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World news from The Times and the Sunday Times - Times Online
A SUICIDE bomber killed 24 people and injured more than 150 at a Shia Muslim shrine yesterday.
The bomber blew himself up in the Bari Imam shrine where thousands had gathered to pay homage to a 17th-century Sufi saint. Witnesses said that they saw the body of the bomber flying through the air after he detonated his explosives close to a podium where a sermon was being given on the last day of a five-day annual festival.
The shrine is near the official residence of Pakistan’s Prime Minister and diplomatic compounds in Islamabad.
Sufism is a mystical movement within Islam. Sunni and Shia Muslims revere Shah Abdul Latif Kazmi, Islamabad’s patron saint, but some conservative Sunni groups regard it as un-Islamic to celebrate him. Hundreds of people have been killed in sectarian attacks in the past year but this was the worst attack so far in the capital.
The bodies of most of the victims were so disfigured that they could not be identified.
Munazar Abbasi, who was slightly injured in the bombing, said: “We were listening to a sermon when there was a huge blast. Everything went black and I couldn’t hear anything.”
Hundreds of demonstrators blocked the roads after the attack and raised anti-government slogans.
President Musharraf expressed shock and grief at the killings and called for those responsible to be punished.
No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
May 29, 2005 at 12:22 AM in Middle East | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Britain, UK news from The Times and The Sunday Times - Times Online
By Zahid Hussain in Islamabad and Daniel McGrory
BRITAIN and America claimed a breakthrough in their war on terrorism yesterday when Pakistani security forces seized al-Qaeda’s third-in-command after a gunfight near the Afghan border.
President Bush said the capture of Abu Farj al-Libbi, a Libyan with a $5 million (£2.6 million) price on his head, represented a “critical victory in the war on terror”.
Mr Bush described al-Libbi as a “top general” for Osama bin Laden and a “major facilitator and chief planner for the al-Qaeda network”. His arrest “removes a dangerous enemy who was a direct threat to America”.
Western intelligence agencies regard al-Libbi as commander of the terror network’s day-to-day operations, and the one who runs its terror cells abroad, including recruits in Britain. British intelligence agents will be allowed to question al-Libbi.
Al-Libbi, 28, is also believed to be among the handful of al-Qaeda operatives likely to know the whereabouts of bin Laden.
Pakistani intelligence chiefs and CIA agents said to have taken part in his capture were angry that word of his arrest leaked out before they had a chance to move against others in the group.
Al-Libbi is said to have planned two assassination attempts against President Musharraf of Pakistan.
One senior Western intelligence source said the arrest had “broken the back of bin Laden’s terror operation”. “Al-Libbi’s hand controlled all al-Qaeda’s terrorist puppets,” he said.
A gifted computer expert, al-Libbi would know the identities of key figures worldwide, their coded communications network and future terror plans.
Al-Qaeda will have to reorganise its set-up, such as changing the hiding places for its “sleepers” abroad and the way it sends messages.
Pakistani officials refused to say last night what al-Libbi has told them so far about bin Laden’s whereabouts, but Aftab Khan Sherpao, the Interior Minister, said his information showed that they were “on the right track” to capturing the al- Qaeda leader. He said that al-Libbi and five other foreign militants seized with him had already given “lots of tips”. “He was a big, big catch,” he said.
Last night there was some dispute as to where the Libyan was found. The official version is that there was a two-day gun battle at a farmhouse in the Waziristan tribal region. But security sources in Islamabad said a tip-off led troops to raid homes in the village of Fatami, near the northwestern town of Mardan, close to the Afghan border. Ministers would not say where al-Libbi is being held.
In his wanted posters released a year ago, al-Libbi was shown as a slight figure with a neatly trimmed beard and wearing a suit and tie. In a picture released yesterday he appeared dishevelled and exhausted, his face disfigured by a skin complaint.
Officials say it is likely that he will be handed over to the Americans for further questioning.
CIA agents are operating in the mountains bordering Pakistan and have spent considerable sums to persuade local tribal leaders to betray the movements of al-Qaeda’s most wanted agents.
Al-Libbi is seen as “a planner, not a doer”. He is alleged to have helped to organise the September 11 attacks with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, his mentor, who was arrested in March 2003.
It was after this arrest that the Libyan was promoted to No 3 and given the task of liaising with “sleepers” and shifting around al-Qaeda’s finances to limit the damage done to the network.
He was already close to bin Laden after working as his personal assistant for a number of years. Computers found after a series of arrests last year revealed that al-Libbi ordered two agents in Britain to travel to Pakistan for a crisis meeting.
MI5 officers will want to know what happened to the two men, and the instructions they were given.
The priority for the Pakistanis is the two botched assassination plots against General Musharraf in December 2003.
