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US kept spying data from Blair - Sunday Times - Times Online
SARAH BAXTER, WASHINGTON
White House plot to get rid of Rumsfeld claimed
TONY BLAIR was angered by America’s refusal to share intelligence on Iraq with Britain, according to a revealing new book by Bob Woodward, the veteran journalist who exposed the Watergate scandal.
The prime minister protested to President George W Bush about the way intelligence was routinely marked NOFORN (no foreigners), denying access to the US’s closest ally.
In State of Denial, published tomorrow, Woodward reveals that raw intelligence gathered by British operatives in Iraq and fused with the Americans’ own data was stored on the classified Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).
“The British couldn’t see it, let alone get a copy, because it was marked NOFORN,” Woodward writes.
British pilots flying American warplanes such as F-117 Nighthawks and F015E Strike Eagles were even denied access to classified pilot manuals for the same reason.
“At times it went beyond absurd,” Woodward notes.
After complaints from Blair, Bush promised to lift the NOFORN restrictions, but the Pentagon simply began creating a new, separate SIPRNET to cut out the British, Woodward claims.
Bush confided in Blair about his frustration with the course of the Iraq war, telling him that the Americans were doing “such a lousy job of communications” that he was tempted to just “give this thing to the UK”.
During the first Iraqi elections in January 2005, Blair stepped in to help the country’s then leader, Iyad Allawi, when Bush refused to allow the US embassy or the CIA to “pick winners”.
Blair told Bush that the British would take care of matters and sent two operatives to help Allawi’s election campaign, though to little effect. Woodward also recounts how Bush was so intent on reviewing intelligence data that he met a junior Saudi Arabian diplomat to discuss a highly questionable report suggesting that the Saudis had been tipped off in advance about the July 7 London suicide bombings.
The memos said a captured terrorist suspect had told the Saudis six months before the attacks that four terrorists would mount an operation in London that would include the area around “Edgewood Road”, an apparent reference to the Edgware Road Underground station where one of the bombs exploded.
The suspect claimed the operation would involve four bombers coming from different countries, using explosives from Bosnia and requiring a money transfer of $500,000 (£270,000) to complete the operation.
Woodward said the memo was checked by the CIA and British intelligence. “It soon looked like another fabricator, and clearly should have been handled at a lower level,” he concludes in the book.
This weekend the White House was trying to limit the fall-out in Washington from Woodward’s disclosures. One of his most explosive allegations is that presidential aides twice tried to have Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, fired — once with the support of the first lady, Laura Bush.
Woodward portrays the White House as a “royal court” riven by feuds, where bearers of bad news from Iraq are swatted aside. Rumsfeld emerges as the chief villain.
According to Woodward’s account, he has been at odds with both Laura Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state. The first lady is said to have told Andrew Card, Bush’s former chief of staff, that Rumsfeld was hurting her husband’s reputation. “I don’t know why he’s not upset with this,” she reportedly said.
Card is believed to be bitter he was forced out of the White House last spring when “the man most responsible for the post-war trouble, the one who should have gone, was staying”. He admitted this weekend that he had discussed Rumsfeld’s possible removal with the president, but denied leading a sacking “campaign” or talking about it with Laura Bush.
Rumsfeld is described feuding with Rice when she was national security adviser. He would refuse to return her calls on the grounds that she was not in the chain of command. Rice complained to Bush, who advised her to charm the defence secretary by being “playful”.
Bush’s resistance to changing course in Iraq is said to have been stiffened by talks with Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s secretary of state.
The situation in Iraq is likely to worsen in 2007, according to the leaked report. But if Woodward is to be believed, no amount of criticism or bad news will persuade the president to switch tactics.
“I will not withdraw even if Laura and [his pet dog] Barney are the only ones supporting me,” Bush reportedly said.
Additional reporting: David Leppard
September 30, 2006 at 10:13 PM in Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistan 'role in Mumbai attacks'
Pakistan's intelligence agency was behind the train blasts in Mumbai in July that killed 186 people, Indian police say.
The attacks were planned by the ISI and carried out by the Islamist militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba, based in Pakistan, Mumbai's police chief said.
AN Roy said the Students' Islamic Movement of India had also assisted.
Pakistan rejected the allegations and said India had given no evidence of Pakistani involvement in the attacks.
"We have solved the 11 July bombings case. The whole attack was planned by Pakistan's ISI and carried out by Lashkar-e-Toiba and their operatives in India," Mumbai (Bombay) police commissioner AN Roy told a news conference.
'Baseless'
Tariq Azim Khan, Pakistan's minister of state for information, rejected the allegations.
"We are still studying the Indian statement. Needless to say, this is once again baseless allegations - yet another attempt by India to malign Pakistan," he told the BBC.
"Both the president and the prime minister condemned this terrorist attack on the train when it happened. But India also must look at home for reasons for this growing insurgency at home," he said.
Forensic investigator at scene of one of the Mumbai train blasts
The Mumbai police chief said the 11 July case was "solved"
On 11 July 2006, seven co-ordinated blasts within 15 minutes ripped through trains on Mumbai's busy commuter network.
Mr Roy said 15 people had been arrested, and that some of the bombers had received training in Pakistan.
He said the bombs were made using a total of 15-20kg of an explosive called RDX, which was smuggled into the country and packed into seven pressure cookers.
