Fine.
MS Congratulations. I arrived now tonight.
Mehsud Congratulations to you, too.
MS They were our men there.
Mehsud Who were they?
MS There were Saeed, the second was Badarwala Bilal and Ikramullah was also there.
Mehsud The three did it?
MS Ikramullah and Bilal did it.
Mehsud Then congratulations to you again.
MS Where are you? I want to meet with you?
Mehsud I am in Makin. Come I am at Anwar Shah's home.
MS OK I will come.
Mehsud Do not inform their family presently.
MS Right.
Mehsud It was a spectacular job. They were very brave boys who killed her.
MS Praise be to God. I will give you more details when I come.
Mehsud I will wait for you. Congratulation once again.
MS Congratulations to you as well.
Mehsud: Any service?
MS Thank you very much?
Mehsud Peace be on you.
MS Same to you.
December 28, 2007 at 09:07 PM in Al Qaeda, Current Terrorism, Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 16, 2006
Worldwide Terror Organisations
Worldwide Terror Organisations
Group
Center of Gravity
Status
Al-Qaeda
Pakistan
Active
Hezbollah
Lebanon
Active
Militant Sunni Islamic Groups
Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Iraq
Active
Mujahideen Shura Council
Iraq
Active
Ansar al-Sunna
Iraq
Active
Jemaah Islamiya
Indonesia
Active
Taliban
Afghanistan
Active
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin
Afghanistan
Active
Abu Sayyaf
Philippines
Active
Al Gamaa al-Islamiyaa
Egypt
Reconciliating?
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Egypt
Merged with al-Qaeda
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
Algeria
Active
Al-Badhr Mujahedin
Pakistan
Active
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami
Kashmir
Active
Harakat ul-Mujahedin
Kashmir
Active
Hizbul-Mujahedin
Kashmir
Active
Jaish-e-Mohammed
Kashmir
Active
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin
Kashmir
Active
Jammat ul-Furqan
Kashmir
Active
Lashkar e-Tayyiba
Kashmir
Active
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade
Chechnya
Active
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance
and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Chechnya
Active
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment
Chechnya
Active
Al-Ittihad al-Islami
Somalia
Armed Islamic Group
Algeria
Defunct?
Asbat al-Ansar
Lebanon
Active
East Turkistan Islamic Movement
China
Active
Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Active
Harakat-ul-Jihad-I-Islami Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Active
Hezba Nahda
Tajikistan
Islamic Army of Aden
Yemen
Active
Yemen Jannubi Group
Yemen
Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan
Active
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan
Active
Jamaat e Jihad Eritrea
Eritrea
Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia
Malaysia
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Libya
Active
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
Morocco
Active
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
South Africa
Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan
Pakistan
Active
Tunisian Combatant Group
Tunisia
Active
Al-Qaeda Organizations
Al-Qaeda Fatwah Committee
Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda Finance Committee
Pakistan
Al-Qaeda majlis al shura
Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda Military Committee
Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda Travel Subcommittee
Sudan
Al Hijra
Sudan
Defunct
al Themar al Mubaraka
Sudan
Defunct
Jamat Nasiyah Dawa
United Kingdom
Khartoum Tannery
Sudan
Defunct
Ladin International
Sudan
Defunct
Qudarat Transport Company
Sudan
Defunct
Sajana Tower Fruit and Vegetable Company
Sudan
Defunct
Taba Investments
Sudan
Defunct
Wadi al Aqiq
Sudan
Defunct
Operational Cells
UK-US airline bomb plotters
United Kingdom
Captured?
9-11 plotters
United States
Dead or Captured
Hamburg Cell
Germany
Dead, captured or at-large
Bojinka Cell
Philippines
Captured
Palestinian Groups
Hamas
Palestine
Active
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Palestine
Active
Palestine Islamic Jihad
Syria
Active
Palestine Liberation Front
Lebanon
Active
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Palestine
Active
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
-General Command
Syria
Active
Other Groups
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
Colombia
Active
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia Group (AUC)
Colombia
Reconciliating
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN)
Colombia
Reconciliating?
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
Peru
Active
Page maintained by John Lumpkin
August 16, 2006 at 12:00 AM in Al Qaeda, Current Terrorism, Espionage - general, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-e-Taiba | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
December 16, 2005
Bush Officials Deny U.S. Broke Law Amid Spying Report (Update1)
Dec. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and White House spokesman Scott McClellan today defended President George W. Bush against reports he authorized spying on American citizens and foreign nationals in the U.S. following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
The New York Times reported that Bush in 2002 secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop without the court-approved warrants that are required for domestic spying. The international phone calls and e-mail messages of hundreds, possibly thousands, of people have been monitored without warrants to find numbers linked to al-Qaeda, the paper said.
Rice, interviewed on NBC's ``Today'' show, said ``the president has been very clear that he would not order people to do things that are illegal.'' McClellan, speaking to reporters later, made a similar disclaimer. Both he and Rice declined to comment directly on the New York Times report.
The presidential order Bush signed represents a change in responsibilities for the NSA, which traditionally monitors actions in foreign countries, the Times said.
The paper said it interviewed nearly a dozen current and former administration officials about the program and granted them anonymity because the information was classified. The officials said the administration is confident that existing safeguards protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the Times said.
Congress Briefed
The Bush administration briefed Congressional leaders about the program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Court, the secret court in Washington that handles national security issues, the paper said.
Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia lawmaker, the senior Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, raised concerns with the Bush administration about the program, the Times said. Rockefeller's spokeswoman, Wendy Morigi, declined to comment on the NSA program. The NSA didn't respond to requests for comment.
McClellan today said Bush has a responsibility to adhere to the Constitution when making decisions on intelligence and has protected Americans' civil liberties. Activities such as those reported by the Times would be subject to congressional and judicial oversight, McClellan said.
``We've got to respect and uphold people's civil liberties and we do that, and the president has always kept that in mind in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks,'' McClellan told reporters. ``We must do everything we can to prevent attacks from happening and save lives.''
Publication Delayed
The Times said it held off publishing its report for a year because the administration said that could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny. Some information that administration officials could be useful to terrorists was omitted, the paper said. McClellan declined to comment on whether the administration sought to have the story held.
The American Civil Liberties Union urged Congress to investigate and said Attorney General Alberto Gonzales should appoint a special prosecutor to determine ``whether crimes have been committed,'' said Caroline Fredrickson, its legislative director.
``The administration is claiming extraordinary presidential powers at the expense of civil liberties and is putting the president above the law,'' Fredrickson said in a statement. Eavesdropping on conversations of Americans without a court order and without complying with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ``is both illegal and unconstitutional.''
To contact the reporter on this story:
William McQuillen in Washington at bmcquille@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: December 16, 2005 11:06 EST
December 16, 2005 at 02:04 PM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
December 15, 2005
Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say
Bush Secretly Lifted Some Limits on Spying in U.S. After 9/11, Officials Say - New York Times
By JAMES RISEN
and ERIC LICHTBLAU
Published: December 15, 2005
WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 - Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials.
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.
Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda, the officials said. The agency, they said, still seeks warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.
The previously undisclosed decision to permit some eavesdropping inside the country without court approval represents a major shift in American intelligence-gathering practices, particularly for the National Security Agency, whose mission is to spy on communications abroad. As a result, some officials familiar with the continuing operation have questioned whether the surveillance has stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on legal searches.
"This is really a sea change," said a former senior official who specializes in national security law. "It's almost a mainstay of this country that the N.S.A. only does foreign searches."
Nearly a dozen current and former officials, who were granted anonymity because of the classified nature of the program, discussed it with reporters for The New York Times because of their concerns about the operation's legality and oversight.
According to those officials and others, reservations about aspects of the program have also been expressed by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the West Virginia Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a judge presiding over a secret court that oversees intelligence matters. Some of the questions about the agency's new powers led the administration to temporarily suspend the operation last year and impose more restrictions, the officials said.
The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the agency can move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose threats to this country, the officials said. Defenders of the program say it has been a critical tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots and prevent attacks inside the United States.
Administration officials are confident that existing safeguards are sufficient to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the officials say. In some cases, they said, the Justice Department eventually seeks warrants if it wants to expand the eavesdropping to include communications confined within the United States. The officials said the administration had briefed Congressional leaders about the program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the secret Washington court that deals with national security issues.
The White House asked The New York Times not to publish this article, arguing that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists that they might be under scrutiny. After meeting with senior administration officials to hear their concerns, the newspaper delayed publication for a year to conduct additional reporting. Some information that administration officials argued could be useful to terrorists has been omitted.
