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November 30, 2005
Government lied to cover up war crimes in 1975 invasion of island
World news from The Times and the Sunday Times - Times Online
By Richard Lloyd Parry
THE British Government knowingly lied about Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, including the killing of British journalists in 1975, according to newly released diplomatic documents.
In a startling insight into foreign complicity in Indonesia’s invasion of the former Portuguese colony, the documents show that Britain used its position as chair of the United Nations Security Council to “keep the heat out of the Timor business” in discussions in the UN.
The documents have been obtained after a long-running campaign by relatives and supporters of Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie, two British journalists who were working for Australian television. In October 1975, along with three colleagues from Australia and New Zealand, they were killed while filming a clandestine attack on East Timorese soldiers in the town of Balibo by Indonesian soldiers and East Timorese opposed to independence.
Witness reports suggest that they were murdered in order to prevent evidence of Indonesia’s covert war on East Timor from being broadcast to the outside world. Their bodies were immediately burnt and nothing more than a few charred bones has been recovered. Public opinion in Australia was outraged by the deaths of the men.
But Sir John Ford, Britain’s Ambassador in Jakarta, asked the Australian Embassy to refrain from pressing the Indonesians for details of their deaths. “We have suggested to the Australians that, since we, in fact, know what happened to the newsmen it is pointless to go on demanding information from the Indonesians which they cannot, or are unwilling to provide,” Sir John wrote. “Since no protests will produce the journalists’ bodies I think we should ourselves avoid representations about them.”
His cable, dated eight days after the deaths of the so-called Balibo Five, ends by suggesting that the journalists were responsible for their own deaths. “They were in the war zone of their own choice,” he wrote.
In the Cold War atmosphere of 1975, after the US defeat in Vietnam, Indonesia’s status as a pro-Western, anti-communist leader was far more important to Britain than justice for tiny and obscure East Timor.
The documents show that Britain’s main priority was to prevent the issue from outraging British public opinion. “Timor was high on (US National Security Adviser) Henry Kissinger’s list of places where the US do not want to comment or get involved,” Sir John wrote in October 1975 before the invasion.
“I am sure we should continue to follow the American example.” On Christmas Eve 1975, in a cable copied to 10 Downing Street, Sir John said: “Once the Indonesians had established themselves in Dili (the East Timorese capital) they went on a rampage of looting and killing . . . If asked to comment on any stories of atrocities I suggest we say that we have no information.”
Sir John told The Times last night that he could not remember writing the cable. He suggested, however, that the source who had told the diplomats about the atrocities may not have been regarded as reliable.
At New Year, Sir John counselled his Indonesian counterparts to brace themselves for stories of atrocities. “Sooner or later news of (the atrocities) was bound to leak . . . I thought it was important that the Indonesians should prepare for this eventuality.”
Britain’s complicity in the Indonesian invasion went beyond merely suppressing information. The documents record the warm thanks officials received from Indonesia for ensuring that the statement of condemnation in the UN was relatively mild. In February 1976 Murray Simons, head of the South-East Asia Department at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, wrote that “the Indonesians were evidently much gratified at the way in which the British delegation took account of their interests, and considered that the language was one they could quite well live with”.
So successfully was the Indonesian invasion buried as a source of international scandal that Britain’s own UN mission expressed misgivings — the fear was that by colluding in the illegal annexation of a former colony, Britain would leave its own possessions vulnerable to similar attack, particularly the Falklands.
“In the real world it is probably both inevitable and understandable that Timor should be incorporated into Indonesia,” Andrew Stuart, of the British Embassy, wrote in February 1976. “The Timorese as a whole will not lose by this.” By 1999, when they finally gained their freedom, about 200,000 of them had been killed.
OFFICIAL SECRET
“I’m assuming you’re really going to keep your mouth shut on this subject?”
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to his staff in October 1975 in response to reports that Indonesia had attacked East Timor
“They were in the war zone of their own choice.”
Sir John Ford, on the journalists killed filing the clandestine Indonesian invasion
“We had successfully managed to keep the heat out of the Timor business in New York.”
Sir John Ford on Britain’s role in the debate on Indonesia in the UN Security Council
“The Indonesians ... went on a rampage of looting and killing ... I suggest we say that we have no information.”
Sir John Ford on the invasion of East Timor
“A primitive territory.”
Murray Simons, head of the Foreign Office’s South-east Asia Department, on East Timor
“Britain’s interests indicated a low profile ... This policy has paid off handsomely. The lack of involvement has largely kept Timor out of the British and US headlines”.
FCO report on East Timor
November 30, 2005 at 12:58 AM in UK | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Afghans Confront Surge in Violence
Afghans Confront Surge in Violence
Foreign Support Seen Behind Attacks That Mimic Those in Iraq
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 28, 2005; Page A01
KABUL, Afghanistan, Nov. 27 -- An onslaught of grisly and sophisticated attacks since parliamentary elections in September has left Afghan and international officials concerned that Taliban guerrillas are obtaining support from abroad to carry out strikes that increasingly mimic insurgent tactics in Iraq.
The recent attacks -- including at least nine suicide bombings -- have shown unusual levels of coordination, technological knowledge and blood lust, according to officials. Although military forces and facilities have been the most common targets, religious leaders, judges, police officers and foreign reconstruction workers have also fallen prey to the violence.
The success of the September vote, which was relatively peaceful despite Taliban threats of sabotage, initially raised hopes that the insurgency was losing strength. But after two of the bloodiest months since U.S. forces entered Kabul in 2001, officials now say the Taliban might have been using that time to marshal foreign support and plot new ways to undermine the Western-backed government.
The attacks have been particularly noteworthy for their use of suicide bombers. Some have struck in waves, with one explosive-laden car following the next in an effort to maximize casualties. That sort of attack has been a hallmark of al Qaeda and a regular occurrence in Iraq. But in Afghanistan, suicide attacks of any kind have been relatively rare, despite a quarter-century of warfare.
Attackers have also shown a growing appetite for strikes in cities, particularly Kabul, setting residents' nerves on edge and leading them to take new security precautions at work, home and social events.
At a wedding Saturday, armed Afghan police officers meticulously searched guests before they were allowed to enter -- a practice unknown here until recent months. "Maybe somebody will bring a bomb and explode it at the wedding," said Nasrullah, a guest in his fifties who, like many Afghans, uses only one name. "It used to be that we could trust people. But right now, we cannot trust."
Col. Jim Yonts, spokesman for the U.S. military in Afghanistan, said the Taliban is resorting to suicide attacks and remote-controlled bombings in urban areas "out of desperation" as it continues to lose ground -- and men -- to international forces in the mountains and other rural areas. "They only lose one person in a suicide attack, not 10 or 15," as they would in battle, he said.
But Yonts acknowledged "grave concern" among U.S. officials over the idea that the Taliban might be taking a page from Iraqi insurgents' playbook by attacking with explosives in cities.
Afghan officials said the recent attacks demonstrate that the Taliban fighters are continuing to receive considerable outside assistance, such as advanced explosives and computerized timing devices that are being used to build more devastating bombs.
"There has been . . . more money and more weapons flowing into their hands in recent months," Defense Minister Rahim Wardak said in a recent interview with the Associated Press. "We see similarities between the type of attacks here and in Iraq."
In the past two weeks, Afghanistan has experienced near-daily attacks. Among the incidents:
Eight civilians and a German soldier were killed when two cars -- one coming minutes after the other -- plowed into crowds in Kabul. Soldiers thwarted a suspected third attack when they shot and killed the driver of a car speeding toward the scene.
An Indian truck driver was taken hostage while working on a road reconstruction project in Nimruz province in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban later asserted it had killed him when a deadline passed for the worker's company to agree to abandon its operations in Afghanistan. Villagers found his nearly decapitated body the following day.
Two U.S. soldiers were killed by separate roadside bombs, bringing the number of American troops killed in Afghanistan this year close to 90 -- double the total in 2004. A Portuguese soldier and a Swedish soldier were also killed in bombings.
Insurgents burned down a police headquarters in eastern Afghanistan and took five Afghan officers hostage. Dozens more Afghans across the country were killed by bombs planted in homes, or in suicide attacks and ambushes.
The level of violence in Afghanistan is still nowhere near that in Iraq. The insurgency here is generally considered to have far less public support and to be less capable of pulling off attacks that cause mass casualties. Reconstruction projects are ongoing in most parts of the country, and Westerners can move freely in many areas with little fear of violence.
"Compared to Iraq, where the suicide bomber is such a cheap commodity they could throw them at almost any target, that's not where we are here," said U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann, noting that the bombers have been a mix of Afghans and foreigners.
Neumann said he did not believe the stepped-up attacks were a sign of widening Taliban support, but rather represented "a change in tactics and in targets, which makes the violence more evident."
But the increased violence has added another obstacle to the country's reconstruction effort, still struggling nearly four years after the overthrow of Taliban rule and the conference of international officials and Afghan leaders in Bonn that charted Afghanistan's democratization process.
"We've seen a deterioration in the security situation. And that's something that all of us who work here are worried about," said Adrian Edwards, the Kabul-based U.N. spokesman. "I don't think any of us [at Bonn] would have expected that this kind of security environment is something we would be faced with four years down the road," he said.
Gen. Zaher Azimi, spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, said he believes one reason the Taliban has become especially active is that the road map to democracy outlined in Bonn is nearly complete, with the new parliament set to convene in December. "That makes the enemies of Afghanistan upset," he said.
The enemies of Afghanistan, according to government officials, include not just the Taliban, but also militant Islamic groups worldwide -- especially al Qaeda -- that have had a reciprocal relationship with the Taliban for the past decade. Taliban authorities used foreign financial and military support in the 1990s to defeat their domestic opponents; in turn, international terrorists, Osama bin Laden among them, received sanctuary here.