Timers were attached to the bombs, which were put into bags and concealed using newspapers and umbrellas, he said.
He said 11 Pakistanis were involved in the operation, and had crossed into India in small groups from Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh.
Seven teams, each made up of one Indian and one Pakistani militant, transported the bombs by taxi before placing them on the trains, Mr Roy said.
Peace talks
Indian security officials suggested early on in their investigations that the bombings bore the hallmarks of Lashkar-e-Toiba, a leading militant group fighting in Kashmir and based in Pakistan.
But Pakistan denied any involvement in the blasts and Lashkar-e-Toiba condemned the attacks.
India postponed talks with Pakistan after the bombings, but Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met recently in Cuba and said they had agreed to resume talks.
The two nations, both nuclear armed, have fought three wars since independence, two over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
September 30, 2006 at 01:08 PM in Lashkar-e-Taiba | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Telegraph | News | Omar role in truce reinforces fears that Pakistan 'caved in' to Taliban
By Massoud Ansari in Peshawar and Colin Freeman
(Filed: 24/09/2006)
The fugitive Taliban commander Mullah Omar has emerged as the key player behind the movement's controversial peace deal with Pakistan.
The Taliban's one-eyed spiritual leader, who has a $10 million price on his head for refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden after the September 11 attacks, signed a letter explicitly endorsing the truce announced this month. The deal between the Pakistani authorities and pro-Taliban militants in the tribal provinces bordering Afghanistan was designed to end five years of bloodshed in the area.
In return for an end to the US-backed government campaign in Waziristan, the tribal leaders - who have harboured Taliban and al-Qaeda units for more than five years - agreed to halt attacks on Pakistani troops, more than 500 of whom have been killed. The deal has been widely criticised as over-generous, with no way to enforce the Taliban's promise not to enter Afghanistan to attack coalition troops.
The disclosure that Mullah Omar personally backed the deal will come as a fresh embarrassment to Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, who met President Bush in Washington on Friday to discuss security in the region.
While officially a US ally in the war on terror, Pakistan has been repeatedly accused by Afghanistan of not doing enough to clear Taliban militants out of its border regions, allegations it denies. However, Mullah Omar clearly felt that the deal benefited the Taliban, adding force to criticisms that it was in effect a cave-in. Tribal elders in south Waziristan said that Mullah Omar had sent one of his most trusted and feared commanders, Mullah Dadullah, to ask local militants to sign the truce. Dadullah, a one-legged fighter known for his fondness for beheading his enemies, is believed to be the man leading the campaign in southern Afghanistan in which 18 British troops have been killed.
"Had they been not asked by Mullah Omar, none of them were willing to sign an agreement," said Lateef Afridi, a tribal elder and former national assembly member. "This is no peace agreement, it is accepting Taliban rule in Pakistan's territory."
Waziristan has a 50-mile border with Afghanistan's Paktika province, long a trouble spot for US and Afghan forces in their battle against al-Qaeda and Taliban renegades. It is home to three tiers of Islamists who operate freely. Of greatest security concern is the al-Qaeda element, followed by Afghani Taliban and then local Taliban.
In return for a reduction in the Pakistani army's 80,000-strong presence and the release of about 165 hardcore militants arrested for attacks on Pakistani armed forces, local Taliban agreed to stop supporting the foreign militants in their midst, and promised not to set up their own fundamentalist administrations.
The government also agreed to compensate tribal leaders for the loss of life and property, and to return all weapons and vehicles seized during army operations.
Critics say the deal is a dangerous climb-down by Gen Musharraf, who is under huge pressure from religious conservatives in his own country to curb his US-backed fight against militant Islam.
September 24, 2006 at 09:54 AM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
France, US, unable to confirm report bin Laden dead | Top News | Reuters.com
By Anna Willard and David Morgan
PARIS/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - France and the United States said on Saturday they could not confirm a report that Osama bin Laden had died and France launched a probe into how a secret document containing the claim was leaked.
French regional daily L'Est Republican, published in Nancy, quoted a document from France's DGSE foreign intelligence service as saying the Saudi secret services were convinced the al Qaeda leader had died of typhoid in Pakistan in late August.
Time magazine separately posted an article on its website citing an unidentified Saudi source, who claimed bin Laden was stricken with a water-borne disease and may already be dead.
President Jacques Chirac told reporters bin Laden's death "has not been confirmed in any way whatsoever, and so I have no comment to make."
"I was a bit surprised to see that a confidential note from the DGSE had been published," he said after a summit with leaders of Germany and Russia.
The Saudi Interior Ministry was not available for comment.
Officials in the United States, which has made capturing bin Laden a priority in its war on terrorism, were unable to confirm the account.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters in New York: "No comment, no knowledge," when asked about the French article. A U.S. intelligence source separately said Washington had no evidence this report was any more credible than earlier rumors of bin Laden's demise.
"We've heard these things before and have no reason to think this is any different," said the U.S. intelligence official, who asked not to be named.
"There's just nothing we can point to to say this report has any more credence than other reports we've seen in the past," the official said.
LEAK PROBE
In Paris, Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie ordered an investigation into the leak of the classified DGSE document.
L'Est Republican printed what it said was a copy of the report, dated September 21, and said it had been passed to Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin the same day.