While many details about the program remain secret, officials familiar with it said the N.S.A. eavesdropped without warrants on up to 500 people in the United States at any given time. The list changes as some names are added and others dropped, so the number monitored in this country may have reached into the thousands over the past three years, several officials said. Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are monitored at one time, according to those officials.
Several officials said the eavesdropping program had helped uncover a plot by Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker and naturalized citizen who pleaded guilty in 2003 to supporting Al Qaeda by planning to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches. What appeared to be another Qaeda plot, involving fertilizer bomb attacks on British pubs and train stations, was exposed last year in part through the program, the officials said. But they said most people targeted for N.S.A. monitoring have never been charged with a crime, including an Iranian-American doctor in the South who came under suspicion because of what one official described as dubious ties to Osama bin Laden.
Dealing With a New Threat
The eavesdropping program grew out of concerns after the Sept. 11 attacks that the nation's intelligence agencies were not poised to deal effectively with the new threat of Al Qaeda and that they were handcuffed by legal and bureaucratic restrictions better suited to peacetime than war, according to officials. In response, President Bush significantly eased limits on American intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the military.
But some of the administration's antiterrorism initiatives have provoked an outcry from members of Congress, watchdog groups, immigrants and others who argue that the measures erode protections for civil liberties and intrude on Americans' privacy. Opponents have challenged provisions of the USA Patriot Act, the focus of contentious debate on Capitol Hill this week, that expand domestic surveillance by giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation more power to collect information like library lending lists or Internet use. Military and F.B.I. officials have drawn criticism for monitoring what were largely peaceful antiwar protests. The Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security were forced to retreat on plans to use public and private databases to hunt for possible terrorists. And last year, the Supreme Court rejected the administration's claim that those labeled "enemy combatants" were not entitled to judicial review of their open-ended detention.
Mr. Bush's executive order allowing some warrantless eavesdropping on those inside the United States including American citizens, permanent legal residents, tourists and other foreigners is based on classified legal opinions that assert that the president has broad powers to order such searches, derived in part from the September 2001 Congressional resolution authorizing him to wage war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, according to the officials familiar with the N.S.A. operation.
The National Security Agency, which is based at Fort Meade, Md., is the nation's largest and most secretive intelligence agency, so intent on remaining out of public view that it has long been nicknamed "No Such Agency.'' It breaks codes and maintains listening posts around the world to eavesdrop on foreign governments, diplomats and trade negotiators as well as drug lords and terrorists. But the agency ordinarily operates under tight restrictions on any spying on Americans, even if they are overseas, or disseminating information about them.
What the agency calls a "special collection program" began soon after the Sept. 11 attacks, as it looked for new tools to attack terrorism. The program accelerated in early 2002 after the Central Intelligence Agency started capturing top Qaeda operatives overseas, including Abu Zubaydah, who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002. The C.I.A. seized the terrorists' computers, cellphones and personal phone directories, said the officials familiar with the program. The N.S.A. surveillance was intended to exploit those numbers and addresses as quickly as possible, the officials said.
In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading e-mail messages to and from the Qaeda figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others linked to them, creating an expanding chain. While most of the numbers and addresses were overseas, hundreds were in the United States, the officials said.
Under the agency's longstanding rules, the N.S.A. can target for interception phone calls or e-mail messages on foreign soil, even if the recipients of those communications are in the United States. Usually, though, the government can only target phones and e-mail messages in this country by first obtaining a court order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which holds its closed sessions at the Justice Department.
Traditionally, the F.B.I., not the N.S.A., seeks such warrants and conducts most domestic eavesdropping. Until the new program began, the N.S.A. typically limited its domestic surveillance to foreign embassies and missions in Washington, New York and other cities, and obtained court orders to do so.
Since 2002, the agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping on people in the United States who are linked, even if indirectly, to suspected terrorists through the chain of phone numbers and e-mail addresses, according to several officials who know of the operation. Under the special program, the agency monitors their international communications, the officials said. The agency, for example, can target phone calls from someone in New York to someone in Afghanistan.
Warrants are still required for eavesdropping on entirely domestic-to-domestic communications, those officials say, meaning that calls from that New Yorker to someone in California could not be monitored without first going to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court.
A White House Briefing
After the special program started, Congressional leaders from both political parties were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office in the White House. The leaders, who included the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House intelligence committees, learned of the N.S.A. operation from Mr. Cheney, Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, who was then the agency's director and is now the principal deputy director of national intelligence, and George J. Tenet, then the director of the C.I.A., officials said.
It is not clear how much the members of Congress were told about the presidential order and the eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to comment about the matter, while others did not return phone calls.
Later briefings were held for members of Congress as they assumed leadership roles on the intelligence committees, officials familiar with the program said. After a 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee that year, wrote a letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns about the program, officials knowledgeable about the letter said. It could not be determined if he received a reply. Mr. Rockefeller declined to comment. Aside from the Congressional leaders, only a small group of people, including several cabinet members and officials at the N.S.A., the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, know of the program.
Some officials familiar with it say they consider warrantless eavesdropping inside the United States to be unlawful and possibly unconstitutional, amounting to an improper search. One government official involved in the operation said he privately complained to a Congressional official about his doubts about the legality of the program. But nothing came of his inquiry. "People just looked the other way because they didn't want to know what was going on," he said.
A senior government official recalled that he was taken aback when he first learned of the operation. "My first reaction was, ‘We're doing what?' " he said. While he said he eventually felt that adequate safeguards were put in place, he added that questions about the program's legitimacy were understandable.
Some of those who object to the operation argue that is unnecessary. By getting warrants through the foreign intelligence court, the N.S.A. and F.B.I. could eavesdrop on people inside the United States who might be tied to terrorist groups without skirting longstanding rules, they say.
The standard of proof required to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is generally considered lower than that required for a criminal warrant intelligence officials only have to show probable cause that someone may be "an agent of a foreign power," which includes international terrorist groups and the secret court has turned down only a small number of requests over the years. In 2004, according to the Justice Department, 1,754 warrants were approved. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can grant emergency approval for wiretaps within hours, officials say.
Administration officials counter that they sometimes need to move more urgently, the officials said. Those involved in the program also said that the N.S.A.'s eavesdroppers might need to start monitoring large batches of numbers all at once, and that it would be impractical to seek permission from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court first, according to the officials.
Culture of Caution and Rules
The N.S.A. domestic spying operation has stirred such controversy among some national security officials in part because of the agency's cautious culture and longstanding rules.
Widespread abuses including eavesdropping on Vietnam War protesters and civil rights activists by American intelligence agencies became public in the 1970's and led to passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which imposed strict limits on intelligence gathering on American soil. Among other things, the law required search warrants, approved by the secret F.I.S.A. court, for wiretaps in national security cases. The agency, deeply scarred by the scandals, adopted additional rules that all but ended domestic spying on its part.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, though, the United States intelligence community was criticized for being too risk-averse. The National Security Agency was even cited by the independent 9/11 Commission for adhering to self-imposed rules that were stricter than those set by federal law.
Several senior government officials say that when the special operation first began, there were few controls on it and little formal oversight outside the N.S.A. The agency can choose its eavesdropping targets and does not have to seek approval from Justice Department or other Bush administration officials. Some agency officials wanted nothing to do with the program, apparently fearful of participating in an illegal operation, a former senior Bush administration official said. Before the 2004 election, the official said, some N.S.A. personnel worried that the program might come under scrutiny by Congressional or criminal investigators if Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, was elected president.
In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national security officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush administration to suspend elements of the program and revamp it.
For the first time, the Justice Department audited the N.S.A. program, several officials said. And to provide more guidance, the Justice Department and the agency expanded and refined a checklist to follow in deciding whether probable cause existed to start monitoring someone's communications, several officials said.
A complaint from Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, the federal judge who oversees the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, helped spur the suspension, officials said. The judge questioned whether information obtained under the N.S.A. program was being improperly used as the basis for F.I.S.A. wiretap warrant requests from the Justice Department, according to senior government officials. While not knowing all the details of the exchange, several government lawyers said there appeared to be concerns that the Justice Department, by trying to shield the existence of the N.S.A. program, was in danger of misleading the court about the origins of the information cited to justify the warrants.
One official familiar with the episode said the judge insisted to Justice Department lawyers at one point that any material gathered under the special N.S.A. program not be used in seeking wiretap warrants from her court. Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not return calls for comment.