The recent spate of urban violence has alarmed Afghans, even after years of exposure to civil strife and warfare.
"This is the worst security that we've had," said Abdul Karim, 26, who drives a construction crane and used to work at a job site on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad. He has refused to return to the site since nine people were killed in an attack there two weeks ago. "I'm too worried about suicide bombers," he said.
Nafisa Faqirzada, a 43-year-old high school teacher, said she believes the suicide attacks are the work of foreigners who follow the teachings of bin Laden, because "Afghans know that a suicide attack is forbidden in Islam."
Faqirzada said she wants U.S. soldiers to stay in Afghanistan and help keep the peace, but she also blames them -- both for failing to catch bin Laden and for exposing her to risk through their presence. "The suicide bombers won't do anything to me because I'm a common woman," she said. "But if I see the American military, I worry because maybe someone will try to blow them up, and I will get hurt."
But other Kabul residents said they had other, more immediate concerns. Abdul Rauf, 41, said he had heard about the recent suicide bombings, but was far more worried about how he would buy firewood and food for his six children this winter on the $120 a month he makes repairing shoes.
"What will I do with security if I don't have food to eat, and don't have work to do?" Rauf said.
November 30, 2005 at 12:50 AM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
CIA black sitres - Europe and Asia
Graphic courtesy of The Times.
0,,247558,00.jpg (JPEG Image, 750x927 pixels)
November 30, 2005 at 12:34 AM in CIA | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Europe demands answers on CIA and the secret terror jails
Europe demands answers on CIA and the secret terror jails - World - Times Online
By Anthony Browne
More and more Governments are preparing to challenge US over alleged ‘black sites’
WHEN Condoleezza Rice tours Europe next week, she will fly into an extraordinary storm over US — or at least alleged US — counter-terrorism practices that threatens to send the still fragile transatlantic relationship into a tailspin.
Allegations that the CIA has been conducting clandestine operations across Europe were sparked by an article in The Washington Post and have multiplied so rapidly that they have now engulfed most European Governments.
The allegations are potentially devastating, an abuse of national sovereignty and of human rights: that the CIA has illegally abducted terrorist suspects in Europe, covertly used European airports for transporting terrorist suspects and has been interrogating them in secret prisons — “black sites” — in Europe.
The row has been fuelled by Washington’s steadfast refusal to confirm or deny the allegations. European Governments have become increasingly vociferous in demanding answers: eight, including Britain, have appealed directly to the US for “clarification”, a dozen are conducting internal investigations and the Council of Europe, an intergovernmental human rights body, has opened a pancontinental inquiry.
The European Commission has sought answers from Washington, which has replied that it needs “time to evaluate the situation”.
The controversy is dogging the US Secretary of State even before she arrives in Europe: it was on the agenda of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the new German Foreign Minister, on his first official visit to America yesterday. On arrival he raised the matter with Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary- General, saying: “I presume the seriousness of these (accusations) is being recognised in Washington.”
When the allegations first erupted, the US Administration all but admitted that the “black sites” existed.
Dr Rice dodged the matter yesterday in a newspaper interview before her trip to Brussels, Poland and Romania, but said: “We have never fought a war like this before where . . . you can’t allow someone to commit the crime before you detain them. Because if they commit the crime, thousands of innocent people die.”
The row is frustrated by the lack of denial on one side and the lack of firm evidence on the other, but it could have widespread repercussions.
The Netherlands has given warning that if true, the allegations would have serious consequences for its participation in military operations in Afghanistan.
On Monday the European Commission threatened political sanctions, including the potential loss of voting rights, against any EU member that harboured CIA prisons, declaring them a violation of the EU’s human rights values. The EU had warned applicant countries that their membership talks would be suspended if they had secret CIA sites.
The Washington Post article alleged that the CIA has been interrogating suspects in secret prisons in various countries around the world, including unnamed “Eastern European democracies”.
Eastern European countries lined up to plead innocence, but the US group Human Rights Watch said it was practically convinced that the allegations were true. It cited flight details that pointed to CIA activity in two former Soviet bases, one in Poland and one in Romania. The Polish and Romanian Governments have strongly denied the charge, with Aleksander Kwasniewski, the outgoing Polish President, saying: “Such prisons do not exist on Polish territory . . . and there have not been any.”
There was then a spate of reports that the CIA had been covertly using European airports to transport terrorist suspects around the world, in so-called extraordinary renditions — secretly moving suspects from one territory to another for interrogation that may include torture.
The Spanish media said that CIA flights had landed at least ten times at airports in the country this year and last. It was reported in Germany that the CIA had operated 85 flights through the country. Baghdad, Kabul and Amman, the Jordanian capital, were the usual points of origin and destination.
The Council of Europe’s investigator, Dick Marty, is examining 31 suspect flights. He said that large-scale CIA bases were unlikely, but that it was possible that detainees had been held for up to 30 days.
Asked whether it was just an excuse to bash the United States, he said: “This is absolutely not a crusade against America.”
But the most serious allegations against the CIA are that it has been abducting suspects in Europe. German prosecutors are investigating the alleged CIA kidnapping of Khaled Masri in Macedonia in 2003. Mr Masri, who is of Lebanese origin, says that he was flown by the CIA to Afghanistan, where he was interrogated for five months before being freed.
An Italian prosecutor is trying to extradite 22 CIA agents from the US, whom he accuses of abducting the radical Egyptian cleric Abu Omar in Milan in 2003. Mr Omar claims that he was tortured in Egypt in the presence of US officials. But the Italian Government has distanced itself from the accusation, calling the prosecutor a left-wing militant. As with all the allegations, it is as difficult to substantiate as it is potentially damaging.
Tony Blair has urged caution. “These types of stories arise with a fair degree of regularity,” he said. “I think we should wait for the facts first.”
November 30, 2005 at 12:30 AM in CIA | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
November 29, 2005
Global Jihad and the United States: Interpretation of the New World Order of Usama bin Ladin
By Reuven Paz
PRISM Series of Global Jihad, No. 1
This is the first of a new series of articles that translate and analyze articles, reports, and religious decrees, written in Arabic by Islamist scholars, clerics, or intellectuals.
Al-Qa`idah’s Interpreters
One of the interesting phenomena related to Al-Qa`idah and the culture of global Jihad since the September 11th attacks and the global war against Islamist terrorism led by the United States, is the emergence of a group of interpreters of Usama bin Ladin, Tanzim Qa`idat al-Jihad, and of the nature of the war between radical Islam and the West. These interpreters, primarily Saudi, Yemeni, and Egyptian scholars and intellectuals, have published throughout the past year, dozens of articles in Islamist web sites and on-line magazines. Their articles are widely distributed and circulated on numerous Islamist Internet forums. The numerous responses to them prove their popularity. Some of them opened in recent months their own web sites. Amongst the more famous of these scholars are Abu Ayman al-Hilali, Abu Sa`ad al-`Ameli, Lewis Atiyyat Allah, and Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi.
These popular scholars are part of a bigger group of well-known clerics, primarily Saudis from the Saudi Islamist opposition known in Arabic `Ulama’ al-sahwah (Clerics of the resurgence), who serve as the backbone of the support for the ideology and doctrines of the culture of global Jihad and Al-Qa`idah. But, if the contribution of the clerics lies in supporting and developing these doctrines, the importance of the “interpreters” lies in spreading the political messages of the global Jihad in the Arab and Muslim world, and in promoting the expectations of the radical Muslim youth for further struggle and more anti-Western and anti-Jewish sentiments. Part of their articles could be viewed in the West as disinformation or psychological warfare. Yet, a profound research of the phenomenon of the global Jihad and their radical Jihadi Salafist doctrines, as well as Al-Qa`idah’s policies, should not ignore them.
Another example for such “interpretations” are several dozens of unsigned articles published in the past year by the Center for Islamic Study and Research (Markaz al-Dirasat wal-Buhuth al-Islamiyyah). The center is regarded by many observers and intelligence communities as one of the official means of propaganda for al-Qa`idah, which accurately reflects the Jihadi-Salafist doctrines of the culture of global Jihad. The fact that many of the reports and articles published by the center are unsigned, gives them the image of the authentic views of the organization or front of al-Qa`idah, and not just individual views of its supporters.
This phenomenon is interesting and serves the group and its supporters and adherents very well. A good example for such interpretations that might have practical implications, was an article published by the center in August 2002, about future scenarios of the conflict between al-Qa`idah and the United States.(1) The article talks among different scenarios about: “A series of events in various sensitive places over the world, either planned by Al-Qa`idah or not, prior to the attack against the United States.” One might conclude that the series of terrorist attacks in October-November 2002 – Bali, Kuwait, the French oil tanker in the Yemen, Mombassa, and the theatre in Moscow, in addition to arrests of suspects in London and Germany, are according to this scenario, an introduction to another major attack on American soil.
One of the more popular interpreters of al-Qa`idah is Lewis Atiyyat Allah, who is well known in the circles of the supporters of the culture of global Jihad in the Arab and Muslim world, and has his own web site as well –
THE NEW WORLD ORDER OF BIN LADIN
In November 30th 2002, Atiyyat Allah published an interesting article, which was circulated in several Islamist web sites, including his own, titled: “The New World Order as written by Usama bin Ladin.”(3) This is an attempt to review the development of Al-Qa`idah and the culture of global Jihad and mainly their future, as if bin Ladin himself was sketching his lines of thinking. The article that was written in the first person, is unusual in its attempt to enter bin Ladin’s mind in such a direct manner. Yet, it might really reflect the future plans and policies of Al-Qa`idah and its front groups.