"According to a usually reliable source, the Saudi services are now convinced that Osama bin Laden is dead," it read.
"The information gathered by the Saudis indicates that the head of al Qaeda fell victim, while he was in Pakistan on August 23, 2006, to a very serious case of typhoid that led to a partial paralysis of his internal organs."
The report, which was stamped "defense confidential" and with the initials of the French secret service, said Saudi Arabia first heard the information on September 4 and was waiting for more details before making an official announcement.
Time magazine said its source claimed Saudi officials have received a number if reports in recent weeks that bin Laden had been struck by a water-borne illness and was likely dead, but had no solid proof.
"He is very ill. He got a water-related sickness and it could be terminal. There are a lot of serious facts about things that have actually happened. There is a lot to it. But we don't have any concrete information to say that he is dead," Time quoted the source as saying.
There was skepticism about whether Riyadh was well-placed to be the first to pick up on such a development.
"If anyone was in the picture, I doubt it would be Saudi intelligence," a Western diplomat in Riyadh said.
"Even if Saudi Arabia had information, they'd pass it on to the United States, not France. It doesn't ring true."
A senior Pakistani government official said Islamabad had received no information from any foreign government that would corroborate the story.
The Saudi-born bin Laden was based in Afghanistan until its Taliban government was overthrown by U.S.-backed forces after al Qaeda's September 11 attacks on the United States.
Since then, U.S. and Pakistani officials have regularly said they believe bin Laden is hiding somewhere on the rugged border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Bin Laden is rumored to have been suffering from kidney ailments and receiving dialysis treatment.
His last videotaped message was released in late 2004, but several low-quality audio tapes have been released this year.
Senior U.S. intelligence figures have cautioned against assuming that bin Laden's death or capture would automatically have a substantial impact in the war on terrorism.
They note that the death in June of al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has failed to lead to any let-up in the violence there.
(Additional reporting by Jon Boyle, Islamabad bureau, Mark Trevelyan in London, Paul Eckert in New York, Alister Bull in Washington, Andrew Hammond in Riyadh)
September 24, 2006 at 09:46 AM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Conservative Party - News Story
The annual JP Morgan lecture at the British American Project
"It is an honour to be speaking to the British American Project today, on this sombre anniversary.
Your organisation is one of the most illustrious of the countless ties that connect our two countries.
Today we remember the almost three thousand dead, killed in the most callous and indiscriminate act of terrorism in modern history.
There is much we owe to their memories.
To find and defeat those responsible for planning international terror.
To do everything we can to stop further outrages.
And, above all, to make the world safer for the future.
Fighting terrorism is the most consuming concern for modern government.
I know that if my Party wins the next election, the moment I walk through the front door of Downing Street I will have the huge responsibility of protecting the British public from this threat.
It will involve action to support and enhance our security response.
It will involve action to make our society stronger at home.
And it will require firm action on the international front.
It is the international dimension that I'd like to focus on today.
FOREIGN POLICY IN OPPOSITION
It is important to take care when developing foreign policy in opposition.
First, we are Her Majesty's loyal opposition - and I take the 'loyal' part seriously.
Where possible, we should offer support to the Government so ministers can speak abroad with the authority of the whole country.
And second, we should use the time and space available to us seriously.
Foreign policy-making should not be a narrow discipline: we should bring a wide range of experts into the process.
William Hague has been developing our thinking in a range of areas, with, for example, a new Conservative focus on human rights.
And I have established a Foreign Affairs Council to access the advice of a wide range of senior former diplomats and service personnel.
It includes, for example, Charles Powell and Charles Guthrie, as well as historians and former ministers, and will help me formulate foreign policy for the next Parliament.
A MATURE DEBATE
I also believe that we should try to debate foreign policy in a mature and responsible way.
It is not responsible to try and polarise debate through simplistic exercises in political positioning.
If you question the approach of the US administration, you're "anti-American."
If you support what the United States is doing, you're "America's poodle."
If you care about civil liberties, you're "soft on terror."
If you back an extension of our security laws, you're "building a police state".
These are not mature contributions to debate.
Foreign policy decisions are not black and white, something which the public well understands.
We need a sense of balance, judgement and proportion in handling the complex and dangerous challenges of foreign and security policy in the twenty-first century.
REMEMBERING 9/11
In analysing the threat we face today, I'd like to go back to September 11th, 2001.
At lunchtime on that day I was working at home in my constituency in Oxfordshire.
When the news came that America was under attack, the first thing I thought about was Sam, my wife.
She was in Manhattan.
She'd flown there to open a new store, one that she had designed.
It took several hours to get through to her on the phone.
Like so many others, I watched those towers come crashing down.
I used to go for meetings there when I worked in business before becoming an MP.
Like everyone in this room, I looked on with horror and wondered what kind of world had dawned that morning.
9/11 was a wake-up call indeed…
…although with hindsight, the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993, the horrific bombings of US embassies in East Africa, and the assault on the USS Cole should have woken us up already.
But 9/11 alerted us all to a security threat on a new and unprecedented scale…
… to a world of connections and complexity, conflating religion, foreign policy, domestic security policy, even economic policy in an unstable mix…
… and to a world in which we urgently needed new thinking to match these frightening new challenges.