A related issue arose in a case in which the F.B.I. was monitoring the communications of a terrorist suspect under a F.I.S.A.-approved warrant, even though the National Security Agency was already conducting warrantless eavesdropping. According to officials, F.B.I. surveillance of Mr. Faris, the Brooklyn Bridge plotter, was dropped for a short time because of technical problems. At the time, senior Justice Department officials worried what would happen if the N.S.A. picked up information that needed to be presented in court. The government would then either have to disclose the N.S.A. program or mislead a criminal court about how it had gotten the information.
The Civil Liberties Question
Several national security officials say the powers granted the N.S.A. by President Bush go far beyond the expanded counterterrorism powers granted by Congress under the USA Patriot Act, which is up for renewal. The House on Wednesday approved a plan to reauthorize crucial parts of the law. But final passage has been delayed under the threat of a Senate filibuster because of concerns from both parties over possible intrusions on Americans' civil liberties and privacy.
Under the act, law enforcement and intelligence officials are still required to seek a F.I.S.A. warrant every time they want to eavesdrop within the United States. A recent agreement reached by Republican leaders and the Bush administration would modify the standard for F.B.I. wiretap warrants, requiring, for instance, a description of a specific target. Critics say the bar would remain too low to prevent abuses.
Bush administration officials argue that the civil liberties concerns are unfounded, and they say pointedly that the Patriot Act has not freed the N.S.A. to target Americans. "Nothing could be further from the truth," wrote John Yoo, a former official in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and his co-author in a Wall Street Journal opinion article in December 2003. Mr. Yoo worked on a classified legal opinion on the N.S.A.'s domestic eavesdropping program.
At an April hearing on the Patriot Act renewal, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Democrat of Maryland, asked Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and Robert S. Mueller III, the director of the F.B.I., "Can the National Security Agency, the great electronic snooper, spy on the American people?"
"Generally," Mr. Mueller said, "I would say generally, they are not allowed to spy or to gather information on American citizens." President Bush did not ask Congress to include provisions for the N.S.A. domestic surveillance program as part of the Patriot Act and has not sought any other laws to authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that such new laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the Congressional resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization, officials said.
Seeking Congressional approval was also viewed as politically risky because the proposal would be certain to face intense opposition on civil liberties grounds. The administration also feared that by publicly disclosing the existence of the operation, its usefulness in tracking terrorists would end, officials said.
The legal opinions that support the N.S.A. operation remain classified, but they appear to have followed private discussions among senior administration lawyers and other officials about the need to pursue aggressive strategies that once may have been seen as crossing a legal line, according to senior officials who participated in the discussions.
For example, just days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the Pentagon, Mr. Yoo, the Justice Department lawyer, wrote an internal memorandum that argued that the government might use "electronic surveillance techniques and equipment that are more powerful and sophisticated than those available to law enforcement agencies in order to intercept telephonic communications and observe the movement of persons but without obtaining warrants for such uses."
Mr. Yoo noted that while such actions could raise constitutional issues, in the face of devastating terrorist attacks "the government may be justified in taking measures which in less troubled conditions could be seen as infringements of individual liberties."
The next year, Justice Department lawyers disclosed their thinking on the issue of warrantless wiretaps in national security cases in a little-noticed brief in an unrelated court case. In that 2002 brief, the government said that "the Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute extinguish that constitutional authority."
Administration officials were also encouraged by a November 2002 appeals court decision in an unrelated matter. The decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which sided with the administration in dismantling a bureaucratic "wall" limiting cooperation between prosecutors and intelligence officers, noted "the president's inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance."
But the same court suggested that national security interests should not be grounds "to jettison the Fourth Amendment requirements" protecting the rights of Americans against undue searches. The dividing line, the court acknowledged, "is a very difficult one to administer."
December 15, 2005 at 08:52 PM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
October 19, 2005
Secret code 'traces copies'
19/10/2005 12:37 - (SA)
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# Have your say
San Francisco - A secret code embedded in many colour laser jet printers allows the US government and any other organisation capable of reading the cipher to identify when the copies were made and on which particular machine, according to research conducted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
The San Francisco-based privacy organisation said it had detected almost invisible patterns of yellow dots on every document printed on the affected machines that could indicate when and where the print was made
Among the copiers found to include the secret yellow dots are ones made by Brother, Canon, Dell, Epson, HP, Konica/Minolta, Kyocera, Lexmark, Ricoh, Tektronix/Toshiba and Xerox.
The foundation cautioned that though it had deciphered the code on Xerox machines, it had not done the same for the yellow dots found on other copiers, but that it was likely that they too represented a sophisticated document tracking system.
"So far, we've only broken the code for Xerox DocuColour printers, but we believe that other models from other manufacturers include the same personally identifiable information in their tracking dots," said EFF Staff Technologist Seth David Schoen.
The dots are yellow, less than one millimetre in diameter, and are typically repeated over each page of a document. The pattern can be seen using a blue light, a magnifying glass, or a microscope.
The group said that currently only the US Secret Service and now itself had the ability to decrypt the imprint. It said that although the Secret Service claims to use this information only for cornering counterfeit crimes, there is no legal framework to prevent the information being put to other uses.
EFF expressed concern that no laws were in place to prevent the government from abusing information obtained through this new tracking technique.
"Underground democracy movements that produce political or religious pamphlets and flyers, like the Russian samizdat of the 1980s, will always need the anonymity of simple paper documents, but this technology makes it easier for governments to find dissenters," said EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien.
"Even worse, it shows how the government and private industry make backroom deals to weaken our privacy by compromising everyday equipment like printers.
"The logical next question is: what other deals have been or are being made to ensure that our technology rats on us?." - Sapa-dpa
October 19, 2005 at 10:24 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
September 19, 2005
Honoured at last: 'The Many' of the Battle of Britain
By David Millward
(Filed: 19/09/2005)
In pictures: the new monument
Seventy Battle of Britain pilots looked on proudly yesterday as the Prince of Wales unveiled a memorial to the bravery of the wartime RAF in overcoming almost insurmountable odds to defeat the Luftwaffe in 1940.
But it was not just "the few" who were honoured, tribute was also paid to those on the ground whose contribution has often been overlooked for the past 65 years.
The heroism of 2,936 air crew, drawn from 15 countries, is depicted on one side of the granite memorial by Paul Day.
The other side of the monument, on the Victoria Embankment in the heart of London, pays homage to the men and women who performed an array of vital tasks from the "ack ack" gunners to observers and the mechanics responsible for keeping the Hurricanes and Spitfires airworthy.
The contribution of "the many" was recognised earlier by Ron Hesketh, the RAF's Chaplain in Chief, during a special service at Westminster Abbey as he urged the congregation to recall "those whose sacrifices were just as great".
Unveiling the memorial as his wife, the Duchess of Cornwall, looked on, the prince recalled how his parents and grandmother told him of life during the Battle of Britain when there were dogfights in the skies, enemy aircraft flew up the Mall and German bombers crashed in Windsor Great Park.
"For today's generation it is difficult to imagine how dangerous and bleak the situation was in the summer of 1940," the prince said. "It seemed almost inevitable that this country would succumb to Nazi aggression."
Almost 550 pilots died in the battle, which was fought during the summer of 1940. The pilots' names are engraved on one side of the monument and yesterday the survivors were swift to see where they had been recorded for posterity on the £1.65 million work paid for by public subscription.
They included Ricky Wright, 85, from East Coker, Somerset, who reached the rank of air commodore when he retired from the RAF. In 1940 he was a flight sergeant and a member of 605 Squadron.
By the end of the war he was credited with seven "hits" and his achievements were marked with the award of a Distinguished Flying Cross and Distinguished Flying Medal.
Tom Neil, a wing commander with 249 Squadron, who won the DFC and Bar for his part in the battle, was credited with 13 "hits".
Those on the ground included Jean Shrimpton, 82, from Bletchley Park, Bucks. She started the war making children's gas masks, before becoming a gunner - who downed one Luftwaffe aircraft. "I think the monument is wonderful - it shows what contribution we made."
September 19, 2005 at 08:18 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
September 17, 2005
JTF2 targets Taliban, Qaeda
Militants killed by elite commandos
Ottawa to detail unit's exploits
OTTAWA—Canadian special forces soldiers in southern Afghanistan have killed Taliban and Al Qaeda rebels over dozens of operations in recent months as they work secretly in small units, military sources say.
The modest contingent of elite and highly trained troops from Joint Task Force 2 is an integral part of coalition efforts to stem the tide of insurgency that has risen since campaigning began for tomorrow's parliamentary elections.
JTF2 commandos have joined American and Australian counterparts in fighting that has claimed more than 1,200 lives in six months, say the Canadian defence sources.