“Bin Ladin” the author, describes in the first part of the article how the idea of global Jihad developed in his mind, and there is nothing new. The development of the ideas in bin Ladin’s mind is presented in a very well organized and rational manner. Yet, there is the guidance of Allah, almost in the same manner he did with the Prophet.
The author plants in its readers an image that could easily turn bin Ladin in young Muslim minds into a kind of a “new Muhammad.” The admiration for bin ladin by Muslim youth, which is constantly growing, becomes here a personification of the best of the Prophet and the stages he experienced during the divine revelation to him. bin Ladin’s immigration—Hijrah—is to Afghanistan, and his worst period of ignorance—Jahiliyyah—is the American “invasion” of Arabia in 1990-91: “the most sinful crime in the history of Arabia…. And the biggest high treason in Islamic history…. Which was blessed by an unanimous categorical Islamic Fatwah that said that these forces came for the defense of the purity of Islam, and whoever fights them is a fighter against Allah.”
But then, after the Gulf war, there was a split over the issue of the Islamic priorities:
Some of our Mujahidin brothers decided that there was the time to spread the Jihadi messages in order to defeat the Western made regimes, what led to clashes with the Egyptian and Algerian government. During our study of those efforts, we noticed that the international planning center for burying every Jihadi liberating project in the Islamic nation is found in the United States, the center of evil… The ultimate conclusion was therefore, that no project for the liberation of the Islamic nation from Western dominancy could succeed as long as the United States was there…. Then we concluded that the equator of the Islamic world is composed from two sections:
a. There is no chance in changing the situation of the Islamic world unless the role of the United States is singled out.
b. The United States could not be defeated by an army or by any traditional military confrontation.
From here originated the globalization of the war against the United States, “starting in Somalia, where we killed over 200 American soldiers…. And started studying from close the nature of the American soldier, the lines of the American military doctrine, and the nature of the American retaliation.”
Then, Al-Qa`idah decided to provoke the United States by operations that “imposed on them the distribution of our Jihadi doctrines on the international level, and pushed Clinton to declare us the first enemy of the United States. The flames were the two operations in Nairobi and Dar as-Salam:
It was in fact what the Americans wanted according to their studies. They were looking for a while for an enemy that would grant them a justification to live. One of their scholars stated that there was no meaning to the United States if there is no Soviet Union to hate. We granted them what they wished for and turned into that enemy. But, unfortunately for them we were not the traditional enemy they expected, and hence we managed to turn their life into hell.
Then came the September 11th attacks on American soil, and according to “bin Ladin” they managed to embark, in Afghanistan, on another kind of a war, a traditional guerrilla warfare in an area which was better known to the Islamists than to the Americans.
But, the more important outcome of the September 11th attacks was according to this analysis, the American attempt to impose upon the Arab government a coalition against the Islamists. The Arab response uncovered the high treason of these governments to their publics and the fact that their first mission was actually the protection of the West. It enabled al-Qa`idah to act against the United States from within societies that hate their own governments as well as the Americans.
Another important consequence was in “bin Ladin’s” eyes, the success of the Islamists to acknowledge the globalization of Islam and their ability to stand above the nationalist dimension. It enabled them to be released from all the limits of the regional perceptions that paralyzed many of the other Islamic groups.
WHAT NEXT
The present conflict between the Islamist radicals and the West is perceived by the author as the first stage, yet there are three other stages. The next phase and first priority of the global Jihad for the near future as presented in this analysis, is to defeat the Arab governments. They should achieve that goal by:
Imposing upon the American administration the direct cooperation with us. The United States itself will remove the legitimacy of the [Arab] cartoon states. The American direct involvement in the affairs of the Muslim world by limiting the power of their rulers or by encouraging them to behave according to the American dictates is the ideal situation we wish for a long time. When the direct confrontation between the Americans and us comes, there would be no importance to the agent Arab and Islamic governments.
The third stage is called the “stage of isolation,” in which the Islamists would seek to isolate the American administration from its own citizens on one hand, and from its allies, on the other. “At first, we did not know how we could arrive at this stage due to the war against us. But, the American political stupidity of the Bush administration gave us the answer, when it started recruiting the world towards the war against Iraq.”
The author gives special importance to the tapes bin Ladin sent and keeps sending to the Western and Muslim people:
These two messages were meant to target two audiences:
a. To give the Muslim peoples the confidence that the Mujahidin are the only element capable of destructing the Western hegemony.
b. To remind the Western people that the revenge against them would be tremendous, and the destruction of the Bush administration and its allied governments would bring up on them… They could never uproot the new Islamic powers and therefore, they should press upon their governments to start isolating themselves from the United States. Otherwise, they would be hit like the Americans would.
This issue of the tapes is interesting, since it might reflect the way of thinking of Al-Qa`idah’s leadership. The Modus Operandi of sending audiotapes through the Al-Jazirah TV station became in the past year a kind of a ritual by bin Ladin, like the few articles and books that his deputy Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri has published through the Saudi London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat. It seems that bin Ladin and his aides are closely following the effect of their tapes or announcements in the West, and deliberately sending them every few months and not more often. This is probably part of the attempt to keep their whereabouts vague and secure and leave a fog of mystery surrounding them. The same as bin Ladin or his spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghayth can record voice messages, so too they can probably send their messages by video as well. Yet, the mystery of their whereabouts seems to be a deliberate act.
The atmosphere of the forthcoming attack against Iraq, perceived by Islamist radicals as part of the war against Islam, increases the expectations of the supporters of al-Qa`idah and a great part of the Anti-American Muslim world, for a major retaliation by al-Qa`idah. Moreover, on the background of this event there is a growing atmosphere in an historical sense that arouses apocalyptic visions among Muslim, as occurred in 1991. Wishful thinking of the forthcoming appearance of the Mahdi and the Black Flags (4) (Al-rayat al-sud) started to be popular recently. We can find signs of that sense in Islamist forums, as well as in the web site of the Center for Islamic Study and Research. In an article published in late January 2003, by the center, they attempted to cool down the enthusiasm of those who started waiting for the Mahdi, and even wished to view Usamah bin Ladin as the expected one.(5)
It seems that the method of distributing these tapes infrequently, as used by al-Qa`idah, has its effect on large parts of Muslim publics.
THE FINAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
The third stage is linked to the forth: the final direct confrontation with the United States in order to “pure the world from the American power…. By destroying the United States and defeating it on its soil. Defeating the United States means the defeat of the West, what would lead to the shift of the international center of gravity back to the Islamic world.”
And then what? Do these radical Islamists possess a real political vision? Not necessarily. As other Islamic groups that have no political vision of a modern Islamic state, it seems that al-Qa`idah is not different. The author, speaking on behalf of bin Ladin, claims that “we have our perceptions of how the Islamic world would look like after the forth stage, and we have already planned it in details, yet, what we really look for is the awakening of the nation….Until that day we must do our best in fighting the enemies of Allah, through the sword, the pen, and the word in order to chain their hands and deport them from the Islamic world, and stop their support for the Jews in Palestine.”
Where are those political plans for the future Islamic world? Are they not important for the motivation and recruitment of the Muslims? There is no answer, but a utopian vision of a world that “would be more just, purer, cleaner, and nicer, without the United States. We act for the day in which we would wake up and there is no America.”
CONCLUSION
This vision of the future of the conflict of the Islamic world with the United States and the West, whether it reflects the environment of al-Qa`idah and Usamah bin Ladin, or just the wishful thinking of the author, is far beyond the limited targets of deporting the American military forces from Arabia, the Middle East, or the Muslim world. This is a vision of megalomaniacs, as the late Prof. Ehud Sprinzak defined them, which are fed by doctrines of hatred. They are not motivated by positive and constructive political ideas, but by the demonization of an eternal enemy. They cannot supply their audience a clear political vision for the stage that would follow their victory, as if the Jihad as an endless struggle is actually the primary and even the only goal. Furthermore, the globalization of the Islamist struggle instead of dividing it in the various Arab countries might help them in gaining support of wider Islamic publics. Yet, it leaves the final political targets vague and more difficult to achieve.
It seems that the success of the leaders of al-Qa`idah to survive the war against them, reorganize their forces in Afghanistan, initiate terrorist attacks in various places throughout the world, and frequently alert the Western world even through threats and recorded messages, gave them in the past year more self confidence to widen their declared targets to the maximum and to the widest vision of the global conflict. Even if their final targets are vague, their view of the struggle through global terrorism is vivid and their persistence is clear.
The article, which was published in November 2002, should be carefully read not only in the United States but also in Europe. The disputes over the attack against Iraq in February 2003 might look on the background of this article, as part of the bin Ladin vision and plan.
NOTES
1. Qira’ah li-mustaqbal al-ma`rakah bayna farouq al-`asr Usamah bin Ladin wa-Amrika (Reading the future war between bin Ladin and the United States), 17 August 2002. See on-line in:
2. Ha’ulaa yala`anahum Allah, wayal`anahum al-la`inun. See on-line in:
3. Al-nizam al-duwali al-jadid – written by Usama bin Ladin. See on-line in
4. The Black Flags, the Mahdi, as well as the false Messiah (al-Masih al-Dajjal), are part of Islamic theories on the end of the world. They are partly based upon sayings of the Prophet in the accepted Hadith, and partly on popular beliefs and sayings in the weak and controversial parts of the Hadith. These theories were very popular in the first Gulf War in 1991, as well the distribution of literature about al-Masih al-Dajjal.
5. Nahnu Ummah lam yukallifna Allah bi-ma`rifat shakhs al-mahdi qabla khurujihi (Allah did not assign our nation to know the personality of the Mahdi prior to his appearance), The Center for Islamic Study and Research, January 2003. See on-line in:
Dr. Reuven Paz is a Senior Fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and director of its Project for the Research of Islamist Movements.