THE THREAT
All that we have learned since 9/11 confirms this picture.
Yet there are some who still do not appreciate the new realities.
They believe that the threat is no different in nature from that posed to Britain by terrorism in the past, for example by the IRA.
I am afraid that this view simply does not reflect reality.
This terrorist threat is clearly different from those we have faced before.
We are dealing with people who are prepared to do anything, kill any number, and use suicide attacks to further their aims.
These people include a number of our own citizens.
They are driven by a wholly incorrect interpretation - an extreme distortion - of the Islamic faith, which holds that mass murder and terror are not only acceptable, but necessary.
As I said in a speech on this subject in August last year, "there is no list of demands we can accept and no group of terrorists we could meet and negotiate with - even if we wanted to - to stop the attacks."
This terrorism cannot be appeased - it has to be defeated.
And as I said in August this year, the actions we must take domestically, in partnership with other countries, could not be more pressing.
Expanding the security services and unfreezing the Home Office budget.
Improving anti-terrorism law.
Deporting those foreign nationals who threaten or directly encourage terror.
All of these things are vital and urgent.
But true success in this endeavour, and true progress in making the world a safer place requires a deep understanding of what we're dealing with.
We will not defeat the terrorists unless we cut off their life support systems.
And the deformed vision of Islam which inspires some of them is part of a wider picture that includes…
…the perception by many Muslims that Islam is under attack…
…the suppression of political freedom and economic opportunity by ruthless dictatorships…
…the relative lack of progress in some Muslim societies…
…and the belief that the West deliberately fails to resolve issues of crucial concern to
Muslims, like Palestine.
The clear implication of this is that we cannot just rely on conventional counter-terrorism.
We need a broader and highly co-ordinated strategy…
…identifying and thwarting terrorist plots…
…separating the terrorists from their recruiting base…
…and winning the trust of the majority Muslim community…
… addressing the geopolitical issues that constitute direct and indirect security threats.
THE CURRENT RESPONSE
In foreign policy terms, how have we dealt with this threat over the past five years?
Broadly, the response can be summarised as 'neo conservatism.'
There is a wide-ranging debate about exactly what neo-conservatism is.
But for the purposes of my argument today, we can focus on three propositions that are most commonly understood to represent the core of neo-conservative thinking.
First, a realistic appreciation of the scale of the threat the world faces from terrorism.
Second, a conviction that pre-emptive military action is not only an appropriate, but a necessary component of tackling the terrorist threat in the short term.
And third, a belief that in the medium and long term, the promotion of freedom and democracy, including through regime change, is the best guarantee of our security.
THE LAST FIVE YEARS
We must be honest in looking at what has happened in the world during the five years that these beliefs have been the guiding principles of British and American policy.
It is, of course, a mixed picture.
We have managed to avert further terrorist attacks on the scale of 9/11, and our security services deserve all our thanks for the brave and painstaking work they do.
And yet across the globe, terrorists are being recruited in increasing numbers and are active in many more areas than before September 11th.
Hundreds of people have died at their hands: here in London we lost fifty two people in July last year.
Two of the world's most repressive regimes, in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been removed.
I supported both these actions, and I support our ongoing work in those countries.
And yet both continue to suffer appalling levels of violence.
These countries used to suffer barbaric dictatorships.
Now they suffer terrible civil conflict, and our own troops are continually exposed to murderous attacks.
Libya, once the greatest terrorist threat to the West, has abandoned its nuclear weapons programme.
But North Korea continues to make steps towards developing its own arsenal.
Syria has withdrawn its troops from Lebanon.
But as we have seen in recent months, Hezbollah still poses a grave threat to democracy in Lebanon and to stability in the region.
And at the epicentre of global instability, in the Middle East, Israel is in the slow and painful process of disengaging from Gaza, and free elections have been held in the occupied territories.
But those elections delivered Hamas to power - an organisation which remains publicly committed to the destruction of Israel and prepared to use terrorist methods.
Finally, there is Iran.
There is little positive to report on this front.
The regime in Tehran has encouraged parts of the insurgency in Iraq and is widely suspected of involvement in the murder of British troops around Basra.
It is the principal sponsor of Hezbollah.
Worst of all, it is now only a few short years away from developing its own nuclear weapons capability - and it remains to be seen whether the world's great powers have the will and the ability to stop it.
So: continuing instability in the world.
An ever-present threat of terrorism.
Democracy struggling, often unsuccessfully, to take root in the Middle East.
The threat of a nuclear Iran.
On any reasonable measure, the challenges are greater today than five years ago.
And we must recognise something else - that the way we have tried to meet these challenges over the past five years has had an unintended and worrying consequence.
It has fanned the flames of anti-Americanism, both here in Britain and around the world.
ANTI-AMERICANISM
I find it extremely troubling how many people - not just in countries affected by war and instability, but here in the West, here in Britain…
…regard America not as a beacon of freedom and a pro-democracy superpower, but as the world's worst power.
Anti-Americanism represents an intellectual and moral surrender.
It is a complacent cowardice born of resentment of success and a desire for the world's problems simply to go away.
I and my Party are instinctive friends of America, and passionate supporters of the Atlantic Alliance.
We believe in the alliance for both emotional and rational reasons.