The President narrowly escaped the bomb attacks near his official residence in Rawalpindi. Seventeen people were killed in a Christmas Day suicide attack on the President’s motorcade.
Al-Libbi is also suspected of orchestrating other bombings in Pakistan, including an attempt to kill Shaukat Aziz, the Prime Minister.
MOST WANTED: ABU FARJ Al-LIBBI
# Born: Libya
# Age: said to be 28
# Alias: Dr Taufeeq
# Role: operational commander of al-Qaeda
# Took over in 2003 after the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, whom he helped to organise the September 11 attacks. Previously a personal assistant to Osama bin Laden
# A computer expert who handles all messages to and from bin Laden
# The CIA has offered £2.6 million for his capture, Pakistan £180,000
# Alleged to have managed two assassination attempts on President Musharraf
# Suffers from vitiligo, a condition that transforms his skin from black to white
May 4, 2005 at 10:37 PM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
They vary, experts say. The large majority of insurgents are Sunni nationalists who want to derail the U.S.-backed, Shiite-dominated transitional government. There are also some groups with "a much more aggressive belief that Iraq should be an Islamist state on Sunni terms," said Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a November 2004 interview. The aims of foreign-born jihadis under the sway of Zarqawi are less clear. Some experts say their goal is to make Iraq a foothold in the Arab world from which to export Islamic fundamentalism abroad, much like Sudan was during the 1990s. Others say they have no concrete political objective beyond sowing fear and chaos.
May 1, 2005 at 10:32 AM in Iraq | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
SAS arrests at Blair home - Britain - Times Online
By Michael Evans, Defence Editor
TWO men arrested near the Prime Minister’s country residence were found to be SAS soldiers. They were spotted in a tree by a police helicopter.
The police, on full alert around Chequers during the election campaign, made checks and found that the soldiers were from Hereford, the home of the SAS, and were on an “officially sanctioned� exercise. The constabulary had not been told.
They were apparently not engaged in a covert mission to test security at the house in Buckinghamshire. But they had cameras and mobile phones and were in a position in the tree with a good view of the estate. The soldiers were released on bail and no further action will be taken. The Ministry of Defence declined to comment.
May 1, 2005 at 09:45 AM in SAS | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Who steals wins: birth of the SAS - Review - Times Online
The original members of the elite unit were misfits and mavericks, writes Stuart Wavell
It was the most unexpected telephone call that Gordon Stevens had ever received, summoning him to a Special Air Service office in London. The SAS is notoriously tight-lipped but it appeared that the regiment wanted the television documentary maker to spill some of its secrets.
It was 1985. Stevens had caught the eye of the regiment’s high-ups with his film Secret Hunters which revealed how, between 1945 and 1948, a secret SAS unit hunted down war criminals even though the regiment had been disbanded.
To his astonishment, Stevens was invited by Colonel Sir David Stirling, founder of the SAS, to a discreet hotel in the New Forest. There he met and filmed Stirling and the other surviving founders of the regiment, who put on record for the first time how the extraordinary unit was formed in the north African desert campaign during the second world war.
The idea of a film was later dropped, but Stevens saved the transcripts and has now woven them into a book, The Originals.
Stirling, then 70 and in poor health (although he lived for another five years), was not the gung-ho figure that Stevens had imagined.
“He struck me as a very powerful character,” he says. “But talking to the others he came across as a strange mixture — shy and with a quality of vulnerability, yet totally ruthless.”
Stirling’s “originals” were a group of rule breakers, misfits and mavericks. They included a veteran of the Spanish civil war and an Irish rugby international who had been imprisoned for beating up his commanding officer.
Stirling’s big idea came in 1941 as he lay on a hospital bed in Cairo. He was 24, a second lieutenant who had escaped being court-martialled for cowardice after using his hangovers to fake illness. For once he was officially paralytic, having damaged his spine during his first parachute jump.
He was finding life as a commando frustrating: operations were invariably postponed or cancelled. “I’d gone out with the usual enthusiasm for having a go at the enemy,” he said, “but I wasn’t going to have a go at them if we were going to have a dreary life in the desert.”
Stirling’s concept of the SAS was born out of the commandos’ calamitous experience. Instead of a 600-strong commando unit attacking two targets, he reasoned that 15 units comprising four men could attack 15 targets. By exploiting surprise and guile it would be more effective. His revolutionary idea was that every soldier would be independent.
To sell his big idea Stirling knew that he would have to avoid military bureaucracy and go straight to the top.
He left his hospital bed and limped to Middle East HQ, where he used his crutches “as a kind of ladder” and dodged his way to General Ritchie, deputy commander Middle East, who read his paper and ordered him to assemble his new force.
