« July 2004 |
Main
| September 2004 »
Nicholas Rufford, Tom Walker and Dean Nelson
Cape Town
THE Pentagon and MI6 were warned in advance about the prospect of the African coup attempt which led to the arrest of Sir Mark Thatcher.
The American defence department was tipped off by Greg Wales, a British businessman named in legal papers as one of the ringleaders behind the plot.
Two weeks before the plan swung into action, he met a senior Pentagon official in Washington and told her that the situation in Equatorial Guinea had become “dangerous” and to expect trouble.
This weekend the official confirmed that the conversation had taken place, and the subsequent coup attempt tallied with the warning. The alleged plot failed when a group of mercenary soldiers were arrested in Zimbabwe while trying to collect a cargo of machineguns, mortars and other weapons at Harare airport in March.
Those at the centre of the affair say Washington wanted the overthrow of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who has been blamed for human rights abuses.
During earlier trips to the American capital, Wales, who worked for Simon Mann, the alleged coup leader, met a CIA analyst and representatives from the Africa section of the US State Department. Wales participated with government officials in private think tanks that had discussed the possibility that Obiang could be arrested for money laundering or human rights violations.
“The State Department was under increasing pressure because of Obiang’s reputation to impose penalties on Equatorial Guinea which would have damaged American oil interests,” Wales said.
Earlier this year the State Department put Equatorial Guinea on notice of sanctions after it was named in an official report as one of the world’s worst offenders for human trafficking.
MI6 also knew in advance of a conspiracy to overthrow Obiang “through diplomatic channels”, according to a British official. However, the Foreign Office said publicly that it had no advance knowledge of any coup attempt.
Mann was found guilty last Friday by a magistrate in Zimbabwe of attempting to buy weapons illegally. Mann’s coaccused, a group of 66 men he recruited for the operation, were acquitted of weapons charges under Zimbabwe’s tough security laws. Two of the men who returned yesterday to South Africa said they had been tortured while imprisoned.
Thatcher was arrested last Wednesday by South African police. Prosecutors claim they have receipts from Thatcher to show that he invested $275,000 to fund the logistics of the coup attempt and that he had bought a helicopter gunship. Thatcher has denied the charges.
Sipho Ngwema, spokesman for the Scorpions unit of the police, said: “Thatcher definitely knew the money was for a coup. There was $275,000 in two payments. There were specific instructions and specific meetings which led to the purchase of logistical material they needed for the coup. It is not a vague connection.
“Some of the material we picked up in the raid has assisted us in this. There are invoices from various transactions to him and receipts. It’s clear that there is a direct link. We took his computer and are downloading it now. There is also written material above and beyond the receipts.
“There is no doubt about his connection with Simon Mann. He is not a passive investor, he was an active participant and he was in constant contact with what was happening. He was a direct investor in a short-termproject. His correspondence was with the coup organisers.”
Had the coup succeeded, the plotters would have become rich through Equatorial Guinea’s “black gold”. Each would have stood to have made millions of pounds, industry analysts say.
Since the botched coup, the Pentagon has announced plans for a show of naval strength in the Gulf of Guinea. A US navy battle group may be sent to waters near Equatorial Guinea as part of a wider military exercise.
Equatorial Guinea is of increasing strategic interest to the United States. The country is sub-Saharan Africa’s third biggest oil producer, pumping 330,000 barrels a day, and with oil prices topping the political agenda in Washington, officials are anxious to increase sources of supply outside the Middle East.
Severo Moto, 60, the opposition leader in exile who has been linked to the coup plot, flew to Washington in 2002 where his backers had hired a lobbying firm to promote him as the future leader of the government in exile. Moto is said to have met Charles Snyder, a senior official in the African affairs bureau at the State Department, and other senior officials.
A State Department official said he had not been briefed and had no comment on whether a warning of the coup had been received. Wales denies involvement in the coup plot.
There are other indications that the plot — which has been widely portrayed as a hamfisted attempt by a band of mercenaries to seize power in an oil-rich state — had wider backing. Moto had contacts with the government of Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar, according to Spanish media reports. Sources say that Spain was planning to issue an international warrant for Obiang’s arrest.
According to one account, Obiang was to have been detained at the request of Spanish authorities while he was travelling. Had the plan succeeded it would have been an almost carbon copy of the arrest of General Pinochet, the former Chilean leader. Pinochet was arrested while in London for medical treatment on a warrant issued by a Spanish judge. Pinochet was accused of presiding over political killings and torture while he was head of state.
Obiang flew frequently to Rabat in Morocco where he is said to have been receiving treatment for cancer. One trip that he made to Morocco in April coincided with the timing of the intended coup, had the mercenaries not been intercepted.
Ronnie Kasrils, South Africa’s intelligence minister, is reported as having said that the alleged conspiracy to overthrow Obiang was infiltrated at an early stage by South African intelligence. Three agents were reported to have been among those held when Mann’s USregistered plane landed at Harare to pick up weapons.
August 29, 2004 at 10:31 PM in MI6 | Permalink | TrackBack (103) | Top of page | Blog Home
Telegraph | News | Nato risks MI6 lives by naming agents on website
By David Bamber and Guy Dennis
(Filed: 29/08/2004)
Nato has exposed the identities of four MI6 intelligence officers working in the Balkans, sparking intense anger from Britain.
The four were named on the alliance's website in a summary of news, translated into English, from the former Yugoslavia.
The site identified the men eight weeks ago, on July 9, and their names remained there until yesterday, when The Telegraph alerted Nato to its blunder.
Within hours of being told of the error, embarrassed officials removed the web page yesterday afternoon. Their prompt action did not appease senior intelligence officials in London, who last night expressed fury at Nato's mistake and warned that the men's lives had potentially been placed in danger.
The names of the four officers had originally been published in Nacional, a weekly news magazine in Croatia which sells just 35,000 copies. By having the article translated into English and put on its website, www.nato.int, the alliance circulated their names worldwide.
The naming of the men followed the recent unmasking by the Nedeljni Telegraf, a newspaper in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, of a man who was allegedly the chief MI6 officer in Serbia.
The four people named by Nato all allegedly work for MI6, the secret intelligence service, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One is said to be the director of the information sector and Nato even names his wife.
A second man is named as head of British intelligence in Bosnia and the third is an intelligence officer - the website also names his fiancee. The fourth man is allegedly a spy in the office of Donald Hays, an American who is the principal deputy high representative of the international community in Bosnia.
Officials said that it would be embarrassing for the Government if Britain has been caught spying on a key ally.
Last night a senior intelligence officer confirmed that the names published by Nato seemed accurate and described the mistake as a "major breach of security". He said that the men would have to be withdrawn from the Balkans and be re-deployed elsewhere.
Patrick Mercer, the Conservative shadow homeland security minister, said: "With friends like these we really don't need enemies.
"This is a terrible breach of security. MI6 works abroad to make sure terrorists do not reach these shores and it is unbelievable their identities would be revealed by Nato."