Emotional - because we share so much.
A set of values and beliefs about the world - a common language, common institutions, and our common belief in individual liberty.
Profound memories too - our soldiers fighting together to liberate Europe; our joint effort to withstand and defeat the Soviet Empire.
But there are rational reasons for the Atlantic Alliance as well.
The fact is that that Britain just cannot achieve the things we want to achieve in the world unless we work with the world's superpower.
So when it comes to the special relationship with America, Conservatives feel it, understand it and believe in it.
All Conservatives share this attitude.
I cannot think of a single Conservative Member of Parliament who does not think the same way.
That is a source of great strength for any Conservative leader in their dealings with America.
We do not have to worry about a divided party at home.
It is precisely this strength of feeling that gives us the confidence to speak freely to any American administration.
I believe that it is now vital for our strategic and security interests that we challenge anti-Americanism.
That means reviving the best traditions of the special relationship.
And it also means developing with America a tough and effective foreign policy for the age of international terrorism - a policy that moves beyond neo-conservatism, retaining its strengths but learning from its failures.
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Britain does not need to establish her identity by recklessly poking the United States in the eye, as some like to do.
But we will serve neither our own, nor America's, nor the world's interests if we are seen as America's unconditional associate in every endeavour.
Our duty is to our own citizens, and to our own conception of what is right for the world.
We should be solid but not slavish in our friendship with America.
It all comes down to a sense of confidence.
Your long-standing friend will tell you the truth, confident that the friendship will survive.
Your newest friend will tell you what you want to hear, eager to please so as not to put the friendship at risk.
We have never, until recently, been uncritical allies of America.
We have for more than half a century acted as a junior partner to the United States.
Churchill, though he found it difficult, was junior partner to Roosevelt; Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, John Major to George Bush Senior in the First Gulf War.
It is not an easy part to play, but these three Prime Ministers learned to carry it through with skill and success.
I worry that we have recently lost the art.
I fear that if we continue as at present we may combine the maximum of exposure with the minimum of real influence over decisions.
The sooner we rediscover the right balance the better for Britain and our alliance.
This is not anti-American.
This is what America wants.
As Senator John McCain has said:
"not only do we seek European leadership, we believe it is necessary to make the world a better, safer place for our interests and our values. This means true leadership, not a group of countries that merely follows American directions, as some fear; nor a coalition that opposes American power simply because of its country of origin, as others suggest."
THE NEXT STEPS
In that context, what should be the outline of British and American foreign policy in the post-neo-conservative world?
Let me start by making clear where I agree with the neo-conservative approach.
I fully appreciate the scale of the threat we face.
I believe that the leadership of the United States, supported by Britain, is central to the struggle in which we are engaged.
I believe that the neo-conservatives are right to argue that extending freedom is an essential objective of Western foreign policy.
And I agree that Western powers should be prepared, in the last resort, to use military force.
We know from history that a country must be ready to defend itself and its allies.
More than that, we and others are justified in using pre-emptive force when an attack on us is being prepared, and when all means of peaceful dissuasion and deterrence have failed.
Furthermore, I believe that we should be prepared to intervene for humanitarian purposes to rescue people from genocide.
LIBERAL CONSERVATISM
But I believe that in the last five years we have suffered from the absence of two crucial qualities which should always condition foreign policy-making.
Humility, and patience.
These are not warlike words.
They are not so glamorous and exciting as the easy sound-bites we have grown used to in recent years.
But these sound-bites had the failing of all foreign policy designed to fit into a headline.
They were unrealistic and simplistic.
They represented a view which sees only light and darkness in the world - and which believes that one can be turned to the other as quickly as flicking a switch.
I do not see things that way.
I am a liberal conservative, rather than a neo-conservative.
Liberal - because I support the aim of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention.
Conservative - because I recognise the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world.
A liberal conservative approach to foreign policy today is based on five propositions.
First, that we should understand fully the threat we face.
Second, that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside.
Third, that our strategy needs to go far beyond military action.
Fourth, that we need a new multilateralism to tackle the new global challenges we face.
And fifth, that we must strive to act with moral authority.
Let me touch on each of these in turn.
THE NATURE OF THE THREAT
Part of the problem we have encountered these past five years is that the struggle has been perceived - as the terrorists want it to be perceived - as a single struggle between single protagonists.
The danger is that by positing a single source of terrorism - a global jihad - and opposing it with a single global response - American-backed force - we will simply fulfil our own prophecy.
We are not engaged in a clash of civilisations, and suggestions that we are can too easily have the opposite effect to the one intended: making the extremists more attractive to the uncommitted
This is not to deny the connections between terrorist activity in different parts of the world.
It is simply an appeal for us to be a little smarter in how we handle those connections.
Our aim should be to dismantle the threat, separating its component parts, rather than amalgamating them into a single global jihad that simply becomes a call to arms.
DEMOCRACY CANNOT QUICKLY BE IMPOSED
The second proposition of a liberal conservative foreign policy is a recognition that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside.
In part, this is because democracy takes time.
The transformation of a country from tyranny to freedom does not begin and end with regime change and the calling of elections.
Put another way, democracy is not the foundation of freedom.
Democracy itself has foundations, without which it cannot stand.