Stirling had the pick of the disgruntled commando forces languishing in the area. Their felonious aptitudes were put to the test by his first order — to “steal” some quarters in which to train the detachment. The men obliged by absconding with a camp temporarily vacated by New Zealanders. “We stole tents, bars and three marquees. We stole the lot,” recalled Bob Bennett, one of the “originals”.
Appropriating the name “Special Air Service” was Stirling’s private joke. It was already the title of a bogus deception unit of tiny model parachutists with 3ft parachutes. Choosing a motto was more difficult. “We Descend To Defend” was briefly contemplated before Stirling decided on “Who Dares Wins”.
Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.
May 1, 2005 at 09:40 AM in SAS | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
Blair planned Iraq war from start - Sunday Times - Times Online
Michael Smith
INSIDE Downing Street Tony Blair had gathered some of his senior ministers and advisers for a pivotal meeting in the build-up to the Iraq war. It was 9am on July 23, 2002, eight months before the invasion began and long before the public was told war was inevitable.
The discussion that morning was highly confidential. As minutes of the proceedings, headed “Secret and strictly personal — UK eyes only”, state: “This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.”
In the room were the prime minister, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, Lord Goldsmith, the attorney-general, and military and intelligence chiefs. Also listed on the minutes are Alastair Campbell, then Blair’s director of strategy, Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Sally Morgan, director of government relations.
What they were about to discuss would dominate the political agenda for years to come and indelibly stain Blair’s reputation; and last week the issue exploded again on the political scene as Blair campaigned in the hope of winning a third term as prime minister.
For the secret documents — seen by The Sunday Times — reveal that on that Tuesday in 2002:
# Blair was right from the outset committed to supporting US plans for “regime change” in Iraq.
# War was already “seen as inevitable”.
# The attorney-general was already warning of grave doubts about its legality.
Straw even said the case for war was “thin”. So Blair and his inner circle set about devising a plan to justify invasion.
“If the political context were right,” said Blair, “people would support regime change.” Straightforward regime change, though, was illegal. They needed another reason.
By the end of the meeting, a possible path to invasion was agreed and it was noted that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the defence staff, “would send the prime minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week”.
Outside Downing Street, the rest of Britain, including most cabinet ministers, knew nothing of this. True, tensions were running high, and fears of terrorism were widespread. But Blair’s constant refrain was that “no decisions” had been taken about what to do with Iraq.
The following day in the House of Commons, Blair told MPs: “We have not got to the stage of military action . . . we have not yet reached the point of decision.”
It was typical lawyer’s cleverness, if not dissembling: while no actual order had been given to invade, Blair already knew Saddam Hussein was going to be removed, sooner or later. Plans were in motion. The justification would come later.
AS a civil service briefing paper specifically prepared for the July meeting reveals, Blair had made his fundamental decision on Saddam when he met President George W Bush in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002.
“When the prime minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April,” states the paper, “he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change.”
Blair set certain conditions: that efforts were first made to try to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through weapons inspectors and to form a coalition and “shape” public opinion. But the bottom line was that he was signed up to ousting Saddam by force if other methods failed. The Americans just wanted to get rid of the brutal dictator, whether or not he posed an immediate threat.
This presented a problem because, as the secret briefing paper made clear, there were no clear legal grounds for war.
“US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community,” says the briefing paper. “Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law.”
To compound matters, the US was not a party to the International Criminal Court, while Britain was. The ICC, which came into force on 1 July, 2002, was set up to try international offences such as war crimes.
Military plans were forging ahead in America but the British, despite Blair’s commitment, played down talk of war.
In April, Straw told MPs that no decisions about military action “are likely to be made for some time”.
That month Blair said in the Commons: “We will ensure the house is properly consulted.” On July 17 he told MPs: “As I say constantly, no decisions have yet been taken.”
Six days later in Downing Street the man who opened the secret discussion of Blair’s war meeting was John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. A former MI6 officer, Scarlett had become a key member of Blair’s “sofa cabinet”. He came straight to the point — “Saddam’s regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action”.
Saddam was expecting an attack, said Scarlett, but was not convinced it would be “immediate or overwhelming”.
His assessment reveals that the primary impetus to action over Iraq was not the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction — as Blair later told the country — but the desire to overthrow Saddam. There was little talk of WMD at all.
The next contributor to the meeting, according to the minutes, was “C”, as the chief of MI6 is traditionally known.
Sir Richard Dearlove added nothing to what Scarlett had said about Iraq: his intelligence concerned his recent visit to Washington where he had held talks with George Tenet, director of the CIA.
“Military action was now seen as inevitable,” said Dearlove. “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.”
The Americans had been trying to link Saddam to the 9/11 attacks; but the British knew the evidence was flimsy or non-existent. Dearlove warned the meeting that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy”.
It was clear from Dearlove’s brief visit that the US administration’s attitude would compound the legal difficulties for Britain. The US had no patience with the United Nations and little inclination to ensure an invasion was backed by the security council, he said.