November 29, 2005 at 12:10 AM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
November 28, 2005
Cong dismisses Mitrokhin papers as 'rubbish
Cong dismisses Mitrokhin papers as 'rubbish'- The Times of India
NEW DELHI: Congress on Thursday dismissed Mitrokhin papers as "rubbish" and rejected BJP demand for a discussion on the "fictional" document which had carried allegations that the KGB funded Congress and CPI-M in 1970s.
"First of all we reject such an insinuation. It is nothing but rubbish. There has been no precedent when fictional accounts are discussed in Parliament", party spokesman Anand Sharma told reporters when asked about BJP's demand for a discussion on Mitrokhin Archives.
Recalling instances, he said there were several occasions when "fiction" was not allowed to be discussed. "When it comes to books, many were written during NDA rule, including one on Tehelka, which were not allowed a discussion.
"If BJP is willing to discuss fictions and books, then they should also be ready for a discussion on the book on Mahatma Gandhi's assassination", Sharma said.
He also made it clear that Mitrokhin papers had no evidential value. "It’s a fictional account and the time of this House (Parliament) cannot be wasted in discussing it. It would be setting an "unhealthy" precedent," he added.
November 28, 2005 at 01:39 PM in | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
November 26, 2005
Bird Flu Killed 300 in China, Says Unofficial Report
The Epoch Times | Bird Flu Killed 300 in China, Says Unofficial Report
Details Disputed, but Official Numbers Likely Just Tip of the Iceberg
By Jan Jekielek
Epoch Times Thailand Staff
This report is an update to the November 24 original, Bird Flu Killed 300 in China, WHO Expert Says, with possible inaccuracies corrected and information current as of November 26.
The bird flu has killed 100 times more people than Chinese officials admit, said an unofficial report presented by a World Health Organisation (WHO) avian influenza expert on November 20.
WHO bird flu consultant Dr. Masato Tashiro presented this unverified information, received from China via "private channels," to a room of the world's top virologists, while speaking at the University of Marburg in Germany.
According to the data, at least 300 people have died from H5N1 bird flu in China and 3000 have been infected including seven cases of human-to-human transmission, reported the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).
The implications of these numbers, if confirmed, are staggering. They point to an active human H5N1 epidemic in China.
Dr. Tashiro, head of the Department of Virology at the Japanese National Institute of Infectious Disease, and Director of the WHO Collaborating Center on Influenza at the Tokyo National Institute of Infectious Diseases, was reported by FAZ to have said that the West is being "systematically deceived" by Chinese authorities, and that he believes that the numbers he presented are from a reputable source. FAZ also reported that Dr. Tashiro compared the situation to Beijing's 2003 SARS cover-up, adding that five Chinese medical workers were detained by authorities for trying to report on the bird flu.
However, Dr. Tashiro later denied these claims. "I clarified [at the meetings] that I do not know the original sources and I cannot confirm whether they are true, how these numbers were derived and what laboratory tests and epidemiological investigation were done," he wrote in a letter to the ProMED-Mail website hosted by the International Society for Infectious Diseases on November 24, stating flatly that he never said that he believed the data, nor claimed deception on the part of the Chinese authorities. Dr. Tashiro also told ProMED that his recent visit to China was not as part of an official WHO delegation.
Meeting attendee Professor Hans-Dieter Klenk of the University of Marburg confirmed that Dr. Tashiro presented data to the effect of 300 human deaths, according to Israel's Haaretz daily. Klenk also denied the FAZ reports of Dr. Tashiro's claims of cover-up by Chinese authorities, supporting Dr. Tashiro's letter to ProMED.
Case Closed?
While it is possible that the FAZ reporter sensationalized the story of Dr. Tashiro's presentation in Marburg, such a report from a high-level WHO official bears thorough examination.
"Due to poorly organized surveillance and information sharing systems in many affected countries including China, it is reasonable to consider that more cases have occurred actually," Dr. Tashiro wrote to ProMED, explaining the take-home message he had hoped to deliver to his Marburg audience. Because the official numbers reflect only the laboratory-confirmed cases, he sees them as being only a small subset of the actual number of cases, what he called "an iceberg phenomenon."
"In this context, I talked about a few examples of non-authorized information and rumors…which I received through private channels," he wrote.
Until recently, Chinese authorities didn't allow for any independent analyses of their bird flu test results, and didn't share the details of their data. It was only with the entry of WHO personnel onto the Chinese bird flu scene that the first cases of H5N1 in humans were confirmed in China. This led the WHO to commend Beijing for being forthcoming with the realities of China's avian influenza. Officially, there have been just three bird flu deaths from 23 active bird flu outbreaks in birds across China.
However, numerous unconfirmed lines of evidence suggest that a bird flu epidemic in humans has been happening in China for quite some time. Several unofficial Boxun.com reports have suggested human bird flu deaths in the hundreds, with military-imposed quarantines and media blackouts attempting to contain both the disease and the knowledge of the damage it left in its wake.
Even bird flu outbreak reports in wild waterfowl were met with censorship. An influenza research centre was closed after it published thorough findings of an H5N1 outbreak in China and suggested that the disease would spread via migratory pathways to Europe – precisely what ended up happening last month. The Epoch Times documented these lines of evidence as early as last July.
According to the official WHO tally, as of November 25 there were 132 laboratory-confirmed cases of bird flu in humans, resulting in 68 deaths. The vast majority occurred since last December, and all were in Asia. Adding Dr. Tashiro's numbers to this would demonstrate an average H5N1 infection rate across the subcontinent 20-times-greater than was previously known.
With an ongoing rise in the avian influenza human death toll in Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia over the past two years, there is no reason to believe that China would have been spared similar cases. Perhaps the only good news from Dr. Tashiro's figures would be that they suggest a much lower death rate than those implied by the WHO stats – 10 percent instead of 50 percent.
Irrespective of whether the report that Dr. Tashiro presented is confirmed, it is still very likely that the official numbers are only, as Dr. Tashiro suggests, the tip of the iceberg.
November 26, 2005 at 05:46 PM in Flu pandemic watch | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Palestinians take over key border
BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Palestinians take over key border
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has presided over a ceremony marking the official re-opening of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.
Declaring the crossing at Rafah open, Mr Abbas said it was "a dream come true" for Gaza's 1.3 million residents.
For the first time, Palestinians will control a gateway to the outside world that is vital for Gaza's economy.
Israel passed control of the border to the Palestinian Authority - under the supervision of EU monitors.
The crossing will actually be opened to Palestinians coming from and going to Egypt on Saturday.
The EU's envoy to the Middle East, Marc Otte said the opening would mean an "enormous step forward toward the freedom of the Palestinian people".
Gaza has no sea port and the Israel has not agreed to allow the international airport to re-open, so the Rafah border is Gaza's gateway to the outside world.
BBC Gaza correspondent Alan Johnston says Palestinians have always hated having to pass through Israeli hands at the frontier, where they were often subjected to delays and questioning.
Israel closed the Rafah crossing on 7 September shortly after withdrawing from Gaza, citing concerns that it would be used to smuggle weapons and militants from Egypt into the Palestinian Territories. Since then, the crossing has barely been open at all.
The Israelis worry that Islamic militants might infiltrate Gaza and threaten Israel. They have insisted on the right to monitor the crossing point on television screens from a base a few kilometres away.
Last-minute deal
Earlier this month, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brokered a deal between Israel and Egypt allowing key border crossings into the Gaza Strip to be re-opened.
Under the agreement, there are limits to Palestinian authority at the border.
Palestinians will control the border, but EU monitors will have the authority to detain vehicles or individuals if they feel they have not been properly checked.
Map showing Gaza border crossings and planned port
Israeli security officials will watch all movements at the crossing on TV screens, but they will not have veto power over individuals moving through.
While exports will not be supervised by the Israelis, the flow of goods into Gaza will remain entirely under its control at the border crossing at Kerem Shalom.
Palestinians will be able to travel in bus convoys between Gaza and the West Bank from December, and in lorry convoys a month after that.
There are plans for a sea port, although the Israelis have refused to allow the international airport to re-open.
EU mission
On Wednesday, the head of the team of EU monitors, Italian military police General Pietro Pistolese, said the crossing would only be open for four hours a day until the number of monitors increases from 20 to between 50 and 70.
European officials have described their role as one of the most important missions the EU has ever undertaken.
It is the first time the EU has been so directly involved in efforts to ease the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As the Europeans are also expecting to play a role at the start of next year in training the Palestinian police force, there is a sense in Brussels that this is a mission that cannot be allowed to fail, correspondents say.
November 26, 2005 at 10:57 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
November 24, 2005
Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Groups - 3
continued ...
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
Description
The JRA is an international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from the Japanese Communist League�Red Army Faction. The JRA�s historical goal has been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. JRA�s leader, Fusako Shigenobu, claimed that the forefront of the battle against international imperialism was in Palestine, so in the early 1970s she led her small group to the Middle East to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel and the West. After her arrest in November 2000, Shigenobu announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence, and the group announced it would disband in April 2001.
Activities
During the 1970s, JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. During the late 1980s, JRA began to single out American targets and used car bombs and rockets in attempted attacks on US Embassies in Jakarta, Rome, and Madrid. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman. He was convicted of the charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, is also jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport fraud. Four JRA members remain in North Korea following their involvement in a hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Strength
About six hard-core members; undetermined number of sympathizers. At its peak, the group claimed to have 30 to 40 members.
Location/Area of Operation
Location unknown, but possibly in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.
External Aid
Unknown.