A great American President once stood on an American battlefield and reminded his audience that their forefathers had "brought forth in this continent a new nation."
As Lincoln said at Gettysburg, America was "conceived in liberty."
But though that new nation was born in 1776, it had been long in the womb.
It takes longer to build a democracy than the time it takes to draw up and sign a constitution or a declaration of independence.
The foundations of democracy are the rule of law, including the freedoms of speech and association;
...civil society, meaning the network of independent organisations which sustain social life independently from the state;
…an independent and impartial judiciary;
…and a free economy, including the freedom to trade and to register property.
The ambition to spread democracy is noble and just.
But it cannot be quickly achieved to suit a political timetable.
Because it takes time, it cannot easily be imposed from outside.
Liberty grows from the ground - it cannot be dropped from the air by an unmanned drone.
In the last month I have visited both South Africa and India.
These countries show that democracy can flourish everywhere there are people.
And the key to this flourishing is growth from within.
Roelf Meyer, co-architect of South Africa's new, non-racial constitution, told me why he thought the handover from apartheid to majority rule was achieved with such relative peace and stability.
One of the main reasons, he said, was that political and community leaders inside South Africa took ownership of the process, and responsibility for their people's future.
So in many ways the debate about whether Britain, or America, or any other external power, should engage in nation-building misses the point.
You can't carry out nation-building unless the people inside a country want to build a nation.
As the Republican Senator Chuck Hagel has put it, "We can help countries reach their destination but it must be on their terms and their way."
A good example is the EU accession process, through which countries have voluntarily embraced democratic and institutional reform in order to gain the benefits of EU membership.
Let us remember that it took Britain and America decades to emancipate women and the male working population, to clear slums and to conquer killer diseases like cholera and typhoid.
So we must show sympathy for the sheer difficulty and desperation of life in many countries that we would like to move forward on the path to democracy.
They face huge pressures and challenges - like the basic battle for water supplies, or a high birth rate leading to an overwhelmingly young population.
BEYOND MILITARY ACTION
Recognition of these circumstances leads us to the third proposition of the liberal conservative approach: that our strategy needs to go far beyond military action.
As I have made clear, there may be circumstances in which military intervention is the best way to deal with security threats: we should never shy away from that reality.
I thought carefully about this responsibility before deciding to stand for the leadership of my Party.
I know that sometimes it will have to be done.
Sending troops into battle is one of the most difficult decisions a Prime Minister can ever make.
I've always had the greatest faith in our armed forces.
I was in Afghanistan earlier this summer. Seeing our servicemen and women at work in Kandahar, in Kabul, and at Camp Bastion in Helmand province has redoubled that faith.
But it is not military might alone which will deliver security to us, or freedom for the world.
If we accept that democracy takes time; that it is founded on the institutions of society, and that it cannot easily be imposed from without…
…then we must put far greater effort into helping undermine dictators and tyrannies from within, and helping moderate regimes to move forward.
Bombs and missiles are bad ambassadors.
They win no hearts and minds; they can build no democracies.
There are more tools of statecraft than military power.
Intelligence, economic development, educational training, support for pro-democracy groups, international law, foreign aid, sporting and cultural initiatives can all play their part.
Britain has a huge contribution to make here, from the knowledge and experience of our diplomats abroad, to the work of the British Council, to our expertise in culture, media and communications.
As the limits of military power become more obvious, we must use our non-military power to better effect.
So force should be a last resort.
Even in a technological age every war produces innocent civilian casualties.
Every war, however skilfully conducted - and our own armed forces have shown unmatched skill in such conflicts - produces its quota of sorrow and anger, with consequences hard to predict.
The prospect of war may attract too readily those who look for quick dramatic answers.
Such answers often turn out to be illusory.
A NEW MULTILATERALISM
Whether our chosen method of intervention is military or non-military, I believe that the new and highly connected nature of the threat we face demands a new emphasis on multilateralism…
…the fourth proposition underlying the liberal conservative approach.
We should not be naïve or starry-eyed about multilateralism.
But a multilateral approach is essential if we are successfully to tackle some of the biggest security challenges we face - for example the challenge of nuclear proliferation.
Of course, a country's right to decide its own foreign and defence policy, and - within a framework of rights and responsibilities - to act alone when necessary, is a cornerstone of nationhood.
But as we have found in recent years, a country may act alone - but it cannot always succeed alone.
The United States has learnt this lesson painfully.
As Senator Joe Biden has put it:
"There was never any doubt that we could defeat Saddam Hussein without a single foreign soldier. But because we chose to wage war virtually alone, we have been responsible for the aftermath virtually alone."
A new multilateralism should have two dimensions: international institutions, and international alliances.
There has always been scope for multilateral action that involves NATO, the UN, the G8, the EU and other similar institutions.
But I believe we will need to both reform existing institutions, and develop new ones if we are to have the range of response mechanisms we need for the range of security challenges we face.
In deciding the most appropriate instrument for action, we will need to balance two factors: legitimacy, and effectiveness.
These factors tend to work in opposite directions.
The United Nations, for example, confers the ultimate legitimacy on any multilateral action.
But the very process of securing that legitimacy can undermine its effectiveness - as we saw, for example, in the Balkans.
We have seen another example more recently. Darfur is at the risk of genocide from the Government of Sudan.