Mr Mercer, who served in Bosnia in 1997 with distinction as a colonel in the Sherwood Foresters Regiment, added: "There must be a full inquiry into how this happened and serious consequences must follow."
Gerald Moor, a former senior military intelligence officer in the Ministry of Defence, who is now chief executive of Inkerman, a private intelligence and security firm, said Nato had committed a serious "cock-up".
He added: "If these people have been exposed it would have interfered with operations and could endanger people working alongside them."
MI6 has a large presence in the Balkans and works closely with Sfor, the Nato-led peacekeeping force which includes 1,000 British troops, to track down wanted war criminals.
August 29, 2004 at 07:00 PM in MI6 | Permalink | TrackBack (13) | Top of page | Blog Home
From Roland Watson in Washington
THE FBI has uncovered an Israeli spy at the highest levels of the Pentagon who may have influenced White House policy on Iraq and Iran.
Federal investigators have a major investigation underway and are poised to arrest the suspected "mole", who was working from inside the office of Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, CBS News reported last night.
The FBI believes that it has "solid" evidence that the mole supplied Israel with highly classified documents, including secret White House deliberations on Iraq and Iran.
The claim drew a swift denial from the Israeli Embassy in Washington last night.
CBS quoted sources saying that the suspected spy, described as a trusted analyst in the Pentagon, handed over a confidential presidential directive on US policy towards Iran while it was "in the draft phase with US policy-makers still debating policy".
This put the Israelis "inside the decision-making loop", giving them the opportunity to "try to influence the outcome".
The FBI is also examining whether the mole tried to steer US policy on Iraq.
The analyst was said to have close ties with Paul Wolfowitz, Mr Rumsfeld's deputy, and Douglas Feith, a Defence Under Secretary, and was assigned to a unit within the building tasked with helping to develop the Pentagon's Iraq policy.
The Pentagon was in the vanguard of arguing the case for toppling Saddam Hussein and both Mr Wolfowitz and Mr Feith are leading neo-conservatives and were vigorous supporters of the Iraq war.
Mr Feith has been accused by some critics of stretching US intelligence too far and removing its caveats.
The FBI inquiry is believed to involve two people who work at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a powerful pro-Israeli lobby in the US capital.
The investigation is headed by Dave Szady and has involved wiretaps, undercover surveillance and photography that CBS News said documented the passing of classified information from the mole to the two AIPAC employees and onto the Israelis.
Lesley Stahl, a CBS News correspondent, said that the FBI had a fully-fledged espionage investigation under way and is about to "roll up someone who agents believe has been spying, not for an enemy but for Israel, from within the office of the Secretary of Defense".
CBS News said that it had placed repeated phone calls to the suspected spy, but none had been returned.
AIPAC told CBS News that it was co-operating with the Government and is taking legal advice. It denied being involved in any wrong-doing.
The US Administration has told AIPAC that it wants information about the two employees and their contacts with the suspected spy.
Asked about the CBS News report, a spokesman for the Israeli Embassy said: "We categorically deny these allegations.
"They are completely false and outrageous."
Copyright 2004 Times Newspapers Ltd.
August 28, 2004 at 07:33 PM in FBI | Permalink | TrackBack (65) | Top of page | Blog Home
Federal Register-Executive Order 12333
Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, appear at 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200, unless otherwise noted.
Table of Contents
Preamble
Part 1. Goals, Direction, Duties, and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort
1.1 Goals
1.2 The National Security Council
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups
1.4 The Intelligence Community
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community
1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency
1.9 The Department of State
1.10 The Department of the Treasury
1.11 The Department of Defense
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense
1.13 The Department of Energy
1.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Part 2. Conduct of Intelligence Activities
2.1 Need
2.2 Purpose
2.3 Collection of Information
2.4 Collection Techniques
2.5 Attorney General Approval
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities
2.7 Contracting
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States
2.10 Human Experimentation
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination
2.12 Indirect Participation
Part 3. General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight
3.2 Implementation
3.3 Procedures
3.4 Definitions
3.5 Purpose and Effect
3.6 Revocation
Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Part 1
Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort
1.1 Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.
(a) Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
(b) All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council. A balanced approach between technical collection efforts and other means should be maintained and encouraged.
(c) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.
(d) To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort.
1.2 The National Security Council.
(a) Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant policies and programs.
(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC, or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity and shall review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups.
(a) Establishment and Duties. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish such boards, councils, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the Intelligence Community concerning:
(1) Production, review and coordination of national foreign intelligence;
(2) Priorities for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
(3) Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
(4) Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;
(5) Protection of intelligence sources and methods;
(6) Activities of common concern; and
(7) Such other matters as may be referred by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(b) Membership. Advisory groups established pursuant to this section shall be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative and shall consist of senior representatives from organizations within the Intelligence Community and from departments or agencies containing such organizations, as designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. Groups for consideration of substantive intelligence matters will include representatives of organizations involved in the collection, processing and analysis of intelligence. A senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall be invited to participate in any group which deals with other than substantive intelligence matters.
1.4 The Intelligence Community. The agencies within the Intelligence Community shall, in accordance with applicable United States law and with the other provisions of this Order, conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States, including:
(a) Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
(b) Production and dissemination of intelligence;
(c) Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents;
(d) Special activities;
(e) Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
(f) Such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence. In order to discharge the duties and responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible directly to the President and the NSC and shall:
(a) Act as the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence and provide the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with national foreign intelligence;
(b) Develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national foreign intelligence;
(c) Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Community;
(d) Ensure implementation of special activities;
(e) Formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence arrangements with foreign governments, coordinate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments, and establish procedures governing the conduct of liaison by any department or agency with such services on narcotics activities;
(f) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad to ensure that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
(g) Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products;
(h) Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures;
(i) Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence;
(j) Establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist in the execution of the Director's responsibilities;
(k) Have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence, and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organizations, ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of national policymakers;
(l) Ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and military commands;
(m) Establish mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the Intelligence Community, resolve conflicts in tasking priority, provide to departments and agencies having information collection capabilities that are not part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program advisory tasking concerning collection of national foreign intelligence, and provide for the development of plans and arrangements for transfer of required collection tasking authority to the Secretary of Defense when directed by the President;
(n) Develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and the Congress;
(o) Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds, in accordance with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget;
(p) Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation, and, as necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations;
(q) Together with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs consistent with the requirement to develop competitive analysis, and provide to and obtain from the Secretary of Defense all information necessary for this purpose;
(r) In accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the heads of the departments and agencies access to all intelligence, developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of the departments and agencies; and
(s) Facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence products by Congress in a secure manner.
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and Agencies.
(a) The heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States, and shall give due consideration to the requests from the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities.
(b) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall ensure timely development and submission to the Director of Central Intelligence by the program managers and heads of component activities of proposed national programs and budgets in the format designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall also ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence is provided, in a timely and responsive manner, all information necessary to perform the Director's program and budget responsibilities.