Nor did the Americans seem very interested in what might happen in the aftermath of military action. Yet, as Boyce then reported, events were already moving swiftly.
“CDS (chief of the defence staff) said that military planners would brief (Donald) Rumsfeld (US defence secretary) on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.”
The US invasion plans centred around two options. One was a full-blown reprise of the 1991 Gulf war, a steady and obvious build-up of troops over several months, followed by a large-scale invasion.
The other was a “running start”. Seizing on an Iraqi casus belli, US and RAF patrols over the southern no-fly zone would knock out the Iraqi air defences. Allied special forces would then carry out a series of small-scale operations in tandem with the Iraqi opposition, with more forces joining the battle as they arrived, eventually toppling Saddam’s regime.
The “running start” was, said Boyce, “a hazardous option”.
In either case the US saw three options for British involvement. The first allowed the use of the bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus and three squadrons of special forces; the second added RAF aircraft and Royal Navy ships; the third threw in 40,000 ground troops “perhaps with a discrete role in northern Iraq entering from Turkey”.
At the least the US saw the use of British bases as “critical”, which posed immediate legal problems. And Hoon said the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime.
AMID all this talk of military might and invasion plans, one awkward voice spoke up. Straw warned that, though Bush had made up his mind on military action, the case for it was “thin”. He was not thinking in purely legal terms.
A few weeks later the government would paint Saddam as an imminent threat to the Middle East and the world. But that morning in private Straw said: “Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.”
It was a key point. If Saddam was not an immediate threat, could war be justified legally? The attorney-general made his position clear, telling the meeting that “the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action”.
Right from the outset, the minutes reveal, the government’s legal adviser had grave doubts about Blair’s plans; he would only finally conclude unequivocally that war was legal three days before the invasion, by which time tens of thousands of troops were already on the borders of Iraq.
There were three possible legal bases for military action, said Goldsmith. Self-defence, intervention to end an humanitarian crisis and a resolution from the UN Security Council.
Neither of the first two options was a possibility with Iraq; it had to be a UN resolution. But relying, as some hoped they could, on an existing UN resolution, would be “difficult”.
Despite voicing concerns, Straw was not standing in the way of war. It was he who suggested a solution: they should force Saddam into a corner where he would give them a clear reason for war.
“We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors,” he said.
If he refused, or the weapons inspectors found WMD, there would be good cause for war. “This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force,” said Straw.
From the minutes, it seems as if Blair seized on the idea as a way of reconciling the US drive towards invasion and Britain’s need for a legal excuse.
“The prime minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors,” record the minutes. “Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD . . . If the political context were right, people would support regime change.”
Blair would subsequently portray the key issue to parliament and the people as the threat of WMD; and weeks later he would produce the now notorious “sexed up” dossier detailing Iraq’s suspected nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes.
But in the meeting Blair said: “The two key issues are whether the military plan works and whether we have the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.”
Hoon said that if the prime minister wanted to send in the troops, he would have to decide early. The defence chiefs were pressing to be allowed to buy large amounts of equipment as “urgent operational requirements”. They had been prevented from preparing for war, partly by Blair’s insistence that there could be no publicly visible preparations that might inflame splits in his party, partly by the fact there was no authorisation to spend any money.
The meeting concluded that they should plan for the UK taking part in any military action. Boyce would send Blair full details; Blair would come back with a decision about money; and Straw would send Blair the background on the UN inspectors and “discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam”.
The final note of the minutes, says: “We must not ignore the legal issues: the attorney-general would consider legal advice with (Foreign Office/Ministry of Defence) legal advisers.”
It was a prophetic warning.
Also seen by The Sunday Times is the Foreign Office opinion on the possible legal bases for war. Marked “Confidential”, it runs to eight pages and casts doubt on the possibility of reviving the authority to use force from earlier UN resolutions. “Reliance on it now would be unlikely to receive any support,” it says.
Foreign Office lawyers were consistently doubtful of the legality of war and one deputy legal director, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ultimately resigned because she believed the conflict was a “crime of aggression”.
The Foreign Office briefing on the legal aspects was made available for the Downing Street meeting on July 23. Ten days ago, when Blair was interviewed by the BBC’s Jeremy Paxman, the prime minister was asked repeatedly whether he had seen that advice.
“No,” said Blair. “I had the attorney-general’s advice to guide me.”
But as the July 23 documents show, the attorney-general’s view was, until the last minute, also riven with doubts.
Three years on, it and the questionable legality of the war are still hanging round Blair’s neck like an albatross.
May 1, 2005 at 09:34 AM in Iraq, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home
The secret Downing Street memo - Sunday Times - Times Online
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
May 1, 2005 at 09:30 AM in Iraq, Special Relationship | Permalink | Top of page | Blog Home