Yet Sudan has been able to ensure that the UN is effectively unable to act.
So we may need to fashion alliances which can act faster than the machinery of formal international institutions.
We must also use our considerable historic, cultural and trading links with Islamic governments that seek cooperation rather than confrontation, to strengthen their position domestically and within the Islamic world.
For instance I regret that our Government has been so indifferent to the views, and neglectful of our friendship with, the Gulf states.
And from Malaysia, to Egypt, to Jordan, to the Maghreb, there are governments with whom we work closely already, and with whom we could do more.
This does not mean uncritical acceptance of all their views or actions.
But it does mean persistent engagement at all levels, and it means basing our actions on real sensitivity and understanding of their domestic circumstances.
Most of all Turkey, with its very substantial Muslim population, should be a principal ally of the West.
Turkey is a democracy, an aspirant EU member, and a key strategic partner in the post 9/11 world.
MORAL AUTHORITY
The fifth and final proposition of a liberal conservative foreign policy is the vital importance of moral authority.
I believe that the values we hold dear in Britain and America are the common values of humanity.
Human dignity, personal freedom, national self-determination - these are the aspirations for all people everywhere.
But if we assume - and I think we should assume - some responsibility for extending these values internationally, we must strive to do so in a way that is consistent and honourable.
A moral mission requires moral methods.
Without them, we are merely war-makers.
Might becomes our only standard of right.
And we sink in the esteem of the world.
If the West is to help other countries, we must do so from a position of genuine moral authority.
This means we must strive above all for legitimacy in what we do.
We need to ensure that we only deploy troops as a last resort, and that a British Government takes with the utmost seriousness any decision to send our servicemen to kill and be killed anywhere in the world.
And I believe that the consent of Parliament should always be required for any substantial deployment of troops on active service.
But legitimacy means more than going through the right channels.
It means doing the right thing.
That is why we must not stoop to conquer.
We must not stoop to illiberalism - whether at Guantanamo Bay, or here at home with excessive periods of detention without trial.
We must not turn a blind eye to the excesses of our allies - abuses of human rights in some Arab countries, or disproportionate Israeli bombing in Lebanon.
We are fighting for the principles of civilisation - let us not abandon those principles in the methods we employ.
We must not forget the lessons of the Cold War.
A firm stand military stand was essential.
But it was only part of the strategy.
We did not defeat communism on the military battlefield.
We defeated communism in the battle of ideas.
Equally, we are today facing an enemy which ultimately will not be defeated by military force, but by moral force.
We must therefore present to the world a genuine and attractive alternative to the fanaticism of terror and dictatorship.
We must not merely be stronger than our enemy, but better than our enemy.
CONCLUSION
The problems we face are unique to our times.
But for centuries politicians have had to grapple with the issue of when and whether to intervene in the affairs of the world.
I have said I am a liberal conservative.
Let us remember the words of the perhaps the greatest Liberal Prime Minister, and the great Victorian advocate of moral interventionism abroad.
WE Gladstone's famous Midlothian campaign was founded on the proposition that, and I quote, "the foreign policy of England should always be inspired by a love of freedom."
But he also warned against imperial hubris and international arrogance.
As he said, "even when you do a good thing, you may do it in so bad a way that you entirely spoil the beneficial effect."
In short, we must be wise as well as good.
This is a struggle which requires all our might and all our conviction.
But it is a long struggle, and it also requires our intelligence, our patience, and our humility.
I have set out today the principles according to which I would conduct that struggle:
Passionate support for the Atlantic Alliance within a rebalanced special relationship.
Retaining the strengths of the neo-conservative approach while learning from its failures.
And basing our actions on a new approach to foreign affairs - liberal conservatism, which I believe is right for our times and right for the struggle we face."
September 13, 2006 at 08:52 AM in UK | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
I'm no neocon, says Cameron on 9/11 anniversary - Britain - Times Online
By Philip Webster, Political Editor
DAVID CAMERON will criticise, in a speech today, a soundbite approach to foreign policy that sees only lightness and darkness in the world.
In remarks that are certain to be seen as an attack on the conduct of foreign policy by the Bush Administration, supported by Tony Blair, the Tory leader will say that humility and patience have been absent from the making of foreign policy in recent years.
In a reference to elements of the US Administration, Mr Cameron, speaking on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on America, will say pointedly that he is a liberal conservative, not a neoconservative.
In his most substantial address on security policy, Mr Cameron will make a fierce attack on anti-Americanism, which he will say is an “intellectual and moral surrender”. Sources close to the Tory leader said that his words did not mark any weakening in his support for the Iraq war, but they are nevertheless controversial after recent efforts to build bridges with the Republicans.
Mr Cameron will say that the international security challenges are greater today than five years ago. “I find it extremely troubling how many people, not just in countries affected by war and instability, but here in the West, here in Britain, regard America as the world’s worst power. Anti-Americanism represents an intellectual and moral surrender. It is a complacent cowardice born of resentment of success and a desire for the world’s problems simply to go away.”
Mr Cameron will say that he and his party are instinctive friends of America, and passionate supporters of the Atlantic alliance. “We believe in that alliance for emotional, historical and rational reasons . . . So when it comes to the special relationship with America, Conservatives feel it, understand it and believe in it.”