(c) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program may appeal to the President decisions by the Director of Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the heads of such organizations, as appropriate, shall:
(a) Report to the Attorney General possible violations of federal criminal laws by employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those procedures;
(b) In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security, recommend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation;
(c) Furnish the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC, in accordance with applicable law and procedures approved by the Attorney General under this Order, the information required for the performance of their respective duties;
(d) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director of Central Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence activities of their organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive;
(e) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure consistent with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(f) Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under arrangements established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(g) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination of intelligence resulting from criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad if their departments, agencies, or organizations have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic narcotics production and trafficking;
(h) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight Board; and
(i) Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsels for their organizations have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by this Order.
1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the CIA shall be related to the intelligence functions set out below. As authorized by this Order; the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the CIA Act of 1949, as amended; appropriate directives or other applicable law, the CIA shall:
(a) Collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking;
(c) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(d) Coordinate counterintelligence activities and the collection of information not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other departments and agencies;
(e) Conduct special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)1) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective;
(f) Conduct services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as directed by the NSC;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
(h) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary; and
(i) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (h) above, including procurement and essential cover and proprietary arrangements.
1.9 The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:
(a) Overtly collect information relevant to United States foreign policy concerns;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Disseminate, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic and consular posts;
(d) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
(e) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their statutory responsibilities for direction and coordination of mission activities.
1.10 The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(a) Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information;
(b) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information;
(c) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States economic policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities; and
(d) Conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to determine the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used against the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, other Secret Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be acquired intentionally through such activities except to protect against such surveillance, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
1.11 The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall:
(a) Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as required for execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(e) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence and communications security activities, except as otherwise directed by the NSC;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
(h) Protect the security of Department of Defense installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary;
(i) Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international organizations, and ensure that such relationships and programs are in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(j) Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the National Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national reconnaissance entities; and
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:
(a) Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include;
(1) Collection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies;
(2) Collection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products;
(3) Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements;
(4) Management of the Defense Attache system; and
(5) Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) National Security Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense;
(2) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
(3) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(4) Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(6) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes;
(7) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(8) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the communications security of the United States Government;
(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security;
(10) Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA as are necessary;
(11) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA, and exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations;
(12) Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(13) Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.
(c) Offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized intelligence;
(2) Responding to tasking in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(3) Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for research, development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.
(d) The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
(2) Conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI; and
(3) Monitoring of the development, procurement and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and conducting related research, development, and test and evaluation activities.
(e) Other offices within the Department of Defense appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense. If such other offices are used for intelligence purposes, the provisions of Part 2 of this Order shall apply to those offices when used for those purposes.
1.13 The Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy shall:
(a) Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information with respect to foreign energy matters;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements where the special expert capability of the Department can contribute; and
(d) Provide expert technical, analytical and research capability to other agencies within the Intelligence Community.
1.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:
(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense;
(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with the CIA as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the United States Government;
(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and
(e) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.
Part 2
Conduct of Intelligence Activities
2.1 Need. Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded.
2.2 Purpose. This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers. Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.
2.3 Collection of Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the following types of information:
(a) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned;
(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons;
(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation;
(d) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations, including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist organizations;
(e) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United States shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other agencies of the Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting;
(f) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability or credibility;
(g) Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical or communications security investigation;
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons;
(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and
(j) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it.
2.4 Collection Techniques. Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:
(a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic surveillance;
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and
(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in its possession.
(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting; and
(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence element of a military service.
(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means.
2.5 Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community;
(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the providing agency; and
(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law.
2.7 Contracting. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the institution.
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States. No one acting on behalf of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join or otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing his intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such participation shall be authorized only if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the agency head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a lawful investigation; or
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
2.10 Human Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.
2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.
Part 3
General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight. The duties and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments, agencies, and entities engaged in intelligence activities to cooperate with the Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall be as provided in title 50, United States Code, section 413. The requirements of section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2422), and section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413), shall apply to all special activities as defined in this Order.
3.2 Implementation. The NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue appropriate supplementary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The Attorney General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving any procedures established by the head of an agency in the Intelligence Community other than the FBI. The National Security Council may establish procedures in instances where the agency head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.
3.3 Procedures. Until the procedures required by this Order have been established, the activities herein authorized which require procedures shall be conducted in accordance with existing procedures or requirements established under Executive Order No. 12036. Procedures required by this Order shall be established as expeditiously as possible. All procedures promulgated pursuant to this Order shall be made available to the congressional intelligence committees.
3.4 Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have these meanings:
(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.
(b) Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
(c) Employee means a person employedby, assigned to or acting for an agency within the Intelligence Community.
(d) Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities.
(e) Intelligence activities means all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.
(f) Intelligence Community and agencies within the Intelligence Community refer to the following agencies or organizations:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
(2) The National Security Agency (NSA);
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
(4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
(5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
(6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and
(7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(g) The National Foreign Intelligence Program includes the programs listed below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security Council and modification by the President:
(1) The programs of the CIA;
(2) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance, except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
(3) Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
(4) Activities of the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) Special activities means activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.
(i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.
3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as amended, entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," is revoked.
August 28, 2004 at 06:54 PM in CIA | Permalink | TrackBack (194) | Top of page | Blog Home
By Richard Owen in Rome
A documentary says Il Duce’s death was covered up because of incriminating letters from Britain’s wartime leader
BENITO MUSSOLINI was murdered by a two-man team led by a British secret agent acting on the orders of Winston Churchill, according to a new investigation.
In the official version, the Italian dictator and his final mistress, Clara Petacci, were shot by Italian partisans led by Walter Audisio — codenamed “Colonel Valerio” — at the gates of Villa Belmonte at Mezzegra near Lake Como at 4.10pm on April 28, 1945. Their bodies were then hung upside down in Milan.
But it is now suggested that this was cover-up, and that Mussolini and Petacci were really killed at 11am that day by Bruno Lonati, an Italian partisan codenamed “Giacomo”, and “Captain John”, a British Special Operations Executive agent of Sicilian parentage whose name was Robert Maccarrone.
An Italian state television documentary claims that Mussolini was carrying compromising letters from Churchill written over a period of years involving a deal under which Italy would make a separate peace with the Allies, a breach of Churchill’s agreement with President Roosevelt at Casablanca to seek the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers.
“Churchill, who like Mussolini was a life-long antiBolshevik, was looking ahead to the coming conflict with the Soviet Union,” Peter Tompkins, a veteran American journalist who coproduced the documentary, said. Some biographers of Mussolini deny that the secret correspondence existed.
But a number of letters have come to light, including Mussolini’s last letter, written on April 24, in which he pleads with Churchill to “intervene personally” and guarantee him “the chance to justify and defend myself”.
Signor Lonati, 83, a former Communist who became a Fiat manager after the war and now lives in Brescia, claims that “John” was sent to northern Italy with the specific aim of eliminating Mussolini and answered directly to General (later Field Marshal) Alexander.
“John” and Signor Lonati went together to the house where Il Duce and his mistress were being held after being captured by partisans near Dongo. When arrested, Mussolini was clutching a briefcase that he told his captors was “of historic importance for the future of Italy”.
