FT.com / Comment & analysis / Editorial comment
Published: June 1 2004 5:00 | Last Updated: June 1 2004 5:00
Saturday's devastating attack on expatriate enclaves on Saudi Arabia's east coast has exposed gaps in the kingdom's security as well as raising doubts about its stability. Plainly, the tactics of al-Qaeda are to stampede westerners out of Saudi Arabia, and to destabilise oil markets by targeting soft but neuralgic parts of the Saudi oil industry. Its strategy, enunciated last week by Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, the terrorist group's presumed chief in the kingdom, is to trigger an uprising to overthrow the ruling House of Saud. Can the insurgents succeed?
The security record against the Islamists is patchy. That is because it took Saudi rulers a long time to acknowledge that al-Qaeda was their problem too, and also because elements in the regime and allied clerics share the same hostility as Osama bin Laden towards the west and to Muslims who do not share their Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. Following the government's robust response to suicide bombings in the past year, moreover, the Islamists have switched tactics. Faced with defensive barriers against car bombs, they have used gunmen to strike twice in the past month at inadequately protected enclaves of foreign oil contractors. The kingdom's vast oil infrastructure is well defended, and at no point have crude exports ceased to flow. Short of a spectacular attack of 9/11 scale, there is little reason to suppose that will change. But a thorough overhaul of security measures for personnel is urgently needed.
But security, although vital, is not enough to ensure stability. That requires reform. And while history provides plenty of examples of the dangers to absolutist regimes of attempting to reform, only that will ensure the long-term survival of the al-Saud.
As things stand, Saudi Arabia provides near laboratory conditions to incubate thousands of bin Ladens. The oil-dominated economy produces few jobs to employ a fast-growing, restless population. Neo-central planning inhibits investment, while getting Saudis into jobs now occupied by millions of foreigners raises costs because locals get paid, on average, three times more. School textbooks drip with religious bigotry, while technology exposes Saudis to the full blast of modernity. The stultifying control of the mosque and political grip of the security services underpin a bloated monarchy.
To prevent these challenges combining into a perfect storm, Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler, has pledged reforms ranging from partial elections to tighter financial controls. He should now implement them, even if it is unrealistic to expect his family to do other than tightly manage a very gradual process of change.
Reform to the House of Saud means the minimum it can get away with, consistent with preserving its power. But it could do worse than heed the advice of the prince in Lampedusa's The Leopard: to "change everything just a little so as to keep everything exactly the same".
May 31, 2004 at 10:33 PM in Middle East | Permalink | TrackBack (143) | Top of page | Blog Home