Some engagements are long range; others close in. Some involve infiltration into enemy compounds and "behind enemy lines" — though no lines exist in the mountainous and desert terrain where they operate.
Using specialized weapons and equipment, Canadian snipers have played their deadly cat-and-mouse games at night and in the 50-degree heat of Afghan summer days.
Many of their victims — described as "murderers and scumbags" by chief of defence staff Gen. Rick Hillier — never knew what hit them, one source said.
Beyond acknowledging that JTF2 is in Afghanistan, defence officials and the federal government have maintained their usual strict silence about the unit's exploits.
They plan a Tuesday briefing, where Defence Minister Bill Graham promised more details will be provided about JTF2.
"They're doing counter-insurgency operations ... quite vigorous ones," said one official.
In an attack blamed on the Taliban, a roadside bomb hit a bus near a voting centre in Afghanistan's central Ghazni province yesterday, killing three civilians and wounding seven.
And gunmen killed candidate Abdul Hadi in southern Helmand province. He was the seventh candidate killed in the lead-up to the election. Four elections workers also have been slain.
canadian press, Associated Press
September 17, 2005 at 10:17 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
September 14, 2005
Google Earth threatens democracy
By Lester Haines (lester.haines at theregister.co.uk)
Published Tuesday 13th September 2005 13:54 GMT
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/13/google_earth_threatens_democracy/print.html
The recent news that South Korea is to take the US to task (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/31/google_earth_korea/) over Google Earth images which expose its military installations to close Commie scrutiny has provoked a mini stampede of other peace-loving nations eager to protect their assets from prying eyes.
Enter stage right Thailand, which says it may ask Google to "block images of important state buildings vulnerable to attack". Armed forces spokeschap Major General Weerasak Manee-in told Reuters: "We are looking for possible restrictions on these detailed pictures, especially state buildings. I think pictures of tourist attractions should do, not crucial places which could threaten national security."
Well, we went and had a quick shufti at some Thai military installations, and took the opportunity to scour the Earth's surfaces for other Google satellite data which might threaten Our Way of Life. We restricted ourselves to stuff which lends itself to perusal, mostly air force bases, because (trust us on this one) you can easily waste a whole day looking for Russian ICBM installations.
First up, the evidence for Thai military preparedness. Here's Udorn Air Force base, around 300 miles from Bangkok:
Move along, nothing to see here, but try Korat:
That's more like it. Zoom in for a closer look, and voila! Top-quality, US-bought hardware:
They've even got an awacs parked there on the hard shoulder:
Hmmm. The good General may have a point. On the other hand, what is Thailand realistically going to do about it?
Manee's Sri Lankan counterpart, Brigadier Daya Ratnayake, admitted it was a "serious concern if anyone could get detailed images of sensitive installations and buildings", but added: "This is a new trend, we will first have to see whether, in this day and age, if this a considerable threat to national security."
He sagely added: "In this era of technology, you have to live with the fact that almost everything is on the internet - from bomb-making instructions to assembling aircraft. So it's something the military has to learn to live with and adapt."
India agrees. Reuters quotes an anonymous security official there as confirming that "the issue of satellite imagery had been discussed at the highest level but the government had concluded that 'technology cannot be stopped'."
"We are aware that there are websites which give detailed pictures of buildings like the president's house including every tree in the compound. Our security agencies are aware of this but how can we stop technology?" he added.
How indeed? And just to prove the point, here's Palam airport in New Delhi, home of domestic flights but also government air transportation in and out of the capital:
for the rest, click here:
September 14, 2005 at 10:30 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 28, 2005
ASIS = Australian Secret Intelligence Service
Militaryphotos.net :: View topic - Caught in the act : the ASIS raid
Caught in the act : the ASIS raid (ASIS = Australian Secret Intelligence Service)
Published in:
Wayward governance : illegality and its control in the public sector / P N Grabosky
Canberra : Australian Institute of Criminology, 1989
ISBN 0 642 14605 5
(Australian studies in law, crime and justice series); pp. 129-142
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/lcj/wayward/ch8t.html
At about 8 pm on Wednesday, 30 November 1983, the Manager of the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne was alerted by a guest to a disturbance on the 10th floor. The Manager entered a lift and upon reaching the 10th floor, he was accosted by a stranger who said 'Come with me, you're not going to get hurt, but come with me.' The Manager retreated back into the lift, the stranger followed and pressed the appropriate button to return to the lobby. The two scuffled while descending. The stranger's repeated insistence that 'nobody would be hurt' was not entirely reassuring. When the lift reached the lobby, the Manager ran out and called for his staff to ring the police. The stranger retreated to the 10th floor.
Shortly thereafter another lift reached the ground floor. A group of hotel employees were gathered near the door of the lift, and the Manager equipped himself with a nightstick - a 30 cm metal rod covered with heavy duty red tape - which was normally kept behind the reception desk. As the lift door opened, a group of men stepped out. Some were wearing masks, some were carrying weapons, ranging from Browning 9 mm automatic pistols to the formidable Heckler and Koch submachine gun. The intruders moved through the lobby into the kitchen, menacing the kitchen staff on the way, and departed in two getaway cars waiting outside a kitchen exit.
One of the cars was stopped by officers of the Victoria Police a short distance from the hotel and its occupants were taken into custody. When other police officers arrived at the hotel, they encountered a bystander, who rather strangely claimed that he could explain everything that had happened, and that he was willing to pay for any damages incurred. Hotel staff may have assumed that they were the victims of an armed robbery; in fact they were unwilling parties to an incident culminating a year of acute embarrassment for the new Hawke Labor government. The episode in question turned out to have been a resoundingly unsuccessful training exercise by officers of the super-secret Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS).
ASIS, unknown to most Australians prior to its having been thrust, reluctantly, into the public spotlight, is Australia's equivalent of the United States' CIA and Britain's MI6. Although its primary function was the collection of foreign intelligence, it was also required, as a result of decisions taken by the Fraser government and continued by their successors, to maintain a 'covert action capability'. While the precise contours of this minor role remain secret, it appears that such a function involved paramilitary activities - for example, the rescue of hostages (Wright 1989).
To this end, a small group of part-time agents were recruited and brought together for periodic training exercises. The ill-fated visit to the Sheraton Hotel was for the purpose of rescuing a 'hostage' being held in a room by two 'foreign intelligence officers of a major power'. In an effort to make training activities as realistic as possible, it was decided to conduct the exercise in a public place, without notifying hotel staff, local police or bystanders. The trainees were equipped with weapons, albeit without live ammunition.
The episode caused considerable distress to a number of unwitting individuals. One member of the hotel staff at whom a submachine gun was pointed gave evidence to the Royal Commission that the experience was so traumatising he afterwards felt 'emotionally unstable', suffered from a 'lack of sleep' and experienced 'recurring headaches' (Australia 1984, p. 30). Moreover, the potential for physical harm to members of the public was substantial. As luck would have it, what could have resulted in tragedy came to be regarded by many members of the public as farce. In addition to the cost of their accommodation, the make-believe captors and their hostage incurred expenses of $70 for alcoholic beverages. Their hotel room door, moreover, had been smashed in with a sledgehammer.
It was apparent to Mr Justice Hope, the Royal Commissioner who was asked to inquire into the matter, that the ASIS blunder arose from serious lapses in planning and supervision of the training exercise. He fixed primary responsibility for these lapses on the ASIS officer (referred to anonymously as 'P/EM'), who was both in charge of the special operations covert action program and manager of the abortive training exercise. The most obvious deficiency was the failure to notify either the Victoria Police or the hotel manager of the exercise. The decisions were conscious ones.
In his testimony before the Royal Commission, the officer expressed concern that disclosure would compromise security of the ASIS special operations program.
The basic reason that crossed my mind when I dismissed the possibility of informing the police was that I was probably concerned about the security of the actual operation itself, not necessarily the Exercise, and was worried that informing the police might cause them to show some interest in our activities in Melbourne at that time and perhaps even identify some of the operatives. But I must say that I dismissed the possibility of informing the police fairly early in the piece and chose myself on this occasion not to inform them (quoted in Australia 1984, p. 26).
The officer also expressed his belief that hotel management and staff would not become aware of the exercise.
[I] didn't envisage that any of the hotel staff or any member of the public would be involved with the team and, in fact, the hotel staff would not even know the team were in the hotel (quoted in Australia 1984, p. 22).
The Royal Commissioner, noting that properly executed covert operations in the real world have contingency plans, faulted P/EM for failing to have any such plans for the Sheraton raid.