Signor Lonati said: “Petacci was sitting on the bed and Mussolini was standing. John took me outside and told me his orders were to eliminate them both, because Petacci knew many things. I said I could not shoot Petacci, so John said he would shoot her. He was quite clear that Mussolini had to be killed by an Italian.”
He said that, when Mussolini stepped out to get some air, under guard, Petacci said with a sad smile: “So, it’s all over for us.” She asked them to shoot “at the chest, not the head”. At the corner of a lane leading down to the lake, less than a mile from Villa Belmonte, “John” and “Giacomo” stood their victims against a fence and opened fire.
Signor Lonati said: “Mussolini had a look of surprise on his face, but not Petacci.”
After the shootings, “John” took a camera from his knapsack and photographed the bodies, with Signor Lonati beside them. He had also referred to “very important documents” which he was ordered to recover from Il Duce.
Mr Tompkins, who coproduced the documentary with Maria Luisa Forenza, said that there was evidence that the photographs existed. “Lonati went to the British consulate in Milan in 1981,” he said. “The consul sat opposite Lonati with them, but said he needed authorisation to hand them over. Lonati received a letter from the consulate promising to get in touch, but never heard any more.”
Mr Tompkins, himself a secret agent for the Allies in occupied Rome in 1944, said that he had approached the British Embassy in Rome about the pictures. An embassy official “promised to see what he could do, but later apologetically said ‘no’. He did not say they did not exist”.
Signora Forenza said that Signor Lonati’s claims, first advanced ten years ago, had been greeted with scepticism “but we spent three years testing his account and find it completely convincing, with no discrepancies”.
By contrast, the official version of Mussolini’s death changed frequently and was “riddled with inconsistencies and lies”. This month, the French-made MAS submachinegun with which Mussolini was said to have been shot by Walter Audisio came to light in Albania. Signor Lonati said that he and “John” had used Sten guns.
The documentary by Rai, the Italian state television station. entitled Mussolini: The Final Truth, includes testimony from Dorina Mazzola, who was 19 at the time. She said that she heard the firing: “I looked at the clock, it was almost 11.”
She said that her mother, Giuseppina, who was in the garden, saw the shooting.
Partisans arrived soon after and took the bodies away, holding Mussolini up to make it look as if he was still alive, she said. The documentary says that partisans were later dressed as Mussolini and Petacci and driven to the gates of the Villa Belmonte, where the bodies were already laid out. “Colonel Valerio” and others then pretended to shoot them. Roberto Remund, who was at the scene, said that the bodies were “ unnaturally stiff and contorted” and that there was “very little blood”, suggesting that the killings had happened earlier.
The programme includes interviews with Claudio Ersoch, grandson of Tommaso David, Mussolini’s head of covert operations, who said that his grandfather confirmed that the correspondence existed and that Churchill had promised in it to restore to Italy lost territory such as Istria. The programme claims that postwar painting trips made by Churchill to the Italian lakes were a cover for efforts to retrieve the correspondence.
Christopher Woods, researcher for the official history of the SOE in Italy, disputed the suggestion that a British spy had led the assassination mission. He said: “It’s just love of conspiracy-making. The leaders of the Resistance in Milan, particularly the left-wing parties, decided that Mussolini should be killed before the Allies arrived.”
THE LAST DAYS OF WAR
Mussolini’s death in April 1945 came as the end of the Second World War was in sight and the Soviet Union and the West were already vying to shape the postwar world. Three days earlier talks to found the United Nations were held in San Francisco
When Il Duce was killed, Nazi Germany was crumbling and the remnants of Mussolini’s last Fascist regime at Salo on Lake Garda were fleeing
In March, US forces had crossed the Rhine, the first Nazi concentration camps were liberated and the race was on between the Allied armies and the Russians to enter Berlin. The Red Army won, flying the Red Flag in Berlin on April 21
Two days after Mussolini was killed, Hitler committed suicide with Eva Braun in his Berlin bunker. On May 7 Germany surrendered unconditionally and the next day was celebrated as Victory in Europe (VE) Day
The war in the Pacific continued but, in August, Truman, who became President in April after the death of Roosevelt, took the decision to use the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to the surrender of Japan
Despite his achievements as war leader, Churchill was defeated in the July 1945 election by the Labour Party led by Clement Attlee
Churchill returned to power in 1951 and served as Prime Minister for four years. He died in 1965
Copyright 2004 Times Newspapers Ltd.
August 27, 2004 at 11:48 PM in UK | Permalink | TrackBack (38) | Top of page | Blog Home
BBC NEWS | Europe | Italian troops 'to stay in Iraq'
Italy says it has no intention of withdrawing its 3,000 troops from Iraq in the face of demands from kidnappers who have seized an Italian journalist.
The government says it is committed to securing the release of the journalist, Enzo Baldoni, but the Italian presence in Iraq would continue.
Earlier, the Arabic television channel, al-Jazeera, broadcast a video appearing to show Mr Baldoni.
His kidnappers demanded that Italy pull its forces out of Iraq within 48 hours.
'Maintain commitments'
"We are committed to obtaining the freedom of Mr Baldoni," Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's office said in a statement.
"We will do so while maintaining the commitments made to the Iraqi provisional government," the government said.
A group calling itself the Islamic Army in Iraq says it is holding the journalist.
In a statement to the Qatar-based television station, the group said that it "could not guarantee the Italian's safety... if Italy does not respond within 48 hours with a decision to withdraw its troops from Iraqi territories", Reuters news agency reported.
In the video, broadcast on Tuesday, a man identifying himself as Enzo Baldoni says he is a journalist and Red Cross volunteer who came to Iraq to write about the resistance.
Mr Baldoni has been missing since Thursday.
His driver-interpreter was apparently found dead on Saturday and Italian newspapers have said the two were probably caught in an ambush between Baghdad and Najaf.
The whereabouts of another two French journalists remains a mystery.
Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot have not been heard of since Friday.
US journalist Micah Garen was freed on Sunday by an Iraqi group who had held him hostage in the southern city of Nasiriya.
August 24, 2004 at 09:24 PM in Al Qaeda | Permalink | TrackBack (24) | Top of page | Blog Home
Private Moments in the Public Eye
By Peter H. King, Times Staff Writer
A full year had passed and it was time for a final visit to the Muslims of Las Vegas. April to April, spring to spring, the world had coughed up one arresting image after another, from the fire-streaked thunderclouds of shock and awe to the charred body parts of Americans dangling from a bridge in Iraq.
And every day, it seemed, a fresh body count from the war — one, two, three more Americans dead. And every month or so, another front-page picture of rubble and ripped limbs, another dateline marking the latest large-scale terrorist assault — Riyadh, Casablanca, Jakarta, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid.
While these calamitous events translated into more unease, more muttered comments from co-workers, more hard looks in airports, they were not, in fact, the touchstone moments by which Las Vegas Muslims measured the previous 12 months.
Rather, like people everywhere, the landmarks they looked back on tended to involve the universal turns of everyday life: a death in the family, a business venture gone bust, a child who made the honor roll, a new house, a memorable trip.