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
Description
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) favors the overthrow of the Malaysian Government and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe an extremist wing of the KMM has engaged in terrorist acts and has close ties to the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Key JI leaders, including the group�s spiritual head, Abu Bakar Ba�asyir, and JI operational leader Hambali, reportedly had great influence over KMM members. The Government of Singapore asserts that a Singaporean JI member assisted the KMM in buying a boat to support jihad activities in Indonesia.
Activities
Malaysia is holding a number of KMM members under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for activities deemed threatening to Malaysia�s national security, including planning to wage jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings and robberies, the murder of a former state assemblyman, and planning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. A number of those detained are also believed to be members of Jemaah Islamiya. Several of the arrested KMM militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahedin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Some members are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines. In September 2003, alleged KMM leader Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz�s detention was extended for another two years. In March 2004, Aziz and other suspected KMM members went on a hunger strike as part of an unsuccessful bid for freedom, but the Malaysian court rejected their applications for a writ of habeas corpus in September. One alleged KMM member was sentenced to 10 years in prison for unlawful possession of firearms, explosives, and ammunition, but eight other alleged members in detention since 2001 were released in July and in November. The Malaysian Government is confident that the arrests of KMM leaders have crippled the organization and rendered it incapable of engaging in militant activities. Malaysian officials in May 2004 denied Thailand�s charge that the KMM was involved in the Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand.
Strength
KMM�s current membership is unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians and to the southern Philippines for operational training.
External Aid
Largely unknown, probably self-financing.
Lord�s Resistance Army (LRA)
Description
The LRA was formally established in 1994, succeeding the ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement and other insurgent groups. LRA leader Joseph Kony has called for the overthrow of the Ugandan Government and its replacement with a regime run on the basis of the Ten Commandments. More frequently, however, he has spoken of the liberation and honor of the Acholi people, whom he sees as oppressed by the "foreign" Government of Ugandan President Museveni. Kony is the LRA�s undisputed leader. He claims to have supernatural powers and to receive messages from spirits, which he uses to formulate the LRA�s strategy.
Activities
The Acholi people, whom Kony claims to be fighting to liberate, are the ones who suffer most from his actions. Since the early 1990�s, the LRA has kidnapped some 20,000 Ugandan children, mostly ethnic Acholi, to replenish its ranks. Kony despises Acholi elders for having given up the fight against Museveni and relies on abducted children who can be brutally indoctrinated to fight for the LRA. The LRA forces kidnapped children and adult civilians to become soldiers, porters, and "wives" for LRA leaders. The LRA prefers to attack camps for internally displaced persons and other civilian targets, avoiding direct engagement with the Ugandan military. Victims of LRA attacks sometimes have their hands, fingers, ears, noses, or other extremities cut off. The LRA stepped up its activities from 2002 to 2004 after the Ugandan army, with the Sudanese Government�s permission, attacked LRA positions inside Sudan. By late 2003, the number of internally displaced had doubled to 1.4 million, and the LRA had pushed deep into non-Acholi areas where it had never previously operated. During 2004, a combination of military pressure, offers of amnesty, and several rounds of negotiation markedly degraded LRA capabilities due to death, desertion, and defection of senior commanders.
Strength
Estimated in early 2004 at between 500 and 1,000 fighters, 85 percent of whom are abducted children and civilians, but numbers have since declined significantly.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Uganda and southern Sudan.
External Aid
Although the LRA has been supported by the Government of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese now appear to be cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Description
An extreme Loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the LVF did not emerge publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardliners who have sought to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name for its actions but has also called for the group�s disbandment. In October 2001, the British Government ruled that the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998 after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. According to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a small amount of weapons in December 1998, but it has not repeated this gesture. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks. Finances its activities with drug money and other criminal activities. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious; the group has murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or paramilitary affiliations, including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. The terrorists also have conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns. From 2000 to 2004, the LVF has been engaged in a violent feud with other Loyalists, which has left several men dead.
Strength
Small, perhaps dozens of active members.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland and Ireland.
External Aid
None.
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
Description
The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al-Qa�ida�s jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the 1990s and is comprised of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan and some who fought in the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. On November 22, 2002, the United States designated the GICM for asset freeze under EO 13224 following the group�s submission to the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee.
Activities
Moroccans associated with the GICM are part of the broader international jihadist movement. GICM is one of the groups believed to be involved in planning the May 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and has been involved in other plots. Members work with other North African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents, and possibly arms smuggling. The group in the past has issued communiqu�s and statements against the Moroccan Government. In the last year, a number of arrests in Belgium, France, and Spain have disrupted the group�s ability to operate, though cells and key members still remain throughout Europe. Although the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, among others, claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Qa�ida, Spanish authorities are investigating the possibility that GICM was involved in the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Morocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada.
External Aid
Unknown, but believed to include criminal activity abroad.
New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)
a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente
Description
This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy�s foreign and labor policies and to NATO.
Activities
In 2004, the BR/PCC continued to suffer setbacks, with their leadership in prison and other members under pressure from the Italian Government. The BR/PCC did not claim responsibility for a blast at an employment agency in Milan in late October, although the police suspect remnants of the group are responsible. In 2003, Italian authorities captured at least seven members of the BR/ PCC, dealing the terrorist group a severe blow to its operational effectiveness. Some of those arrested are suspects in the assassination in 1999 of Labor Ministry adviser Massimo D�Antona, and authorities are hoping to link them to the assassination in 2002 of Labor Ministry advisor Marco Biagi. The arrests in October came on the heels of a clash in March 2003 involving Italian Railway Police and two BR/PCC members, which resulted in the deaths of one of the operatives and an Italian security officer. The BR/PCC has financed its activities through armed robberies.
Strength
Fewer than 20.
Location/Area of Operation
Italy.
External Aid
Unknown.
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
Description
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and its ally Qibla (an Islamic fundamentalist group that favors political Islam and takes an anti-US and anti-Israel stance) view the South African Government as a threat to Islamic values. The two groups work to promote a greater political voice for South African Muslims. PAGAD has used front names such as Muslims Against Global Oppression and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders when launching anti-Western protests and campaigns.
Activities
PAGAD formed in November 1995 as a vigilante group in reaction to crime in some neighborhoods of Cape Town. In September 1996, a change in the group�s leadership resulted in a change in the group�s goal, and it began to support a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state. Between 1996 and 2000, PAGAD conducted a total of 189 bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the Western Cape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD�s targets included South African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and West-ern-associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to have masterminded the bombing on August 25, 1998, of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Since 2001, PAGAD�s violent activities have been severely curtailed by law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leading members of the organization. Qibla leadership has organized demonstrations against visiting US dignitaries and other protests, but the extent of PAGAD�s involvement is uncertain.
Strength
Early estimates were several hundred members. Current operational strength is unknown, but probably vastly diminished.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates mainly in the Cape Town area.
External Aid
May have ties to international Islamic extremists.
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Description
The RHD is an extremist terrorist group formed in 1998 and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from Loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January 2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate targets. Despite calls in February 2002 by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment, RHD continued to make threats and issue claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used by elements of the banned UDA and LVF. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
In early 2003, the RHD claimed responsibility for killing two UDA members as a result of what is described as Loyalist internecine warfare. It also claimed responsibility for a bomb that was left in the offices of Republican Sinn Fein in West Belfast, although the device was defused and no one was injured. In recent years, the group has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson attacks against "soft" civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, the group bombed the home of a prison official in North Belfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibility for attacks -- the murder of a Catholic postman and a Catholic teenager -- that were later claimed by the UDAUFF, further blurring distinctions between the groups. In 2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons. The RHD has claimed responsibility for hoax bomb devices, and recently has set off petrol bombs and made death threats against local politicians.
Strength
Up to 20 members, some of whom have experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making. Police arrested one member in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland.
External Aid
None.
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Description
The NIPR is a clandestine leftist extremist group that appeared in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s -- an encircled five point star -- for its declarations. Opposes Italy�s foreign and labor policies. Has targeted property interests rather than personnel in its attacks.
Activities
The NIPR has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since an April 2001 bomb attack on a building housing a US-Italian relations association and an international affairs institute in Rome�s historic center. The NIPR claimed to have carried out a bombing in May 2000 in Rome at an oversight committee facility for implementation of the law on strikes in public services. The group also claimed responsibility for an explosion in February 2002 on Via Palermo adjacent to the Interior Ministry in Rome.
Strength
Possibly 12 members.
Location/Area of Operations
Mainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.
External Aid
None evident.
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Description
RS is a radical leftist group that is anti-Greek establishment and ideologically aligns itself with the organization 17 November. Although the group is not specifically anti-US, its anti-imperialist rhetoric suggests it may become so.
Activities
First became known when the group conducted a bombing in September 2003 against the courthouse at which the trials of alleged 17 November members were ongoing. In May 2004, the group detonated four improvised explosive devices at a police station in Athens. These two attacks were notable for their apparent attempts to target and kill first responders -- the first time a Greek terrorist group had used this tactic. RS is widely regarded as the most dangerous indigenous Greek terrorist group at this time.
Strength
Likely less than 50 members.
Location/Area of Operation
Athens, Greece.
External Aid
Unknown.
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
Description
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), led by Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev, uses terrorism as part of an effort to secure an independent Muslim state in the North Caucasus. Basayev claimed the group was responsible for the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3, 2004, which culminated in the deaths of about 330 people; simultaneous suicide bombings aboard two Russian civilian airliners in late August 2004; and a third suicide bombing outside a Moscow subway that same month. The RSRSBCM, whose name translates into English as "Requirements for Getting into Paradise," was not known to Western observers before October 2002, when it participated in the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.