These failures in planning effectively meant that, once the final stages of the Exercise had commenced, the trainees were out of control. Nothing short of a specific order from an ASIS officer of P/EM's seniority at least, would have stopped the trainees from completing their assignment with single-minded determination - no matter what reservations any of them may have felt as to the propriety of their conduct (Australia 1984, p. 28).
The Royal Commissioner also called attention to what he perceived to be a lack of skills and experience appropriate to the leadership of such a raid.
I find it difficult to imagine that a real covert operation, similar in nature to the Exercise, would not require the presence of a leader with the experience, capacity and judgement which a military officer would have (Australia 1984, p. 21).
Whilst acknowledging the desirability of a certain amount of realism in training exercises, the Royal Commissioner contended that the degree of realism achieved in the Sheraton operation was excessive.
It simply was not necessary to break down a hotel door with a sledgehammer, to attempt to restrain the Hotel Manager, to carry weapons, and to display them to unwitting members of the public. The authenticity of the exercise would not have been compromised by a greater degree of simulation (Australia 1984, p. 24).
The Minister responsible for ASIS, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, was absolved of responsibility for the agent's misconduct by the Royal Commissioner. Despite the argument by critics that security intelligence operations should be under strict ministerial control (Toohey 1983a), Mr Justice Hope concluded that Hayden had no duty to inquire into specific details of ASIS training programs, and the Acting Director General had no duty to inform him. 'Having given his general approval for the project ASIS had commenced, the Minister was entitled to believe that the Acting Director General would ensure that special operations activities were conducted legally, properly and safely' (Australia 1984, p. 18).
According to the Royal Commissioner, 'ASIS management recognised only belatedly the requirement for better supervision, closer direction and tighter control' of the covert action program (Australia 1984, p. 23). A decision was taken in early November 1983, to place the program under the control of a 'Directorate of Covert Action and Emergency Planning', scheduled to be established by 1 February 1984. In the interim, P/EM was denied the planning and administrative support which might have prevented breaches of the law arising from the Sheraton exercise.
Although P/EM bore primary responsibility for the planning and execution of the Sheraton raid, he failed to inform his immediate supervisor of the details of the operation, and to obtain his approval for the aspects which the exercise entailed. In giving brief outlines of the operation to the Acting Director General of ASIS and to the agency's Head of Emergency Planning, P/EM implied that the concealed handguns were to be carried and force was not to be used. Authorisation for the mission was granted on that basis.
The Royal Commissioner further criticised P/EM for not making it explicit to the trainees that force was not to be used in gaining entry to the hotel room, particularly as he had assured the Acting Director General that 'doors would not be bashed down' (Australia 1984, p. 37). The trainees thus assumed that the use of force, if necessary, had been authorised. P/EM moreover, was physically present when the trainees began their forced entry, and did not intervene.
P/EM failed to instruct the trainees regarding the use which they could make of the weapons which they were issued, and regarding their interaction with those members of the public with whom they might come in contact. The Royal Commissioner referred to the failure to instruct the trainees adequately as 'deplorable' (Australia 1984, p. 39).
The Acting Director General of ASIS, John Ryan, was faulted for having authorised a training operation to take place in public, in the Sheraton Hotel, involving the use of concealed weapons by trainees. The authorisation moreover, was given in ignorance of whether or not hotel management or the Victoria police were to be made aware of the exercise, or whether contingency plans had been prepared, or of what provisions for supervision had been considered.
The Acting Director General was criticised for not informing the Deputy Director General and the Assistant Director General of his interest in the exercise and of insisting that planning and implementation of the exercise occur through the normal lines of authority (Australia 1984, p. 43).
The immediate supervisor of P/EM was the Assistant Director General (Operations). He had, however, 'only the most general knowledge of the Exercise' (Australia 1984, p. 44). Whilst he apparently expected P/EM would keep him informed, he was criticised by the Royal Commissioner for taking insufficient steps to ensure that this was, in fact, the case. By virtue of the Acting Director General's passing involvement in the exercise, the Assistant Director General was less dedicated to the supervision of his subordinate than was necessary.
The Deputy Director General too came in for criticism for his lack of attentiveness to the covert action program and to the Sheraton raid. In the words of the Acting Director General, Mr Ryan:
[W]hen you run a Branch which includes a section which is engaged in an exercise, or when you run a Division that includes a Branch, that includes a section running an exercise, in my book you're expected to know what's going on (Australia 1984, p. 46).
The Royal Commissioner was more forgiving of the ASIS trainees. The team leader was criticised for not seeking clarification of the potentially illegal aspects of the exercise, and for seeking to restrain the hotel manager. Mr Justice Hope found that the trainees were entitled to assume that they were authorised to carry weapons, but not justified in brandishing them in the presence of members of the public.
In addressing specifically the Sheraton incident, Mr Justice Hope neglected to confront more general issues of accountability of such a traditionally secret agency. However, he may have dealt with these issues in the course of a secret report. But the precise managerial dynamics of just how an agency such as ASIS is mobilised to undertake a particular task, or prevented from engaging in other activities is a vexed issue. It has, for example, been alleged that 'ASIS officers have actually murdered people in Indonesia' (Toohey 1983a).
It has, moreover, been suggested that when the Whitlam government was in office, ASIS
was unaware of the help it was giving to the CIA by lending two officers to help in Chile at the time of the destabilisation project against the democratically elected Government of Salvadore [sic] Allende; (Toohey 1983a).
According to a previously secret document presented to the Fraser government, Mr Justice Hope himself acknowledged that espionage necessitates crime.
We should not allow the use of any euphemisms to cloud the central issue - that ASIS exists to conduct espionage against foreign countries and that to do it successfully ASIS must probably infringe the laws of those countries and certainly be prepared to do so (Toohey 1983b).
One of the getaway cars was apprehended by the Victoria Police a short distance from the Sheraton. in the car the police found one submachine gun, a sledgehammer, a jemmy, and four plastic masks, among other equipment.
The suspects declined to identify themselves on grounds of national security.
At the time of the Sheraton raid, Australian security and intelligence agencies were already the subject of a Royal Commission. This of course, had arisen out of the Combe-Ivanov affair in mid 1983 (Marr 1984). The Commissioner was approached informally on the day following the raid by the Foreign Minister to request that the circumstances of the raid be incorporated into the inquiry.
Mr Justice Hope began collecting evidence on 2 December. Formal hearings began on 12 December and concluded on 12 January 1984. The report was published the following month. Among the requests conveyed by the Prime Minister to the Royal Commissioner was that of exploring 'whether any breach of the law was committed by anyone carrying out or authorising the exercise' (correspondence: Hawke to Hope, 7 December 1983; Australia 1984, p. 76).
The Royal Commissioner remarked that it would be 'oppressive' for him to make specific findings about individuals' possible breaches of the criminal law of Victoria, and to present such findings to the federal government which would not be responsible for prosecution. Rather, His Honour specified those statutory provisions which seemed to apply. The list was embarrassing in its length.
Firearms Act 1958
Possessing a pistol without a licence s.22(l)
Carrying a loaded firearm s.29E(l)
Possession of a machine gun s.32(3)
Possession of a silencer s.34(l)
Crimes Act 1958
Common assault s.37
Burglary s.76(l)
Aggravated burglary (firearm in possession) s.77(l)
Possession of articles for use in the course of burglary s.91(l)
Wilful damage to property s.9
Intentional destruction of another's property s.197(l)
Possession of implement with the purpose of using it to destroy Property s.199
Aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence ss.323-4
Summary Offences Act 1966
Offensive or riotous behaviour in a public place s.17
Assault s.23
Assault in company s.24
Vagrancy Act 1966
Being found armed with an offensive weapon s.6(l)(e)
Possessing a disguise without lawful excuse s.6(l)(f)
Possessing housebreaking implements s.7(l)(g)
Being found within a building without lawful excuse s.7(l)(i)
Carrying a firearm with criminal intent s.8(a)
Motor Car Act 1958
Failure to provide a driver's licence or refusing to state name and address when requested to do so by a member of the police force s.29
Common Law
Common Assault
Affray
Conspiracy
The Royal Commissioner saw it as neither appropriate nor as part of his Terms of Reference to make findings or recommendations as to whether specific persons had committed any offence or whether they should be prosecuted.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Commonwealth government submitted that as
the persons responsible for such breaches of state law as may have been committed in the course of or in relation to the exercise neither intended to commit such breaches as breaches nor committed such breaches for their own purposes but rather in accordance with the directions given to them by persons whom they reasonably believe to be authorised to give such directions, no good purpose would be served by the prosecution of the persons (quoted in Australia 1984, pp. 66-7).