Muhammad Ali, the car lot philosopher who had suggested that heightened scrutiny of Muslims since Sept. 11 was only natural — "If you are bitten by a snake, you are going to be afraid of a rope" — did not seem himself as he sat down in his tiny office off the showroom floor.
He had proved over the course of many conversations to be a man of good humor and wit. At home one Sunday, he had punctuated a family discussion about patriarchal customs by breaking into an Archie Bunker impersonation. At the lot, he had laughed along with colleagues when they warned customers that, if they didn't buy a truck, "Muhammad will light his shoe."
On this April afternoon, however, he seemed subdued.
"A lot has happened," he said.
Two months earlier he had made a trip to Pakistan to visit his 90-year-old mother. At McCarran International Airport here, a snag had developed. As other passengers filed aboard the jetliner, Ali was held back. Twenty minutes passed.
"What is taking so long?" he asked.
"We have to get your clearance from Washington," he was told.
Ali, an Air Force veteran of the Vietnam War, was receiving the rope treatment. His reaction?
"It worked both ways. It was kind of …" He began to grope for the right words. "You feel, uh, degraded, you know, that they want to check you out. The other side is that, you know, some Muslim people with the name of Muhammad did it." He meant the Sept. 11 hijackings and attacks. "And I don't want that my plane should go down too."
At the opposite end of his flight, Ali arrived at the family home in Lahore and was greeted by his sister. A nurse was dressing his mother, whom he had not seen in a dozen years.
"Just give us some time," his sister told him, "and I'll call you in."
A few minutes passed. There was a commotion. Someone scurried to a neighboring house and brought back a doctor. She disappeared into his mother's room for a moment and then approached Ali.
"Your mother died," she told him.
He had been home for 10 minutes.
"I never even said hi," he said.
August 22, 2004 at 08:16 AM in Muslim background | Permalink | TrackBack (5) | Top of page | Blog Home
Their Spiritual Thirst Found a Desert Spring
By Peter H. King, Times Staff Writer
One grew up on a farm in Pakistan, the other was a child of Detroit. One was born into Islam, the other was brought up a Baptist. From these disparate starting points, Iqbal Khan and Mustafa Yunis Richards set out as young men to explore the most fundamental questions of faith.
They took different paths. One wandered the world as a seaman, the other bounced from one belief system to the next. In the end, oddly enough, both wound up here, working in the casinos of Las Vegas, praying in the city's mosques — strangers to each other, but in spirit the closest of travel companions.
"I wanted to find all the truths," said Khan, a 53-year-old security guard at the Main Street Casino. "I wanted to see all the holy places. Growing up in Muslim society, I was kept like in a cave, in life's cave, even though I was from a very educated family. It's a cave that had no information from the outside: What's right? What's wrong? How can you verify?"
For years Khan toiled in the engine rooms of commercial ships that supplied U.S. military bases overseas. On shore leave he would hunt for used books on history and religion and make visits to the landmark shrines of all faiths. While at sea he studied the texts and also taught himself languages — German, Greek, Arabic — preparing to converse with people he encountered at ports of call.
"I checked everything," he said. "I talked to people. I learned about humans. I learned about their livings, their religions, how they act. I started going to churches. I went to synagogues. I learned about Catholics, about Orthodox, Protestants. All of that."
He frowned.
"I still don't know a lot about Mormons."
Richards, a soft-spoken, 52-year-old black man, worked as a bellhop at the Imperial Palace hotel and casino on the Strip until circulatory disease forced him into early retirement a few years ago. He has been a practicing Muslim for a decade, the last leg of a journey that began in his late teens with a visit to a Detroit synagogue.
Richards was a physical presence back then, weighing a well-muscled 215 pounds. As he stepped into the doorway, the rabbi thrust his hands into the air, as if expecting to be robbed.
"What do you want?" he asked.
"I want," the 18-year-old replied, "to learn about the Jewish religion."
For the next three years Richards studied Judaism. Though there was much he admired about the religion, he said, "I recognized fairly early on that it was not really an embracing moment." He moved on.
Over the next several years, he would spend time with Episcopalians in Boston, with Mormons in upstate New York, with followers of the Nation of Islam on the streets of New York City. He read the Greek philosophers, studied Hinduism, Taoism.
"I went to a weekend retreat, a Catholic retreat," he said, describing a typical leap of faith in his low-key, laconic way, "and that lasted for about six weeks."
Richards had wed young, and his wife could not understand his spiritual wanderlust. In time, it cost him his marriage. He knew what was driving him, but it was difficult conveying it to others: "Back and forth, back and forth. I studied a lot of different religions looking for the same thing — understanding. I wanted to understand God. For some reason, understanding God became very important to me.
"But it wasn't something I could talk about, because when you started talking to people about God, they'd think you were nuts. That would kill any conversation."
He remarried and moved to Las Vegas. It was here that he entered his numerology phase, tutored by a gambler who persuaded him that numbers clustered in predictable patterns — a valuable theory, if workable, at the slots and blackjack tables.
One day Richards dropped into a bookstore and spotted an English translation of the Koran, the sacred book of Islam.
"I'd read everything else," he said. "And so I said, well, I'll go ahead and read the Koran."
He took the book home and put it on a shelf. A few days later he picked it up and began to read.
"By the time I had finished reading that day," he recalled, "I said, 'This is what I've been looking for my whole life.' "
August 22, 2004 at 08:15 AM in Muslim background | Permalink | TrackBack (8) | Top of page | Blog Home
Still Living in the Shadow of a September Day
By Peter H. King, Times Staff Writer
LAS VEGAS — Late one weeknight in the middle of last summer, Khalid Khan, a stalwart among Las Vegas Muslims, sat in his living room with his daughter, a law student, discussing Islam in America, clashes between culture and religion, and the tensions large and small stirred by the terrorist strikes of Sept. 11.
As president of the Islamic Society of Nevada, it was Khan's task to maintain contact with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, to build their trust and talk them down should they overreact to dubious tips about specific Muslims.
"They have been honest with me," he said of his FBI contacts. "They told me: 'Mr. Khan, try to understand our situation. Before 9/11, our job was to solve a crime. When there was a crime committed, we would be assigned to solve it. Now they are saying to us, there might be a crime that might be committed, and you go find it.' "
On first impression, Khan had seemed a stern, humorless fellow. His textile company supplies sheets to large hotels on the Strip, and in an introductory interview a few months earlier he had been asked, in a feeble attempt at jocularity, if he ever thought about what transpired on all that linen.
"That," he had replied with a frown, "is something we never think about."
Now, though, as his visitor stood to leave, the interview completed, Khan gestured to the sofa and said, "Wait, I have to tell you a joke."
Everybody sat back down. Khan leaned forward, eyes bright, voice low, almost a whisper.
"You know," he began, deadpan, "that in Islam we believe in angels. We believe that, after death, the person has to go into the ground and an angel comes and asks three questions. Who was your God? Who was your prophet? And what was your book? The right answers are: There is only one God, Muhammad is the prophet, and the book is the Koran.