Activities
Primarily terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Russian and Chechen non-combatants.
Strength
Probably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.
Location/Area of Operations
Primarily Russia.
External Aid
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.
Sipah-i-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Description
The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution. Pakistani President Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August 2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and Musharraf re-banned the group under its new name in November 2003. The SSP also has operated as a political party, winning seats in Pakistan�s National Assembly.
Activities
The group�s activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was responsible for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004, when at least 50 people were killed.
Strength
The SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trained activists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.
Location/Area of Operation
The SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. It is considered to be one of the most powerful sectarian groups in the country.
External Aid
The SSP reportedly receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia through wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Funds also are acquired from other sources, including other Sunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions by political groups.
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Description
The SPIR is one of three terrorist groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002. The SPIR has had at least seven commanders since it was founded in the late 1990s. Movsar Barayev, who led and was killed during the theater standoff, was the first publicly identified leader. The group continues to conduct guerrilla operations in Chechnya under the leadership of the current leader, Amir Aslan, whose true identity is not known. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.
Activities
Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Has also been involved in various hostage and ransom operations, including the execution of ethnic Chechens who have collaborated with Russian authorities.
Strength
Probably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.
Location/Area of Operations
Primarily Russia.
External Aid
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
Description
The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the Jama�a Combattante Tunisienne, seeks to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and has targeted US and Western interests. The group is an offshoot of the banned Tunisian Islamist movement, an-Nahda. Founded around 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the TCG has drawn members from the Tunisian diaspora in Europe and elsewhere. It has lost some of its leadership, but may still exist, particularly in Western Europe. Belgian authorities arrested Maaroufi in late 2001 and sentenced him to six years in prison in 2003 for his role in the assassination of anti-Taliban commander Ahmad Shah Massoud two days before 9/11. The TCG was designated under EO 13224 in October 2002. Historically, the group has been associated with al-Qa�ida as well. Members also have ties to other North African extremist groups. The TCG was designated for sanctions under UNSCR 1333 in December 2000.
Activities
Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of planning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in April 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Western Europe and Afghanistan.
External Aid
Unknown.
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Description
MRTA is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active in the 1960s. It aims to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily US and Japanese influence). Peru�s counterterrorist program has diminished the group�s ability to conduct terrorist attacks, and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment or deaths of senior leaders, and the loss of leftist support.
Activities
Previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied the Japanese Ambassador�s residence in Lima and held 72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces stormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members, including the remaining leaders. The group has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned MRTA members, although there are reports of low-level rebuilding efforts.
Strength
Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and experience.
Location/Area of Operation
Peru, with supporters throughout Latin America and Western Europe. Controls no territory.
External Aid
None.
Turkish Hizballah
Description
Turkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Sunni Islamic terrorist organization that arose in the early 1980s in response to the Kurdistan Workers� Party (PKK)�s secularist approach of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Turkish Hizballah spent its first 10 years fighting the PKK, accusing the group of atrocities against Muslims in southeastern Turkey, where Turkish Hizballah seeks to establish an independent Islamic state.
Activities
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Turkish Hizballah, which is unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to conducting low-level bombings against liquor stores, bordellos, and other establishments the organization considered "anti-Islamic." In January 2000, Turkish security forces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hizballah, in a shootout at a safe house in Istanbul. The incident sparked a year-long series of counterterrorist operations against the group that resulted in the detention of some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested several hundred of those on criminal charges. At the same time, police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and journalists that Turkish Hizballah had tortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late 1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated the Diyarbakir police chief in the group�s most sophisticated operation to date. Turkish Hizballah did not conduct a major operation in 2003 or 2004 and probably is focusing on recruitment, fundraising, and reorganization.
Strength
Possibly a few hundred members and several thousand supporters.
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.
External Aid
It is widely believed that Turkey�s security apparatus originally backed Turkish Hizballah to help the Turkish Government combat the PKK. Alternative views are that the Turkish Government turned a blind eye to Turkish Hizballah�s activities because its primary targets were PKK members and supporters, or that the Government simply had to prioritize scarce resources and was unable to wage war on both groups simultaneously. Allegations of collusion have never been laid to rest, and the Government of Turkey continues to issue denials. Turkish Hizballah also is suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is not sufficient evidence to establish a link.
Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Description
The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership. The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-fires between 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/ UFF�s Inner Council withdrew its support for Northern Ireland�s Good Friday Agreement. The following month, after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence, the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF�s cease-fire defunct. The dissolution of the organization�s political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In January 2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster Political Research Group to serve in a similar capacity. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
The UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organization deeply involved in drug trafficking and other moneymaking criminal activities through six largely independent "brigades." It has also been involved in murder, shootings, arson, and assaults. According to the International Monitoring Commission, "the UDA has the capacity to launch serious, if crude, attacks." Some UDA activities have been of a sectarian nature directed at the Catholic community, aimed at what are sometimes described as �soft� targets, and often have taken place at the interface between the Protestant and Catholic communities, especially in Belfast. The organization continues to be involved in targeting individual Catholics and has undertaken attacks against retired and serving prison officers. The group has also been involved in a violent internecine war with other Loyalist paramilitary groups for the past several years. In February 2003, the UDA/UFF declared a 12-month cease-fire, but refused to decommission its arsenal until Republican groups did likewise and emphasized its continued disagreement with the Good Friday accords. The cease-fire has been extended. Even though numerous attacks on Catholics were blamed on the group, the UDA/ UFF did not claim credit for any attacks, and in August 2003 reiterated its intention to remain militarily inactive.
Strength
Estimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with several hundred active in paramilitary operations.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland.
External Aid
Unknown.
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Description
The UVF is a Loyalist terrorist group formed in 1966 to oppose liberal reforms in Northern Ireland that members feared would lead to unification of Ireland. The group adopted the name of an earlier organization formed in 1912 to combat Home Rule for Ireland. The UVF�s goal is to maintain Northern Ireland�s status as part of the UK; to that end it has killed some 550 persons since 1966. The UVF and its offshoots have been responsible for some of the most vicious attacks of "The Troubles," including horrific sectarian killings like those perpetrated in the 1970s by the UVF-affiliated "Shankill Butchers." In October 1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command, which included the UVF, declared a cease-fire, and the UVF�s political wing, the Progressive Unionist Party, has played an active role in the peace process. Despite the cease-fire, the organization has been involved in a series of bloody feuds with other Loyalist paramilitary organizations. The Red Hand Commando is linked to the UVF.
Activities
The UVF has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. UVF members have been linked to recent racial attacks on minorities; however, these assaults were reportedly not authorized by the UVF leadership. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include nationalist civilians, Republican paramilitary groups, and, on occasion, rival Loyalist paramilitary groups. The UVF is a relatively disciplined organization with a centralized command. The UVF leadership continues to observe a cease-fire.
Strength
Unclear, but probably several hundred supporters, with a smaller number of hard-core activists. Police counterterrorist operations and internal feuding have reduced the group�s strength and capabilities.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland. Some support on the UK mainland.
External Aid
Suspected in the past of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers overseas.
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
Description
Northeast India�s most prominent insurgent group, ULFA -- an ethnic secessionist organization in the Indian stateof Assam, bordering Bangladesh and Bhutan -- was founded on April 7, 1979 at Rang Ghar, during agitation organized by the state�s powerful students� union. The group�s objective is an independent Assam, reflected in its ideology of "Oikya, Biplab, Mukti" ("Unity, Revolution, Freedom"). ULFA enjoyed widespread support in upper Assam in its initial years, especially in 1985-1992. ULFA�s kidnappings, killings and extortion led New Delhi to ban the group and start a military offensive against it in 1990, which forced it to go underground. ULFA began to lose popularity in the late 1990s after it increasingly targeted civilians, including a prominent NGO activist. It lost further support for its anti-Indian stand during the 1999 Kargil War.
Activities
ULFA trains, finances and equips cadres for a "liberation struggle" while extortion helps finance military training and weapons purchases. ULFA conducts hit and run operations on security forces in Assam, selective assassinations, and explosions in public places. During the 1980s-1990s ULFA undertook a series of abductions and murders, particularly of businessmen. In 2000, ULFA assassinated an Assam state minister. In 2003, ULFA killed more than 60 "outsiders" in Assam, mainly residents of the bordering state of Bihar. Following the December 2003 Bhutanese Army�s attack on ULFA camps in Bhutan, the group is believed to have suffered a setback. Some important ULFA functionaries surrendered in Assam, but incidents of violence, though of a lesser magnitude than in the past, continue. On August 14, one civilian was killed and 18 others injured when ULFA militants triggered a grenade blast inside a cinema hall at Gauripur in Dhubri district. The next day, at an Indian Independence Day event, a bomb blast in Dhemaji killed an estimated 13 people, including 6 children, and injured 21.
Strength
ULFA�s earlier numbers (3,000 plus) dropped following the December 2003 attack on its camps in Bhutan. Total cadre strength now is estimated at 700.
Location/Area of Operations
ULFA is active in the state of Assam, and its workers are believed to transit (and sometimes conduct operations in) parts of neighboring Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Nagaland. All ULFA camps in Bhutan are reportedly demolished. The group may have linkages with other ethnic insurgent groups active in neighboring states.
External Aid
ULFA reportedly procures and trades in arms with other Northeast Indian groups, and receives aid from unknown external sources.
April 27, 2005
November 24, 2005 at 02:23 PM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Groups - 2
continued ,,
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The group�s primary leadership resides in Syria, though other leadership elements reside in Lebanon, as well as other parts of the Middle East.