Nevertheless, the Premier of Victoria, upon first learning of ASIS involvement in the raid, claimed that no-one in Victoria was above the law.
Nearly one year after the Sheraton raid, the High Court of Australia dismissed the pleas by the unfortunate ASIS agents that their identities not be disclosed to the Victorian authorities. The Court held that any contract between the agents and the Commonwealth government which forbade that any individual's name be divulged were under the circumstances unenforceable. The names of the agents were duly handed to the Victoria Police. For a while, it appeared that Victorian authorities might proceed, Indeed, state parliament had even passed special legislation to suppress the names of any defendants in proceedings arising from the raid, and to provide for court hearings to be held in camera. To allay concerns that the criminal justice system of Victoria was returning to the ethos of the Star Chamber, the special legislation was specifically limited to the Sheraton incident, and contained a sunset clause which provided for its cessation of operation after two years. But notwithstanding previous remarks to the contrary by Premier Cain that no-one in Victoria was 'above the law', there were to be no prosecutions. Public and private requests by the Commonwealth government not to proceed prevailed in the end. Officially, the Chief Commissioner of Police, on the advice of the state Director of Public Prosecutions, announced that matters would not proceed. It was maintained that as the suspects had worn masks, it was not possible to determine who had done precisely what, and that lack of evidence precluded the laying of specific charges.
There was, however, some justice for the victims of the raid. Shortly after the incident, hotel management initiated legal action on behalf of itself and its employees against the Commonwealth government. In an out of court settlement, Victorian Holdings, a subsidiary of Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd. and manager of the hotel at the time of the raid, received $259,000 in exemplary damages from the government (Australian Financial Review 30 October 1984, p. 81). Employees of the hotel received additional amounts which were not disclosed. It has been reported that the total settlement amounted to approximately $300,000 (The Age 22 March 1984).
The mechanisms of oversight and accountability for Australian security intelligence agencies which were inherited by the Hawke government when it came to power in March 1983 soon proved to be embarrassingly inadequate. Certainly, they were relatively modest compared to those safeguards which had been adopted over the previous decade in the United States and Canada. These sister English-speaking democracies had themselves suffered embarrassing scandals in the 1970s which provided the impetus for significant reforms.
In Canada, the findings of the McDonald Commission that the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had engaged in warrantless entry and electronic surveillance, interceptions of mail, and other abuses led to the abolition of the RCMP security intelligence function and the creation of a new civilian security intelligence agency with a clear legislative mandate. Oversight is currently exercised by an independent Inspector General as well as by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, comprised of three privy counsellors appointed after consultation with the leader of the opposition and the leader of each party in the House of Commons (Rutan 1985).
In the United States, evidence of assassination programs overseas, of illegal entry and surveillance of American citizens at home, and of complicity in the Watergate affair on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency led to the creation of a variety of oversight mechanisms (Flanagan 1985). Both the US Senate and the House of Representatives established permanent bipartisan intelligence oversight committees by the end of the 1970s. In addition, Congress appropriates all funds for US intelligence agencies, thereby exercising a degree of fiscal oversight.
Each US intelligence agency has its own inspector-general. Executive oversight for intelligence activities is assisted by the Office of Management and Budget, and by the Intelligence Oversight Board, a panel of private citizens charged with monitoring, through the inspectors-general of the various agencies, the legality and propriety of intelligence activities.
The final report on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies was presented to the Commonwealth government in 1985. While much of it remains secret, the Prime Minister did reveal a number of the report's recommendations which pertained to ASIS. These included the recommendation that ASIS no longer have an 'attack function' and that its agents henceforth be forbidden to carry out 'special political action' in any foreign countries. It was also recommended that the use of weapons by ASIS agents be discontinued, and that the agency's existing supply of weapons and explosives be disposed of. On 22 May 1985, the Prime Minister announced in Parliament that these recommendations had been accepted by the government. Ostensibly, ASIS would thereafter stick to what it did best - the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence.
A representative of the Queensland government is reputed to have recommended that Australian intelligence agents be given special indemnity from prosecution for offences which they might commit during training exercises and operations (Kitney 1985). No such policy has been adopted, however. If the Sheraton case is any precedent, future offenders will be quietly diverted from the criminal process once media attention subsides.
The Prime Minister announced additional steps to improve the oversight and accountability of ASIS and related organisations. Henceforth, the Security Committee of Cabinet would meet regularly, and would develop clear guidelines and directions for security intelligence agencies. The Committee would be assisted by a full-time Secretariat in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. In addition, the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security, comprised of permanent heads of relevant government departments, would be expanded to include the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department and of the Department of Special Minister of State.
Following a recommendation of the Hope Report, the government would also establish an Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. The Inspector-General and a small supporting staff would perform an auditing function of security and intelligence agencies as recommended in the Australian Labor Party submission to the Hope Royal Commission. The Inspector-General would be approved to act at the request of the Attorney-General, in response to a complaint, on his or her own initiative.
The lack of strict ministerial scrutiny of ASIS activities which Mr Justice Hope found tolerable nevertheless remained troublesome to a majority of government members. While His Honour explicitly recommended against parliamentary oversight of security agencies by means of a bipartisan committee, the spotty record of the agencies in question, combined with a lingering suspicion on the part of many that the agencies were insufficiently accountable under existing arrangements, carried the day. The Leader of the Opposition referred to these additional safeguards as unnecessary, attributing them to 'left wing paranoia'. The fact that it was the government, and not the opposition, which faced the risk of embarrassment from any future indiscretions was not raised in response. Whether the new oversight structures and a narrower mandate for ASIS would succeed in preventing future malpractice by Australian intelligence agents is a question which may be answered in time.
References
* The Age 22 March 1984.
* Australia 1984, Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies: Report on the Sheraton Hotel Incident, Mr Justice Hope, Royal Commissioner, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra
* Australian Financial Review, 30 October 1984, p. 81.
* The Canberra Times, 14 January 1989, p. 1.
* ibid. 15 January, p. 17.
* ibid. 16 January, p. 1.
* Flanagan, S. 1985, 'Managing the Intelligence Community', International Security, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 58-95.
* Kitney, Geoff 1985, 'Sheraton Hotel Bungle May Cost ASIS its Covert Raiders', The National Times 1-7 March, p. 3.
* Marr, David 1984, The Ivanov Trail, Nelson, Melbourne.
* Rutan, G. 1985, 'The Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Squaring the Demands of National Security with Canadian Democracy', Conflict Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 17-30.
* Toohey, Brian 1983a, 'Who's in Charge, Bill?', The National Times 2-8 December, p. 2.
* ------------ 1983b, 'Secret Report: Judge Content for ASIS to Break the Law', The National Times 9-15 December, p. 4.
Additional reading
* Simpson, B. 1984, 'The Criminal Proceedings Act and the Sheraton Raid', Legal Service Bulletin, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 194-6.
August 28, 2005 at 12:09 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 27, 2005
Spy craft take gull flight lesson
BBC NEWS | Science/Nature | Spy craft take gull flight lesson
Aviation researchers at the University of Florida have copied the wing action of seagulls to develop spy drones that can morph shape mid-flight.
The toy-sized drones are being developed for tricky urban missions so that they can zip around tight places.
They could fly into urban environments to detect biological agents.
The drones could shoot darts with microphones into rooms
You could have it shoot a small dart and the vehicle flies away, or the vehicle could change its shape to look like something else
Dr Rick Lind, University of Florida
Nature has always been a useful source for flight engineers
Funded by Nasa and the US Air Force, the unmanned, sensor-packed craft in development could be on missions in two to three years, say researchers.
By watching how seagulls alter their wing shape, and using morphing techniques, the agile craft can squeeze through confined spaces, such as alleyways, and change direction rapidly.
The micro air vehicles (MAVs) could automatically find their way to monitor locations, such as apartment blocks, where suspicious activity is detected.
Although a relatively new area, it is not such a challenge to get a craft to morph.
It is more of a challenge to do it under autopilot, Dr Rick Lind, assistant professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering, told the BBC News website.
Fly like a bird
"The ultimate aim is to have an on-board autopilot so it can fly by itself through cities to search for bio-agents."
Essentially, the researchers want to take the human out of the loop.
"Autonomy for us involves using cameras or some other sensors to tell us about obstacles in its flightpath. We can assume it will have maps, but we cannot anticipate poles, trees and so on.
"The vehicles will need to identify unexpected obstacles, re-plan the flight path and go on with the mission," explained Dr Lind.