He will add: “We do not have to worry about a divided party at home. It is precisely this strength of feeling that gives us the confidence to speak freely to any American Administration. I believe that it is now vital for our strategic and security interests that we challenge anti-Americanism. That means reviving the best traditions of the special relationship. And it means developing with America a tough and effective foreign policy for the age of international terrorism: a policy that moves beyond neo conservatism, retaining its strengths but learning from its failures.”
He will say that humility and patience have been missing from foreign policy in the past five years. “These are not war-like words,” he will say. “They are not so glamorous and exciting as the easy soundbites we have grown used to in recent years. But these soundbites had the failing of all foreign policy designed to fit into a headline. They were unrealistic and simplistic. They represented a view which sees only light and darkness in the world and which believes that one can be turned to the other as simply as flicking a switch. I do not see things that way. I am a liberal conservative, rather than a neoconservative.”
Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat leader, said: “The sense of unity reflected by the headline in Le Monde stating ‘We are all Americans now’ was unique. The campaign against terrorism has unfortunately not been characterised by that same spirit.
“Our thoughts are with those who perished in New York and all of those who have been a victim of terrorism since. I remain firmly convinced that concerted international action based upon the rule of law and in the name of the UN remains our best defence.”
September 11, 2006 at 12:06 AM in UK | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
National Strategy For Combating Terrorism
September 2006
Image of the Front Cover - National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Link to Full PDF Document Full PDF Document (1.64 MB)
1. Overview of America’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
2. Today’s Realities in the War on Terror
* Successes
* Challenges
3. Today’s Terrorist Enemy
4. Strategic Vision for the War on Terror
5. Strategy for Winning the War on Terror
* Long-term approach: Advancing effective democracy
* Over the short term: Four priorities of action
o Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
o Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them
o Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states
o Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror
6. Institutionalizing Our Strategy for Long-term Success
7. Conclusion
September 6, 2006 at 02:24 AM in US | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Telegraph | Expat | The ill-fated battle for Indian independence
Jad Adams reviews The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition by Narendra Singh Sarila.
The partition of India was one of the great humanitarian disasters of the 20th century, the massacre of perhaps half a million people, a number that seems all the more terrible because it had been preceded by a liberation campaign that stressed non-violence, and it followed a peaceful transfer of authority by the British.
Narendra Singh Sarila, a former ADC to Lord Mountbatten and a senior Indian civil servant of penetrating intelligence, shines a light on the diplomatic world of hints, pressures and concealed motives on the route to partition that he has uncovered through painstaking research in archives in the USA and Britain. A refreshing number of his sources have the feel of the recently released or long-hidden about them.
This story has been told as a tale of heroes (Nehru and Gandhi) and villains (Jinnah and Churchill), but Sarila presents it as a series of blunders: by Nehru and the Congress Party, mainly, for relinquishing their political control over the majority of the country in a petulant refusal to join with the British in the war effort in 1939; and for their rejection of the British offer of eventual self-government in 1942. Every retreat they made was an advance for Jinnah and the Muslim League, which at the start of the war did not represent even a quarter of Muslim voters yet was able to demand the partition of the nation on religious lines at the end of it.
Sarila charges Congress leaders, some of whom he knew personally, with 'arrogance', 'inconsistency,' 'poor political judgement' and a fatal lack of interest in foreign affairs and defence. These are tough words, but they needed to be said by someone who has India's interests at heart.
Gandhi's blend of mysticism and Hindu reformism kept India enthralled but not all Indians were bewitched; it is salutary to see the Mahatma being referred to by the prime minister of Travancore as a 'dangerous, semi-repressed sex maniac'.
Sarila is contemptuous of Jinnah's vanity and love of luxury but always gives him his due; when Congress Party leaders were vacillating, uncertain whether non-violence or independence was more important to them, Jinnah was direct and single-minded: only an independent Pakistan would do. He was a man with whom the British could do business, the Congress leaders were not.
Sarila's contribution to scholarship is to emphasise the role of British strategic interests in the region; a continuation of the 'Great Game' of keeping Russia out of the subcontinent, in order to safeguard the oil fields of the Middle East, the 'wells of power'. Thus the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, put forward a plan as early as February 1946 for the creation of a Pakistan which would accept British military requirements when it was uncertain whether a new India under the Congress Party would even be in the Commonwealth.
Pathetically, Congress leaders actually believed their own propaganda, that independence for India would inaugurate a period of high-mindedness in government and principled interactions between nations. Even before full independence, the Indian delegation to the United Nations was exercising the moral scourge in attacking South Africa over apartheid, at a time when divisions at home were about to break out in bloody madness.
Real diplomacy was less idealistic: Sarila has uncovered communications showing how Churchill deliberately misled our American allies as to the proportion of Muslims in the Indian army when the US were lobbying for Indian independence. Playing on American self-interest, he stressed the need to keep the Muslims 'on side' in the war against Japan; something it would be harder to do if they felt they were fighting for a Hindu-ruled India.
Thus was India dismembered, with a little help from its princes. The Maharaja of Kashmir was asked by Mountbatten's chief of staff about the future of his province but 'all he would talk about was polo ... and the prospect of his colt in the Indian Derby'. Of such derelictions of duty are massacres made.
September 4, 2006 at 10:33 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home