"So then this Muslim died. And the angel came and said, 'Who is your God?' And the Muslim answered, 'President Bush.' 'Who is your prophet?' 'John Ashcroft.' 'What is your book?' 'The Patriot Act.' The angel was really confused by these answers. He went back to God and said, 'Look, I found one person who has some really strange answers I have never heard.' And God said: 'Bring him to me. I'll ask him the questions.' "
Now, standing before the obviously true God — Allah, in Arabic — the Muslim answered the questions again, this time giving the proper Islamic responses. But why, God wanted to know, hadn't the fellow done this the first time, why all this business about Bush, Ashcroft and the Patriot Act?
Khan paused a beat, smiling in anticipation of the punch line:
"Because, Allah, I thought the angel was an FBI agent."
August 22, 2004 at 08:14 AM in Muslim background | Permalink | TrackBack (10) | Top of page | Blog Home
Islam and How to Live It: One Faith, Many Beliefs
By Peter H. King, Times Staff Writer
LAS VEGAS — Friday afternoon prayers at the mosques of Las Vegas tend to draw late-arriving crowds. The ritual call to prayer has been recited, the weekly sermon has been launched, and still the stragglers stream in, kicking off their shoes and scurrying to find a place on the prayer rug.
Nobody seems to take much notice. Nonetheless, Muslim worshipers who show up after the Islamic equivalent of the first pitch do forfeit an opportunity for enhanced reward in the afterlife.
"There is a tradition," said Zafar A. Anjum, imam at the Jama Masjid mosque on Desert Inn Road, "that on Fridays angels come to the door of the mosque and make records. The one who comes in first, Allah gives him a reward equal to that person who sacrifices the camel, and who gives away the meat of the camel as a charity."
The second Muslim, Anjum went on, receives the same reward as one who has sacrificed and donated a cow, the third a goat, the fourth a chicken, and so on down the sacrificial food chain. The last to arrive on time for prayers earns a chit for paradise equivalent to that of giving away an egg.
"After that," he said, "when the speeches start, these angels close their records, the books. Those who come after that, their names are not written. They don't get any rewards."
In the course of a year of visits, Las Vegas Muslims would prove to be passionate instructors in the intricacies of Islam. They would weigh in, when asked, on the war, geopolitics and terrorism. What seemed to animate them most, however, were questions that got to the heart of what it meant to be a Muslim.
Their thoughts on the afterlife, on arranged marriages, on traditional Islamic dress, on dream interpretation and beards and angels — whatever the topic, most did their best to tackle it. The tutorials were given in the entry halls and parking lots of mosques, around dinner tables, in office conference rooms and, late one night last July, from behind the wheel of Muhammad Hayat's well-worn Mercedes-Benz.
"This is Islam," Hayat, a clothes salesman originally from Morocco, was saying. "This is the work of the prophet."
He and another Muslim man were headed to the mosque for final evening prayers after making a call on a widow and her five children. The family, newly arrived from Afghanistan, lived in a small apartment outside the city. The mother spoke little English, and the oldest boy in the room, a 10-year-old who had picked up the language in school, acted as host. He laid out a plastic tea set on the rug and, explaining that there was no tea in the house, offered the visitors tap water.
Are you all still making your daily prayers at home? Hayat asked the boy.
"Some days," he said.
With her son serving as interpreter, the mother said she had been looking for work at the casino hotels as a maid. In the meantime, her oldest boy, a teenager asleep in the next room, was supporting the family as a roofer — not the softest of jobs in a Las Vegas summer.
"They don't know too much about American culture," Hayat said of the family. He was back in his car and rolling down a slight grade on the Boulder Highway. The lights of the city were spread out below. "But day to day, basically, they survive. All they need is two or three more breadwinners."
The excursion was part of a weekly effort to reach out to others who had been missing at prayers or who perhaps had fallen into some difficulty. The purpose of the visit, Hayat said, was simply to offer a measure of moral support, "to maybe put a smile on their faces."
"This, little as it is, makes a difference. This is Islam. Islam is not a matter of worship. You go out of your way for other people the best way you can. How you worship, and what you say when you worship, that is something up to you."
Outside the car window, lighted billboards flashed by, one after another, hawking $7.99 prime rib, loose slots, looser women. Hayat seemed to notice none of it. He talked rapidly over his shoulder as he drove, teaching:
"A Muslim is somebody who submits his life to the will of Allah in the best way he can. Meaning you try to live your life according to what Allah wants. Of course you are not going to be 100% successful, but at least you try as hard as you can…. Islam is not race. It's not only for the Arabic-speaking people. No. Islam is the complete religion, the last religion. After this, there is the meeting with Allah.
"And everything in this world, everything in this life" — he waved a hand across the window — "is the proof of the existence of the Allah. Nothing here can be created with the human being by chance, like this." He clicked his fingers, and as he did so, the car happened to pass Sam's Town, a casino-hotel ablaze with flashing lights.
Does that everything include Sam's Town? a passenger ventured from the back seat.
The rearview mirror reflected Hayat's thin smile.
"Well," he said, "this is another thing."
August 22, 2004 at 08:12 AM in Muslim background | Permalink | TrackBack (11) | Top of page | Blog Home
A Straight Path Through Sin City
By Peter H. King, Times Staff Writer
LAS VEGAS — There must be easier places for a Muslim to follow the straight path to paradise. Islam forbids gambling, alcohol, public nudity, fornication. Las Vegas banks on them, promoting its Sin City reputation as vigorously as Southern California boosters once pitched sunshine and oranges.
"What happens here, stays here," winks the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority in a national advertising campaign. The cityscape is awash in straightforward invitations to adult frolic. Seminude vixens beckon from freeway billboards, taxicab placards and newspaper racks, taking seductive bites out of apples, coiling themselves around serpents, posing seven across, hip to bare hip, buttocks flexed.
What's a good Muslim to do?
"Lower your gaze," an imam intoned in his sermon, or khutbah, before prayers one Friday last spring. "Especially you young brothers. Out there" -- he pointed vaguely in the direction of the Strip -- "you must lower your gaze."
There are about 10,000 Muslims in Las Vegas, and they come from all over. In the mosques on any Friday, one can find well-to-do doctors from the Indian subcontinent, barrel-chested circus tumblers from Tangier, cabdrivers from Compton, war widows from Kabul.
Mobina Nabi stood at the edge of a celebration taking place outside a mosque on Desert Inn Road. This was in mid-November, at the close of the month of fasting and reflection known as Ramadan. Over the happy squeals of children, Nabi described how a decade earlier her family had been torn from a comfortable existence in Afghanistan.
"The Taliban come one night," the 38-year-old recalled, her two school-age children listening at her side. "They are crazy. Crazy people. My husband was a pilot. They don't like him. They kill him. Like this."
Nabi slashed a finger across her throat. And then, with an expression that conveyed something like disbelief, she repeated the gesture, twice.
These are awkward times for the people of Islam here and across America. The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent military campaigns in the predominantly Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq have brought new uncertainties and complications to everyday life.