External Aid
Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistical assistance from Syria.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Description
Formerly a part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP was founded by George Habash when it broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does not view the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it instead as a broader revolution against Western imperialism. The group earned a reputation for spectacular international attacks, including airline hijackings, that have killed at least 20 US citizens.
Activities
The PFLP committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978, the group has conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including killing a settler and her son in December 1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activity since the start of the current intifadah, highlighted by at least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minster in 2001 to avenge Israel�s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
External Aid
Receives safe haven and some logistical assistance from Syria.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine�General Command (PFLP-GC)
Description
The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Originally it was violently opposed to the Arafat-led PLO. The group is led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, whose son Jihad was killed by a car bomb in May 2002. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syria and Iran.
Activities
Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. Known for cross-bor-der terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary focus is now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon and small-scale attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
Strength
Several hundred.
Location/Area of Operation
Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.
External Aid
Receives logistical and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.
Al-Qa�ida
a.k.a. Usama Bin Ladin Organization
Description
Al-Qa�ida was established by Usama Bin Ladin in 1988 with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Goal is to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Is-lamic," and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Eventual goal would be establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. Issued statement in February 1998 under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. Merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001, renaming itself "Qa�idat al-Jihad." Merged with Abu Mus�ab al-Zarqawi�s organization in Iraq in late 2004, with al-Zarqawi�s group changing its name to "Qa�idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn" (al-Qa�ida in the Land of the Two Rivers).
Activities
In 2004, the Saudi-based al-Qa�ida network and associated extremists launched at least 11 attacks, killing over 60 people, including six Americans, and wounding more than 225 in Saudi Arabia. Focused on targets associated with US and Western presence and Saudi security forces in Riyadh, Yanbu, Jeddah, and Dhahran. Attacks consisted of vehicle bombs, infantry assaults, kidnappings, targeted shootings, bombings, and beheadings. Other al-Qa�ida networks have been involved in attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2003, carried out the assault and bombing on May 12 of three expatriate housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 30 and injured 216. Backed attacks on May 16 in Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center, restaurant, nightclub, and hotel that killed 33 and injured 101. Probably supported the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on August 5, that killed 12 and injured 149. Responsible for the assault and bombing on November 9 of a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 17 and injured 122. The suicide bombers and others associated with the bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, on November 15 that killed 20 and injured 300 and the bombings in Istanbul of the British Consulate and HSBC Bank on November 20 that resulted in 41 dead and 555 injured had strong links to al-Qa�ida. Conducted two assassination attempts against Pakistani President Musharraf in December 2003. Was involved in some attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2002, carried out bombing on November 28 of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Probably supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on October 12 by Jemaah Islamiya that killed more than 200. Responsible for an attack on US military personnel in Kuwait on October 8 that killed one US soldier and injured another. Directed a suicide attack on the tanker M/V Limburg off the coast of Yemen on October 6 that killed one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia on April 11 that killed 19 and injured 22. On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa�ida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets -- two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania -- leaving nearly 3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, on October 12, 2000, killing 17 US Navy sailors and injuring another 39.
Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted US troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992.
Al-Qa�ida is linked to the following plans that were disrupted or not carried out: to bomb in mid-air a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted to carry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999 (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial). In December 2001, suspected al-Qa�ida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a trans-Atlantic flight from Paris to Miami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed the Mombasa, Kenya, airport in November 2002.
Strength
Al-Qa�ida�s organizational strength is difficult to determine in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist efforts since 9/11. However, the group probably has several thousand extremists and associates worldwide inspired by the group�s ideology. The arrest and deaths of mid-level and senior al-Qa�ida operatives have disrupted some communication, financial, and facilitation nodes and interrupted some terrorist plots. Al-Qa�ida also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including some members of Gama�a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
Location/Area of Operation
Al-Qa�ida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. It was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Al-Qa�ida has dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests.
External Aid
Al-Qa�ida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. US and international efforts to block al-Qa�ida funding have hampered the group�s ability to obtain money.
Real IRA (RIRA)
a.k.a. 32-County Sovereignty Committee
Description
RIRA was formed in the late 1990s as the clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a "political pressure group" dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein�s adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence; it also opposed the amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which had claimed the territory of Northern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members -- including the group�s founder Michael "Mickey" McKevitt -- for a ceasefire and disbandment, RIRA has pledged additional violence and continues to conduct attacks.
Activities
Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Many Real IRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left that organization after the Provisional IRA renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to RIRA. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, police in Northern Ireland, and local Protestant communities. RIRA�s most recent fatal attack was in August 2002 at a London army base that killed a construction worker. In 2004, RIRA conducted several postal bomb attacks and made threats against prison officers, people involved in the new policing arrangements, and senior politicians. RIRA also planted incendiary devices in Belfast shopping areas and conducted a serious shooting attack against a Police Service of Northern Ireland station in September. The organization reportedly wants to improve its intelligence-gathering ability, engineering capacity, and access to weaponry; it also trains members in the use of guns and explosives. RIRA continues to attract new members, and its senior members are committed to launching attacks on security forces. Arrests in the spring led to the discovery of incendiary and explosive devices at a RIRA bomb making facility in Limerick. The group also engaged in smuggling and other non-terrorist crime in Ireland.
Strength
The number of activists may have fallen to less than 100. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and Republican sympathizers dissatisfied with the IRA�s continuing cease-fire and Sinn Fein�s involvement in the peace process. Approximately 40 RIRA members are in Irish jails.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and Irish Republic.
External Aid
Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from US gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans, and to have taken materials from Provisional IRA arms dumps in the later 1990s.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Description
Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America�s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin. Although only nominally fighting in support of Marxist goals today, the FARC is governed by a general secretariat led by long-time leader Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. "Tirofijo") and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. "Mono Jojoy"). Organized along military lines but includes some specialized urban fighting units. A Colombian military offensive targeting FARC fighters in their former safe haven in southern Colombia has experienced some success, with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or captured. On December 31, 2004, FARC leader Simon Trinidad, the highest-ranking FARC leader ever captured, was extradited to the United States on drug charges.
Activities
Bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. In March 1999, the FARC executed three US indigenous rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them in Colombia. In February 2003, the FARC captured and continues to hold three US contractors and killed one other American when their plane crashed in Florencia. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution.
Strength
Approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants and several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily in Colombia with some activities -- extortion, kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R -- suspected in neighboring Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, and Ecuador.
External Aid
Cuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and political consultation. In December 2004, a Colombian Appeals Court declared three members of the Irish Republican Army -- arrested in Colombia in 2001 upon exiting the former FARC-controlled demilitarized zone (despeje) -- guilty of providing advanced explosives training to the FARC. The FARC often uses the Colombia/ Venezuela border area for cross-border incursions and consider Venezuelan territory as a safe haven.
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)
a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells, Revolutionary Popular Struggle, ELA
Description
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range of antiestablishment and anti-US/NATO/EU leftist groups active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece�s most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People�s Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene. RN�s few communiqu�s show strong similarities in rhetoric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, nor has it announced its disbandment.
Activities
Since it began operations in January 1995, the group has claimed responsibility for some two dozen arson attacks and low-level bombings against a range of US, Greek, and other European targets in Greece. In its most infamous and lethal attack to date, the group claimed responsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Intercontinental Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of a Greek woman and injured a Greek man. Its modus operandi includes warning calls of impending attacks, attacks targeting property instead of individuals, use of rudimentary timing devices, and strikes during the late-evening to early-morning hours. RN may have been responsible for two attacks in July 2003 against a US insurance company and a local bank in Athens. RN�s last confirmed attacks against US interests in Greece came in November 2000, with two separate bombings against the Athens offices of Citigroup and the studio of a Greek-American sculptor. Greek targets have included judicial and other Government office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices of Greek firms involved in NATO-related defense contracts in Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European interests in Athens. The group did not conduct an attack in 2004.
Strength
Group membership is believed to be small, probably drawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist milieu.
Location/Area of Operation
Primary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitan area.
External Aid
Unknown but believed to be self-sustaining.
Revolutionary People�s Liberation Party/ Front (DHKP/C)
a.k.a. Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, Revolutionary Left
Description
This group originally formed in Turkey in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. "Party" refers to the group�s political activities, while "Front" is a reference to the group�s militant operations. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is vehemently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish establishment. Its goals are the establishment of a socialist state and the abolition of one- to three-man prison cells, called F-type prisons. DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion.
Activities
Since the late 1980s the group has targeted primarily current and retired Turkish security and military officials. It began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990, which included attacks against US military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. To protest perceived US imperialism during the Gulf War, Dev Sol assassinated two US military contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 US and NATO military, commercial, and cultural facilities. In its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C in 1996, the group assassinated a prominent Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with successful attacks against Turkish police in January and September. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised explosive devices against official Turkish targets and soft US targets of opportunity; attacks against US targets beginning in 2003 probably came in response to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operations and arrests against the group have weakened its capabilities. DHKP/C did not conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2003, but on June 24, 2004 -- just days before the NATO summit -- an explosive device detonated, apparently prematurely, aboard a passenger bus in Istanbul while a DHKP/C operative was transporting it to another location, killing the operative and three other persons.
Strength
Probably several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey, with a large support network throughout Europe. On April 1, 2004, authorities arrested more than 40 suspected DHKP/C members in coordinated raids across Turkey and Europe. In October, 10 alleged members of the group were sentenced to life imprisonment, while charges were dropped against 20 other defendants because of a statute of limitations.
Location/Area of Operation
Turkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Europe.
External Aid
Widely believed to have training facilities or offices in Lebanon and Syria.
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat
Description
The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks to overthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of installing an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA in approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective and largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria.