"We realised we needed better agility and manoeuvrability to move in the city so we asked, 'well, how do birds to do it?'" Dr Lind explained.
Research colleague Mujahid Abdulrahim studied the action of gulls in flight to develop the latest version of the drones, which range from 6in (15cm) to 2ft (61cm) in size.
Other US and global teams are also working on morphing drones, such as Darpa (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency).
Its craft, said Dr Lind, would have wing spans of 20 to 30ft (6m to 9m), however, which are not suitable for urban environments.
The F-14 is the most well-known example of a shape-changing craft which can shift its wing shape for different manoeuvres mid-air, said Dr Lind.
As a former Nasa engineer, he also worked on a special Nasa version of the F-18, the Active Aeroelastic Wing (AAW), does twists its wings on command.
But the original masters of flight, the Wright brothers, were also an inspiration for the craft.
Their planes used the pilot's movements on a platform to control wing shape.
Dr Lind's craft are constructed of extremely lightweight and strong carbon fibre. The frame itself weighs about 50g, allowing for about 750g of payload.
On board is a small motor, batteries, GPS (global positioning system), a camera and communications equipment.
Eventually, the craft will be laden with sensors as well as communications to gather and send information back to base.
"A mission payload would include a mission camera, chemical sensors, and, potentially, acoustic sensors for listening outside apartment windows, for example," said Dr Lind.
"We have flown with a video camera but do not have chemical sensors yet - they are being developed by other organisations."
What the team hopes is that sensors and communications equipment can be developed to be as light and as power-efficient as possible.
Very small sensor technology is being developed, and some nanotechnology techniques could be deployed to drastically improve the technology.
"There are always smart and nano materials being developed," said Dr Lind. "Currently, they require too much electricity to be useful. But they have great opportunities for the future."
The craft is powered by lithium ion batteries, but there lies the greatest challenge for small vehicles.
"Batteries are being developed all the time, though. Every month there are better ones on the market," he said.
"A lot of development is by the cellphone industry. As they develop, they slowly come to market." Finding small, low-cost circuit boards is also a problem right now.
Swarms and darts
Eventually, the craft will be tiny, allowing them to work in swarms, thus making them even more inconspicuous, the team believes.
"Colleagues have built vehicles as small as four inches across. They are difficult to spot visually. From an audio viewpoint, they are very quiet," said Dr Lind.
Working in swarms, each craft would communicate with each other. A likely scenario would involve a "mother ship" stationed high above a city, he explained.
"It could maybe fly 20 smaller vehicles inside the city. Each small one sends information up to the ship, which can then make decisions about the job and redirect the vehicles to other areas," he said.
One possibility for the morphing craft as they get smaller is using them to plant monitoring devices, such as microphones, into specific locations.
"You could have it shoot a small dart and the vehicle flies away, or the vehicle could change its shape to look like something else. The wings could fall off, for example."
Autonomously controlled drones will be ready in two to three years, Dr Lind said.
"They could be deployed very rapidly," said Dr Lind. "We are comfortable that the vehicles are of consistent quality that they will perform in a variety of conditions."
But in 20 years' time, the vehicles will go from bird size to insect size, the researcher believes. They will, at that point, be able to morph considerably, changing colour and form.
"They will be like biological systems so that they mimic birds much more than they do now."
August 27, 2005 at 11:40 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 24, 2005
Industrial espionage and electronic eavesdropping surveillance: The Red Balloon
This is certainly a very important topic nowadays, and this site is a source of good information on how to plan.
From their site "The Red Balloon"
“The Red Balloon” Wins the coveted national 2005 Aurora “Platinum Best of Show Award” in the category of Issue Awareness/Training. Produced by Pinpoint Productions, Inc. and Charles Taylor, “The Red Balloon” is a two-hour video that delves into the depths of Industrial Espionage and Electronic Eavesdropping in the United States.Previous Aurora Award recipients include A&E Television Network, Discovery Channel, ESPN, Fox Sports Net, The History Channel, The Learning Channel, Lifetime Television, PBS, TNT, Touchstone Pictures, The Travel Channel, Turner Broadcasting, Walt Disney Pictures, and Warner Bros. Corporate-sponsored and educational film and video award winners include Kentucky Educational Television, Smithsonian Institution, News 12 Connecticut, Philadelphia Zoo, Tampa Bay Advertising Federation, the United States Marine Corps and Xavier University.
“When you compete amongst thousands of entries and some of finest video and film production companies in the world, and to then be awarded their highest award is an extreme honor” according to Charles Taylor the video’s host and co-producer. “I know that all of us, the owners of Pinpoint Productions, the director and creative staff will all cherish this award for the rest of our lives.”To learn more about “The Red Balloon” please go to www.tscmvideo.com.
August 24, 2005 at 09:39 AM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 13, 2005
Going it alone Down Under
TheStar.com - Going it alone Down Under
MARTIN REGG COHN
ASIA BUREAU
HONIARA, Solomon Islands—Federal agent Simone Kleehammer dons a helmet and flak jacket before linking up with an army escort for her nightly police patrols.
This is where her police colleagues were shot late last year — one killed, one injured — after local gunmen targeted Australian police on this anarchic South Pacific island nation 3,000 kilometres northeast of Sydney.
TORSTEN BLACKWOOD/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
In this file photo from July 2003, the first soldiers of an Australian-led intervention force come ashore at Honiara to restore law and order to the Solomon Islands. The amphibious landing was the start of a massive, decade-long intervention in the troubled South Pacific nation.
The shootings "felt like all of us getting kicked in the stomach," admits Kleehammer, 31, as she drives past the shooting scene. "But we were all here to do a job and we knew this could happen."
The deadly ambushes sent a chill through this dusty tropical town, demoralizing Australian police deployed here on a precedent-setting mission: to rebuild a failed state by reviving its faltering police force.
Australia reacted to the shootings by airlifting combat troops and arming its cops on the beat. Now, nighttime patrols are still tense, but by daybreak Kleehammer dumps her body armour, ditches her military escort and leaves the safety of a police outpost blanketed in barbed wire.
Relying on a smile and a 9-millimetre Glock handgun, she patrols with her local partners — fresh recruits from the discredited Royal Solomon Islands Police.
Hunched in a rickety cruiser, they begin a bone-jarring sweep through "Borderland," the deadliest district in this ramshackle capital.
Despite the threats, most residents of this dirt-poor island chain look upon the strapping Australian men and women in blue as saviours.
Two years ago, these outsiders rescued the islanders from themselves — from the chaos of a failed state riven by ethnic cleansing and gang violence culminating in the government's collapse.
In fact, Kleehammer is one of 300 foot soldiers in an Australian experiment that has redefined her government's approach to global trouble spots. The police deployment is the centrepiece of a massive, decade-long intervention launched in mid-2003 with an amphibious landing by 1,700 combat troops.
As they restored order, the $1 billion operation was bolstered by squads of elite civil servants reviving the moribund machinery of government, ranging from treasury economists to customs agents patrolling the airport. It is a virtual takeover of a sovereign country — albeit by invitation.
The Solomon Islands rescue mission has served as the inspiration for an equally ambitious police deployment in Papua New Guinea — another crime-infested, corruption-ridden troublespot off Australia's northern coast.
Saving the day is becoming a habit for Australians. The federal police have set up an "international deployment division" as part of its "core business," says Will Jamieson, who ran the division before relocating here to run the Solomon Islands police mission.
Australia's biggest and boldest intervention came in late 1999, when its military deployed decisively into nearby East Timor as it was struggling for independence from adjacent Indonesia in mid-1999. While Western countries stood by paralyzed, the global spotlight was shining on 5,700 Australian troops as they stared down Indonesian-backed militiamen.
Today, Australia projects its power from Iraq and Afghanistan in the West, to the Solomon Islands and other South Pacific nations in the East. Beyond the sheer sweep of territory, Australia's increasingly muscular and activist strategy suggests a country that is punching far above its weight.
Bruised by the 2002 Bali bombing that claimed 88 Australian lives and left the country reeling, it emerged more determined to ally itself with Washington's war on terror.
An early clue to Australia's inclinations came when Prime Minister John Howard famously agreed with an interviewer that he was America's "deputy sheriff" in the region; he created an even bigger stir by threatening pre-emptive strikes against terrorists plotting against Australians from neighbouring countries.
But Australia's influence is about more than muscle and sabre-rattling. Australians beat the rest of the world to the punch by donating a remarkable $1 billion within hours of last December's tsunami, and sending in the first waves of military rescue teams.