Many perceive that their loyalty has come under question, their American welcome suspended, if not revoked. Sometimes this message arrives in overt ways -- an unannounced visit from FBI agents, an anti-Muslim epithet scrawled inside a portable toilet at the mosque. More often it takes subtler forms -- a long stare from a stranger on an airplane, a clicking sound on the telephone that might or might not mean a law enforcement eavesdropper has come on the line.
"Did you hear that?" asked Aziz Eddebbarh, a hydraulic engineer who serves as a liaison of sorts between Las Vegas Muslims and the rest of the city, midway through what had been a rather innocuous telephone conversation about the Islamic calendar.
"What?"
"Those clicks. Look, can you call me back at my other number? Do you understand?"
August 22, 2004 at 08:11 AM in Muslim background | Permalink | TrackBack (24) | Top of page | Blog Home
Anyone who has a low opinion of Tony Blair and John Prescott ought to have been absolutely delighted by their embarrassing public denunciation by Rose and Maxine Gentle last week.
Gentle and her daughter are in mourning for Fusilier Gordon Gentle of the Royal Highland Fusiliers, their son and brother, who died when he was only 19 on the day the American coalition handed over sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government. He was blown up by a roadside bomb in Basra after serving only three months in the army.
Mother and daughter went to Downing Street where they were received not by the prime minister, who is busy on his lamentable holiday jaunts, but by our deputy prime minister — he of the white-water rescue that wasn’t — to express their anger at Gordon’s death and their demand that Blair should resign. They made various other angry accusations and in the end walked out on Prescott in contempt.
That seems to me entirely reasonable in itself. The Gentles are and ought to be free to make their feelings known like any other citizen. But when they were interviewed on the BBC’s Today programme on Friday in the prime political slot at 8.10am, demanding that our troops should be pulled out of Iraq, I found that I was angry.
This was a classic example of the contemporary infantilisation of public debate — a deliberate emphasis on personal feelings rather than on rational, dispassionate adult argument, on the assumption that, like infants, we the public are not mature enough to respond beyond personal feeling and can’t be expected to. This is convenient commercially since the infantile corresponds so closely to the sensational, and there are megabucks to be made out of all that sensational emoting.
There is probably little that one can or should do to stop the independent media capitalising on this or splashing such personal, emotional responses, and it would be a bad day for Britain if protests like the Gentles’ were not aired widely.
But for a public service broadcaster and an influential, reputable political programme such as Today to splash such personal emotion across the airwaves as if it amounted to serious debate is another matter. The BBC should not be taking part in this infantilisation of the listener, least of all when exploiting the bereaved at the same time. It should be a bulwark against the trivialisation of public discourse.
The terrible grief of the Gentles and their understandable anger have no bearing on the rights and the wrongs of the invasion of Iraq or the deployment of troops.
Their dreadful personal loss does not give them any special insight into what is going on in Iraq and certainly no insight that they did not have before Gordon died or that families of surviving soldiers in his regiment do not have. They are entitled to their views but you can be absolutely sure that if Gordon had not died, his mother and sister would have been of no public interest whatsoever. As it is, they teach us nothing.
The death of even one soldier is, of course, terrible. Everyone thinks so. But it can make no difference to my view or yours about the current complexities
in Iraq or about the invasion.
The BBC should have had nothing to do with the Gentles, especially as it seems that they may have links with anti-war lobbyists, who may perhaps be exploiting them as well.
The Gentles’ Today interview is a glaring example of the infantilisation of debate, but it is only one of many. The massacre at Dunblane produced plenty, for instance. As soon as media sharks had arrived, in their feeding frenzy they began asking the shocked inhabitants — in almost the same breath — both for their feelings and for their views on gun control.
This was our media at their contemporary worst. For obviously enough there is no special reason to suppose that a particular person in the street has any well-considered views at all on gun control, or on anything else, merely because a sensational shooting has just taken place that has probably profoundly disturbed them.
And equally obviously a person who is probably in deep shock is hardly in the best state to give her views at all, well considered or otherwise. It was not only a failure of human kindness to ask them; it was a serious intellectual mistake and one that has been rapidly creeping up on public argument.
In serious argument you cannot generalise from the particular. That used to be an old chestnut of school philosophy lessons: you cannot extrapolate from one instance or from one personal experience, and most particularly not from one unusual experience. That was why in the bad old days women had such a poor reputation for intellectual rigour. It was believed that women argued purely personally, from personal experience.
Whether that was fair to women, the objection was reasonable enough in itself. It is unsound to generalise from your own limited personal experience, for obvious reasons. But these days, I suspect, the reasons may no longer be so obvious, if only because of the dumbing down of general education.
Judging from last week’s reports about A-levels, I wonder whether more than a minority of A-star students would know the meaning of the word “extrapolate”.
With all due respect to my sex, I have long suspected that the dumbing down of the media has also, in part at least, been due to the feminisation of the media, following the increasing power of women generally and of feminists in the media.
Sixties feminists came up with the slogan “the personal is the political”. This was entirely understandable because for so long personal feelings had been too much repressed in western culture, privately, publicly and politically. But with feminism came an extreme overreaction and today the personal is hugely overemphasised.
It has almost reached the point where if you do not have direct personal experience of something, you may be considered unqualified to speak about it, no matter how much expertise you may have. Contrariwise, a person who does have direct personal experience of something, however uninformed, inexpert or unqualified she may be otherwise, will be listened to seriously.
For instance, on the subject of disability I have various views that are far from politically correct and I occasionally speak publicly about them. I might well expect to be silenced or at least hissed. But because I have the standard required personal experience — a close family member has a disability — my views (which have nothing at all to do with her disability) are always tolerated.
Such are the absurd consequences of the touchy-feely approach to argument. But it isn’t funny. It is dangerous because this anti-rational approach has quickly come to dominate public argument.
Curiously enough it is not just a failure of intellectual discipline. By an odd paradox this emphasis on emotion quite often involves a failure of proper emotional discipline, too, as in the response to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales and, in its different way, the Today programme’s exploitation of the grieving Gentles.
Copyright 2004 Times Newspapers Ltd.
August 22, 2004 at 01:26 AM in Current Terrorism | Permalink | TrackBack (13) | Top of page | Blog Home
Even before his squalid death in 1967, Che Guevara was the face that launched a thousand beards. By burying his bullet-riddled body in a secret place, Bolivian army officers hoped the myth of the charismatic Argentine revolutionary would end. Instead, it spiralled out of control, his image becoming the ultimate icon of youthful revolt on a billion posters.
His executioners would have been astonished if they knew that 37 years later Guevara’s immortality is being burnished in an acclaimed road movie, The Motorcycle Diaries, which brings to life his vivid journals of the epic journey he took across South America as a young man. The slogan “Che vive” — “Che lives” — seems to be as true as ever.