Activities
The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at Algerian Government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. The Government of Algeria scored major counterterrorism successes against GSPC in 2004, significantly weakening the organization, which also has been plagued with internal divisions. Algerian military forces killed GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui and one of his top lieutenants, Abbi Abdelaziz, in June 2004 in the mountainous area east of Algiers. In October, the Algerian Government took custody of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction that held 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and the Middle East maintain contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to al-Qa�ida. In late 2003, the GSPC leader issued a communiqu� announcing the group�s support of a number of jihadist causes and movements, including al-Qa�ida.
Strength
Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators outside Algeria.
Location/Area of Operation
Algeria, the Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania, and northern Niger), Canada, and Western Europe.
External Aid
Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistical support. GSPC members also engage in criminal activity.
Shining Path (SL)
a.k.a. Sendero Luminoso People�s Liberation Army
Description
Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL�s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. Approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, but reports of recent SL involvement in narco-trafficking and kidnapping for ransom indicate it may be developing new sources of support. Its stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments. Peruvian Courts in 2003 granted approximately 1,900 members the right to request retrials in a civilian court, including the imprisoned top leadership. The trial of Guzman, who was arrested in 1992, was scheduled for November 5, 2004, but was postponed after the first day, when chaos erupted in the courtroom.
Activities
Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations.
Strength
Unknown but estimated to be some 300 armed militants.
Location/Area of Operation
Peru, with most activity in rural areas.
External
Aid None.
Tanzim Qa�idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR)
a.k.a. Al-Zarqawi Network, Al-Qa�ida in Iraq, Al-Qa�ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of The Two Rivers, Jama�at al-Tawhid wa�al-Jihad
Description
The Jordanian Palestinian Abu Mus�ab al-Zarqawi (Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, a.k.a. Abu Ahmad, Abu Azraq) established cells in Iraq soon after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), formalizing his group in April 2004 to bring together jihadists and other insurgents in Iraq fighting against US and Coalition forces. Zarqawi initially called his group "Unity and Jihad" (Jama�at al-Tawhid wa�al-Jihad, or JTJ). Zarqawi and his group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Iraqi resistance. The group adopted its current name after its October 2004 merger with Usama Bin Ladin�s al-Qa�ida. The immediate goal of QJBR is to expel the Coalition -- through a campaign of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation -- and establish an Islamic state in Iraq. QJBR�s longer-term goal is to proliferate jihad from Iraq into "Greater Syria," that is, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.
Activities
In August 2003, Zarqawi�s group carried out a major international terrorist attack in Iraq when it bombed the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, followed 12 days later by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23, including the Secretary-General�s Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Also in August the group conducted a VBIED attack against Shi�a worshippers outside the Imam Ali Mosque in Al Najaf, killing 85 -- including the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). It kept up its attack pace throughout 2003, striking numerous Iraqi, Coalition, and relief agency targets such as the Red Cross. Zarqawi�s group conducted VBIED attacks against US military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure throughout 2004, including suicide attacks inside the Green Zone perimeter in Baghdad. The group successfully penetrated the Green Zone in the October bombing of a popular caf� and market. Zarqawi�s group fulfilled a pledge to target Shi�a; its March attacks on Shi�a celebrating the religious holiday of Ashura, killing over 180, was its most lethal attack to date. The group also killed key Iraqi political figures in 2004, most notably the head of Iraq�s Governing Council. The group has claimed responsibility for the videotaped execution by beheading of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 8, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 20, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004). The group may have been involved in other hostage incidents as well.
Zarqawi�s group has been active in the Levant since its involvement in the failed Millennium plot directed against US, Western, and Jordanian targets in Jordan in late 1999. The group assassinated USAID official Laurence Foley in 2002, but the Jordanian Government has successfully disrupted further plots against US and Western interests in Jordan, including a major arrest of Zarqawi associates in 2004 planning to attack Jordanian security targets.
Strength
QJBR�s numerical strength is unknown, though the group has attracted new recruits to replace key leaders and other members killed or captured by Coalition forces. Zarqawi�s increased stature from his formal relationship with al-Qa�ida could attract additional recruits to QJBR.
Location/Area of Operation
QJBR�s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.
External Aid
QJBR probably receives funds from donors in the Middle East and Europe, local sympathizers in Iraq, and a variety of businesses and criminal activities. In many cases, QJBR�s donors are probably motivated by support for jihad rather than affiliation with any specific terrorist group.
United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)
a.k.a. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
Description
The AUC, commonly referred to as "the paramilitaries," is an umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to coordinate the activities of local paramilitary groups and develop a cohesive paramilitary effort to combat insurgents. The AUC is supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective Government security, and claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from Marxist insurgents. The AUC�s affiliate groups and other paramilitary units are in negotiations with the Government of Colombia and in the midst of the largest demobilization in modern Colombian history. To date, approximately 3,600 AUC-affiliated fighters have demobilized since November 2003.
Activities
AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. As much as 70 percent of the AUC�s operational costs are financed with drug-related earnings, with the rest coming from "donations" from its sponsors. The AUC generally avoids actions against US personnel or interests.
Strength
Estimated 8,000 to 11,000, with an unknown number of active supporters.
Location/Area of Operation
AUC forces are strongest in the northwest of Colombia in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Atlantico, Magdelena, Cesar, La Guajira, and Bolivar Departments, with affiliate groups in the coffee region, Valle del Cauca, and in Meta Department.
External Aid
None.
Other Selected Terrorist Organizations
Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)
Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
Communist Party of India (Maoist)
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)
Islamic Great East Raiders�Front (IBDA-C)
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
Lord�s Resistance Army (LRA)
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Turkish Hizballah
Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
Al Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)
Description
The Al Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971, when a group named Al Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Later operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar�s Hizb-I Islami (HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM in Kashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000. Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility for attacks against Indian military targets.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir.
Strength
Perhaps several hundred.
Location/Area of Operation
Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
External
Aid Unknown.
Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
Description
AIAI rose to prominence in the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s, following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime and the subsequent collapse of the Somali nation state into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive and suffered divisions between factions supporting moderate Islam and more puritanical Islamic ideology. Following military defeats in 1996 and 1997, AIAI evolved into a loose network of highly compartmentalized cells, factions, and individuals with no central control or coordination. AIAI elements pursue a variety of agendas ranging from social services and education to insurgency activities in the Ogaden. Some AIAI-associated sheikhs espouse a radical fundamentalist version of Islam, with particular emphasis on a strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law), a view often at odds with Somali emphasis on clan identity. A small number of AIAI-associated individuals have provided logistical support to and maintain ties with al-Qa�ida; however, the network�s central focus remains the establishment of an Islamic government in Somalia.
Activities
Elements of AIAI may have been responsible for the kidnapping and murder of relief workers in Somalia and Somaliland in 2003 and 2004, and during the late 1990s. Factions of AIAI may also have been responsible for a series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997. Most AIAI factions have recently concentrated on broadening their religious base, renewed emphasis on building businesses, and undertaking "hearts and minds" actions, such as sponsoring orphanages and schools and providing security that uses an Islamic legal structure in the areas where it is active.
Strength
The actual membership strength is unknown.
Location/Area of Operations
Primarily in Somalia, with a presence in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.
External Aid
Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Somali diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Arabian Peninsula.
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
Description
The ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People�s Army, was formed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to the Terrorist Exclusion list in December 2001.
Activities
Responsible for more than 100 murders, including the murder in 1989 of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. In March 1997, the group announced it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, the group claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against the Department of Energy building in Manila and strafed Shell Oil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oil prices.
Strength
Approximately 500.
Location/Area of Operation
The largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islands of Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas.
External Aid
Unknown.
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units
Description
The NTA is a clandestine leftist extremist group that first appeared in Italy�s Friuli region in 1995. Adopted the class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s and a similar logo -- an encircled five-point star -- for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an "anti-imperialist fighting front" with other Italian leftist terrorist groups, including Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what it perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemns Italy�s foreign and labor polices. In a leaflet dated January 2002, NTA identified experts in four Italian Government sectors -- federalism, privatizations, justice reform, and jobs and pensions -- as potential targets.
Activities
To date, NTA has conducted attacks only against property. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice and Rome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democrats of the Left. NTA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in September 2000 against the Central European Initiative office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001 against the Venice Tribunal building. In January 2002, police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to enter the Rivolto Military Air Base. In 2003, NTA claimed responsibility for the arson attacks against three vehicles belonging to US troops serving at the Ederle and Aviano bases in Italy. There has been no reported activity by the group since the arrest in January 2004 of NTA�s founder and leader.
Strength
Accounts vary from one to approximately 20 members.
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily northeastern Italy and near US military installations in northern Italy.
External Aid
None evident.
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
a.k.a. Cholana Kangtoap Serei Cheat Kampouchea
Description
The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998 in the wake of political violence that saw many influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian People�s Party assume power. With an avowed aim of overthrowing the Government, the group is led by a Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF�s membership reportedly includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and the United States, and former soldiers from the Khmer Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various political factions.
Activities
The Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF members who were reportedly planning an unspecified terrorist attack in southwestern Cambodia in late 2003, but there were no successful CFF attacks that year. Cambodian courts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in 2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including one US citizen, of "terrorism" and/or "membership in an armed group" and sentenced them to terms of five years to life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibility for an attack in late November 2000 on several Government installations that killed at least eight persons and wounded more than a dozen. In April 1999, five CFF members were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons.
Strength
Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have exceeded 100 armed fighters.
Location/Area of Operation
Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border, and the United States.
External Aid
US-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-American community.
Communist Party of India (Maoist)
Formerly Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI) and People�s War (PW)
Description
The Indian groups known as the Maoist Communist Center of India and People�s War (a.k.a. People�s War Group) joined together in September 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist). The MC