Compared to Canada — with a similarly modest population and compact military — Australia is emerging as a global player and diplomatic powerhouse. It is often said that there no two countries more similar than Canada and Australia in terms of size and British parliamentary traditions, but on defence and foreign policy the two countries are following distinctly different paths.
While Canada concentrates on peacekeeping and emphasizes multilateralism, Australia opts for rapid responses to shore up failing states — even without United Nations approval.
Canada proudly wears its multilateral memberships on its sleeve and heralds the United Nations as the foundation of its foreign policy, while Australia's government is openly dismissive of Security Council consultations that go nowhere.
Australia's long-serving foreign minister, Alexander Downer, is a harsh critic of "sclerotic" multilateralism that has become "a synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy of internationalism of the lowest common denominator."
Interviewed in his Sydney office this month, Downer restated Australia's determination to follow its own course — in close consultations with its American ally — rather than taking its cue from others overseas. And like many influential Australian foreign policy analysts, he made plain his displeasure with Ottawa's readiness to sit on the sidelines while others do the "heavy lifting."
Despite the apparent similarities, Canada can coast on Washington's protective umbrella while Australia has to look after itself, while keeping firepower in reserve for neighbours in need.
Downer says Australians are keen on looking after themselves because "this is our neighbourhood. Canada's neighbourhood is completely dominated by the United States."
He adds that Australia is more than merely self-reliant — it is also a reliable ally.
"We pull our weight," Downer says pointedly.
The contrast with Canada, which prides itself on being a "middle power" that absented itself from Iraq, is inescapably unflattering.
Despite significant domestic opposition — the country is still split on the issue — Australia didn't hesitate to send troops during the U.S.-led invasion and now has about 400 soldiers in Iraq. It is also sending more soldiers to Afghanistan, again.
Nor did it wait for U.N. approval before dispatching forces to the Solomon Islands, fearing a Security Council veto by China.
"The political will comes from a commitment to try to make a contribution to dealing with some of the world's problems," Downer says.
"Sometimes we can do it alone — at least lead the operation, as we did in East Timor," he continues.
"We did the heavy lifting. Same in the Solomon Islands. With Papua New Guinea we do it alone with the PNG government."
Australians are unabashed about flexing their muscle.
"We're all very proud to be punching above our weight," says Susan Windybank, head of foreign policy research at Sydney's Centre for Independent Studies. "We don't want our backyard to become a junkyard."
The risk, however, is that Australia is stretching itself thin while trying too hard to please the Americans, says Owen Harries, a foreign policy advisor to previous Australian governments.
Despite his skepticism of Australia's over-arching ambition to be in the big leagues, Harries is contemptuous of Canada's more cautious foreign policy.
"I don't admire Canada's foreign policy very much. For a country of its weight, it should be doing more than engaging in good works."
Additional articles by Martin Regg Cohn
August 13, 2005 at 06:41 PM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
August 07, 2005
World Population Prospects
August 7, 2005 at 11:23 PM in Espionage - general | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Intelligence Briefs: January - August 2001
Intelligence Briefs - July 2000
An Irish arms dealer - code-named "Mr Weinstein" by the FBI - is at the centre of the agency's cover-up into an "illicit weapons shipment" to China - only months after Washington and Beijing had been involved in the first confrontation of the Bush Administration over the downing of a U.S. spy plane by a Chinese fighter in the South China Sea.
"Mr Weinstein" had obtained the shipment of missiles from a supposedly "cancelled" U.S. military defense program.
The shipment consisted of "Lemmings" - the Pentagon code-name for sophisticated explosive bolts used in the separation of guided missiles with ranges up to 2600 miles.
Washington analyst Al Martin - a former senior officer in the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence - said this week that "the incident may prove to be the opening of a Pandora's Box with regard to the Bush Administration's covert and illicit policy of secretly arming China."
The FBI intercepted a rented truck en route to New Orleans from the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama. The truck had originally been stopped by Huntsville state troopers for speeding.
But the FBI had been tailing the truck from the arsenal. When they moved in, they found it was stacked with crates marked "Lemmings".
Their destination was given as Shanghai. The Chinese port has several nuclear missile facilities in its suburbs.
It was from Shanghai that the Chinese fighter took off to intercept the U.S. spy plane and force it down last March. The Chinese pilot was killed. The spy plane's crew were eventually repatriated to the U.S.
The FBI have refused to give any details about the Irishman other than he is an authorised arms procurer.
Al Martin claims that "prior to the shipment of the Lemmings, Weinstein had procured actual missiles into which the Lemmings would be fitted. They are explosive bolts and form an integral part of a missile's automatic detonation system. He bought both missiles and the Lemmings at the weekly weapons sale at the Redstone Arsenal".
It appears that Weinstein did not tell arsenal staff the Lemmings and missiles were destined for China.
That information was only known to senior White House staff and officials at the Pentagon.
Both the White House and Pentagon have refused to comment.
The FBI office in Huntsville have also refused to discuss the matter.
But Martin - whose connections in Washington are legendary - believes "the FBI agents who seized the truck were out of the loop".
Later, when Washington intervened, says Martin, a massive cover-up operation went into action. The truck load of Lemmings and missiles that the FBI agents had originally confiscated "disappeared off the radar" - as did "Mr Weinstein".
He received a cell phone call from a senior FBI agent in Washington telling him to "cool it until you are told it is okay to move".
The Lemmings and weapons are now believed to be in a military airbase in California - waiting to be shipped to China.
The CIA have supplied Israel's Defence Force snipers with 50 of its ultra-secret super-pressure rifles that fire tiny transuranium bullets.
The bullets have no tell-tale muzzle flash - but have twice the impact of ordinary sniper rifles. The guns have a killing range of 2 kilometres.
Approval to supply the rifle was personally given by George Tenet, CIA Director, during his doomed recent attempt to broker peace between the PLO and Israel.
Sources close to the CIA director say the Israelis insisted on having the new sniper rifles as part of their "defence system" in the event of Tenet's initiative breaking down.
Days after the 45 year old Director had returend to Washington, his hopes of brokering peace had failed. But he still agreed - "as a mark of our good faith", claims one CIA source - that the rifles should be sent.
On July 4th, America's Day of Independence, the consignment of rifles plus crates of the bullets were loaded on an El Al 747 and flown to Tel Aviv from New York.
Intelligence community relations between the United States and Britain's MI5 and MI6, as well as those of Germany's BND, have been seriously compromised by accused FBI spy, Robert P Hanssen.
The rift revolves around Hanssen's role as the FBI's acknowledged expert on computer software. It was in that capacity that Hanssen visited Britain's intelligence agencies and those of the BND at its headquarters at Pullach, Germany.
The British and German agencies now fear that Hanssen used those visits to learn valuable information about the U.S. software installed at the MI5, MI6 and BND facilities - and that he later passed on that information to his Russian handlers. They, in turn, passed the data on to Osama bin Laden, enabling the most wanted terrorist in the world to monitor efforts by all three agencies to track him down.
Confirmation of all this has emerged in Washington in the past few days via CIA and FBI sources. Some details have been leaked to The Washington Times.
Writer Jerry Seper, who covers the Justice Department for the newspaper, wrote: "The sophisticated software gives Bin Laden access to databases on specific targets of his choosing and the ability to monitor electronic banking transactions, easing money-laundering operations for himself or others."
What Seper did not reveal is that Hanssen, before his arrest, had played an important role in installing the U.S. software in MI5, MI6 and BNC facilities. The software was an upgraded version of a program known as Enhanced Promis, developed in the 1980s by a small Washington company called Inslaw. Since then the company has heavily modified and revised its software.
Bill Hamilton, CEO of Inslaw, told me this week that his information was that bin Laden has been provided with the latest version of Enhanced Promis - for which he paid his Russian handlers over US$2 million.
Hamilton confirmed that the BND had ceased to buy U.S. software and had mounted a "thorough review" of what had been installed.
Similar moves are underway in London.
"The technical manual the FBI alleges Hanssen gave to the Soviet Union may, therefore, have been related to the use of Promis as the standard software of the U.S. intelligence community," Hamilton said, noting that Mr Hanssen was a "computer savvy FBI agent" who reportedly was instrumental in introducing the Promis system into the FBI foreign counterintelligence division.
Inslaw battled the Justice Department for more than a decade over a $10 million, three-year contract to install the Promis program. A federal court initially ruled the department used "trickery, fraud and deceit" to steal the Promis program, but that ruling was later overturned in the government's favor.
The House Judiciary Committee, following a three-year investigation, ruled in 1992 there was "strong evidence" the Justice Depa