The film, directed by Walter Salles and released later this month, is a cross between Jack Kerouac in the Amazon and Easy Rider in the Andes. Unburdened by the ideology that would turn him into Fidel Castro’s zealous lieutenant in the “liberation” of Cuba, the 23-year-old Ernesto Guevara sets off with his older buddy on a Norton 500 named La Poderosa (the Mighty One) on a jaunt of wine, women and song that becomes a life-changing odyssey around Chile, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela.
Here are the beguiling elements that make Guevara more potent in death than he was in life — the handsome visage and insouciant air that made him irresistible to women, his self-belief and fearlessness overlaid by intimations of the early death that would turn him into a martyr for left-wing movements worldwide.
There is no hint of the firing squads that Guevara would command, the concentration camps he would establish, his intolerance of failings among the common people he professed to love or his failure to export the Cuban revolution to the Congo and Bolivia. These blemishes have been airbrushed from his romantic image which became the message on everything from protest banners and T-shirts to skis and watches.
Che sells and he still stirs, but why? His famous portrait — beret askew and gaze focused on a distant horizon — makes him the embodiment of idealistic longing for succeeding generations. For little-travelled “political pilgrims”, once encouraged to believe that Albania or Mao’s China were the perfect societies, Guevara symbolises the purity of political commitment in far-off lands that contrasts with the decadence of their own societies.
History is not so kind. His ideological heritage has suffered wholesale rejection, just as Cuba’s revolution stutters, purveying Che mementos for tourist dollars.
Hugh Thomas, the most eminent historian of Cuba, is blunt: “He dignified the idea of violence to an unacceptable degree. He said that in Latin America he hoped there would be 10 or 20 Vietnams; that was wholly irresponsible. For about 20 years his idea of violent revolution was thought of as a possible way forward.”
Who was the man behind the trademark beret and cigar? The eldest of five children, he was christened Ernesto Guevara de la Serna in 1928 at Rosario, an Argentine river port. His father, Ernesto Guevara Lynch de la Serna, could boast of noble Spanish and Irish ancestors, but most of the family fortune was lost and he became a planter of mate, a herbal tea. But his wife, Celia, was an Argentine blue blood.
The nickname “Che” would come later — his greeting to friends, meaning “Hey you” in Guarani. As a youngster he was dubbed “Baldy”, a comment on his close-cropped hair. But it was his chronic asthma that defined his childhood, forcing the family to move to the dry climate of Alta Gracia, a small spa town near Cordoba.
Unable to attend school until he was nine years old, he was tutored by his mother at home, creating a bond that continued in Guevara’s soul-baring correspondence until her death in 1965. Often confined to bed, he read voraciously and learnt to play chess with his father.
In healthy spells he played sport including rugby, learnt to ride and shoot, swam in the local streams and was given flying lessons by his uncle. He finally attended school where his headmistress, Elba Rossi de Oviedo Zelaya, recalled him as “a mischievous, bright boy”, undistinguished in class but with “leadership qualities”. He was a show-off, drinking ink from a bottle and eating chalk in class to get attention.
At 14 his sexual initiation was arranged by friends who supplied a household maid. They watched through a keyhole, giggling when he interrupted his coupling to take his asthma medicine.
In 1947 he went to study medicine at the University of Buenos Aires, dreaming of becoming “a famous investigator” who would benefit mankind with medical discoveries. He already stood out from his peers, rejecting their impeccable dress in favour of grimy windbreakers and cheap shoes.
Three years later he set off on a motorised bicycle into Argentina’s interior in the first of several trips that would culminate in his epic “diaries” journey with his friend Alberto Granado in 1952. Many of their exploits were hilarious. They were consummate freeloaders, shamelessly begging food and hospitality. One night, hearing a scratching at the door, Guevara fired his father’s Smith & Wesson at what he thought was a jaguar, only to discover the next morning that he had shot his host’s pet alsatian.
The wretchedness and poverty they encountered made a deep impression. Returning to Argentina he recorded in his diary: “The person who wrote these notes died upon stepping once again onto Argentinian soil.”
After graduating in 1953 as a doctor he went to Guatemala, where the overthrow of its progressive leftist government in a CIA-backed coup convinced him that social progress was impossible without violent revolution. By the mid-1950s he was a Marxist and married to Hilda Gadea, an exiled Peruvian militant, with whom he had a daughter.
In 1956 he met Castro, who was looking for a doctor to tend his tiny guerrilla force. “A young Cuban leader has asked me to join the armed liberation movement of his country and, of course, I have accepted,” Guevara wrote to his father from Mexico City.
Eighty men sailed to Cuba’s Oriente province in November 1956. “It wasn’t a landing,” Guevara wrote later. “It was a shipwreck.”
Superficially wounded in the neck but believing it to be fatal, he pondered “the best way to die”. But far from dying, Guevara became a courageous guerrilla leader and his unit of 220 men spearheaded the final attack that caused the dictator Fulgencio Batista to flee.
Castro and Guevara had much in common. They were sexually voracious, contemptuous of homosexuals and identified America as the enemy. Castro appointed him supreme prosecutor in charge of the “cleansing commission” that exacted justice on “war criminals”. He sent dozens before firing squads, shocking friends with his mercilessness. “Either you kill first or else you get killed,” he said unconvincingly.
The photograph that immortalised him was taken by Alberto Korda, a Cuban photographer who was struck by his “absolute look of steely defiance” at a memorial service for victims of an explosion on March 5, 1960. “I managed to shoot two frames and then he was gone,” said Korda, whose refusal to collect royalties for the picture helped its dissemination.
Guevara served briefly as minister of industry and president of the National Bank of Cuba. Having split with Gadea, he married Aleida March de la Torre, with whom he had another four children. But he was growing restless and in 1965 he led a covert and unsuccessful Cuban intervention in the civil war in the former Belgian Congo, from which he was evacuated sick with asthma and dysentery.
He emerged the following year in Bolivia to spread the revolution. Guevara’s Argentine cockiness was resented by many Bolivian peasants, who rejected his revolution. Dishevelled and defeated, he was caught near the village of Vallegrande. He was tied up, shot four times, then laid on a slab and photographed to prove he was dead.
“Many think of me as an adventurer,” Guevara had written to his parents, “and I am one, but of a different type, those who risk their skin to prove their truths.”
Thirty years later Che’s grave was discovered and his body was transferred to Cuba, where the revolutionary was laid to rest with great state pomp.
With time the details of Che’s life and suicidal missions have blurred. Ultimately it is his image that remains and fascinates.
August 22, 2004 at 01:25 AM in Cold War | Permalink | TrackBack (133) | Top of page | Blog Home
Yahoo! News - Rumsfeld Cautions on Intelligence Reform
By JESSE J. HOLLAND, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld struck a cautious tone Tuesday on the need for a national intelligence director, saying any changes should not create new barriers between war fighters and agencies that collect intelligence.
As the Senate Armed Services Committee (news - web sites) considered intelligence reform, acting CIA (news - web sites) Director John McLaughlin also said he — personally — would support giving the proposed national intelligence director the authority to control the foreign intelligence elements of a national intelligence budget believed to be in the $40 billion range.
That would give the proposed director intragency spending control over huge swaths of the country's intelligence network, including the Defense Dep